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Kripke's Wittgenstein or Kripkenstein is a fictional character customarily taken to be the person committed to the views of meaning, content, and rule-following presented in Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Kripkenstein first presents us with the skeptical challenge to explain what it is for expressions to have a particular meaning in a speaker's idiolect. Consider a word like '+' which is intuitively for applying the addition function or 'table' which is for talking about tables. Kripkenstein asks what makes it the case that in one's idiolect these words are indeed for doing these things. After all, we can assume that our history of past uses is entirely compatible with '+' being for applying the quaddition function (x quus y = x plus y, if x, y < 57, = 5 otherwise) or for talking about tabairs (a tabair = anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel tower or a chair found there). He then presents a skeptical argument by considering a series of potential answers and showing that they don't work. For starters, he argues that the relevant fact can't consist in a speaker's having given herself instructions how to use the expression because instructions would have to be stated in language and that would merely push back the problem. Second, he argues that it can't consist in her being disposed to use the expression in certain ways (e. g. when using ‘+’ one is disposed to give the sum, or when using ‘table’ one is disposed to do so only in the presence of tables) because this fails to make sense of the fact that using it in those ways is correct. Finally, he argues that we can't invoke simplicity considerations to rule out quaddition-like candidates, nor by claiming that the relevant state is primitive. Having drawn the skeptical conclusion that nothing makes It the case that expressions have particular meanings in our idiolects, Kripkenstein presents a skeptical solution by claiming that we should construe attributions of meaning, content etc. in non-factualist terms by taking them to be justifiable or permissible when the person to whom we attribute meaning, content etc. behaves like we do.

Key works Kripkenstein's discussion of meaning, content, and rule-following is presented in Kripke 1982. Important early commentaries include Forbes 1983, Blackburn 1984, and Goldfarb 1985 which defend the dispositionalist answer, Lewis 1983 which discusses invoking simplicity considerations, and McDowell 1984 and McGinn 1984 which discuss taking the state to be primitive and the relation between Wittgenstein's and Kripkenstein's views. Important later commentaries include Boghossian 1989, Pettit 1990, and Wilson 1994. Many of these papers are collected in Miller & Wright 2002. Recent discussions include Hattiangadi 2007 and Ginsborg 2011.
Introductions  Boghossian 1989; the Introduction to Miller & Wright 2002
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  1. Virgil C. Aldridge (1987). Kripke on Wittgenstein on Regulation. Philosophy 62 (241):375-384.
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  2. Barry G. Allen (1989). Gruesome Arithmetic: Kripke's Sceptic Replies. Dialogue 28 (2):257-264.
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  3. G. E. M. Anscombe (1985). Critical Notice: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):103-9.
  4. G. E. M. Anscombe (1985). Review of Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. [REVIEW] Ethics 95:342-352.
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  5. Gordon P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (1986). Reply to Mr Mounce. Philosophical Investigations 9 (3):199-204.
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  6. Gordon P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (1984). On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's Private Language Argument. Synthese 58 (3):407-450.
  7. Alexander Bird (2009). Kripke. In Christopher Belshaw & Gary Kemp (eds.), 12 Modern Philosophers. Wiley-Blackwell 153--72.
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  8. Simon W. Blackburn (1984). The Individual Strikes Back. Synthese 58 (March):281-302.
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  9. Paul A. Boghossian (1990). The Status of Content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.
    A n irrealist conception of a given region of discourse is the view that no real properties answer to the central predicates of the region in question. Any such conception emerges, invariably, as the result of the interaction of two forces. An account of the meaning of the central predicates, along with a conception of the sorts of property the world may contain, conspire to show that, if the predicates of the region are taken to express properties, their extensions would (...)
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  10. Paul A. Boghossian (1990). The Status of Content Revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (December):264-278.
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  11. Paul A. Boghossian (1989). The Rule-Following Considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49.
