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  1. Scott F. Aikin (2006). Modest Evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343.
    Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditions. As such, a (...)
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  2. Timothy Allen & Joshua May (forthcoming). Does Opacity Undermine Privileged Access? International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
    [Critical Notice] Carruthers argues that knowledge of our own propositional attitudes is achieved by the same mechanism used to attain knowledge of other people’s minds. This seems incompatible with “privileged access”—the idea that we have more reliable beliefs about our own mental states, regardless of the mechanism. At one point Carruthers seems to suggest he may be able to maintain privileged access, because we have additional sensory information in our own case. We raise a number of worries for this suggestion, (...)
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  3. Torin Alter (2009). Does the Ignorance Hypothesis Undermine the Conceivability and Knowledge Arguments? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):756-765.
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  4. Torin Alter (2008). 13 Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience. In Edmond L. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press. 247.
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  5. Murat Aydede (2003). Is Introspection Inferential? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
    I introduce the Displaced Perception Model of Introspection developed by Dretske which treats introspection of phenomenal states as inferential and criticize it.
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  6. Katalin Balog (2012). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 16.
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
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  7. Imants Baruss (1998). Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality of Participants at 'Tucson II'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):483-496.
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  8. Benjamin Bayer, From Folk Psychology to Folk Epistemology: The Status of Radical Simulation.
    In this paper I consider one of the leading philosophic-psychological theories of “folk psychology,” the simulation theory of Robert Gordon. According to Gordon, we attribute mental states to others not by representing those states or by applying the generalizations of theory, but by imagining ourselves in the position of a target to be interpreted and exploiting our own decision-making skills to make assertions which we then attribute to others as ‘beliefs’. I describe a leading objections to Gordon’s theory—the problem of (...)
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  9. Tim Bayne (2001). Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):407 - 419.
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  10. Timothy J. Bayne (2001). Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):407-19.
    We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM), David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. (...)
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  11. E. Bouratinos (2003). A Pre-Epistemology of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):38-41.
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  12. Francis H. Bradley (1909). On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience. Mind 18 (69):40-64.
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  13. Raymond D. Bradley (1964). Avowals of Immediate Experience. Mind 73 (April):186-203.
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  14. Selmer Bringsjord (2010). Meeting Floridi's Challenge to Artificial Intelligence From the Knowledge-Game Test for Self-Consciousness. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312.
    Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is to (...)
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  15. Wendell T. Bush (1906). The Privacy of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (2):42-45.
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  16. Jack C. Carloye (1991). Consciousness and Introspective Knowledge. Methodology and Science 8:8-22.
  17. David J. Chalmers (1996). The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  18. Thomas W. Clark (2005). Killing the Observer. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):38-59.
    Phenomenal consciousness is often thought to involve a first-person perspective or point of view which makes available to the subject categorically private, first-person facts about experience, facts that are irreducible to third-person physical, functional, or representational facts. This paper seeks to show that on a representational account of consciousness, we don't have an observational perspective on experience that gives access to such facts, although our representational limitations and the phenomenal structure of consciousness make it strongly seem that we do. Qualia (...)
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  19. Earl Conee (1994). Phenomenal Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.
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  20. Daniel C. Dennett (2002). How Could I Be Wrong? How Wrong Could I Be? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):13-16.
    One of the striking, even amusing, spectacles to be enjoyed at the many workshops and conferences on consciousness these days is the breathtaking overconfidence with which laypeople hold forth about the nature of consciousness Btheir own in particular, but everybody =s by extrapolation. Everybody =s an expert on consciousness, it seems, and it doesn =t take any knowledge of experimental findings to secure the home truths these people enunciate with such conviction.
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  21. John Dilworth (2006). Perception, Introspection, and Functional Consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.
    What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a _conforming _belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be _red _to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be (...)
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  22. Fred Dretske (2003). How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. 1--14.
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  23. Fred Dretske (1999). The Mind's Awareness of Itself. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.
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  24. John J. Drummond (2002). Phenomenological Epistemology. International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):134-136.
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  25. Steven Duncan, A Plea for Cardiognosis.
    In this paper, a follow-up to my "Seeing Other Minds," I encourage philosophers to explore the notion of cardiognosis - "knowledge of hearts" - as a unique, irreducible form of knowledge, and suggest some applications for this notion.
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  26. Steven M. Duncan, Mind, Body, Space, and Time.
    In this essay I explore some of the basic elements of consciousness from a substance dualist point of view, incorporating some elements of Kant's Transcendental Analytic into an overall account of the constitution of consciousness.
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  27. Steven M. Duncan, The Consequences of Neurophysiological Materialism.
    In this essay, I argue that neurophysiological materialism - the thesis that all of our mental contents are caused by non-mental, purely physical brain states - is epistemically self-refuting, and ought to be rejected even if it cannot be otherwise disproved.
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  28. Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  29. Uljana Feest (forthcoming). Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data. Philosophy of Science.
    This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical (...)
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  30. S. Benjamin Fink (2012). Knowing Pain. In Esther Cohen, Leona Toker, Manuela Consonni & Otniel E. Dror (eds.), Knowledge and Pain. Rodopi.
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  31. Eugen Fischer (2001). Discrimination: A Challenge to First-Person Authority? Philosophical Investigations 24 (4):330-346.
    It is no surprise that empirical psychology refutes, again and again, assumptions of uneducated common sense. But some puzzlement tends to arise when scientific results appear to call into question the very conceptual framework of the mental to which we have become accustomed. This paper shall examine a case in point: Experiments on colour-discrimination have recently been taken to refute an assumption of first-person authority that appears to be constitutive of our ordinary notion of perceptual experience. The paper is to (...)
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  32. Robert Francescotti (2000). Introspection and Qualia: A Defense of Infallibility. Communication and Cognition 33 (3-4):161-173.
  33. Manfred Frank (2002). Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge: On Some Difficulties with the Reduction of Subjectivity. Constellations 9 (3):390-408.
  34. Manfred Frank (2000). Self-Awareness and Self-Knowledge: Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription. In Willem van Reijen & Willem G. Weststeijn (eds.), Subjectivity. Rodopi.
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  35. Brie Gertler (2012). Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  36. Brie Gertler (2003). How to Draw Ontological Conclusions From Introspective Data. In , Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. 233.
  37. Brie Gertler (ed.) (2003). Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
    When read as demands for justification, these questions seem absurd. We don’t normally ask people to substantiate assertions like “I think it will rain tomorrow” or “I have a headache”. There is, at the very least, a strong presumption that sincere self-attributions about one’s thoughts and feelings are true. In fact, some philosophers believe that such self-attributions are less susceptible to doubt than any other claims. Even those who reject that extreme view generally acknowledge that there is some salient epistemic (...)
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  38. Brie Gertler (2001). Introspecting Phenomenal States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
    This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions (...)
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  39. Irwin Goldstein (1985). Communication and Mental Events. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (October):331-338.
    How do the young learn names for feelings? After criticizing Wittgensteinian explanations, I formulate and defend an explanation very different from Wittgensteinians embrace.
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  40. Willis Harman (1996). Toward a Science of Consciousness: Do We Need a New Epistemology? World Futures 47 (2):103-111.
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  41. Benj Hellie (2013). The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination. In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press.
    Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view (...)
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  42. Benj Hellie (2010). An Extenalist's Guide to Inner Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 97.
    Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...)
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  43. Benj Hellie (2009). Acquaintance. In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In every familiar case, a conscious subject has a perspective on the world. From time to time, various things are brought within this perspective: when one sees a mockingbird, or entertains a thought about Tony Blair, the mockingbird---or Blair---comes within one’s perspective. Upon reflection, it seems that not all entries into a subject’s perspective are on a par: the mockingbird when seen seems to be in some sense more intimately within one’s perspective than is Blair when merely thought about. This (...)
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  44. Benj Hellie (2007). Factive Phenomenal Characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
    This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does (...)
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  45. Benj Hellie (2007). Higher-Order Intentionalism and Higher-Order Acquaintance. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.
    I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be (...)
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  46. Benj Hellie (2005). Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability. Mind 114 (455):481-508.
    Perception represents colours inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'.
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  47. Christopher S. Hill (1988). Introspective Awareness of Sensations. Topoi 7 (March):11-24.
    My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs.
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  48. Chien-Hsing Ho (2007). Consciousness and Self-Awareness. Asian Philosophy 17 (3):213 – 230.
    In this paper I propose to inquire into the theory of self-awareness propounded by the two Buddhist epistemologists, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. I first give an outline of the Buddhist notion of consciousness, then deal with the notion of objectual appearance, and finally dwell on the theory itself together with certain arguments in its favor. It is shown that the Buddhists subscribed themselves to the following self-awareness thesis: that our waking consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. Adopting an (...)
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  49. Frank Hofmann (2009). Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence. Erkenntnis 71 (1):19 - 34.
    The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing this’ is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing a pain’ occurs. This second self-ascription is (...)
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  50. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 41-61.
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