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  1. John Altmann, Meditations on Moral Philosophy.
    An extensive commentary on moral philosophy that is a renunciation of my previous two essays. This essay promotes the idea that the answer to an objective morality lies in examining moral problems through an epistemic lens.
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  2. M. Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo (2011). Piccolo Trattato di Epistemologia. Codice Edizioni.
    La discussione generale sulla filosofia della scienza contemporanea è complicata dal numero e dall’eterogeneità delle scienze, mentre lo studio di temi specifici porta inevitabilmente a dissertazioni specialistiche che mancano nel dare ragione della trama di senso sottostante. Questo Piccolo trattato di epistemologia intende occupare uno spazio vuoto, proponendo alcuni temi chiave per la comprensione dei meccanismi alla base della conoscenza scientifica: i rapporti tra filosofia e scienze, siano esse naturali o umane; la complessa relazione tra fatti e valori; la distinzione (...)
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  3. Luis M. Augusto (2010). Accommodating Unconscious Beliefs. Princípios 17 (28):129-154.
    More often than not, theories of belief and of belief ascription restrict themselves to conscious beliefs, thus obliterating a vast part of our mental life and offering extremely incomplete, unrealistic theories. Indeed, conscious beliefs are the exception, not the rule, as far as human doxastic states are concerned, and a naturalistic, realistic theory of knowledge that aspires to completeness has to take unconscious beliefs into consideration. This paper is the elaboration of such a theory of belief.
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  4. Maria Baghramian & Adam Carter, Relativism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. Defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. Detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness. Debates about relativism permeate the whole spectrum of philosophical sub-disciplines. From ethics to epistemology, science to religion, political theory to ontology, theories of meaning and even logic, philosophy (...)
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  5. Peter Baumann (2015 (3.ed.)). Erkenntnistheorie. Metzler.
    An introduction to epistemology with a focus on different accounts of knowledge, scepticism, belief, truth, rationality and justification, the sources of knowledge.
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  6. Peter Baumann (2014). A Contradiction for Contextualism? In Franck Lihoreau & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.), Epistemology, Context, and Formalism. Springer 49-57.
    This discusses a problem for epistemic contextualism having to do with the possibility of evaluating knowledge attributions made in other contexts.
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  7. Peter Baumann (2013). Gettier, Wissen, Zufall. In Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren. Mentis 9-27.
    This is a discussion of the Gettier problem and its relation to epistemic luck.
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  8. Peter Baumann (2012). Response to Schaffer's Reply. In Stefan Toiksdorf (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter 425-431.
    This is a response to Jonathan Schaffer's reply to my criticism of contrastivism.
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  9. Peter Baumann (2012). Knowing About Other Contexts. In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Ontos 63-79.
    This discusses and proposes a solution to the factivity problem for contextualism.
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  10. Peter Baumann (2012). Knowledge, Practical Reasoning and Action. Logos and Episteme 3:7-26.
    Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many cases (and in all (...)
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  11. Peter Baumann (2011). Epistemic closure. In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge 597--608.
    This article gives an overview over different principles of epistemic closure, their attractions and their problems.
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  12. Peter Baumann (2011). WAMs: Why Worry? Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.
    Abstract One of the most popular objections against epistemic contextualism is the so-called ?warranted assertability? objection. The objection is based on the possibility of a ?warranted assertability manoeuvre?, also known as a WAM. I argue here that WAMs are of very limited scope and importance. An important class of cases cannot be dealt with by WAMs. No analogue of WAMs is available for these cases. One should thus not take WAMs too seriously in the debate about epistemic contextualism.
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  13. Peter Baumann (2010). Factivity and Contextualism. Analysis 70 (1):82-89.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  14. Peter Baumann (2008). Contextualism and the Factivity Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580–602.
    Epistemological contextualism - the claim that the truth-value of knowledge-attributions can vary with the context of the attributor - has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However, in order to solve the problem the contextualist (...)
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  15. Peter Baumann (2004). Lotteries and Contexts. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):415 - 428.
    There are many ordinary propositions we think we know. Almost every ordinary proposition entails some lottery proposition which we think we do not know but to which we assign a high probability of being true (for instance:I will never be a multi-millionaire entails I will not win this lottery). How is this possible – given that some closure principle is true? This problem, also known as the Lottery puzzle, has recently provoked a lot of discussion. In this paper I discuss (...)
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  16. Peter Baumann (2002). Epistemic Contracts. In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen Ag 1--19.
    The idea of a social contract has played a major role in modern political philosophy but not in modern epistemology, -- not even in more recent "social theories of knowledge". The idea of an epistemic contract, however, is very interesting and deserves more attention. In this paper, I discuss arguments to the effect that we cannot do without epistemic contracts. I come to the conclusion that these arguments are not convincing. If one wants to make use of contractarian arguments in (...)
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  17. Peter Baumann (2001). Im Auge des Betrachters. Über Wissen, Rechtfertigung und Kontext. In Thomas Grundmann (ed.), Erkenntnistheorie. Positionen zwischen Tradition und Gegenwart. Mentis 72-89.
    Defense of a contextualist (in a very broad sense of the term) view of knowledge.
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  18. Peter Baumann (2001). Ist der Begriff des Wissens inkohärent? Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (4):594 - 601.
    This is a response to Ansgar Beckermann's argument to the effect that the concept of knowledge is incoherent and should thus be given up.
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  19. Peter Baumann (1998). Can Reliabilists Believe in Subjective Probability? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):199-200.
    According to reliabilist conceptions of knowledge, knowledge implies reliable true belief. Since reliability is an irreducibly probabilistic notion, one's view of knowledge also depends on one's view of probability. If one believes that all probability is subjective probability, knowledge becomes a relativized concept: knowledge is relative to a given body of beliefs of a given person at a given time. Since such a relativized conception of knowledge is extremely implausible and since reliabilism seems to capture at least part of the (...)
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  20. James K. Beilby (ed.) (2002). Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell University Press.
    In this, the first book to address the ongoing debate, Plantinga presents his influential thesis and responds to critiques by distinguished philosophers from a ...
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  21. Henk Bij de Weg (2001). The Commonsense Conception and its Relation to Scientific Theory. Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):17 – 30.
    In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from (...)
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  22. Jonny Blamey, Knowledge Isn't Necessarily True.
    In this essay I hope to establish that truth is not a necessary condition for knowledge. This is not to go so far as that it is possible to know falsehoods, since not everything that is not true is therefore false. Rather the aim is to show that knowledge is that in which we are fully confident, where our confidence is supported by conclusive evidence. If these two conditions are met, then there is no further condition, truth, that needs to (...)
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  23. Filip A. A. Buyse (2008). Spinoza and Galileo Galilei: Adequate Ideas and Intrinsic Qualities of Bodies. Historia Philosophica 6:117-127.
  24. J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy. Synthese:1-14.
    Pascal Engel (2008) has insisted that a number of notable strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in various respects than its competitors (e.g. the justification and the truth norms)— relies on a presupposition (...)
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  25. J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    If individual knowledge and justification can be vanquished by epistemic defeaters, then the same should go for group knowledge. Lackey (2014) has recently argued that one especially strong conception of group knowledge defended by Bird (2010) is incapable of preserving how it is that (group) knowledge is ever subject to ordinary mechanisms of epistemic defeat. Lackey takes it that her objections do not also apply to a more moderate articulation of group knowledge--one that is embraced widely in collective epistemology--and which (...)
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  26. Andrea Cerroni (2006). Scienza E Società Della Conoscenza. Utet Università.
    Anche se siamo comunemente abituati a pensare alla scienza come a un qualcosa di assolutamente atemporale e indipendente da tutto, in realtà essa è profondamente influenzata dalla cultura e dalla società del tempo in cui vive. Infatti né la scienza è isolabile dalla società, né la società è isolabile dalla scienza, tanto meno come si sta configurando oggi. Per approfondire questi aspetti, esistono però due visioni antagoniste che bisogna superare: secondo la visione scolastica, retaggio del positivismo ottocentesco ancora molto diffuso (...)
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  27. Clarke-Doane, Ethics and Mathematics: The Reliability Challenge.
    It is sometimes alleged that “the reliability challenge” to moral realism is equally compelling against mathematical realism. This allegation is of interest. The reliability challenge to moral realism is increasingly taken to be the most serious challenge to moral realism. However, the specific considerations that are said to motivate it – such as considerations of rational dubitability and evolutionary influence – are widely held not to motivate an analogous challenge to mathematical realism. If it turned out that, in fact, they (...)
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  28. Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe (2012). Guest Editors' Preface. Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):5-6.
    This is the guest editors' preface to the Discipline Filosofiche special issue on Knowledge and Justification.
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  29. John Corcoran (1999). Critical Thinking and Pedagogical License. Manuscrito 22 (2):109.
    Critical thinking involves deliberate application of tests and standards to beliefs per se and to methods used to arrive at beliefs. Pedagogical license is authorization accorded to teachers permitting them to use otherwise illicit means in order to achieve pedagogical goals. Pedagogical license is thus analogous to poetic license or, more generally, to artistic license. Pedagogical license will be found to be pervasive in college teaching. This presentation suggests that critical thinking courses emphasize two topics: first, the nature and usefulness (...)
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  30. Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson & David Vander Laan (eds.) (2006). Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Springer.
    This volume comprises essays presented to Alvin Plantinga on the occasion of his 70th birthday.
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  31. Willem A. deVries, Sellars, Realism, and Kantian Thinking. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.
    This essay is a response to Patrick Reider’s essay “Sellars on Perception, Science and Realism: A Critical Response.” Reider is correct that Sellars’s realism is in tension with his generally Kantian approach to issues of knowledge and mind, but I do not think Reider’s analysis correctly locates the sources of that tension or how Sellars himself hoped to be able to resolve it. Reider’s own account of idealism and the reasons supporting it are rooted in the epistemological tradition that informed (...)
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  32. Billy Dunaway & John Hawthorne (forthcoming). Scepticism. In William J. Abraham Frederick D. Aquino (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology. Oxford University Press
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  33. Philip A. Ebert, What Mathematical Knowledge Could Not Be.
    This is an introductory survey article to the philosophy of mathematics. I provide a detailed account of what Benacerraf’s problem is and then discuss in general terms four different approaches to ….
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  34. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Critical Study of John Hawthorne's Knowledge and Lotteries and Jason Stanley's Knowledge and Practical Interests. [REVIEW] Noûs 43 (1):178-192.
  35. Katalin Farkas (2016). Practical Know‐Wh. Noûs 50 (2):n/a-n/a.
    The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...)
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  36. Yiftach Fehige (2013). The Relativized a Priori and the Laboratory of the Mind: Towards a Neo-Kantian Account of Thought Experiments in Science. Epistemologia 36 (1):55-73.
    Building on a previously published contextualization of Marco Buzzoni’s Neo- Kantian account of scientific thought-experiments, this paper examines the explanatory power of this account. It is argued that Buzzoni’s account suffers from a number of shortcomings. Einstein’s clock-in-the-box thought experiment facilitates the demonstration of these deficits. In the light of both the identified inadequacies of Buzzoni’s account and the long-standing history of Kantian approaches to thought experiments, this paper finally sketches an alternative Neo-Kantian account. This alternative utilizes Michael Friedman’s reading (...)
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  37. Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison (2011). When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
    Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem (...)
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  38. Matthew Frise (forthcoming). No Need to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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  39. Matthew Frise (2014). What God Only Knows: A Reply to Rob Lovering. Religious Studies 50 (2):245-254.
    Rob Lovering has recently argued that God is not omniscient on the grounds that (1) in order to be omniscient a subject must not only know all truths always but also know what it's like not to know a truth, and (2) God cannot fulfil both of these requirements. I show that Lovering's argument is unsuccessful since he inadequately supports (1) and (2), and since there are several serious doubts about (2). I also show that Lovering does not otherwise indicate (...)
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  40. Axel Gelfert (2013). Synthetic Biology Between Technoscience and Thing Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (2):141-149.
    Synthetic biology presents a challenge to traditional accounts of biology: Whereas traditional biology emphasizes the evolvability, variability, and heterogeneity of living organisms, synthetic biology envisions a future of homogeneous, humanly engineered biological systems that may be combined in modular fashion. The present paper approaches this challenge from the perspective of the epistemology of technoscience. In particular, it is argued that synthetic-biological artifacts lend themselves to an analysis in terms of what has been called ‘thing knowledge’. As such, they should neither (...)
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  41. Meskos George, TOWARDS ONTOLOGY FOR A UNIFIED KNOWLEDGE: THE HYPOTHESIS OF LOGICAL QUANTA. Metanexus.Net.
    The suggestion of Logical Quanta (LQ) is a bidirectional synthesis of the theory of logos of Maximus the Confessor and the philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics. The result of such a synthesis is enrichment to the ontology of classical mechanics that enable us to have a unified view and an explanatory frame of the whole cosmos. It also enables us to overcome the Cartesian duality both on biology and the interaction of body and mind. Finally, one can reconstruct a new (...)
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  42. Mikkel Gerken (2015). The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.
    Knowledge norms of action are sometimes said to be motivated by the fact that they align with natural assessments of action in ordinary language. Competent and rational speakers normally use ‘knowledge’ and its cognates when they assess action. In contrast, competing accounts in terms of evidence, warrant or reliability do not straightforwardly align with ordinary language assessments of action. In response to this line of reasoning, I argue that a warrant account of action may explain the prominence of ‘knowledge’ in (...)
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  43. Edmund L. Gettier & Paulo Vélez León (2013). ¿Una creencia verdadera justificada es conocimiento? [Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?]. Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 2 (3):185-193.
    [ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963), de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, (1963) by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief».
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  44. José María Gómez Heras (2011). María G. Navarro: Interpretar argumentando. Isegoría 44:366-372.
    Escribir hoy en día un libro sobre hermenéutica, que tal hermenéutica se refiera a la desarrollada por G. Gadamer en su conocido Verdad y método y que se pretenda añadir algo nuevo a lo mucho escrito sobre el tema parecería, a primera vista, empresa irrealizable. Que ambas pretensiones inspiren la sólida monografía de María G. Navarro —titulada Interpretar y argumentar— constituye empresa audaz y arriesgada, plena de coraje innovador, que provoca admiración, curiosidad e interés. Contra lo que pudiera parecer a (...)
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  45. Yoji K. Gondor (ed.) (2013). The Delude. Sintesi Point Publishing.
    The amount of data to which a human is exposed has increased over time. The Delude is defined here as an individual that is overwhelmed by various incoherent and false assertions that data contains. This writing is a philosophical study that reflects on the epistemic conditions in which knowledge is accumulated. It is obvious that large amounts of falsehood, when regarded as truth, can induce heavy damage to anyone's intellect. -/- Frequently, a faulty mental state is induced by corrupt knowledge. (...)
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  46. Eran Guter (2010). Ornamentality in the New Media. In Anat Biletzki (ed.), Hues of Philosophy: Essays in Memory of Ruth Manor. College Publications 83-96.
    Ornamentality is pervasive in the new media and it is related to their essential characteristics: dispersal, hypertextuality, interactivity, digitality and virtuality. I utilize Kendall Walton's theory of ornamentality in order to construe a puzzle pertaining to the new media. the ornamental erosion of information. I argue that insofar as we use the new media as conduits of real life, the excessive density of ornamental devices which is prevalent in certain new media environments, forces us to conduct our inquiries under conditions (...)
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  47. Johannes Haag (ed.) (2007). Erfahrung und Gegenstand. Zum Verhältnis von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand im empirischen Erkennen. Klostermann.
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  48. Michael Hannon (forthcoming). Skepticism About Meta-Skepticism: Meditations on Experimental Philosophy. Episteme.
    Drawing on new empirical data, a group of experimental philosophers have argued that one of the most popular and influential forms of skepticism is much less interesting and much less worrisome than philosophers have thought. Contrary to this claim, I argue that this brand of skepticism remains as threatening as ever. My argument also reveals an important limitation of experimental philosophy and sheds light on the way professional philosophers should go about the business of doing philosophy.
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  49. Michael Hannon (2015). The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.
    Knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are a central area of research in philosophy. But why do humans think and talk about knowledge? What are knowledge ascriptions for? This article surveys a variety of proposals about the role of knowledge ascriptions and attempts to provide a unified account of these seemingly distinct views.
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  50. Michael Hannon (2013). The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism. Erkenntnis 78 (4):899-919.
    This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about ‘knows’. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call ‘practical interests contextualism’. I also answer some questions that (...)
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