    I. Recent years have witnessed a great resurgence of interest in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, especially with those passages roughly, Philosophical Investigations p)I 38 — 242 and Remarks on the Foundations of mathematics, section VI that are concerned with the topic of rules. Much of the credit for all this excitement, unparalleled since the heyday of Wittgenstein scholarship in the early IIJ6os, must go to Saul Kripke's I4rittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It is easy to explain why. (...)
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  12. Alex Byrne (1996). On Misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):339-343.
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  13. John V. Canfield (1996). The Community View. Philosophical Review 105 (4):469-488.
  14. Rodrigo Jungmann de Castro (2008). 'Kripke's Near Miss' and Some Other Considerations On Rule Following. Princípios 15 (23):135-151.
    In his 1982 book Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke maintains that Wittgenstein´s rule following considerations land us with a skeptical argument about meaning. This essay contains a short exposition of Kripke´s argument. In addition, I hold, both on textual grounds and by an appeal to some select secondary literature, that Wittgenstein offered no such skeptical argument in the Philosophical Investigations . Although Wittgenstein certainly repudiates a view of meaning based on temporally located mental states, it does not (...)
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  15. Kai-Yuan Cheng (2002). Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox. Dissertation, City University of New York
    The rule-following paradox of Kripke's Wittgenstein posits that there is no fact of the matter about an individual that can determine whether he means one thing or another by a term, such as "+". The paradox thus renders the existence of meaning illusory. The objective of this thesis is to examine the paradox and try to offer a version of a dispositional account that can counteract Kripke's skeptics. ;Gaining insights from previous dispositionalist accounts of meaning and rule-following, including those of (...)
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  16. Paul Coates (1997). Meaning, Mistake, and Miscalculation. Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97.
    The issue of what distinguishes systems which have original intentionalityfrom those which do not has been brought into sharp focus by Saul Kripke inhis discussion of the sceptical paradox he attributes to Wittgenstein.In this paper I defend a sophisticated version of the dispositionalistaccount of meaning against the principal objection raised by Kripke in hisattack on dispositional views. I argue that the objection put by the sceptic,to the effect that the dispositionalist cannot give a satisfactory account ofnormativity and mistake, in fact (...)
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  17. Paul Coates (1995). Kripke's Skeptical Paradox: Normativeness and Meaning. Mind 1986 (January):77-80.
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  18. Paul Coates (1986). Kripke's Sceptical Paradox: Normativeness and Meaning. Mind 95 (377):77-80.
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  19. A. Collins (1992). On the Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):74-88.
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  20. F. Davies (1998). How Sceptical is Kripke's 'Sceptical Solution'. Philsophia 26 (1-2):119-40.
  21. S. Davies (1988). Kripke, Crusoe and Wittgenstein. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (March):52-66.
  22. Rodrigo Jungmann de Castro (2010). "Kripke´s Near Miss" and Some Other Considerations On Rule Following. Princípios 15 (23):135-151.
    In his 1982 book Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke maintains that Wittgenstein´s rule following considerations land us with a skeptical argument about meaning. This essay contains a short exposition of Kripke´s argument. In addition, I hold, both on textual grounds and by an appeal to some select secondary literature, that Wittgenstein offered no such skeptical argument in the Philosophical Investigations . Although Wittgenstein certainly repudiates a view of meaning based on temporally located mental states, it does not (...)
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  23. Craig Stephen Delancey (2007). Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language. Synthese 154 (2):231-257.
    I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful (...)
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  24. Florian Demont, Kripkenstein and Non-Reductionism About Meaning-Facts.
    In 1982 Saul A. Kripke proposed a reconstruction of the central insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The reconstruction prominently featured a sceptical challenge which soon was recognised as a new and very radical form of scepticism. According to the challenge there is no fact of the matter which constitutes meaning. As there is no such fact, the first-person authority people intuitively seem to have concerning what they mean is also baseless. In response to the sceptic, many solutions have (...)
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  25. Florian Demont-Biaggi (2014). Rules and Dispositions in Language Use. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Human language is not arbitrary. But how is its use constrained? Are there rules or general human dispositions that govern it? Rules and Dispositions in Language Use explains how correct language use is indeed governed by both rules and general human dispositions. It does so by bringing together themes from Ludwig Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky, which for many years have been thought to be incompatible. -/- Opening with a fresh discussion of Saul Kripke's work on rule-following and meaning, the question (...)
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  26. Michael Devitt (1990). Transcendentalism About Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (December):247-63.
  27. Michael Devitt & Georges Rey (1991). Transcending Transcendentalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):87-100.
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  28. Gary Ebbs (1997). Rule-Following and Realism. Harvard University Press.
    Through detailed and trenchant criticism of standard interpretations of some of the key arguments in analytical philosophy over the last sixty years, this book ...
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  29. Michael Esfeld, Rule-Following and the Ontology of the Mind.
    Rule-following has become a focus of philosophical interest since Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The case which Kripke makes is an argument against reducing the description of the beliefs of a person to a description in naturalistic terms. However, it has also implications for the metaphysics of mind. I claim that, contrary to what one might except, Kripke’s case contains an argument in favour of materialism in ontology.
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  30. Graeme R. Forbes (1983). Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:223-37.
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  31. Bryan Frances (2011). Kripke. In Barry Lee (ed.), Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language. Continuum 249-267.
    This chapter introduces Kripke's work to advanced undergraduates, mainly focussing on his "A Puzzle About Belief" and "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".
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  32. Christopher Gauker (1995). A New Skeptical Solution. Acta Analytica 113 (14):113-129.
    Kripke's puzzle about rule-following is a form of the traditional problem of the nature of linguistic meaning. A skeptical solution explains not what meaning is but the role that talk of meaning plays in the linguistic community. Contrary to what some have claimed, the skeptical approach is not self-refuting. However, Kripke's own skeptical solution is inadequate. He has not adequately explained the conditions under which we are justified in attributing meanings or the utility of the practice of attributing meanings. An (...)
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  33. Grant R. Gillett (1995). Humpty Dumpty and the Night of the Triffids: Individualism and Rule-Following. Synthese 105 (2):191-206.
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  34. Carl Ginet (1992). The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein's Problem About Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73.
    The paper explicates a version of dispositionalism and defends it against Kripke's objections (in his "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language") that 1) it leaves out the normative aspect of a rule, 2) it cannot account for the directness of the knowledge one has of what one meant, and 3) regarding rules for computable functions of numbers, a) there are numbers beyond one's capacity to consider and b) there are people who are disposed to make systematic mistakes in computing values (...)
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  35. Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
    I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive (indicating that speakers have reason to use the expression in a certain way) or semantic (designating certain uses as correct in a sense explicable in terms of truth). I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying (...)
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  36. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Inside and Outside Language: Stroud's Nonreductionism About Meaning. In Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press
    I argue that Stroud's nonreductionism about meaning is insufficiently motivated. First, given that he rejects the assumption that grasp of an expression's meaning guides or instructs us in its use, he has no reason to accept Kripke's arguments against dispositionalism or related reductive views. Second, his argument that reductive views are impossible because they attempt to explain language “from outside” rests on an equivocation between two senses in which an explanation of language can be from outside language. I offer a (...)
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  37. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Review of Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content, by Anandi Hattiangadi. [REVIEW] Mind 119 (476):1175-1186.
    Anandi Hattiangadi packs a lot of argument into this lucid, well-informed and lively examination of the meaning scepticism which Kripke ascribes to Wittgenstein. Her verdict on the success of the sceptical considerations is mixed. She concludes that they are sufficient to rule out all accounts of meaning and mental content proposed so far. But she believes that they fail to constitute, as Kripke supposed they did, a fully general argument against the possibility of meaning or content. Even though we are (...)
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  38. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
  39. Warren D. Goldfarb (1982). Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules. Journal of Philosophy 79 (September):471-488.
