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  1. Derek Ball (2011). Property Identities and Modal Arguments. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (13).
    Physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.
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  2. R. L. Barnette (1977). Kripke's Pains. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):3-14.
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  3. Steven R. Bayne (1988). Kripke's Cartesian Argument. Philosophia 18 (July):265-270.
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  4. George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  5. George Bealer (1994). Mental Properties. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.
    It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity (...)
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  6. Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez (2013). Précis of "E-physicalism-a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness". Ideas Y Valores 152:268-297.
  7. Reinaldo Bernal Velásquez (2012). E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...)
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  8. Alex Blum (1989). Bayne on Kripke. Philosophia 19 (4):455-456.
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  9. J.-B. Blumenfeld (1975). Kripke's Refutation of Materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (April):151-6.
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  10. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  11. Richard Boyd (1980). Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol 1. 1--67.
  12. Alex Byrne (2007). Possibility and Imagination. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.
    forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives.
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  13. James D. Carney (1975). Kripke and Materialism. Philosophical Studies 27 (April):279-282.
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  14. James D. Carney & P. von Bretzel (1973). Modern Materialism and Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (May):78-81.
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  15. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). In Defence of Antecedent Physicalism. In A. Newen & R. van Riel (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. CSLI.
  16. Richard Double (1981). On a Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke's Dualism Argument. Philosophy Research Archives 1414.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory of reference. thus, (...)
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  17. Richard Double (1976). The Inconclusiveness of Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Theory. Auslegung 3 (June):156-65.
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  18. Fred Feldman (1980). Identity, Necessity, and Events. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.
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  19. Fred Feldman (1974). Kripke on the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):665-76.
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  20. Fred Feldman (1973). Kripke's Argument Against Materialism. Philosophical Studies 24 (November):416-19.
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  21. Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) (2002). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
    The capacity to represent things to ourselves as possible plays a crucial role both in everyday thinking and in philosophical reasoning; this volume offers much-needed philosophical illumination of conceivability, possibility, and the relations between them.
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  22. Olav Gjelsvik (1988). A Kripkean Objection to Kripke's Arguments Against the Identity-Theories. Inquiry 30 (December):435-50.
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  23. Peter Hanks (2008). Conceiving of Pain. Dialogue 47 (2):351-376.
    ABSTRACT: In this article we aim to see how far one can get in defending the identity thesis without challenging the inference from conceivability to possibility. Our defence consists of a dilemma for the modal argument. Either "pain" is rigid or it is not. If it is not rigid, then a key premise of the modal argument can be rejected. If it is rigid, the most plausible semantic account treats "pain" as a natural-kind term that refers to its causaI or (...)
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  24. Alexander Heinzel & Georg Northoff (2009). Kripke's Modal Argument is Challenged by His Implausible Conception of Introspection. Kriterion 22:13-31.
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  25. Christopher S. Hill (1981). Why Cartesian Intuitions Are Compatible with the Identity Thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):254-65.
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  26. Eli Hirsch (1986). Metaphysical Necessity and Conceptual Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):243-256.
  27. Emmett L. Holman (1988). Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity. Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29.
    The subjectivity of consciousness is widely regarded as a major stumbling block for materialist theories of mind. In this paper I show how Kripkean arguments against identity theories (Kripke, 1972), and in particular a Kripkean argument against qualia-material property identity developed by Frank Jackson (1980) are a way of highlighting this problem. (And such arguments are not the quasi-historical curiosities they are sometimes pictured as being, because problems confronting functionalism have led to a modest revival of identity theory.) As such, (...)
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  28. Frank Jackson (1980). A Note on Physicalism and Heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (March):26-34.
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  29. Dale Jacquette (1987). Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 41 (4):293-300.
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  30. Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
  31. Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press. 135-164.
    are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In both cases, i~thas usually been t'aken for granted in fife one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgements were possible, and in the other case in contemporary,'d-". philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are ppss. ible. I do not intend to deal with the Kantian question except to mention:ssj~",.
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  32. Jarrett Leplin (1979). Theoretical Identification and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophia 8 (October):673-88.
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  33. Michael E. Levin (1995). Tortuous Dualism. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):313-22.
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  34. Michael E. Levin (1975). Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Thesis. Journal of Philosophy 72 (March):149-67.
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  35. Dan López de Sa (2006). Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta (Why Aposteriority Is Not (Enough according to Kripke, Nor Is) Enough). Theoria 21 (3):245-255.
    Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...)
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  36. Pascal Ludwig, Kripke's Conceivability Argument Reconsidered.
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  37. William G. Lycan (1987). Consciousness. MIT Press.
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ...
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  38. William G. Lycan (1987). Functionalism and Essence. In , Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  39. William G. Lycan (1974). Kripke and the Materialists. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):677-89.
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  40. Norman Malcolm (1980). Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat. Philosophical Investigations 3 (1):12-20.
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  41. Grover Maxwell (1979). Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:9.
  42. Colin McGinn (1978). Reply to Woodfield's Identity Theories and the Argument From Epistemic Counterparts. Analysis 38 (June):144-146.
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  43. Colin McGinn (1977). Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions. Analysis 2 (January):78-80.
    It is argued that kripke's objections to the identity theory can be met by token theories. the crucial point is that the existence of the required qualitative counterparts is consistent with the absence of psychophysical correlations.
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  44. C. McMullen (1984). An Argument Against the Identity Theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:277-87.
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  45. Don A. Merrell (2006). Theoretical Identity, Reference Fixing, and Boyd's Defense of Type Materialism. Philosophia 34 (2):169-172.
    In his Materialism without Reductionism: What Materialism Does not Entail, Richard Boyd answers Kripke’s challenge to materialists to come up with a way to explain away the apparent contingency of mind-brain identities (such as ‘Pain=C-fiber firings’). Boyd accuses Kripke of an imaginative myopia manifesting itself as a failure to realize that the more theoretical term in the identity (‘C-fiber firings’) is fixed by contingent descriptions – descriptions that might pick out otherworldly kinds of neural events where C-fibres are absent. If (...)
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  46. Don A. Merrell (2005). Token Physicalism is Not Immune to Kripke's Essentialist Anti-Physicalist Argument. Philosophia 32 (1-4):383-388.
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  47. Laurence F. Mucciolo (1975). On Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Thesis. Philosophia 5 (October):499-506.
    "Pain" need not be a rigid designator, but instead may pick out a state by its causal role. If it is a rigid designator, then the apparent contingency of identity comes from imagining something else filling the causal role.
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  48. David Papineau, Kripke's Proof That We Are All Intuitive Dualists.
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  49. David Papineau, Kripke's Argument is Ad Hominem Not Two-Dimensional.
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  50. David Papineau (2007). Kripke's Proof is Ad Hominem Not Two-Dimensional. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.
    Identity theorists make claims like ‘pain = C-fibre stimulation’. These claims must be necessary if true, given that terms like ‘pain’ and ‘C-fibre stimulation’ are rigid. Yet there is no doubt that such claims appear contingent. It certainly seems that there could have been C-fibre stimulation without pains or vice versa. So identity theorists owe us an explanation of why such claims should appear contingent if they are in fact necessary.
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