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  1. John Adenitire (2013). Between Institutional and Moral Discourse: On Alexy's Legal Philosophy. Jurisprudence 4 (2):358-364.
    Between Institutional and Moral Discourse: On Alexy's Legal Philosophy. A review of Matthias Klatt, Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy.
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  2. Matthew D. Adler (2000). Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence. Legal Theory 6 (4):337-389.
    Can constitutional rights be both personal and rule-dependent? Can it be true of constitutional adjudication (1) that a constitutional litigant must assert rights, and yet also (2) that the viability of a constitutional challenge depends (or sometimes depends) on whether a particular type of legal rule, for example, a discriminatory or poorly tailored rule, is in force?
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  3. R. Alexy (1993). Legal Argumentation as Rational Discourse, 1992; It. Trans.: G. Sartor In. Ratio Juris 6.
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  4. Katie Atkinson & Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon (2007). Practical Reasoning as Presumptive Argumentation Using Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. Artificial Intelligence 171 (10-15):855-874.
    In this paper we describe an approach to practical reasoning, reasoning about what it is best for a particular agent to do in a given situation, based on presumptive justifications of action through the instantiation of an argument scheme, which is then subject to examination through a series of critical questions. We identify three particular aspects of practical reasoning which distinguish it from theoretical reasoning. We next provide an argument scheme and an associated set of critical questions which is able (...)
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  5. Simon Beck (1993). Counterfactuals and the Law. South African Journal of Philosophy 12 (3).
    This article is concerned with the place counterfactual reasoning occupies in South African law, and how philosophy might be able to help the law. I point out some of the more important and unavoidable uses of counterfactual reasoning in our law. Following this I make some suggestions as to how philosophy, and especially informal logic, can be of help to the law. Finally, I make some suggestions as to how the law in turn can help philosophy.
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  6. T. J. M. Bench-Capon, T. Geldard & P. H. Leng (2000). A Method for the Computational Modelling of Dialectical Argument with Dialogue Games. Artificial Intelligence and Law 8 (2-3):233-254.
    In this paper we describe a method for the specification of computationalmodels of argument using dialogue games. The method, which consists ofsupplying a set of semantic definitions for the performatives making upthe game, together with a state transition diagram, is described in full.Its use is illustrated by some examples of varying complexity, includingtwo complete specifications of particular dialogue games, Mackenzie's DC,and the authors' own TDG. The latter is also illustrated by a fully workedexample illustrating all the features of the game.
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  7. Ian Carlo Dapalla Benitez (2015). A Critique of Critical Legal Studies' Claim of Legal Indeterminacy. Lambert Academic Publishing.
    This paper challenges the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) claims of legal indeterminacy. It shall use a legal formalist logic and language as its main assertion, further maintaining that the CLS claims is only grounded in ambiguity and confusion. CLS is a legal theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms and standards in legal theory and practice. They maintained that law in the historical and contemporary society has an alleged impartiality, and it is used as a tool of privilege and power (...)
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  8. Andrew Botterell (2009). Should the Supreme Court Cite Living Judges? The Advocates' Quarterly 36:138-140.
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  9. L. Karl Branting (2003). A Reduction-Graph Model of Precedent in Legal Analysis. Artificial Intelligence 150 (1-2):59-95.
    Legal analysis is a task underlying many forms of legal problem solving. In the Anglo-American legal system, legal analysis is based in part on legal precedents, previously decided cases. This paper describes a reduction-graph model of legal precedents that accounts for a key characteristic of legal precedents: a precedent's relevance to subsequent cases is determined by the theory under which the precedent is decided. This paper identifies the implementation requirements for legal analysis using the reduction-graph model of legal precedents and (...)
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  10. Thom Brooks (2005). Hegel's Ambiguous Contribution to Legal Theory. Res Publica 11 (1):85-94.
    Hegel's legacy is particularly controversial, not least in legal theory. He has been classified as a proponent of either natural law, legal positivism, the historical school, pre-Marxism, postmodern critical theory, and even transcendental legal theory. To what degree has Hegel actually influenced contemporary legal theorists? This review article looks at Michael Salter's collection Hegel and Law. I look at articles on civil disobedience, contract law, feminism, and punishment. I conclude noting similarities between Hegel's legal theory and that of Ronald Dworkin. (...)
