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  1. Scott F. Aikin (2006). Modest Evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343.
    Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditions. As such, a (...)
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  2. Torin Alter (web). Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience. In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press.
    Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. But it need not. For example, one could know what it’s like to see red without seeing red—indeed, without having any color experiences. Daniel Dennett (2007) and Pete Mandik (forthcoming) argue that this and related considerations undermine the knowledge argument against physicalism. If they are right, then this is not only a problem for anti‐physicalists. Their argument threatens to undermine any version of phenomenal realism—the view that there are phenomenal properties, or qualia, that are (...)
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  3. Torin Alter (2009). Does the Ignorance Hypothesis Undermine the Conceivability and Knowledge Arguments? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):756-765.
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  4. Murat Aydede (2003). Is Introspection Inferential? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
    Suppose there is a red ball against a uniformly gray background moving toward my left. I am seeing the moving red ball. I am having a visual experience that carries the information (among other things) that [the ball] is red.1 Now supposing that I have the concepts RED and SEEING, and all my other cognitive (including introspective) mechanisms are intact and working normally, the job is to say exactly how I do come to know that I am seeing [the ball] (...)
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  5. Katalin Balog (forthcoming). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.), The Mental, the Physical. Cambridge University Press.
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
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  6. Imants Baruss (1998). Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality of Participants at 'Tucson II'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):483-496.
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  7. Benjamin Bayer, From Folk Psychology to Folk Epistemology: The Status of Radical Simulation.
    In this paper I consider one of the leading philosophic-psychological theories of “folk psychology,” the simulation theory of Robert Gordon. According to Gordon, we attribute mental states to others not by representing those states or by applying the generalizations of theory, but by imagining ourselves in the position of a target to be interpreted and exploiting our own decision-making skills to make assertions which we then attribute to others as ‘beliefs’. I describe a leading objections to Gordon’s theory—the problem of (...)
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  8. Tim Bayne (2001). Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):407 - 419.
    We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM), David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. (...)
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  9. Timothy J. Bayne (2001). Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):407-19.
    We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM), David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. (...)
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  10. E. Bouratinos (2003). A Pre-Epistemology of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):38-41.
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  11. Francis H. Bradley (1909). On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience. Mind 18 (69):40-64.
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  12. Raymond D. Bradley (1964). Avowals of Immediate Experience. Mind 73 (April):186-203.
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  13. Wendell T. Bush (1906). The Privacy of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (2):42-45.
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  14. Jack C. Carloye (1991). Consciousness and Introspective Knowledge. Methodology and Science 8:8-22.
  15. David J. Chalmers (1996). The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  16. Thomas W. Clark (2005). Killing the Observer. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):38-59.
    Phenomenal consciousness is often thought to involve a first-person perspective or point of view which makes available to the subject categorically private, first-person facts about experience, facts that are irreducible to third-person physical, functional, or representational facts. This paper seeks to show that on a representational account of consciousness, we don't have an observational perspective on experience that gives access to such facts, although our representational limitations and the phenomenal structure of consciousness make it strongly seem that we do. Qualia (...)
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  17. Earl Conee (1994). Phenomenal Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.
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  18. Daniel C. Dennett (2002). How Could I Be Wrong? How Wrong Could I Be? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):13-16.
    One of the striking, even amusing, spectacles to be enjoyed at the many workshops and conferences on consciousness these days is the breathtaking overconfidence with which laypeople hold forth about the nature of consciousness Btheir own in particular, but everybody =s by extrapolation. Everybody =s an expert on consciousness, it seems, and it doesn =t take any knowledge of experimental findings to secure the home truths these people enunciate with such conviction.
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  19. John Dilworth (2006). Perception, Introspection, and Functional Consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.
    What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a _conforming _belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be _red _to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be (...)
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  20. Fred Dretske (2003). How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
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  21. Fred Dretske (1999). The Mind's Awareness of Itself. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.
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  22. Steven Duncan, A Plea for Cardiognosis.
    In this paper, a follow-up to my "Seeing Other Minds," I encourage philosophers to explore the notion of cardiognosis - "knowledge of hearts" - as a unique, irreducible form of knowledge, and suggest some applications for this notion.
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  23. Steven M. Duncan, Mind, Body, Space, and Time.
    In this essay I explore some of the basic elements of consciousness from a substance dualist point of view, incorporating some elements of Kant's Transcendental Analytic into an overall account of the constitution of consciousness.
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  24. Steven M. Duncan, The Consequences of Neurophysiological Materialism.
    In this essay, I argue that neurophysiological materialism - the thesis that all of our mental contents are caused by non-mental, purely physical brain states - is epistemically self-refuting, and ought to be rejected even if it cannot be otherwise disproved.
