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Laws as Relations between Universals

Edited by Markus Schrenk (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf)
Assistant editor: Florian Boge (University of Cologne, University of Düsseldorf)
About this topic
Summary The idea that laws of nature do not connect just any kind of properties -- for example the property of being an object that the pope possesses or the property of looking red to a bull -- is old. Laws of nature, so the intuition, say something about the regular co-occurrence of real properties and not just any made up classes of things. One way to put this is to say that laws hold between universals, another to say that they hold between perfectly natural properties.
Key works David Armstrong has written key works on both universals and laws of nature and also their relation: Armstrong 1982Armstrong 1978Armstrong 1983.
Introductions Armstrong 2010
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  1. D. M. Armstrong (2016). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press.
    First published in 1985, D. M. Armstrong's original work on what laws of nature are has continued to be influential in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Presenting a definitive attack on the sceptical Humean view, that laws are no more than a regularity of coincidence between stances of properties, Armstrong establishes his own theory and defends it concisely and systematically against objections. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Marc (...)
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  2. D. M. Armstrong (2001). Going Through the Open Door Again: Counterfactual Versus Singularist Theories of Causation. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman and Littlefield 163--176.
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  3. D. M. Armstrong (1999). Comment on Smart. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 171--172.
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  4. D. M. Armstrong (1997). Singular Causation and Laws of Nature. In John Earman & John Norton (eds.), The Cosmos of Science. University of Pittsburgh Press 498--511.
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  5. D. M. Armstrong (1996). Comments on Lierse. In P. Riggs (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Kluwer Academic Publishers 227--228.
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  6. D. M. Armstrong (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press.
    This is a study of a crucial and controversial topic in metaphysics and the philosophy of science: the status of the laws of nature. D. M. Armstrong works out clearly and in comprehensive detail a largely original view that laws are relations between properties or universals. The theory is continuous with the views on universals and more generally with the scientific realism that Professor Armstrong has advanced in earlier publications. He begins here by mounting an attack on the orthodox and (...)
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  7. D. M. Armstrong (1982). Laws of Nature as Relations Between Universals and as Universals. Philosophical Topics 13 (1):7-24.
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  8. David M. Armstrong (1999). Reply to Ellis. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 43--48.
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  9. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Open Door: Counterfactual Versus Singularist Theories of Causation. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 175--185.
  10. John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.) (1993). Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    D. M. Armstrong is an eminent Australian philosopher whose work over many years has dealt with such subjects as: the nature of possibility, concepts of the particular and the general, causes and laws of nature, and the nature of human consciousness. This collection of essays explores the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests. There are four sections to the book: possibility and identity, universals, laws and causality, and philosophy of mind. The contributors comprise an international (...)
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  11. Alexander Bird (2011). Lange and Laws, Kinds, and Counterfactuals. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. MIT Press
    In this paper I examine and question Marc Lange’s account of laws, and his claim that the law delineating the range of natural kinds of fundamental particle has a lesser grade of necessity that the laws connecting the fundamental properties of those kinds with their derived properties.
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  12. Alexander Bird (2005). The Ultimate Argument Against Armstrong's Contingent Necessitation View of Laws. Analysis 65 (286):147-55.
    I show that Armstrong’s view of laws as second-order contingent relations of ‘necessitation’ among categorical properties faces a dilemma. The necessitation relation confers a relation of extensional inclusion (‘constant conjunction’) on its relata. It does so either necessarily or contingently. If necessarily, it is not a categorical relation (in the relevant sense). If contingently, then an explanation is required of how it confers extensional inclusion. That explanation will need to appeal to a third-order relation between necessitation and extensional inclusion. The (...)
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  13. John Bolender (2006). Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which Are Basic and Which Are Derived? Philosophia 34 (4):405-410.
    Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This construal of (...)
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  14. David Brooks (1996). Ontology, Causality and Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):518.