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  11. Thom Brooks (2003). Does Philosophy Deserve a Place at the Supreme Court? Rutgers Law Record 27 (1):1-17.
    This Comment demonstrates that policy judgements are not masked by philosophical references, nor do philosophers play any crucial role in contentious judicial decisions. Neomi Rao’s study is flawed for many reasons: incomplete content analysis, poor assessment of data, and an inadequate definition of philosophy. She should be criticised for hypocritically praising Court philosopher references in some instances and not others, especially with regard to the Court’s early development. This Comment searched unsuccessfully for an instance where philosophers were cited just once (...)
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  12. Brian E. Butler (2001). Is All Judicial Decision-Making Unavoidably Interpretive? Legal Studies Forum (3&4):315-329.
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  13. Michael Clark (1997). Review of P. Wahlgren, Automation of Legal Reasoning. [REVIEW] Information and Communications Technology Law 6.
  14. Michael Cuffaro (2011). On Thomas Hobbes's Fallible Natural Law Theory. History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (2):175-190.
    It is not clear, on the face of it, whether Thomas Hobbes's legal philosophy should be considered to be an early example of legal positivism or continuous with the natural-law tradition. On the one hand, Hobbes's command theory of law seems characteristically positivistic. On the other hand, his conception of the "law of nature," as binding on both sovereign and subject, seems to point more naturally toward a natural-law reading of his philosophy. Yet despite this seeming ambiguity, Hobbes scholars, for (...)
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  15. John Danaher (forthcoming). Common Knowledge, Pragmatic Enrichment and Thin Originalism. Jurisprudence:1-30.
    The meaning of an utterance is often enriched by the pragmatic context in which it is uttered. This is because in ordinary conversations we routinely and uncontroversially compress what we say, safe in the knowledge that those interpreting us will “add in” the content we intend to communicate. Does the same thing hold true in the case of legal utterances like “This constitution protects the personal rights of the citizen” or “the parliament shall have the power to lay and collect (...)
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  16. John Danaher (2015). The Normativity of Linguistic Originalism: A Speech Act Analysis. Law and Philosophy 34 (4):397-431.
    The debate over the merits of originalism has advanced considerably in recent years, both in terms of its intellectual sophistication and its practical significance. In the process, some prominent originalists—Lawrence Solum and Jeffrey Goldsworthy being the two discussed here—have been at pains to separate out the linguistic and normative components of the theory. For these authors, while it is true that judges and other legal decision-makers ought to be originalists, it is also true that the communicated content of the constitution (...)
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  17. Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum (2007). An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law. In Colin Patrick Farrelly & Lawrence Solum (eds.), Virtue Jurisprudence. Palgrave Macmillan
  18. James Franklin (2005). Case Comment: Quantification of the ‘Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt’ Standard. Law, Probability and Risk 6:159-165.
    Argues for a minimal level of quantification for the "proof beyond reasonable doubt" standard of criminal law: if a jury asks "Is 60% enough?", the answer should be "No.".
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  19. Kathleen Freeman & Arthur M. Farley (1996). A Model of Argumentation and its Application to Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):163-197.
    We present a computational model of dialectical argumentation that could serve as a basis for legal reasoning. The legal domain is an instance of a domain in which knowledge is incomplete, uncertain, and inconsistent. Argumentation is well suited for reasoning in such weak theory domains. We model argument both as information structure, i.e., argument units connecting claims with supporting data, and as dialectical process, i.e., an alternating series of moves by opposing sides. Our model includes burden of proof as a (...)
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  20. J. Garfield & P. Hennessy (eds.) (1984). Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspectives. University of Massachusetts.
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  21. Thomas F. Gordon (1995). The Pleadings Games: An Artificial Intelligence Model of Procedural Justice. Springer.
    The Pleadings Game is a major contribution to artificial intelligence and legal theory. The book draws on jurisprudence and moral philosophy to develop a formal model of argumentation called the pleadings game. From a technical perspective, the work can be viewed as an extension of recent argumentation-based approaches to non-monotonic logic: (1) the game is dialogical rather than mono-logical; (2) the validity and priority of defeasible rules is subject to debate; and (3) resource limitations are acknowledged by rules for fairly (...)