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  25. Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  26. Eugen Fischer (2001). Discrimination: A Challenge to First-Person Authority? Philosophical Investigations 24 (4):330-346.
    It is no surprise that empirical psychology refutes, again and again, assumptions of uneducated common sense. But some puzzlement tends to arise when scientific results appear to call into question the very conceptual framework of the mental to which we have become accustomed. This paper shall examine a case in point: Experiments on colour-discrimination have recently been taken to refute an assumption of first-person authority that appears to be constitutive of our ordinary notion of perceptual experience. The paper is to (...)
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  27. Robert Francescotti (2000). Introspection and Qualia: A Defense of Infallibility. Communication and Cognition 33 (3-4):161-173.
  28. Manfred Frank (2002). Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge: On Some Difficulties with the Reduction of Subjectivity. Constellations 9 (3):390-408.
  29. Manfred Frank (2000). Self-Awareness and Self-Knowledge: Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription. In Willem van Reijen & Willem G. Weststeijn (eds.), Subjectivity. Rodopi.
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  30. Brie Gertler (2012). Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  31. Brie Gertler (2003). How to Draw Ontological Conclusions From Introspective Data. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
  32. Brie Gertler (ed.) (2003). Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
    When read as demands for justification, these questions seem absurd. We don’t normally ask people to substantiate assertions like “I think it will rain tomorrow” or “I have a headache”. There is, at the very least, a strong presumption that sincere self-attributions about one’s thoughts and feelings are true. In fact, some philosophers believe that such self-attributions are less susceptible to doubt than any other claims. Even those who reject that extreme view generally acknowledge that there is some salient epistemic (...)
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  33. Brie Gertler (2001). Introspecting Phenomenal States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
    This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions (...)
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  34. Irwin Goldstein (1985). Communication and Mental Events. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (October):331-338.
    How do the young learn names for feelings? After criticizing Wittgensteinian explanations, I formulate and defend an explanation very different from Wittgensteinians embrace.
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  35. Benj Hellie (forthcoming). The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination. In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press.
    Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view (...)
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  36. Benj Hellie (2010). An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
    Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...)
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  37. Benj Hellie (2009). Acquaintance. In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In every familiar case, a conscious subject has a perspective on the world. From time to time, various things are brought within this perspective: when one sees a mockingbird, or entertains a thought about Tony Blair, the mockingbird---or Blair---comes within one’s perspective. Upon reflection, it seems that not all entries into a subject’s perspective are on a par: the mockingbird when seen seems to be in some sense more intimately within one’s perspective than is Blair when merely thought about. This (...)
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  38. Benj Hellie (2007). Factive Phenomenal Characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
    This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does (...)
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  39. Benj Hellie (2007). Higher-Order Intentionalism and Higher-Order Acquaintance. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.
    I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be (...)
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  40. Benj Hellie (2005). Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability. Mind 114 (455):481-508.
    Perception represents colors inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'.
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  41. Christopher S. Hill (1988). Introspective Awareness of Sensations. Topoi 7 (March):11-24.
    My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs.
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  42. Chien-Hsing Ho (2007). Consciousness and Self-Awareness. Asian Philosophy 17 (3):213 – 230.
    In this paper I propose to inquire into the theory of self-awareness propounded by the two Buddhist epistemologists, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. I first give an outline of the Buddhist notion of consciousness, then deal with the notion of objectual appearance, and finally dwell on the theory itself together with certain arguments in its favor. It is shown that the Buddhists subscribed themselves to the following self-awareness thesis: that our waking consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. Adopting an (...)
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  43. Frank Hofmann (2009). Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence. Erkenntnis 71 (1):19 - 34.
    The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing this’ is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing a pain’ occurs. This second self-ascription is (...)
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  44. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
  45. Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
    It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its (...)
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  46. Robert J. Howell (2010). Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3).
    'Where am I?' This is something we might expect to hear from hapless explorers or academics with no sense of direction. If we can, we'll explain to our inquirer that he is east of East St. Louis and hope he can find his way from there. If he persists, insisting that he is not really lost, but only cannot find himself no matter how hard he looks, we might reasonably suspect that we are dealing with that peculiarly incorrigible academic explorer, (...)
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  47. Robert A. Imlay (1969). Immediate Awareness. Dialogue 8 (September):228-42.
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  48. Andreas Kemmerling, Glamorous Self Knowledge – What's It Good For?
    We have self-knowledge of various sorts: knowledge of things we have done or suffered, for example, and some knowledge of who we are: of our character-traits, our temper, our inclinations, weaknesses, feelings, addictions, worries, lusts and so on. Most of this knowledge is human knowledge of the regular kind, nothing exciting about it, epistemologically speaking.
