Related categories
Siblings:
42 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Ferenc Altrichter (1985). Belief and Possibility. Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):364-382.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
    The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   36 citations  
  3. David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
    In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is Russellianism, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concernssubstitution of co-referring names in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context). Since `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus, this view implies that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   39 citations  
  4. Tony Cheng (2016). Compositionality and Believing That. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 15:60-76.
    This paper is about compositionality, belief reports, and related issues. I begin by introducing Putnam’s proposal for understanding compositionality, namely that the sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts and of its logical structure (section 1). Both Church and Sellars think that Putnam’s move is superfluous or unnecessary since there is no relevant puzzle to begin with (section 2). I will urge that Putnam is right in thinking that there is indeed a puzzle with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Sean Crawford (2004). A Solution for Russellians to a Puzzle About Belief. Analysis 64 (3):223-29.
  6. Mark Crimmins & John Perry (1989). The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs. Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685 - 711.
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   67 citations  
  7. Robert Fiengo & Robert May (2006). De Lingua Belief. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    It is beliefs of this sort--de linguabeliefs--that Robert Fiengo and Robert May explore in this book.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  8. Robert Fiengo & Robert May (1998). Names and Expressions. Journal of Philosophy 95 (8):377-409.
  9. Kit Fine (2007). Semantic Relationism. Blackwell Pub..
    Introducing a new and ambitious position in the field, Kit Fine’s _Semantic Relationism_ is a major contribution to the philosophy of language. Written by one of today’s most respected philosophers Argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought Proposes that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves Forms part of the prestigious new _Blackwell/Brown Lectures (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   43 citations  
  10. Graeme Forbes (1994). Donnellan on a Puzzle About Belief. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):169 - 180.
    Keith Donnellan has advanced an interpretation of Kripke's well-known "Puzzle About Belief" according to which the puzzle concerns the true nature of beliefs. In this paper I argue that the puzzle merely concerns problems that others can have in "reporting" a confused individual's beliefs. I conclude that a new-Fregean account of belief- ascription is best- equipped to solve the puzzle.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Bryan Frances (2002). A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription. Analysis 62 (2):116–125.
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the form (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Bryan Frances (2000). Disquotation and Substitutivity. Mind 109 (435):519-25.
    Millianism is reasonable; that is, it is reasonable to think that all there is to the semantic value of a proper name is its referent. But Millianism appears to be undermined by the falsehood of Substitutivity, the principle that interchanging coreferential proper names in an intentional context cannot change the truth value of the resulting belief report. Mary might be perfectly rational in assenting to ‘Twain was a great writer’ as well as ‘Clemens was not a great writer’. Her confusion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Bryan Frances (1999). Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles. Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.
    Kripke’s puzzle has puts pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g., if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, then (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Bryan Frances (1998). Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle. Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Bryan Frances (1998). Defending Millian Theories. Mind 107 (428):703-728.
    In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent, so it has no additional sense. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke’s puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean’s arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Richard Garrett (1991). Putnam on Kripke's Puzzle. Erkenntnis 34 (3):271 - 286.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Karen Green (1985). Is a Logic for Belief Sentences Possible? Philosophical Studies 47 (1):29 - 55.
    In this paper I distinguish normative and descriptive reasons for attempting to construct a logic for belief sentences, and argue that because the interpretation of the content of an attribution of belief is context sensitive and ambiguous, no simple logic is adequate.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). Brandom on Kripke's Puzzle. Logique Et Analyse 189:159-168.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Jesper Kallestrup (2003). Paradoxes About Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):107-117.
    Referentialism is the view that all there is to the meaning of a singular term is its referent. Referentialism entails Substitutivity, i.e., that co-referring terms are intersubstitutable salva veritate . Frege's Paradox shows that Referentialism is inconsistent given two principles: Disquotation says that if S assents to 'P', then S believes that P, and Consistency says that if S believes that P and that not-P, then S is not fully rational. Kripke's strategy was to save Substitutivity by showing that those (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20. David Kaplan (2013). De Re Belief. In Richard Hull (ed.), Presidential Addresses of The American Philosophical Association 1981–1990. Kluwer Academic Publishers 25-37.
  21. Saul A. Kripke (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel 239--83.
  22. Barry Lee (ed.) (forthcoming). Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language. Continuum.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. David Lewis (1981). What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):283 – 289.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  24. David Lumsden (1984). What Powers Kripke's Puzzle? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (2):189.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1981). A Proposed Solution to a Puzzle About Belief. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):501-510.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  26. A. Margalit (ed.) (1979). Meaning and Use. Reidel.