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  22. Thomas F. Gordon (1993). The Pleadings Game. Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (4):239-292.
    The Pleadings Game is a normative formalization and computational model of civil pleading, founded in Roberty Alexy''s discourse theory of legal argumentation. The consequences of arguments and counterarguments are modelled using Geffner and Pearl''s nonmonotonic logic,conditional entailment. Discourse in focussed using the concepts of issue and relevance. Conflicts between arguments can be resolved by arguing about the validity and priority of rules, at any level. The computational model is fully implemented and has been tested using examples from Article Nine of (...)
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  23. Enrique Guerra-Pujol (2014). The Evolutionary Path of the Law. [REVIEW] Indonesian Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (3):878-890.
    What lessons can legal scholars learn from the life and work of W. D. "Bill" Hamilton, a lifelong student of nature? From my small corner of the legal Academia, three aspects of Bill Hamilton’s work in evolutionary biology stand out in particular: (i) Hamilton’s simple and beautiful model of social behavior in terms of costs and benefits; (ii) his fruitful collaboration with the political theorist Robert Axelrod and their unexpected yet elegant solution of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, an important game or (...)
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  24. Jaap C. Hage, Ronald Leenes & Arno R. Lodder (1993). Hard Cases: A Procedural Approach. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (2):113-167.
    Much work on legal knowledge systems treats legal reasoning as arguments that lead from a description of the law and the facts of a case, to the legal conclusion for the case. The reasoning steps of the inference engine parallel the logical steps by means of which the legal conclusion is derived from the factual and legal premises. In short, the relation between the input and the output of a legal inference engine is a logical one. The truth of the (...)
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  25. Jaap Hage & Bart Verheij (1994). Reason-Based Logic: A Logic for Reasoning with Rules and Reasons. Inform. Commun. Technol. Law 3 (2-3):171-209.
  26. Scott Hershovitz (2006). Integrity and Stare Decisis. In Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press
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  27. Ori J. Herstein (2011). A Normative Theory of the Clean Hands Defense. Legal Theory 17 (3):171-208.
    What is the clean hands defense (CHD) normatively about? Courts designate court integrity as the CHD's primary norm. Yet, while the CHD may at times further court integrity, it is not fully aligned with court integrity. In addition to occasionally instrumentally furthering certain goods (e.g., court legitimacy, judge integrity, deterrence), the CHD embodies two judicially undetected norms: retribution and tu quoque (“you too!”). Tu quoque captures the moral intuition that wrongdoers are in no position to blame, condemn, or make claims (...)
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  28. Andrew Ingram (2012). Parsing the Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-Defense. American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (3):101-120.
    Mistakes are a fact of life, and the criminal law is sadly no exception to the rule. Wrongful convictions are rightfully abhorred, and false acquittals can likewise inspire outrage. In these cases, we implicitly draw a distinction between a court’s finding and a defendant’s actual guilt or innocence. These are intuitive concepts, but as this paper aims to show, contemporary use of the reasonable person standard in the law of self-defense muddles them. -/- Ordinarily, we can distinguish between a person's (...)
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  29. Paula Kim (2014). Psychopathy, Genes, and the Criminal Justice System. The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 15:375-400.
    This Note examines whether, and at which stages, a criminal defendant should be permitted to offer genetic evidence of a predisposition to psychopathy. Drawing on multidisciplinary sources, including the work of legal scholars, neurobiologists, psychologists, and medical researchers, the Note discusses psychopathy, its symptoms, and how it is measured, along with the proposed genetic and environmental causes of the disorder. The Note then examines current evidence rules and trends in the admissibility of genetic evidence at the guilt/innocence phase of criminal (...)
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  30. Adam Kolber (2014). Smooth and Bumpy Laws. California Law Review 102:655-690.
    Modest differences in conduct can lead to wildly different legal outcomes. A person deemed slightly negligent when harming another may owe millions of dollars. Had the person been just a bit more cautious, he would owe nothing. Similarly, when self-defense is deemed slightly negligent, a person may spend several years in prison. Had the person been just a bit more cautious, he would have no criminal liability at all. Though the law must draw difficult lines, the lines need not have (...)
