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Summary Sir Karl Popper (1902-1994) was an Austrian-born philosopher who for the most significant period of his career held a position at the London School of Economics.  Popper was a philosopher of science, who also made contributions in epistemology, philosophy of mind and social and political philosophy.  He argued that scientific theories are distinguished from non-scientific theories and pseudo-science by being falsifiable claims about the world.  Popper proposed a "solution" to the problem of induction by arguing that there is no need for induction in the scientific method.  The method of science is to propose conjectural theories which are then submitted to rigorous tests in the attempt to falsify them.  Theories which fail these tests are to be rejected.  Theories which survive attempts to refute them may be accepted tentatively, but are not proven to be true.  At best, they may be highly corroborated.  This "falsificationist" philosophy of science has a more general application beyond the method of the sciences.  The attempt to falsify a theory is an attempt to criticize the theory.  For Popper, criticism lies at the heart of rational thought, which he took to consist in the method of critical discussion and reflection.  The resulting general position is known as "critical rationalism".  Popper extended these ideas as well into the social and political realm.  He introduced the distinction between open and closed societies.  Open societies welcome and foster critical discussion and change whereas closed societies, which are usually tribal societies, are based on unchanging social custom and ritual.
Key works The classic statement of Popper's philosophy of science is The Logic of Scientific Discovery.  Perhaps the best introduction to his work is his collection of essays, Conjectures and Refutations.  Popper's social and political thought may be found in The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and its Enemies.  A good anthology of his writings has been edited by David Miller, Popper Selections.  A useful way into Popper's ideas is by way of his intellectual autobiography, Unended Quest, as is Bryan Magee's short book, Popper.  Alan Musgrave's Common Sense, Science and Scepticism presents a broadly Popperian introduction to epistemology.  David Miller's Critical Rationalism presents good discussion of many critical points that have been made against Popper's views.  Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, contains a number of important papers which bring Popper's views into contact with T.S. Kuhn's theory of science.  Wesley Salmon's 'Rational Prediction' is an important criticism of Popper's solution to the problem of induction.  See also Adolf Grunbaum's paper 'Is the method of bold conjectures and attempted refutations justifiably the method of science?'.
Introductions A good place to start is the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Thornton 2008.  Alan Chalmers provides an introductory discussion in What is this thing called science?, chapters 4-6.  Gurol Irzik provides an overview in 'Critical Rationalism', and Alan Musgrave presents his interpretation of Popper's solution of the problem of induction in his paper 'How Popper (might have) solved the problem of induction'.
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  1. Joseph Agassi (1986). On Hugo Bergman's Contribution to Epistemology. In Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. Distributed in the U.S.A. By Humanities Press 47-58.
    Approximationism — science approximates the truth as an ideal — is the view of science implicit in all of Einstein's major works, heralded by Hugo Bergman in Hebrew in 1940 and expressed by Karl Popper in 1954 and 1956. Yet Bergman was not sufficiently clear about it, and even Popper is not - as shown by their not giving up certain remnants of the older views which approximationism replaces, even when these remnants are inconsistent with approximationism. Norare the approximationist theories (...)
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  2. Joseph Agassi (1983). Theoretical Bias in Evidence: A Historical Sketch. Philosophica 31 (1):7-24.
    The studies of theoretical bias in evidence are these days developed by many clever psychologists, social psychologists, and philosophers. It therefore comes as a surprise to realize that most of the material one can find in the up-to -date literature repeats discoveries which are due to the heroes of the present sketch, namely Galileo Galilei, Sir Francis Bacon, and Robert Boyle; William Whewell, Pierre Duhem, and Karl Popper. We may try to raise scholarly standards by familiarizing ourselves with their ideas (...)
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  3. Joseph Agassi (1976). The Lakatosian Revolution. In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel 9--21.
  4. Joseph Agassi (1969). Popper on Learning From Experience'. In Peter Achinstein (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, Published by Basil Blackwell with the Cooperation of the University of Pittsburg 162--71.
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  5. Joseph Agassi (1968). The Novelty of Popper's Philosophy of Science. International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3):442-463.
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  6. Joseph Agassi, Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: Popper's Popular Critics.
    Two suggestions are at the back of the present talk. First, toleration is obligatory, not criticism. So do not try to make people critically-minded: do not force them in any way to try to offer or accept criticism, to learn to participate effectively in the game of critical discussion. If they refuse, then they are within their right. Also, they will easily ad vance excuses for their refusal; admittedly some of these are unreasonable, but not all. Instead of trying to (...)