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  49. John F. Kihlstrom & S. B. Klein (1997). Self-Knowledge and Self-Awareness. In James G. Snodgrass & R. Thompson (eds.), The Self Across Psychology: Self-Recognition, Self-Awareness, and the Self Concept. New York Academy of Sciences.
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  50. Robert Kirk (1971). Armstrong's Analogue of Introspection. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (April):158-62.
  51. William C. Kneale (1950). Experience and Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:I.
  52. Ole Koksvik, Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique.
    In some philosophical arguments an important role is played by the claim that certain situations differ from each other with respect to phenomenology. One class of such arguments are minimal pair arguments. These have been used to argue that there is cognitive phenomenology, that high-level properties are represented in perceptual experience, that understanding has phenomenology, and more. I argue that facts about our mental lives systematically block such arguments, reply to a range of objections, and apply my critique to some (...)
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  53. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Review of E. Schwitzgebel, Perplexities of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  54. Uriah Kriegel (2007). The Phenomenologically Manifest. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.
    Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I (...)
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  55. Harold Langsam (2002). Consciousness, Experience, and Justification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-28.
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  56. Stephen Leeds (1993). Qualia, Awareness, Sellars. Noûs 27 (3):303-330.
  57. Keith Lehrer (2006). Consciousness, Representation, and Knowledge. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
  58. Ramon M. Lemos (1965). Immediacy, Privacy, and Ineffability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (June):500-515.
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  59. Joseph Levine (2003). Knowing What It's Like. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
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  60. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket. Synthese 149 (1):37-58.
    A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some (...)
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  61. Pete Mandik, Swamp Mary Semantics: A Case for Physicalism Without Gaps.
    I argue for the superiority of non-gappy physicalism over gappy physicalism. While physicalists are united in denying an ontological gap between the phenomenal and the physical, the gappy affirm and the non-gappy deny a relevant epistemological gap. Central to my arguments will be contemplation of Swamp Mary, a being physically intrinsically similar to post-release Mary (a physically omniscient being who has experienced red) but has not herself (the Swamp being) experienced red. Swamp Mary has phenomenal knowledge of a phenomenal character (...)
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  62. Pete Mandik, Transcending Zombies.
    I develop advice to the reductionist about consciousness in the form of a transcendental argument that depends crucially on the sorts of knowledge claims concerning consciousness that, as crucial elements in the anti-reductionists’ epistemicgap arguments, the anti-reductionist will readily concede. The argument that I develop goes as follows. P1. If I know that I am not a zombie, then phenomenal character is (a certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content. P2. I know that I am not a zombie. P3. Phenomenal character (...)
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  63. Pete Mandik (2010). Swamp Mary's Revenge: Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge and Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (2).
    Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it’s like to have experiences of, e.g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists are in a superior (...)
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  64. J. Barry Maund (1976). Awareness of Sensory Experience. Mind 85 (July):412-416.
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  65. Alain Morin & Jennifer Everett (1990). Inner Speech as a Mediator of Self-Awareness, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge: An Hypothesis. New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.
  66. Thomas Natsoulas (1989). An Examination of Four Objections to Self-Intimating States of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:63-116.
  67. Thomas Natsoulas (1988). Is Any State of Consciousness Self-Intimating? Journal of Mind and Behavior 9:167-203.
  68. Thomas Natsoulas (1977). Consciousness: Consideration of an Inferential Hypothesis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 7 (April):29-39.
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  69. Catherine Osborne (1983). Aristotle, De Anima 3. 2: How Do We Perceive That We See and Hear? The Classical Quarterly 33 (02):401-411.
    The second chapter of book three of the De anima marks the end of Aristotle's discussion of sense-perception. The chapter is a long one and apparently rambling in subject matter. It begins with a passage that is usually taken as a discussion of some sort of self-awareness, particularly awareness that one is perceiving, although such an interpretation raises some difficulties. This paper reconsiders the problems raised by supposing that the question discussed in the first paragraph is ‘how do we perceive (...)
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  70. Kathryn P. Parsons (1970). Mistaking Sensations. Philosophical Review 79 (April):201-213.
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  71. David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
    A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think (...)
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  72. Jesse Prinz, Mental Pointing.
    It is one thing to have phenomenal states and another thing to think about phenomenal states. Thinking about phenomenal states gives us knowledge that we have them and knowledge of what they are like. But how do we think about phenomenal states? These days, the most popular answer is that we use phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts are presumed to be concepts that represent phenomenal states in a special, intrinsically phenomenal, way. The special nature of phenomenal concepts is said to be (...)
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  73. Thomas Raleigh (2009). Understanding How Experience "Seems". European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):67-78.
    I argue against one way of understanding the claim that how one’s visual experience “seems” provides support for the naïve-realist theory and weighs against sense-data theories (and other theories). If my argument is correct, and we abandon this way of understanding how experience “seems”, we would lose one reason for favouring naïve-realism at the start of the dialectic of the traditional problem of perception. En route, I distinguish diff erent ways of understanding the (alleged) transparency of experience, consider how to (...)
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  74. William S. Robinson (1982). Causation, Sensations, and Knowledge. Mind 91 (October):524-40.
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  75. Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.) (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.
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  76. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Self-Knowledge and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):195 - 209.
  77. Theodore W. Schick (1992). The Epistemic Role of Qualitative Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):383-93.
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  78. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
    Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say (...)
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  79. Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):35-53.
  80. Eric Schwitzgebel (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience.
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  81. Mark F. Sharlow, Knowledge of How Things Seem to You: Readings in From Brain to Cosmos.
    This document consists primarily of an excerpt (chapter 4) from the author’s book From Brain to Cosmos. That excerpt presents a study of a specific problem about knowledge: the logical justification of one’s knowledge of the immediate past. (This document depends heavily upon the concept of subjective fact that the author developed in chapters 2 and 3 of From Brain to Cosmos. Readers unfamiliar with that concept are strongly advised to read those chapters first. See the last page of this (...)
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  82. Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.) (1999). Models of the Self. Imprint Academic.
    A comprehensive reader on the problem of the self as seen from the viewpoints of philosophy, developmental psychology, robotics, cognitive neuroscience, ...
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  83. Charles Siewert (2001). Self-Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity. Noûs 35 (4):542-68.
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  84. J. J. C. Smart (1971). Reports of Immediate Experiences. Synthese 22 (May):346-359.
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  85. Declan Smithies (forthcoming). On the Unreliability of Introspection. Philosophical Studies.
    In his provocative and engaging new book, Perplexities of Consciousness, Eric Schwitzgebel makes a compelling case that introspection is unreliable in the sense that we are prone to ignorance and error in making introspective judgments about our own conscious experience. My aim in this commentary is to argue that Schwitzgebel’s thesis about the unreliability of introspection does not have the damaging implications that he claims it does for the prospects of a broadly Cartesian approach to epistemology.
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  86. Declan Smithies (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification. In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan.
    In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal mentalism provides the best explanation (...)
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  87. Declan Smithies (forthcoming). The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass.
    This is the second in a series of two articles that serve as an introduction to recent debates about cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical role. The first article examines questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology, while the second article explores the (...)
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  88. Declan Smithies (2012). A Simple Theory of Introspection. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only (...)
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  89. Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2012). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and (...)
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  90. Ernest Sosa (2003). Consciousness and Self-Knowledge. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
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  91. Timothy L. S. Sprigge (1981). Knowledge of Subjectivity. Theoria to Theory 14 (June):313-25.
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  92. Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (2012). Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview. In Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Introspection stands at the interface between two major currents in philosophy and related areas of science: on the one hand, there are metaphysical and scientific questions about the nature of consciousness; and on the other hand, there are normative and epistemological questions about the nature of self-knowledge. Introspection seems tied up with consciousness, to the point that some writers define consciousness in terms of introspection; and it is also tied up with self-knowledge, since introspection is the distinctive way in which (...)
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  93. Paul E. Tibbetts (1972). Feigl on Raw Feels, the Brain, and Knowledge Claims: Some Problems Regarding Theoretical Concepts. Dialectica 26:247-66.
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  94. Robert van Gulick (2000). Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
  95. Charles F. Wallraff (1953). On Immediacy and the Contemporary Dogma of Sense-Certainty. Journal of Philosophy 50 (January):29-38.
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  96. Richard Warner (1996). Facing Ourselves: Incorrigibility and the Mind-Body Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):217-30.
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  97. Richard Warner (1994). In Defense of a Dualism. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
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  98. Sebastian Watzl & Wayne Wu (2012). Perplexities of Consciousness, by Eric Schwitzgebel. [REVIEW] Mind 121 (482):524-529.
    In this review of Eric Schwitzgebel's "Perplexities of Consciousness", we discuss the book's arguments in light of the role of attention in introspection.
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  99. Alan R. White (1981). Knowledge, Acquaintance, and Awareness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):159-172.
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  100. Edoardo Zamuner (2008). Knowledge and Self-Knowledge of Emotions. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This thesis addresses two questions. One concerns the metaphysics of emotions and asks what kinds of mental states emotions are. The other asks how the metaphysics of emotions bears on first and third-personal knowledge of emotions. There are two prevailing views on the nature of emotions. They are the perception and cognitive views. The perception view argues that emotions are bodily feelings. The cognitive view, by contrast, contends that emotions are some sorts of evaluative judgments. I show that both views (...)
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