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  31. Matthew Lister (2012). Review of Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary by Evan Fox-Decent. [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (1):150-4.
    In Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary, Evan Fox-Decent uses the idea of fiduciary relationships to explain the legitimate exercise of governmental authority. He makes use of the idea of the state as a fiduciary for the people to ground an account of the duty to obey the law, to explain the proper relationships between colonial (or “settler”) societies and aboriginal populations, the role of agency discretion and judicial review in the administrative state, the rule of law, the relationship between (...)
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  32. R. P. Loui & Jeff Norman (1995). Rationales and Argument Moves. Artificial Intelligence and Law 3 (3):159-189.
    We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is (...)
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  33. Edward C. Lyons (2007). Reason's Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty. Cleveland State Law Review 55 (2):157-232.
    The project of “public reason” claims to offer an epistemological resolution to the civic dilemma created by the clash of incompatible options for the rational exercise of freedom adopted by citizens in a diverse community. The present Article proposes, via consideration of a contrast between two classical accounts of dialectical reasoning, that the employment of “public reason,” in substantive due process analysis, is unworkable in theory and contrary to more reflective Supreme Court precedent. Although logical commonalities might be available to (...)
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  34. Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton (2012). Presumptions in Legal Argumentation. Ratio Juris 25 (3):271-300.
    In this paper a theoretical definition that helps to explain how the logical structure of legal presumptions is constructed by applying the Carneades model of argumentation developed in artificial intelligence. Using this model, it is shown how presumptions work as devices used in evidentiary reasoning in law in the event of a lack of evidence to assist a chain of reasoning to move forward to prove or disprove a claim. It is shown how presumptions work as practical devices that may (...)
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  35. Massimo Mancini (2012). Diritto e comunicazione tra economia e filosofia. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 89 (1):85-108.
    The essay analyzes the relation between Law and Communication from a philosophical point of view. The Author criticizes the position which considers Law just a deductive structure bounded in its definitions. Law is – on the contrary – an expression of social life, and so Law itself is not only a whole of apodictic proposition, but it is also the world of persuasion and probability: this means that Logic and Rhetoric are both parts of Law. Communication – thus – is (...)
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  36. C. Mantzavinos (2007). Interpreting the Rules of the Game. In Christoph Engel Firtz Strack (ed.), The Impact of Court Procedure on the Psychology of Judicial Decision-Making. Nomos
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  37. Jim Mason (2012). How Might the Adversarial Imperative Be Effectively Tempered in Mediation? Legal Ethics 15 (1):111-122.
    The objective of this paper is to discuss the tradition of adversarialism as it relates to mediation and to suggest ways in which good practice can be encouraged amongst mediation advocates. Mediation is a key mechanism for dispute resolution in the English and Welsh jurisdiction. The practice of the lawyers involved in the mediation process is shaped by various factors including training, codes of practice, behavioural norms and court guidance. The default skill set the legal professionals bring to the process (...)
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  38. Marcin Matczak, Legal Text as a Description of a Possible World.
    In this paper I outline a comprehensive theory of legal interpretation based on an assumption that legal text, understood as the aggregate of texts of all legal acts in force at a particular time and place, describes one rational and coherent possible world. The picture of this possible world is decoded from the text by interpreters and serves as a holistic model to which the real world is adjusted when the law is applied. From the above premise I will limit (...)
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  39. Jeffrey Nesteruk & David T. Risser (1993). Conceptions of the Corporation and Ethical Decision Making in Business. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 12 (1):73-89.
  40. John Oberdiek (2010). Specifying Constitutional Rights. Constitutional Commentary 271 (1).
  41. Lorenzo Peña (2013). La frontera entre hecho y derecho: La norma jurídica extranjera como supuesto fáctico. In René González de la Vega & Guillermo Lariguet (eds.), Problemas de filosofía del Derecho: Nuevas perspectivas.
    While lawers and philosophers of law show the difference between matters of fact and normative situations, this paper proves that the difference is not crisp, since, in accordance with usual international private law, foreign juridical norms are, in principle, considered facts, but only up to a certain degree.
