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  1. [author unknown], .
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  2. Pedro Amaral, Humanities and the Idea of a Person in the 22nd Century: Kant, Descartes, Sellars.
    Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already taken over, (...)
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  3. Karl Ameriks (1997). Kant and the Self: A Retrospective. In David Klemm and Zöller (ed.), Figuring the Self. Suny Press 55--72.
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  4. Richard E. Aquila (1997). Self as Matter and Form: Some Reflections on Kant’s View of the Soul. In David Klemm and Zöller (ed.), Figuring the Self. SUNY Press
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  5. Ralf M. Bader (2013). Self-Knowledge in § 7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter 531-540.
    Kant's claim that time is a subjective form of intuition was first proposed in his Inaugural Dissertation. This view was immediately criticised by Schultz, Lambert and Mendelssohn. Their criticisms are based on the claim that representations change which implies that change is real. From the reality of change they then argue to the reality of time, which undermines its supposed status as a subjective form of intuition that only applies to appearances. Kant took these criticisms very seriously and attempted to (...)
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  6. Nikunja Vihari Banerjee (1974). Kant's Philosophy of the Self. Arnold-Heinemann Publishers.
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  7. Nathan Bauer (2012). A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception. Inquiry 55 (3):215-237.
    Abstract Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant's account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant's tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the (...)
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  8. Sébastien Billioud (2006). Mou Zongsan's Problem with the Heideggerian Interpretation of Kant. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33 (2):225–247.
    The article elucidates the modern Chinese philosopher Mou Zongsan's relation to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. It postulates that Mou's appropriation of Immanuel Kant to build up his metaphysical system encountered one real obstacle, which was Heidegger's interpretation of the "Critique of Pure Reason" in the "Kantbuch." Heidegger and Mou both link their conceptions of the Self with understandings of ontology which are totally incompatible.
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  9. Matthew Boyle (forthcoming). Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness. Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
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  10. Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
    I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is (...)
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  11. Daniel Breazeale (2008). Review: Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel. Lectures on German Idealism. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 330-331.
    As the author explains, the title of this work is intended to distinguish it from ordinary, Whiggish accounts of the development of German philosophy “from Kant to Hegel.” Instead, Heinrich treats the positions of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel as potentially viable alternatives, none of which must be viewed as aufgehoben by those that followed, and all of which deserve reconsideration by contemporary philosophers.Dieter Henrich is known for two things: first, for championing a minutely-detailed, revisionist approach to the history of post-Kantian (...)
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  12. Andrew Brook, Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  13. Andrew Brook (1997). Unity of Consciousness and Other Mental Unities. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Ablex Press
    Though there has been a huge resurgence of interest in consciousness in the past decade, little attention has been paid to what the philosopher Immanuel Kant and others call the unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness takes different forms, as we will see, but the general idea is that each of us is aware of many things in the world at the same time, and often many of one's own mental states and of oneself as their single common subject, (...)
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  14. Andrew Brook (1994). Kant and the Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    Kant made a number of highly original discoveries about the mind - about its ability to synthesise a single, coherent representation of self and world, about the unity it must have to do so, and about the mind's awareness of itself and the semantic apparatus it uses to achieve this awareness. The past fifty years have seen intense activity in research on human cognition. Even so, Kant's discoveries have not been superseded, and some of them have not even been assimilated (...)
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  15. David Carr (1977). Kant, Husserl, and the Nonempirical Ego. Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):682-690.
  16. Quassim Cassam (1993). Inner Sense, Body Sense, and Kant's "Refutation of Idealism". European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):111-127.
  17. Quassim Cassam (1989). Kant and Reductionism. Review of Metaphysics 43 (September):72-106.
  18. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1988). Metaphysical Internalism, Selves, and the Invisible Noumenon (A Frego-Kantian Reflection on Descartes's Cogito). Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):129-144.
  19. Andrew Chignell (2010). Causal Refutations of Idealism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):487-507.
    In the ‘Refutation of Idealism’ chapter of the first Critique, Kant argues that the conditions required for having certain kinds of mental episodes are sufficient to guarantee that there are ‘objects in space’ outside us. A perennially influential way of reading this compressed argument is as a kind of causal inference: in order for us to make justified judgements about the order of our inner states, those states must be caused by the successive states of objects in space outside us. (...)
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  20. Andrew Chignell (2004). Review: Glock (Ed.), Strawson and Kant. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (8).
  21. Mark T. Conard (1994). Allison's Reading of Kant's Paradox of Inner Sense. Philosophy Today 38 (3-4):317-325.
  22. D. R. Cousin (1958). Kant on the Self. Kant-Studien 49 (1-4):25-35.
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  23. Theodore di Maria Jr (2009). Is Kant's Theoretical Doctrine of the Self Consistent with His Thesis of Noumenal Ignorance? International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):25-40.
    The relation between the concepts of the subject of apperception, the phenomenal self, and the noumenal self has long puzzled commentators on Kant’s theoretical account of the self. This paper argues that many of the puzzles surrounding Kant’s account can be resolved by treating the subject of apperception and other transcendental predicates of thinking as a dimension of the noumenal self. Yet this interpretation requires a clarification of how the transcendental predicates of thinking can be attributed to the noumenal self (...)
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  24. Theodore Di Maria Jr (2002). Kant's View of the Self In the First Critique. Idealistic Studies 32 (3):191-202.
    In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Henry Allison argues that Kant’s theoretical treatment of the self presents both an incoherent “official view” and a coherent “alternative view.” In this paper, I argue that Kant’s genuine position on the self can be reconstructed as a coherent unity by examining the flaws in Allison’s analysis. It is shown that Allison’s objections to Kant’s official view are based on unwarranted metaphysical assumptions and unjustified conceptual identifications. Allison’s own dual-aspect view of the transcendental distinction between phenomena (...)
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  25. Theodore Di Maria Jr (2002). Kant's View of the Self In the First Critique. Idealistic Studies 32 (3):191-202.
    In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Henry Allison argues that Kant’s theoretical treatment of the self presents both an incoherent “official view” and a coherent “alternative view.” In this paper, I argue that Kant’s genuine position on the self can be reconstructed as a coherent unity by examining the flaws in Allison’s analysis. It is shown that Allison’s objections to Kant’s official view are based on unwarranted metaphysical assumptions and unjustified conceptual identifications. Allison’s own dual-aspect view of the transcendental distinction between phenomena (...)
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  26. Corey W. Dyck (2009). Review: Guyer, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Social Criticism 35 (5):613-619.
  27. Dina Emundts (2006). Die Paralogismen und die Widerlegung des Idealismus in Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (2/2006):295-309.
    Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit Kants Paralogismen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Im ersten Teil wird die These entwickelt, dass Kants Kritik an der rationalen Psychologie wesentlich auf der Behauptung beruht, dass etwas, das nur in der Zeit und nicht im Raum gegeben ist, nicht anhand des Begriffs der Substanz bestimmt werden kann. Im zweiten Teil wird gefragt, ob und wie das Ich als Begleitvorstellung wahrgenommen werden kann.
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  28. Dina Emundts, Stefanie Grüne & Ulrich Schlösser (2006). Kants Paralogismen. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (2/2006):261-263.
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  29. Sandra Jane Fairbanks (2000). Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self. Westview Press.
    This anthology, Defining Public Administration , is designed to assist beginning and intermediate level students of public policy, and to stir the imaginations of readers concerned with public policy and administration. The forty-five articles included in the text are all reprinted from the International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration , and these accessible, interesting articles have been assembled to offer a sample of the riches to be found within the larger work. The articles provide definitions of the vocabulary of (...)
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  30. Naomi Fisher (2015). Review: Corey W. Dyck, Kant and Rational Psychology. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 68 (3):651-653.
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  31. Fabian Freyenhagen (2008). Reasoning Takes Time: On Allison and the Timelessness of the Intelligible Self. Kantian Review 13 (2):67-84.
    Consider the following objection of Bennett to Kant: The least swallowable part of Kant's whole theory of freedom is the claim that the causality of freedom is not in time. This follows from Kant's doctrine that time is an appearance, and anyway the theory of freedom needs it: it is because the noumenal cause of an event is not in time, and thus is not itself an event, that it escapes the causality of nature. Kant is unembarrassed: ‘Inasmuch as it (...)
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  32. Garth Green (2010). The Aporia of Inner Sense: The Self-Knowledge of Reason and the Critique of Metaphysics in Kant. Brill.
    This work identifies Kant’s doctrine of inner sense as a central element within the ‘architectonic of pure reason’ of the first Critique, exposes its variant construals, and considers the implications of its problematicity for Kant’s theoretical philosophy most generally.