    D. M. Armstrong is an eminent Australian philosopher whose work over many years has dealt with such subjects as: the nature of possibility, concepts of the particular and the general, causes and laws of nature, and the nature of human consciousness. This collection of essays explores the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests. There are four sections to the book: possibility and identity, universals, laws and causality, and philosophy of mind. The contributors comprise an international (...)
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  15. J. Butterfield (1985). Armstrong, D. M., "What is a Law of Nature"? [REVIEW] Mind 94:164.
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  16. John W. Carroll (1987). Ontology and the Laws of Nature. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):261 – 276.
    An argument for realism (i.E., The ontological thesis that there exist universals) has emerged in the writings of david armstrong, Fred dretske, And michael tooley. These authors have persuasively argued against traditional reductive accounts of laws and nature. The failure of traditional reductive accounts leads all three authors to opt for a non-Traditional reductive account of laws which requires the existence of universals. In other words, These authors have opted for accounts of laws which (together with the fact that there (...)
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  17. Eduardo Castro (2016). Is the Humean Defeated by Induction? A Reply to Smart. Philosophia 44 (2):435-446.
    This paper is a reply to Benjamin Smart’s : 319–332, 2013) recent objections to David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of induction : 503–511, 1991). To solve the problem of induction, Armstrong contends that laws of nature are the best explanation of our observed regularities, where laws of nature are dyadic relations of necessitation holding between first-order universals. Smart raises three objections against Armstrong’s pattern of inference. First, regularities can explain our observed regularities; that is, universally quantified conditionals are required (...)
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  18. Eduardo Castro (2013). On Induction: Time-Limited Necessity Vs. Timeless Necessity. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):67-82.
    Abstract: This paper defends David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of inductionb against Helen Beebee’s attack on that solution. To solve theproblem of induction, Armstrong contends that the timeless necessity explanation is the best explanation of our observed regularities, whereas Beebee attempts to demonstrate that the time-limited necessity explanation is an equally good explanation. Allegedly, this explanation blocks Armstrong’s solution. I demonstrate that even if the time-limited ecessity explanation were an equally good explanation of our observed regularities, this explanation does (...)
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  19. Rodrigo Cid (2013). As leis da natureza e os casos de Tooley. Manuscrito 36 (1):67-101.
    The purposes of this paper are: (1) to present four theories of the nature of natural laws, (2) to show that only one of them is capable of adequately answering to Tooley's Cases, and (3) indicate why these cases are relevant for our ontology. These purposes are important since the concept of "natural law" is used in many (if not all) realms of natural science and in many branches of philosophy; if Tooley's cases are possible, they represent situations that must (...)
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  20. Chris Daly (1994). Laws and Coincidences Contrasted. Analysis 54 (2):98 - 104.
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  21. Armstrong David (1996). Comments on Lierse. In P. Riggs (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Kluwer Academic Publishers 227.
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  22. Fred I. Dretske (1985). RMSTRONG, D. M.: "What is a Law of Nature"? [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36:79.
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  23. Fred I. Dretske (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
    It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are (...)
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  24. Margaret Drummond (1912). "Real Kinds" and "General Laws". Mind 21 (81):150-152.
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  25. Brian Ellis (1999). Response to David Armstrong. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 39--43.
  26. Evan Fales (1993). Are Causal Laws Contingent? In John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong. Cambridge Up
    It has been nearly a decade and a half since Fred Dretske, David Armstrong and Michael Tooley, having each rejected the Regularity theory, independently proposed that natural laws are grounded in a second-order relation that somehow binds together universals.' (l shall call this the ‘DTA theory’). In this way they sought to overcome the major - and notorious — shortcomings of every version of the Regularity theory: how to provide truth conditions for laws that lack instances; how to distinguish laws (...)
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  27. John Forge (1999). Laws of Nature as Relations Between Quantities? In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 111--124.
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  28. John Forge (1986). David Armstrong on Functional Laws. Philosophy of Science 53 (4):584-587.
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  29. Steven Louis Goldman (1987). What is a Law of Nature? (D. M. Armstrong). [REVIEW] History of European Ideas 8 (1):97-97.
  30. Toby Handfield (2005). Armstrong and the Modal Inversion of Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):452–461.
    D. M. Armstrong has objected that the Dispositionalist theory of laws and properties is modally inverted, for it entails that properties are constituted by relations to non-actual possibilia. I contend that, if this objection succeeds against Dispositionalism, then Armstrong's nomic necessitation relation is also modally inverted. This shows that at least one of Armstrong's reasons for preferring a nomic necessitation theory is specious.
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  31. Adrian Heathcote & D. M. Armstrong (1991). Causes and Laws. Noûs 25 (1):63-73.
  32. Tyler Hildebrand (2013). Tooley's Account of the Necessary Connection Between Law and Regularity. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):33-43.
    Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong accept a theory of governing laws of nature according to which laws are atomic states of affairs that necessitate corresponding natural regularities. Some philosophers object to the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong theory on the grounds that there is no illuminating account of the necessary connection between governing law and natural regularity. In response, Michael Tooley has provided a reductive account of this necessary connection in his book Causation (1987). In this essay, I discuss an improved version (...)
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  33. Tyler Hildebrand (2013). Can Primitive Laws Explain? Philosophers' Imprint 13 (15):1-15.
    One reason to posit governing laws is to explain the uniformity of nature. Explanatory power can be purchased by accepting new primitives, and scientists invoke laws in their explanations without providing any supporting metaphysics. For these reasons, one might suspect that we can treat laws as wholly unanalyzable primitives. (John Carroll’s *Laws of Nature* (1994) and Tim Maudlin’s *The Metaphysics Within Physics* (2007) offer recent defenses of primitivism about laws.) Whatever defects primitive laws might have, explanatory weakness should not be (...)
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  34. Herbert Hochberg (1981). Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):386-399.
    The paper considers recent proposals by Armstrong, Dretske, and Tooley that revive the view that statements of laws of nature are grounded by the existence of higher order facts relating universals. Several objections to such a view are raised and an alternative analysis, recognizing general facts, is considered. Such an alternative is shown to meet a number of the objections raised against the appeal to higher order facts and it is also related to views of Hume and Wittgenstein. Further objections (...)
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  35. Gürol Irzik (1991). Armstrong's Account of Probabilistic Laws. Analysis 51 (4):214 - 217.
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  36. Amy Karofsky (2011). The Ultimate Argument Against Armstrong's Contingent Necessitation View of Laws. Metaphilosophy 42 (5):723-733.
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  37. Max Kistler (2005). Necessary Laws. In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature’s Principles. Springer 201-227.
    In the first part of this paper, I argue against the view that laws of nature are contingent, by attacking a necessary condition for its truth within the framework of a conception of laws as relations between universals. I try to show that there is no independent reason to think that universals have an essence independent of their nomological properties. However, such a non-qualitative essence is required to make sense of the idea that different laws link the same universals in (...)
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  38. Martin Leckey (1995). The Necessitarian Perspective: Laws as Natural Entailments. In F. Weinert (ed.), Laws of Nature. Walter de Gruyter 92-119.
    We maintain that there is something called natural necessity that is involved in the laws of nature -laws are concerned with what must happen, and what could not possibly happen. rather than merely what does and does not happen. Some recent believers in natural necessity, such as Dretske [1977], Tooley [1977,1987] and Armstrong [1978, 1983], have argued that this natural necessity arises from certain relations among the properties of things in our world - they argue that there are relations of (...)
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  39. Duncan Maclean (2012). Armstrong and van Fraassen on Probabilistic Laws of Nature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):1-13.
    In What is a Law of Nature? (1983) David Armstrong promotes a theory of laws according to which laws of nature are contingent relations of necessitation between universals. The metaphysics Armstrong develops uses deterministic causal laws as paradigmatic cases of laws, but he thinks his metaphysics explicates other sorts of laws too, including probabilistic laws, like that of the half-life of radium being 1602 years. Bas van Fraassen (1987) gives seven arguments for why Armstrong’s theory of laws is incapable of (...)
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  40. D. H. Mellor (1990). Laws, Chances and Properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):159 – 170.
    Abstract The paper develops a unified account of both deterministic and indeterministic laws of nature which inherits the merits but not the defects of the best existing accounts. As in Armstrong's account, laws are embodied in facts about universals; but not in higher?order relations between them, and the necessity of laws is not primitive but results from their containing chances of 0 or 1. As in the Ramsey?Lewis account, law statements would be the general axioms and theorems of the simplest (...)
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  41. Stephen Mumford (2007). David Armstrong. Routledge.
    David Armstrong is one of Australia's greatest philosophers. His chief philosophical achievement has been the development of a core metaphysical programme, embracing the topics of universals, laws, modality and facts: a naturalistic metaphysics, consistent with a scientific view of the natural world. It is primarily through his work that Australian philosophy, and Australian metaphysics in particular, enjoys such a high reputation in the rest of the world. In this book Stephen Mumford offers an introduction to the full range of Armstrong's (...)
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  42. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1978). Dretske on Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 45 (3):431-439.
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  43. L. J. O'neill (1985). RMSTRONG, D. M.: "What is a Law of Nature"? [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:233.
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  44. Joan Pag (2002). The Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong Theory of Natural Laws and the Inference Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (3):227 – 243.
    In this article I intend to show that the inference problem, one of the main objections raised against the anti-Humean theory of natural laws defended by Dretske, Tooley and Armstrong ("DTA theory" for short), can be successfully answered. First, I argue that a proper solution should meet two essential requirements that the proposals made by the DTA theorists do not satisfy. Then I state a solution to the inference problem that assumes a local immanentistic view of universals, a partial definition (...)
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  45. Christopher Peacocke (2015). Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Explanation, and Perception. In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter 357-388.
    I am going to argue for a robust realism about magnitudes, as irreducible elements in our ontology. This realistic attitude, I will argue, gives a better metaphysics than the alternatives. It suggests some new options in the philosophy of science. It also provides the materials for a better account of the mind’s relation to the world, in particular its perceptual relations.
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  46. Philip L. Peterson (1994). Which Universals Are Laws? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):492 – 496.
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  47. Jessica Jera Pfeifer (1999). Playing Dice with the Universe: A Combinatorial Account of Laws. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Contemporary accounts of laws of nature face two recurrent problems. On the one hand, some accounts capture what is distinctive about laws---their nomic necessity and their support of counterfactuals. However, they do this at the cost of making obscure how we are ever able to justify a claim that something is a law. On the other hand, there are accounts that seem to give us epistemic access to laws, but these appear unable to capture their distinctive characteristics. ;I resolve this (...)
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  48. Alexander Pruss, Recombinations, Alien Properties and Laws of Nature Alexander R. Pruss March 16, 2002.
    A recombinationist like the earlier Armstrong (1989) claims that logically possible worlds are recombinations of items found in the actual world, with some items reduplicated if need be and others deleted. An immediate consequence of this is that if an..
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  49. Bradley Rives (2014). Laws, the Inference Problem, and Uninstantiated Universals. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):496-520.
    The difficulties facing Humean regularity accounts of laws have led some philosophers to a theory that takes laws to be necessitation relations between universals. In this paper I evaluate David Armstrong's version of this theory by considering two of its key elements: its solution to the so-called “Inference Problem” and its denial of uninstantiated universals. After considering some potential problems with each of these elements on their own, I argue that Armstrong's solution to the Inference Problem and his denial of (...)
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  50. Susan Schneider (2007). What is the Significance of the Intuition That Laws of Nature Govern? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):307 – 324.
    Recently, proponents of Humean Supervenience have challenged the plausibility of the intuition that the laws of nature 'govern', or guide, the evolution of events in the universe. Certain influential thought experiments authored by John Carroll, Michael Tooley, and others, rely strongly on such intuitions. These thought experiments are generally regarded as playing a central role in the lawhood debate, suggesting that the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view of the laws of nature, and the related doctrine of the Humean Supervenience of laws, are false. (...)
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