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  42. Lorenzo Peña (2006). Imperativos, preceptos y normas. Logos 39:111-142.
    The paper goes into the intricate logical relation between imperatives, precepts and norms. It shows that there need not be two senses of "ought", the one descriptive and the other prescriptive, since when the law-giver enacts a fresh statute he is hereby making a tru statement, whose truth is grounded on the statement itself.
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  43. Gilbert E. Plumer (2000). A Review of the LSAT Using Literature on Legal Reasoning. Law School Admission Council Computerized Testing Report 97 (8):1-19.
    Research using current literature on legal reasoning was conducted with the goals of (a) determining what skills are most important in good legal reasoning according to such literature, (b) determining the extent to which existing Law School Admission Test item types and subtypes are designed to assess those skills, and (c) suggesting test specifications or new or refined item types and formats that could be developed in the future to assess any important skills that appear [by (a) and (b)] to (...)
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  44. Henry Prakken (2001). Modelling Defeasibility in Law: Logic or Procedure? Fundamenta Informaticae 48 (2-3):253-271.
  45. Anthony Reeves (2014). The Binding Force of Nascent Norms of International Law. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 28 (1):145-166.
    Demonstrating that a developing norm is not yet well established in international law is frequently thought to show that states are not bound by the norm as law. More precisely, showing that a purported international legal norm has only limited support from well-established international legal sources is normally seen as sufficient to rebut an obligation on the part of subjects to comply with the norm in virtue of its legal status. I contend that this view is mistaken. Nascent norms of (...)
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  46. Anthony Reeves (2011). Judicial Practical Reason: Judges in Morally Imperfect Legal Orders. Law and Philosophy 30 (3):319-352.
    I here address the question of how judges should decide questions before a court in morally imperfect legal systems. I characterize how moral considerations ought inform judicial reasoning given that the law may demand what it has no right to. Much of the large body of work on legal interpretation, with its focus on legal semantics and epistemology, does not adequately countenance the limited legitimacy of actual legal institutions to serve as a foundation for an ethics of adjudication. I offer (...)
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  47. Anthony Reeves (2010). The Moral Authority of International Law. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law 10 (1):13-18.
    How should international law figure into the practical reasoning of agents who fall under its jurisdiction? How should the existence of an international legal norm regulating some activity affect a subject’s decision-making about that activity? This is a question concerning the general moral authority of international law. It concerns not simply the kind of authority international law claims, but the character of the authority it actually has. An authority, as I will use the term, is moral obligation producing: if x (...)
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  48. Anthony R. Reeves (forthcoming). Reasons of Law: Dworkin on the Legal Decision. Jurisprudence:1-21.
    Ronald Dworkin once identified the basic question of jurisprudence as: ‘What, in general, is a good reason for a decision by a court of law?’ I argue that, over the course of his career, Dworkin gave an essentially sound answer to this question. In fact, he gave a correct answer to a broader question: ‘What is a good reason for a legal decision, generally?’ For judges, officials of executive and administrative agencies, lawyers, non-governmental organizations, and ordinary subjects acting in the (...)
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  49. Anthony R. Reeves (2015). Practical Reason and Legality: Instrumental Political Authority Without Exclusion. Law and Philosophy 34 (3):257-298.
    In a morally non-ideal legal system, how can law bind its subjects? How can the fact of a norm’s legality make it the case that practical reason is bound by that norm? Moreover, in such circumstances, what is the extent and character of law’s bindingness? I defend here an answer to these questions. I present a non-ideal theory of legality’s ability to produce binding reasons for action. It is not a descriptive account of law and its claims, it is a (...)
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  50. Anthony R. Reeves (2010). Do Judges Have an Obligation to Enforce the Law?: Moral Responsibility and Judicial-Reasoning. Law and Philosophy 29 (2):159-187.
    Judicial obligation to enforce the law is typically regarded as both unproblematic and important: unproblematic because there is little reason to doubt that judges have a general, if prima facie, obligation to enforce law, and important because the obligation gives judges significant reason to limit their concern in adjudication to applying the law. I challenge both of these assumptions and argue that norms of political legitimacy, which may be extra-legal, are irretrievably at the basis of responsible judicial reasoning.
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