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  40. Steven Gross (forthcoming). The Metaphysics of Meaning: Hopkins on Wittgenstein. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Jim Hopkins defends a ‘straight’ response to Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, a response he ascribes to Wittgenstein himself. According to this response, what makes it the case that A means that P is that it is possible for another to interpret A as meaning that P. Hopkins thus advances a form of interpretivist judgment-dependence about meaning. I argue that this response, as well as a variant, does not succeed.
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  41. Andrea Guardo (2014). Semantic Dispositionalism and Non-Inferential Knowledge. Philosophia 42 (3):749-759.
    The paper discusses Saul Kripke's Normativity Argument against semantic dispositionalism: it criticizes the orthodox interpretation of the argument, defends an alternative reading and argues that, contrary to what Kripke himself seems to have been thinking, the real point of the Normativity Argument is not that meaning is normative. According to the orthodox interpretation, the argument can be summarized as follows: (1) it is constitutive of the concept of meaning that its instances imply an ought, but (2) it is not constitutive (...)
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  42. Andrea Guardo (2012). Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.
    This paper employs some outcomes (for the most part due to David Lewis) of the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of dispositions to evaluate those dispositional analyses of meaning that make use of the concept of a disposition in ideal conditions. The first section of the paper explains why one may find appealing the notion of an ideal-condition dispositional analysis of meaning and argues that Saul Kripke’s well-known argument against such analyses is wanting. The second section focuses on Lewis’ work (...)
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  43. Andrea Guardo (2012). Kripke's Account of the Rule-Following Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
    This paper argues that most of the alleged straight solutions to the sceptical paradox which Kripke (1982) ascribed to Wittgenstein can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. The dilemma is proved to be a by-product of a foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification, as applied to linguistic behaviour. It is maintained that the assumption is unnecessary and that the dilemma is therefore spurious. To this end, an alternative conception of (...)
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  44. Ian Hacking (1993). On Kripke's and Goodman's Uses of 'Grue'. Philosophy 68 (265):269-295.
    Kripke's lectures, published as Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language , posed a sceptical problem about following a rule, which he cautiously attributed to Wittgenstein. He briefly noticed an analogy between his new kind of scepticism and Goodman's riddle of induction. ‘Grue’, he said, could be used to formulate a question not about induction but about meaning: the problem would not be Goodman's about induction—‘Why not predict that grass, which has been grue in the past, will be grue in the (...)
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  45. Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird (2008). Dispositions, Rules, and Finks. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.
    This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes—interfering dispositions and conditions—to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all cases, at least (...)
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  46. Oswald Hanfling (1985). Was Wittgenstein a Sceptic? Philosophical Investigations 8 (January):1-16.
    According to kripke, Wittgenstein denied certain beliefs about meaning and other minds. But who holds these beliefs? we do "not" believe that "all future applications" of a word are "determined"; nor that "i give directions to myself"; nor that something has to "constitute" meaning. Such beliefs are distortions by realist philosophers; it needs no sceptic to deny them. Wittgenstein's "sympathy with the solipsist" is an illusion, Due to misreadings (and mistranslations) of the text. Wittgenstein's position is clear and does not (...)
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  47. Anandi Hattiangadi (2007). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford University Press.
    In Oughts and Thoughts, Anandi Hattiangadi provides an innovative response to the argument for meaning skepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on ...
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  48. Jussi Haukioja (2006). Hindriks on Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):219-239.
    This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks.
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  49. Jussi Haukioja (2004). Kripke's Finiteness Objection to Dispositionalist Theories of Meaning. In M. E. Reicher & J. C. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
    It is often thought that Blackburn and Boghossian have provided an effective reply to the finiteness objection to dispositional theories of meaning, presented by Kripke's Wittgenstein. In this paper I distinguish two possible readings of the sceptical demand for meaning-constitutive facts. The demand can be formulated in one of two ways: an A-question or a B-question. Any theory of meaning will give one of these explanatory priority over the other. I will then argue that the standard reply only works if (...)
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  50. Jussi Haukioja (2002). Soames and Zalabardo on Kripke's Wittgenstein. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):157-73.
    Two counterarguments, given by Scott Soames and Jos.
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