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  33. Michelle Grier (1993). Illusion and Fallacy in Kant's First Paralogism. Kant-Studien 84 (3):257-282.
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  34. Paul Guyer (2009). CHAPTER 3: Cause, Object, and Self. In Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume. Princeton University Press 124-160.
  35. Andy Hamilton (2010). Review: Guyer, Knowledge, Reason and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):737-739.
  36. Robert Hanna (1992). Review: Powell, Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 45 (3):631-633.
  37. Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha (2011). Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
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  38. Dietmar Heidemann (2013). Dass Ich bin: Zu Kants Begriff des reinen Existenzbewusstseins. In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht. De Gruyter 153-164.
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  39. Rolf-Peter Horstmann (1993). Kants Paralogismen. Kant-Studien 84 (4):408-425.
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  40. R. Howell (1996). Review. Kant and the Mind. Andrew Brook. Mind 105 (419):491-495.
  41. Erwin Hufnagel (1974). Aspekte der Schelerschen Personlehre. Kant-Studien 65 (1-4):436-456.
  42. Walter Jaeschke (2000). Substanz und subjekt. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (3):439-458.
    In the modern history of philosophy, the two concepts of "substance" and "subject" play an important role. Their meaning and their relationship, however, are conceived in a manifold way. In the beginning of th 19th century, Descartes is regarded as the inaugurator of modern philosophy and of philosophy of subjectivity, because he makes the "subject" the fundamental basis of philosophy. He is not concerned with clarifying the structure of the "subject", but is interpreting the "subject" as "substance", i.e., the eternal (...)
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  43. Paulo Jesus (2010). Le Je Pense Comme Facteur de Vérité: Adéquation, Cohérence Et Communauté Sémantique. Kant-Studien 101 (2):167-188.
    This article proposes a reading of the Kantian transcendental apperception that attempts both to reinforce the cognitive efficacy of its spontaneity and to determine the modus operandi of its unifying function . Thus, being irreducible to a pure logical form , the I think is meant to constitute the qualitative unity of all possible representational system, insofar as it performs an infinite process of semantic or narrative unification. From this standpoint, the I think denotes the key operation that produces meaning, (...)
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  44. Paulo Jesus (2008). Poetique de L'Ipse: Etude Sur le Je Pense Kantien. Lang.
  45. Immanuel Kant (1993). Opus Postumum. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is the first ever English translation of Kant's last major work, the so-called Opus Postumum, a work Kant himself described as his 'chef d'oeuvre' and as the keystone of his entire philosophical system. It occupied him for more than the last decade of his life. Begun with the intention of providing a 'transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics,' Kant's reflections take him far beyond the problem he initially set out to solve. In fact, he (...)
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  46. Pierre Keller (1991). The Numerical Identity of the Self and its Objects in Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Dissertation, Columbia University
    Kant's philosophy must be understood nonnaturalistically and anti-psychologistically. Self-consciousness must be interpreted as preceding the distinction between different persons. Kant departs from the traditional idea that I thoughts are always mediated by a certain specific I sense or conceptualization of oneself. At the same time the so-called paradoxes of self-consciousness are resolved. The possibility of a pre-personal self-consciousness is what links the way all objects are given to finite beings to the way they are conceptualized by those beings. It serves (...)
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  47. Patricia Kitcher (2014). Replies. Kantian Review 19 (1):149-159.
  48. Patricia Kitcher (2000). On Interpreting Kant's Thinker as Wittgenstein's 'I'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):33-63.
    Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the “unknowability” of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison’s attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell’s linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique’s analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic nonnativity that is importantly different from McDowell’s own account (...)
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  49. Patricia Kitcher (1994). Kant's Transcendental Psychology. OUP Usa.
    In this innovative study Patricia Kitcher argues that we can only understand the deduction of the categories in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in terms of his attempt to fathom the psychological prerequisites of thought. Thus a consideration of his conception of psychology is essential to an understanding of his philosophy. Kitcher specifically considers Kant's claims about the unity of the thinking self; the spatial forms of human perceptions; the relations among mental states necessary for them to have content; the (...)
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  50. Patricia Kitcher (1984). Kant's Real Self. In Allen W. Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy. Cornell University Press 113--47.
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