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  7. Douglas Io Anele (2011). Beyond Logic of Discovery and Paradigmatic Consensus: A Reanalysis of the Popper-Kuhn Debate in the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy Study 1 (1):52-66.
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  8. A. Anglberger, P. Brössel, N. Furlan, F. Greinecker, M. Karlegger, N. Pfeifer, M. Stefan & A. Ungar (2003). Rezension: Was wir Karl R. Popper und seiner Philosophie verdanken. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):23-27.
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  9. O'hear Anthony (1975). Rationality of Action and Theory-Testing in Popper. Mind 84 (1):273-276.
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  10. Karl-Otto Apel (1983). Comments on Farr's Paper (II) Some Critical Remarks on Popper's Hermeneutics. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 13 (2):183-193.
  11. Horacio Arló-Costa & Richmond H. Thomason (2001). Iterative Probability Kinematics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):479-524.
    Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...)
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  12. Elena Aronova (2007). Erratum To: Karl Popper and Lamarckism. Biological Theory 2 (2):213-213.
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  13. David Balduzzi, Information, Learning and Falsification.
    There are (at least) three approaches to quantifying information. The first, algorithmic information or Kolmogorov complexity, takes events as strings and, given a universal Turing machine, quantifies the information content of a string as the length of the shortest program producing it [1]. The second, Shannon information, takes events as belonging to ensembles and quantifies the information resulting from observing the given event in terms of the number of alternate events that have been ruled out [2]. The third, statistical learning (...)
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  14. D. J. Balestra (1979). Non-Falsifiability: An Inductivist Perspective. International Logic Review 19:118.
  15. K. Ballestrem & A. McCarthy (1972). Thesen Zur Begründung Einer Kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 3 (1):49-62.
    Summary In this article the authors seek to broaden the scope of the methodological debates now underway in Germany between proponents of a critical theory of society — principally the late T. W. Adorno and J. Habermas — on the one side and proponents of an analytical theory of social science — principally Karl Popper and Hans Albert — on the other. An attempt is made to formulate and systematize some of the fundamental epistemological and methodological principles which are basic (...)
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  16. Greg Bamford (2002). From Analysis/Synthesis to Conjecture/Analysis: A Review of Karl Popper’s Influence on Design Methodology in Architecture. [REVIEW] Design Studies 23 (3):245 - 61.
    The two principal models of design in methodological circles in architecture—analysis/synthesis and conjecture/analysis—have their roots in philosophy of science, in different conceptions of scientific method. This paper explores the philosophical origins of these models and the reasons for rejecting analysis/synthesis in favour of conjecture/analysis, the latter being derived from Karl Popper’s view of scientific method. I discuss a fundamental problem with Popper’s view, however, and indicate a framework for conjecture/analysis to avoid this problem.
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  17. Sorin Bangu (2013). Popper: Yet Again. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (1):165-168.
    Popper: yet again Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9669-y Authors Sorin Bangu, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  18. Michael C. Banner (1990). The Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious Belief. Oxford University Press.
    In this critical examination of recent accounts of the nature of science and of its justification given by Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, and Newton-Smith, Banner contends that models of scientific rationality which are used in criticism of religious beliefs are in fact often inadequate as accounts of the nature of science. He argues that a realist philosophy of science both reflects the character of science and scientific justifications, and suggests that religious belief could be (...)
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  19. Joe Barnhart (2006). Brightman and Popper on the Emergence of the Person: Implications for the Abortion Issue. The Pluralist 1 (2):57 - 67.
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  20. Joe E. Barnhart (1977). The Study of Religion and its Meaning New Explorations in Light of Karl Popper and Emile Durkheim. Mouton.
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  21. Pierluigi Barrotta (1998). Contemporary Philosophy of Science in Italy: An Overview. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (2):327-345.
    The paper analyses the development of some themes in the contemporary philosophy of science in Italy. Section 1 reviews the dabate on the legacy of neopositivism. The spread of the philosophy of Popper is outlined in Section 2, with particular regard to the problem of the vindication of induction. Section 3 deals with the debate on the incommensurability thesis, while Section 4 examines its consequences on the possible relationships between historical and epistemological studies of science. The last section is devoted (...)
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  22. W. W. Bartley (1982). The Philosophy of Karl Popper Part III. Rationality, Criticism, and Logic. Philosophia 11 (1-2):121-221.
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  23. W. W. Bartley (1978). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Philosophia 7 (3-4):463-494.
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  24. W. W. Bartley (1976). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Philosophia 6 (3-4):463-494.
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  25. Nimrod Bar‐Am & Joseph Agassi (2005). Popper and the Establishment. Critical Review 17 (1-2):13-23.
    Abstract The central thesis of Karl Popper's philosophy is that intellectual and political progress are best achieved by not deferring to dogmatic authority. His philosophy of science is a plea for the replacement of classic dogmatic methodology with critical debate. His philosophy of politics, similarly, is a plea for replacing Utopian social and political engineering with a more fallibilist, piecemeal variety. Many confuse his anti?dogmatism with relativism, and his anti?authoritarianism with Cold War conservatism or even with libertarian politics. Not so: (...)
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  26. José de Lira Bautista (2008). Comprensión Hermenéutica y Análisis Situacional En Karl R. Popper. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 46:129-135.
    In this paper I expose the hermeneutic turn in Popperian philosophy of science. It is a milestone in the search of scientific rationality because permit us explain and understand both the method of deductive test of theories and the growth of knowledge. Especially, incorporating hermeneutics parameters, build up from Popper’s point of view, like situational logic, supported on the third world theory and the scientific tradition theory, open a door to another form of understand the scientific rationality. It expands the (...)
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  27. Charles A. Baylis (1954). Review: K. R. Popper, William Kneale, A. J. Ayer, Symposium: What Can Logic Do for Philosophy? [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (4):290-290.
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  28. L. B. Bazhenov (2002). Reflections on Reading Popper. Russian Studies in Philosophy 41 (2):7-22.
    An enormous amount of philosophical literature gets published nowadays. Some of it is good; some is fit only for pulping. We get into the habit not so much of reading as of glancing through the torrent that pours down on us. But sometimes special conditions arise. It so happened that I was forced to spend about a month in the hospital. I took with me the book Evolutionary Epistemology and the Logic of the Social Sciences: K. Popper and His Critics (...)
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  29. Jean-Roch Beausoleil (1989). The Metamathematics-Popperian Epistemology Connection and its Relation to the Logic of Turing's Programme. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):307-322.
    Turing's programme, the idea that intelligence can be modelled computationally, is set in the context of a parallel between certain elements from metamathematics and Popper's schema for the evolution of knowledge. The parallel is developed at both the formal level, where it hinges on the recursive structuring of Popper's schema, and at the contentual level, where a few key issues common to both epistemology and metamathematics are briefly discussed. In light of this connection Popper's principle of transference, akin to Turing's (...)
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  30. Philip Benesch (2005). Singularism and Multiplism in the Work of Karl Popper. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 12 (1):23-32.
    In this article I argue that Karl Popper embraced a muitiplist approach to ethics, politics, history, and cultural practices. Although Popper combined metaphysical realism with a hermeneutic approach that had the potential to support a multiplist philosophy of science, a commitment to verisimilitude and to the identification of universal laws required him to adopt a singularist approach to natural science. I suggest, therefore, that Michael Krausz’ description of Popper as a singularist should be qualified’ that Popper’s philosophy of natural science (...)
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  31. Albert A. Bennett (1949). Review: G. Ryle, Why Are the Calculuses of Logic and Arithmetic Applicable to Reality?; C. Lewy, Why Are the Calculuses of Logic and Arithmetic Applicable to Reality?; K. R. Popper, Why Are the Calculuses of Logic and Arithmetic Applicable to Reality? [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (2):135-135.
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  32. William Berkson & John Wettersten (1989). Learning From Error, Karl Popper's Psychology of Learning. Synthese 78 (3):357-358.
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  33. Mark Bevir (2003). Notes Toward an Analysis of Conceptual Change. Social Epistemology 17 (1):55 – 63.
    This paper analyses conceptual change. A rejection of pure experience has prompted philosophers of science to adopt a certain perspective from which to view changes of belief. Popper, Kuhn, and others have analysed conceptual change in terms of problems or anomalies, that is, in terms of contingent reasoning about issues posed in the context of an inherited web of belief. This paper explores a more general analysis of conceptual change in dialogue with these philosophers of science. Because changes of belief (...)
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  34. Roy Bhaskar (1977). The Philosophy of Karl Popper by Robert John Ackermann. Philosophical Books 18 (2):78-80.
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  35. Richard J. Blackwell (1975). "The Philosophy of Karl Popper," Ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, 2 Vols. Modern Schoolman 53 (1):87-89.
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  36. Hermann Bondi (1982). Sir Karl Popper—On His Eightieth Birthday. Foundations of Physics 12 (9):821-823.
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  37. George Botterill (1986). Learning From Error: Karl Popper's Psychology of Learning. Philosophical Books 27 (2):98-100.
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  38. Michael Bradie (1996). Taking Popper Seriously. Biology and Philosophy 11 (2):259-270.
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  39. Günther E. Braun (1975). Empirischer Gehalt Und Falsifizierbarkeit. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 6 (2):203-216.
    Summary In this article will be discussed the famous Popperian terms of ‘empirical content’ and ‘falsifiability’ or ‘refutability’. They are all synonymous with another and are all fundamental principles, not for Popper's philosophy exclusively, but for Lakatos — and for Sneed's rational reconstruction of the ideas of Kuhn's book ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’.
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  40. Mátyás Brendel, Carnap, Popper, Gödel: Can Unity Be Refuted by Incompleteness?
    In this paper all the “acting” philosophers play their classical role: Gödel is present with his incompleteness theorems. Carnap is present with the positivist view of unity of science, and specifically with the thesis about a universal language. Finally, Popper tries to refute Carnap’s thesis with the help of Gödel’s. Unfortunately this debate did not take place in real, only one claim and reponse was made in Shilpp’s volume. I attempt to clarify this question in the present paper. The main (...)
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  41. Mátyás Brendel, Et Tu Mi Fili, Thomas?!
    Abstract: In this paper I use or refer to a lot of metaphors, like "Brutus" for Kuhn, "Trojan Horse" for the Structure, "adopted sons" for Quine and Popper, "battlefield" for parts of philosophy. These are however only illustrations to possible theses or questions I investigate: "Did Kuhn refute logical positivism?", Why was Carnap so tolerating so much Popper, Quine and Kuhn?", "Why did logical positivism go away?". I will argue that a complex view should be developed abut these questions synthesising (...)
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  42. Harold I. Brown (2011). Van Fraassen Meets Popper: Logical Relations and Cognitive Abilities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):381-385.
    Van Fraassen, like Popper before him, assumes that confirmation and disconfirmation relations are logical relations and thus hold only among abstract items. This raises a problem about how experience, for Popper, and observables, for van Fraassen, enter into epistemic evaluations. Each philosopher offers a drastic proposal: Popper holds that basic statements are accepted by convention; van Fraassen introduces his “pragmatic tautology.” Another alternative is to reject the claim that all evaluative relations are logical relations. Ayer proposed this option in responding (...)
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  43. Harold I. Brown (1991). Epistemic Concepts: A Naturalistic Approach. Inquiry 34 (3 & 4):323 – 351.
    Several forms of naturalism are currently extant. Proponents of the various approaches disagree on matters of strategy and detail but one theme is common: we have not received any revelations about the nature of the world -- including our own nature. Whatever knowledge we have has been acquired through a fallible process of conjecture and revision. This common theme will bring to mind the writings of Karl Popper and, in many respects, Popper is the father of contemporary naturalism. Along with (...)
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  44. James M. Brown (1987). Popper and After. Philosophical Studies 31:356-361.
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  45. James M. Brown (1984). Popper Had a Brand New Bag. Philosophy 59 (230):512 - 515.
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  46. James Robert Brown (1985). Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists David Stove Oxford: Pergamon, 1982. Pp. 116. $9.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 24 (1):177.
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  47. James Robert Brown (1984). Vintage Popper: The Postscript, After Fifty Years. Dialogue 23 (4):677-682.
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  48. Bartosz Brożek (2002). Popper wobec semantycznej teorii prawdy [dyskusje i polemiki]. Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce 31.
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  49. Mario Bunge (1973). Miguel A. Quintanilla, "Idealismo y Filosofía de la Ciencia: Introducción a la Epistemología de Karl R. Popper". [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 3 (4):399.
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  50. Mario Bunge (1966). The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Karl R. Popper. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (1):134-135.
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