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  1. Derek Ball (2011). Property Identities and Modal Arguments. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (13).
    Physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.
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  2. R. L. Barnette (1977). Kripke's Pains. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):3-14.
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  3. Steven R. Bayne (1988). Kripke's Cartesian Argument. Philosophia 18 (July):265-270.
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  4. George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  5. George Bealer (1994). Mental Properties. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.
    It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity (...)
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  6. Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez (2013). Précis of "E-physicalism-a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness". Ideas Y Valores 152 (152):268-297.
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
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  7. Reinaldo J. Bernal (2012). E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...)
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  8. Alex Blum (1989). Bayne on Kripke. Philosophia 19 (4):455-456.
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  9. J.-B. Blumenfeld (1975). Kripke's Refutation of Materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (April):151-6.
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  10. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  11. Andrea Borghini (ed.) (2010). Il Genio Compreso: La Filosofia di Saul Kripke. Carocci.
  12. Richard Boyd (1980). Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol 1 1--67.
  13. Alex Byrne (2007). Possibility and Imagination. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.
  14. James D. Carney (1975). Kripke and Materialism. Philosophical Studies 27 (April):279-282.
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  15. James D. Carney & P. von Bretzel (1973). Modern Materialism and Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (May):78-81.
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  16. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). In Defence of Antecedent Physicalism. In A. Newen & R. van Riel (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. CSLI
  17. Richard Double (1981). On a Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke's Dualism Argument. Philosophy Research Archives 1414.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory of reference. thus, (...)
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  18. Richard Double (1976). The Inconclusiveness of Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Theory. Auslegung 3 (June):156-65.
  19. Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded. Mind and Language.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this essay, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly (...)
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  20. Fred Feldman (1980). Identity, Necessity, and Events. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol
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  21. Fred Feldman (1974). Kripke on the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):665-76.
  22. Fred Feldman (1973). Kripke's Argument Against Materialism. Philosophical Studies 24 (November):416-19.
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  23. Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) (2002). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
    The capacity to represent things to ourselves as possible plays a crucial role both in everyday thinking and in philosophical reasoning; this volume offers much-needed philosophical illumination of conceivability, possibility, and the relations between them.
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  24. Olav Gjelsvik (1988). A Kripkean Objection to Kripke's Arguments Against the Identity-Theories. Inquiry 30 (December):435-50.
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  25. Alexander Heinzel & Georg Northoff (2009). Kripke's Modal Argument is Challenged by His Implausible Conception of Introspection. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):13-31.
    Kripke presented one of the most influential modal arguments against psycho-physical identities. His argument as exemplied by the identity of pain and its respective neural correlates will be analysed in detail. It shall be argued that his reasoning relies on an implausible conception of introspection implying an implausible conception of mental phenomena such as pain. His account does not consider possible interaction of pain and attention as well as the interaction of pain with other psychological factors. Theoretical and empirical evidences (...)
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  26. Christopher S. Hill (1981). Why Cartesian Intuitions Are Compatible with the Identity Thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):254-65.
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  27. Eli Hirsch (1986). Metaphysical Necessity and Conceptual Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):243-256.
  28. Emmett L. Holman (1988). Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity. Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29.
    The subjectivity of consciousness is widely regarded as a major stumbling block for materialist theories of mind. In this paper I show how Kripkean arguments against identity theories , and in particular a Kripkean argument against qualia-material property identity developed by Frank Jackson are a way of highlighting this problem. As such, Kripkean arguments are akin to recent discussions of subjectivity by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson . I then consider some recent attempts to refute Kripkean arguments or otherwise show (...)
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  29. Frank Jackson (1980). A Note on Physicalism and Heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (March):26-34.
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  30. Dale Jacquette (1987). Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 41 (4):293-300.
    SummaryMind‐body identity theories are standardly supposed to be logically contingent. Kripke defends a quasi‐Cartesian property dualism by observing that bodies and minds or mental and neurophysiological events or event‐types can always be assigned distinct rigid designators. The concept of rigid designation implies that possibly nonidentical rigidly designated bodies and minds are necessarily and therefore actually nonidentical. But Kripke's argument does not refute materialist reductions that affirm the actual identity of minds and bodies while admitting only the possible nonidentity of ncwigidly (...)
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  31. Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
  32. Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press 135-164.
    are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In both cases, i~thas usually been t'aken for granted in fife one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgements were possible, and in the other case in contemporary,'d-". philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are ppss. ible. I do not intend to deal with the Kantian question except to mention:ssj~".
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  33. Jarrett Leplin (1979). Theoretical Identification and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophia 8 (October):673-88.
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  34. Michael E. Levin (1995). Tortuous Dualism. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):313-22.
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  35. Michael E. Levin (1975). Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Thesis. Journal of Philosophy 72 (March):149-67.
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  36. Brian Loar (2004). Phenomenal States (Revised Version). In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. The MIT Press 219.
  37. Brian Loar (1997). Phenomenal States II. In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. The MIT Press
  38. Brian Loar (1997). Phenomenal States (Second Version). In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere, Eds). In Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press
  39. Dan López de Sa (2006). Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta (Why Aposteriority Is Not (Enough according to Kripke, Nor Is) Enough). Theoria 21 (3):245-255.
    Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...)
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  40. Pascal Ludwig, Kripke's Conceivability Argument Reconsidered.
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  41. William G. Lycan (1987). Consciousness. MIT Press.
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ..
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  42. William G. Lycan (1987). Functionalism and Essence. In Consciousness. MIT Press
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  43. William G. Lycan (1974). Kripke and the Materialists. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):677-89.
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  44. Norman Malcolm (1980). Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat. Philosophical Investigations 3 (1):12-20.
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  45. Grover Maxwell (1979). Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:9.
  46. Colin McGinn (1978). Reply to Woodfield's Identity Theories and the Argument From Epistemic Counterparts. Analysis 38 (June):144-146.
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  47. Colin McGinn (1977). Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions. Analysis 2 (January):78-80.
    It is argued that kripke's objections to the identity theory can be met by token theories. the crucial point is that the existence of the required qualitative counterparts is consistent with the absence of psychophysical correlations.
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  48. C. McMullen (1984). An Argument Against the Identity Theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (3):277-87.
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  49. Don A. Merrell (2006). Theoretical Identity, Reference Fixing, and Boyd's Defense of Type Materialism. Philosophia 34 (2):169-172.
    In his "Materialism without Reductionism: What Materialism Does not Entail," Richard Boyd answers Kripke's challenge to materialists to come up with a way to explain away the apparent contingency of mind-brain identities. Boyd accuses Kripke of an imaginative myopia manifesting itself as a failure to realize that the more theoretical term in the identity is fixed by contingent descriptions - descriptions that might pick out otherworldly kinds of neural events where C-fibres are absent. If this is something we can confuse (...)
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  50. Don A. Merrell (2005). Token Physicalism is Not Immune to Kripke's Essentialist Anti-Physicalist Argument. Philosophia 32 (1-4):383-388.
    In his (1977) "Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions," Colin McGinn argues that Donald Davidson's anomalous monism is untouched by Kripke's (1980) argument against the identity theory. The type-identity of the physical with the mental may very well fall at the feet of Kripke's powerful arguments, but a token identification, argues McGinn, is left standing due to the simple fact that token physicalism countenances a kind of imagined separation of token mental states with their corresponding token physical states. If McGinn (...)
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