    This book contains a collection of papers presented at the Second Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter and is dedicated to the late Yehoshua Bar-Hillel.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27. Michael McGlone, Lewis on What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe.
    In “What Puzzling Pierre Does not Believe”, Lewis ([4], 412‐4) argues that the sentences (1) Pierre believes that London is pretty and (2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty both truly describe Kripke’s well‐known situation involving puzzling Pierre ([3]). Lewis also argues that this situation is not one according to which Pierre believes either the proposition (actually) expressed by (3) London is pretty or the proposition (actually) expressed by (4) London is not pretty. These claims, Lewis suggests, provide a (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Michael McGlone (2009). Understanding Kripke's Puzzles About Belief. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):487-514.
    In his famous 1979 article 'A Puzzle About Belief' Saul Kripke presents two puzzles regarding belief attribution, and he uses them to cast doubt on classical substitution arguments against the Millian view that a proper name has a 'denotation' (or reference) but no 'connotation' (or sense). In this article, I present Kripke's puzzles in what I take to be their most revealing form, discuss their relevance to the abovementioned arguments, briefly survey the ways in which philosophers have responded to these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Joseph G. Moore (1999). Misdisquotation and Substitutivity: When Not to Infer Belief From Assent. Mind 108 (430):335-365.
    In 'A Puzzle about Belief' Saul Kripke appeals to a principle of disquotation that allows us to infer a person's beliefs from the sentences to which she assents (in certain conditions). Kripke relies on this principle in constructing some famous puzzle cases, which he uses to defend the Millian view that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to its bearer. The examples are meant to undermine the anti-Millian objection, grounded in traditional Frege-cases, that truth-value is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. Gary Ostertag (2009). Review of Kit Fine, Semantic Relationism. [REVIEW] Austrlasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):345-9.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Gary Ostertag (2007). Review of Robert Fiengo, Robert May, De Lingua Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9).
  32. Gary Ostertag (2005). A Puzzle About Disbelief. Journal of Philosophy 102 (11):573-93.
    According to the naive theory of belief reports, our intuition that “Lois believes that Kent flies” is false results from our mistakenly identifying what this sentence implicates, which is false, with what it says, which is true. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it is here argued that the naive theory’s analysis of negative belief reports—sentences such as “Lois doesn't believe that Kent flies”—gives rise to equally problematic clashes with intuition, but that in this case no “pragmatic” explanation is available. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. D. E. Over (1983). On Kripke's Puzzle. Mind 92 (366):253-256.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  34. Rohit Parikh (2013). On Kripke's Puzzle About Time and Thought. In Kamal Lodaya (ed.), Logic and its Applications. Springer 121--126.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Mark Pinder (2014). Attitude Ascriptions and Acceptable Translations. Analysis 74 (3):530-540.
    Critical notice of Mark Richard's 'Context and the Attitudes: Meaning in Context, Volume 1'.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Angel Pinillos, 1. Introduction.
    In A Puzzle About Belief, Saul Kripke tells the story of a person caught in a classic Frege case. Peter is unaware that Paderewski the famous Polish politician, and Paderewski the famous Polish musician, are one and the same person. What is supposed to distinguish this Frege case from many others is that Peter associates a single name, 'Paderewski' with both of his conceptions. But not everyone may agree with this description. Richard Larson and Peter Ludlow, and Robert Fiengo and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Lewis Powell (2012). How to Refrain From Answering Kripke's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.
    In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in A Puzzle About Belief poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence Londres est jolie, but not to the English sentence London is pretty, both of which he understands perfectly well. The question to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Nathan U. Salmon (1986). Frege's Puzzle. Ridgeview.
  39. Stephen R. Schiffer (2006). A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports. Noûs 40 (2):361-368.
    (1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  40. Ted Sider, Kripke's Puzzle About Belief. Locke Lectures.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. David Sosa (1996). The Import of the Puzzle About Belief. Philosophical Review 105 (3):373-402.
    Relocating Kripke's puzzle about belief, this paper investigates i) in what the puzzle consists, exactly; ii) the method used in its construction; and iii) relations between meaning and rationality. Essential to Kripke's puzzle is a normative notion of contradictory belief. Different positions about the meaning of names yield different views of what constitutes the attribution of contradictory belief; and Kripke's puzzle unwittingly _imports a Millian assumption. Accordingly, the puzzle about belief is not independent of positions about the meaning of names.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  42. William Taschek (1988). Would a Fregean Be Puzzled by Pierre? Mind 97 (385):99-104.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography