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Knowledge

Edited by Clayton Littlejohn (King's College London)
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  1. Celso Martins Azar Filho (2012). Método e estilo, subjetividade e conhecimento nos ensaios de Montaigne. Kriterion 53 (126):559-578.
    A característica mais notável da filosofia renascentista foi também o que tornou sua assimilação pela história da filosofia tão difícil: a interação entre forma e conteúdo, entre ideia e sua expressão. Tal resulta da tentativa de realizar outra inter-relação que lhe é ainda mais essencial: aquela entre teoria e prática, pensamento e ação. Nos Ensaios de Montaigne, o método constitui antes de tudo um estilo de vida: a linguagem é aí o meio pelo qual a implicação entre mundos externos e (...)
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  2. Luís Manuel A. V. Bernardo (2012). Introdução Ao Problema Do Conhecimento Em Pontos de Referência, de Francisco Vieira de AlmeidaIntroduction to the Problem of Knowledge in Pontos de Referência by Francisco Vieira de Almeida. Cultura:33-63.
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  3. Steffen Borge (2006). Knowledge and Lotteries, by John Hawthorne. Disputatio.
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  4. B. W. Bower (2004). Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology-Stephen Hetherington. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1; ISSU 173):107-107.
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  5. Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger (eds.) (2004). Contextualisms in Epistemology.
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  6. Jessica Brown (2014). Shifty Talk: Knowledge and Causation. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):183-199.
    In this paper, I criticise one main strategy for supporting anti-intellectualism, the view that whether a subject knows may depend on the stakes. This strategy appeals to difficulties with developing contextualist and pragmatic treatments of the shiftiness of our talk about knowledge to motivate anti-intellectualism. I criticise this strategy by drawing an analogy between debates about causation and knowledge. In each case, talk about a phenomenon is shifty and contextualist and pragmatic explanations of the shifty talk face the same objections. (...)
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  7. Thomas O. Buford (1982). Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 36 (2):443-444.
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  8. José Mauricio de Carvalho (2012). Djacir Menezes E o Problema Do conhecimentoDjacir Menezes and the Problem of Knowledge. Cultura:65-73.
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  9. Hector Neri Castaneda (1965). Knowledge and Certainty. Review of Metaphysics 18 (3):508 - 547.
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  10. Kuang-Ming Cheng (2005). Must We Know What We Mean? Kriterion 19 (1):21-33.
    In his 1987 article “Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person”, John Searle argues that we actually know what we mean; therefore, W. V. O. Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation must be wrong. In this paper, I will try to identify the mistakes in Searle’s criticism of Quine’s story. I will argue that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses— that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. With these two indeterminacies in mind, Quine’s indeterminacy (...)
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  11. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (1999). Die Stellung der Theorie der Intersubjektivität im System der Husserlschen transzendentalen Phänomenologie. Conceptus 32 (80):99-138.
    Die Theorie der Intersubjektivität bildet einen der zentralen Punkte des Husserlschen Systems. Im Rahmen der konsequenten Epistemisierung des Wahrheitsbegriffs, die Husserl von Brentano übernommen hat, wird die objektive Realität mittels des Begriffs der intersubjektiven epistemischen Begründung definiert. Die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Gemeinschaft bildet demgemäß die unentbehrliche Vorbedingung für die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Welt. Wir zeigen, daß die Husserlsche Theorie nicht einwandfrei funktioniert. Es ist vor allem das Zusammenspiel des Begriffsempirismus mit dem epistemologischen Fundamentalismus, das das Scheitern seiner Version der Analogieschluß-Theorie (...)
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  12. D. S. Clarke (1992). Knowledge and Ethics. Journal of Information Ethics 1 (2):22-31.
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  13. E. J. Coffman (2010). Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.
    Gettiered beliefs are those whose agents are subject to the kind of epistemologically significant luck illustrated by Gettier Cases. Provided that knowledge requires ungettiered belief, we can learn something about knowledge by figuring out how luck blocks it in Gettier Cases. After criticizing the most promising of the going approaches to gettiered belief—the Risk of False Belief Approach—, I explain and defend a new approach: the Risk of Misleading Dispositions Approach.Roughly, this view says that a belief is gettiered just in (...)
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  14. Fabrice Correia, Jessica Leech & Mollie Molyneaux (2011). Genevan Ruminations on The Metaphysics of Knowledge. Dialectica 65 (1):117-123.
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  15. Claudio F. Costa (2010). A Perspectival Definition of Knowledge. Ratio 23 (2):151-167.
    In this paper an improved formulation of the classical tripartite view of knowledge is proposed and defended. This formulation solves Gettier's problem by making explicit what is concealed by the symbolic version of the tripartite definition, namely, the perspectival context in which concrete knowledge claims are evaluated.
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  16. John Dewey (1910). Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (18):477-481.
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  17. Samuel Dimas (2012). A Filosofia Do Conhecimento de Leonardo CoimbraThe Philosophy of Knowledge of Leonardo Coimbra. Cultura:11-23.
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  18. Paul Dimmock & Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes (2014). Knowledge, Conservatism, and Pragmatics. Synthese 191 (14):3239-3269.
    The apparent contextual variability exhibited by ‘knows’ and its cognates—brought to attention in examples like Keith DeRose’s Bank Case—poses familiar problems for conservative forms of invariantism about ‘knows’. The paper examines and criticises a popular response to those problems, one that involves appeal to so-called ‘pragmatic’ features of language. It is first argued, contrary to what seems to have been generally assumed, that any pragmatic defence faces serious problems with regard to our judgments about retraction. Second, the familiar objection that (...)
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  19. Sinan Dogramaci (2010). Knowledge of Validity. Noûs 44 (3):403-432.
    What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of (...)
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  20. Joaquim Domingues (2012). O Tema Do Conhecimento Na Obra de Vilém FlusserThe Subject of Knowledge in the Work of Vilém Flusser. Cultura:125-133.
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  21. Gillian Russell with John Doris, Knowledge by Indifference.
    Is it harder to acquire knowledge about things that really matter to us than it is to acquire knowledge about things we don’t much care about? Jason Stanley (2005) argues that whether or not the relational predicate “knows that” holds between an agent and a proposition can depend on the practical interests of the agent: the more it matters to a person whether p is the case, the more justification is required before she counts as knowing that p.2 In Stanley’s (...)
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  22. Andreas Dorschel (ed.) (2009). Kunst und Wissen in der Moderne. Böhlau.
    The relationship between art and knowledge is subject to historical change. In the early 19th century, the view was still prevalent that art was about eternal values, especially beauty, whereas science was entirely involved in historical time: The former was seen as contemplative, the latter as searching. But ever since, most artists have given up that stance and hence the once imagined detachment from historical time. They search, and sometimes research, too. Does that mean that art and science have come (...)
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  23. Igor Douven & Jos Uffink (2012). Quantum Probabilities and the Conjunction Principle. Synthese 184 (1):109-114.
    A recent argument by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio purports to show that we can uphold the principle that competently forming conjunctions is a knowledge-preserving operation only at the cost of a rampant skepticism about the future. A key premise of their argument is that, in light of quantum-mechanical considerations, future contingents never quite have chance 1 of being true. We argue, by drawing attention to the order of magnitude of the relevant quantum probabilities, that the skeptical threat of Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio’s (...)
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  24. Fred Dretske (1991). Two Conceptions of Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:15-30.
    There are two ways to think about knowledge: From the bottom-up point of view, knowledge is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene; it is what animals need in order to coordinate their behavior with the environmental conditions. The top-down approach, departing from Descartes, considers knowledge constituted by a justified belief which gains its justification only in so far as the process by means of which it is reached conforms to canons of sciemific inference and rational theory choice. Keith Lehrer's (...)
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  25. Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance (forthcoming). Wagering on Pragmatic Encroachment. In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford.
    Lately, there has been an explosion of literature exploring the the relationship between one’s practical situation and one’s knowledge. Some involved in this discussion have suggested that facts about a person’s practical situation might affect whether or not a person knows in that situation, holding fixed all the things standardly associated with knowledge (like evidence, the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties, and so on). According to these “pragmatic encroachment” views, then, one’s practical situation encroaches on one’s knowledge. Though we won’t (...)
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  26. Zachary Ernst (2011). What Is Common Knowledge? Episteme 8 (3):209-226.
    Common knowledge is usually defined as a state in which everyone knows that p, everyone knows that everyone knows that p, and so on, ad infinitum. This definition is usually attributed to David Lewis, despite the fact that his own formulation bears no resemblance to common knowledge as it is usually understood. In this paper, I argue that this concept of common knowledge requires revision. Contrary to usual practice, it turns out to be difficult to model formally because existing models (...)
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  27. Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
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  28. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55 - 66.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I (...)
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  29. Pirooz Fatoorchi (2013). On Intellectual Skepticism: A Selection of Skeptical Arguments and Ṭūsī's Criticisms, with Some Comparative Notes. Philosophy East and West 63 (2):213-250.
    This essay deals with a selected part of an epistemological controversy provided by Tūsī in response to the skeptical arguments reported by Rāzī that is related to what might be called "intellectual skepticism," or skepticism regarding the judgments of the intellect, particularly in connection with self-evident principles. It will be shown that Rāzī has cited and exposed a position that seems to be no less than a medieval version of empiricism. Tūsī, in contrast, has presented us with a position that (...)
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  30. Paul Faulkner (2013). Two-Stage Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, Dualism and the Problem of Sufficiency. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8):121-138.
    Social epistemology should be truth-centred, argues Goldman. Social epistemology should capture the ‘logic of everyday practices’ and describe socially ‘situated’ reasoning, says Fuller. Starting from Goldman’s vision of epistemology, this paper aims to argue for Fuller’s contention. Social epistemology cannot focus solely on the truth because the truth can be got in lucky ways. The same too could be said for reliability. Adding a second layer of epistemic evaluation helps only insofar as the reasons thus specified are appropriately connected to (...)
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  31. Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  32. Andrew Fenton, Re-Conceiving Nonhuman Animal Knowledge Through Contemporary Primate Cognitive Studies.
    Abstract In this paper I examine two claims that support the thesis that chimpanzees are substantive epistemic subjects. First, I defend the claim that chimpanzees are evidence gatherers (broadly construed to include the capacity to gather and use evidence). In the course of showing that this claim is probably true I will also show that, in being evidence gatherers, chimpanzees engage in a recognizable epistemic activity. Second, I defend the claim that chimpanzees achieve a degree of epistemic success while engaging (...)
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  33. Richard Foley, A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.
    In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was (...)
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  34. Maria de Lourdes Sirgado Ganho (2012). A Filosofia Do Conhecimento Em Delfim SantosThe Philosophy of Knowledge in Delfim Santos. Cultura:75-81.
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  35. Lloyd P. Gerson (2006). Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (4):455 – 474.
    In this paper I explore Plato's reasons for his rejection of the so-called standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. I argue that Plato held that knowledge is an infallible mental state in which (a) the knowable is present in the knower and (b) the knower is aware of this presence. Accordingly, knowledge (epistm) is non-propositional. Since there are no infallible belief states, the standard analysis, which assumes that knowledge is a type of belief, cannot be correct. In addition, (...)
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  36. Raymond Geuss (2005). Suffering and Knowledge in Adorno. Constellations 12 (1):3-20.
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  37. Valeria Giardino (2014). Geometria, ragionamento e scommesse. In University of Urbino © Isonomia – Epistemologica (ed.), Mettere a fuoco il mondo. 36-46.
    Poiché i miei interessi di ricerca si concentrano sul rapporto tra spazio e rappresentazione, nel presente articolo commenterò un lavoro di Achille C. Varzi pubblicato nel 2008 e intitolato, nella sua versione italiana, «Configurazioni, regole e inferenze». Accennerò anche a un secondo articolo scritto da Varzi e Massimo Warglien e pubblicato nel 2003, intitolato «The Geometry of Negation». Mi rivolgerò poi alla psicologia sperimentale, collegando alcuni aspetti delle osservazioni di Varzi a un articolo di Johnson- Laird del 2005 intitolato «The (...)
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  38. Carl Ginet (2010). Réplica a Hetherington. Veritas 55 (2):18-23.
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  39. Carl Ginet (1992). Causal Theories in Epistemology. In Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  40. Carl Ginet (1983). Four Difficulties with Dretske's Theory of Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):69-70.
    Four difficulties with Dretske's theory of knowledge .
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  41. Ranulph Glanville & Alexander Riegler (eds.) (2007). The Importance of Being Ernst: Festschrift for Ernst von Glasersfeld. Edition Echoraum.
    In 8 March 2007 Ernst von Glasersfeld attains the age of 90. In celebration of this, we take great pride in publishing this festschrift as our way of saying thank you, and of sending greetings and our affection to this remarkable, honest and modest man. A festschrift is a particular publication, and we have a particular approach. We require that in the all pieces we will publish, the work of von Glasersfeld will take centre stage. We also invite two types (...)
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  42. Daniel Greco (2014). Iteration and Fragmentation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):n/a-n/a.
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  43. Anil Gupta (2006). Review of John Koethe, Skepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9).
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  44. Jay E. Harker (1980). A Note on Believing That One Knows and Lehrer's Proof That Knowledge Entails Belief. Philosophical Studies 37 (3):321 - 324.
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  45. Gilbert Harman & Brett Sherman (2004). Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):492–500.
    John Hawthorne’s marvelous book contains a wealth of arguments and insights based on an impressive knowledge and understanding of contemporary discussion. We can address only a small aspect of the topic. In particular, we will offer our own answers to two questions about knowledge that he discusses.
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  46. W. Hazbun (2008). Book in Review: Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge, by Roxanne L. Euben. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 330 Pp. $29.95 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Political Theory 36 (1):172-174.
  47. Susan Hekman (2009). We Have Never Been Postmodern: Latour, Foucault and the Material of Knowledge. Contemporary Political Theory 8 (4):435.
    In We Have Never Been Modern Bruno Latour challenges the intellectual community to find an alternative to modernism that does not privilege either the discursive or the material in the construction of knowledge. A central aspect of his thesis is the rejection of postmodernism as a version of linguistic constructionism. I challenge his assessment of one postmodern, Michel Foucault, by arguing that Foucault's work successfully integrates the discursive and the material. Focusing on Foucault's theory of power, I argue that he (...)
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  48. Mark Heller (1999). Relevant Alternatives and Closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
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  49. Stephen Hetherington (2010). Free Will as a Sceptical Threat to Knowing. Principia 3 (1):139-154.
    Sceptics standardly argue that a person lacks knowledge due to an inability to know that some dire possibility is not being actualised in her believing that p. I argue that the usual sceptical Inventory of such possibilities should include one' s possibly having had some freedom in forming one's belief that p. A sceptic should conclude that wherever there might have been some such freedom, there is no knowledge that p. (This is not to say that sceptics would be correct (...)
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  50. Stephen Hetherington (2007). Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):41-69.
    If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism-the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in whichknowledge has to be robust. Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology’s supposed conceptual (...)
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