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  1. William P. Bechtel (1994). Levels of Description and Explanation in Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 4 (1):1-25.
    The notion of levels has been widely used in discussions of cognitive science, especially in discussions of the relation of connectionism to symbolic modeling of cognition. I argue that many of the notions of levels employed are problematic for this purpose, and develop an alternative notion grounded in the framework of mechanistic explanation. By considering the source of the analogies underlying both symbolic modeling and connectionist modeling, I argue that neither is likely to provide an adequate analysis of processes at (...)
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  2. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Personal and Subpersonal: A Difference Without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82.
    This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and farts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands of explanatory (...)
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  3. Paco Calvo & John Symons, Radical Embodiment and Morphological Computation: Against the Autonomy of (Some) Special Sciences.
    An asymmetry between the demands at the computational and algorithmic levels of description furnishes the illusion that the abstract profile at the computational level can be multiply realized, and that something is actually being shared at the algorithmic one. A disembodied rendering of the situation lays the stress upon the different ways in which an algorithm can be implemented. However, from an embodied approach, things look rather different. The relevant pairing, I shall argue, is not between implementation and algorithm, but (...)
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  4. François Chapeau-Blondeau (1995). Information Processing in Neural Networks by Means of Controlled Dynamic Regimes. Acta Biotheoretica 43 (1-2).
    This paper is concerned with the modeling of neural systems regarded as information processing entities. I investigate the various dynamic regimes that are accessible in neural networks considered as nonlinear adaptive dynamic systems. The possibilities of obtaining steady, oscillatory or chaotic regimes are illustrated with different neural network models. Some aspects of the dependence of the dynamic regimes upon the synaptic couplings are examined. I emphasize the role that the various regimes may play to support information processing abilities. I present (...)
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  5. Noam Chomsky (1995). Language and Nature. Mind 104 (413):1-61.
  6. Axel Cleeremans & Robert M. French (1996). From Chicken Squawking to Cognition: Levels of Description and the Computational Approach in Psychology. Psychologica Belgica 36:5-29.
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  7. Harry Collins (2013). The Core of Expertise. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):399-416.
    I reply to my critics in respect of my work on expertise. I define the 'core' of the multidisciplinary 'expertise studies'. I argue that those who have taken the work seriously could resolve their problems by paying more attention to the core. Each could have made good use of an aspect of the core.
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  8. Joseph Cruz, Methods & Foundations of Cognitive Science.
    Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary study of minds and intelligent behavior in human beings and animals. The challenge of integrating a study of the mind with a scientific world view has only recently attracted sustained effort. In this course, we will examine the various scientific methodologies that have been brought to bear to uncover the nature of the mind. We will critically assess the data and theoretical results that define contemporary cognitive science. Beyond the results of experiments and the theories (...)
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  9. Martin Davies (2000). Interaction Without Reduction: The Relationship Between Personal and Subpersonal Levels of Description. Mind and Society 1 (2):87-105.
    Starting from Dennett's distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of description, I consider the relationships amongst three levels: the personal level, the level of information-processing mechanisms, and the level of neurobiology. I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal level and the sub-personal level of information-processing mechanisms as interaction without reduction . Even given a nonreductionist conception of persons, philosophical theorizing sometimes supports downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level. An example of a downward inference is (...)
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  10. Huib L. de Jong (2002). Levels of Explanation in Biological Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):441-462.
    Until recently, the notions of function and multiple realization were supposed to save the autonomy of psychological explanations. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience presumably allows both dependence of mind on brain and non-reducibility of mind to brain, reconciling materialism with an independent explanatory role for mental and functional concepts and explanations. Eliminativism is often seen as the main or only alternative to such autonomy. It gladly accepts abandoning or thoroughly reconstructing the psychological level, and considers reduction if successful as equivalent (...)
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  11. Manuel de Pinedo-Garcia & Jason Noble (2008). Beyond Persons: Extending the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction to Non-Rational Animals and Artificial Agents. Biology and Philosophy 23 (1):87-100.
    The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agent’s interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to (...)
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  12. Zoe Drayson (2012). The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  13. Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels (2014). Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture. Mind and Language 29 (2):201-237.
    Do accounts of scientific theory formation and revision have implications for theories of everyday cognition? We maintain that failing to distinguish between importantly different types of theories of scientific inference has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the relationship between science and everyday cognition. In this article, we focus on one influential manifestation of this phenomenon which is found in Fodor's well-known critique of theories of cognitive architecture. We argue that in developing his critique, Fodor confounds a variety of distinct claims (...)
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  14. Sebastian Gardner (2000). Psychoanalysis and the Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):96-119.
    This paper attempts in the first instance to clarify the application of the personal/sub-personal distinction to psychoanalysis and to indicate how this issue is related to that of psychoanalysis" epistemology. It is argued that psychoanalysis may be regarded either as a form of personal psychology, or as a form of jointly personal and sub-personal psychology, but not as a form of sub-personal psychology. It is further argued that psychoanalysis indicates a problem with the personal/sub-personal distinction itself as understood by Dennett (...)
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  15. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science. Philosophy 34:159-188.
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  16. Yu-Houng H. Houng (1990). Classicism, Connectionism and the Concept of Level. Dissertation, Indiana University
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  17. Miriam Kyselo (2013). Enaktivismus. In A. Stephan & S. Walter (eds.), Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft. J.B. Metzler.
  18. David Marr (1982). Vision. Freeman.
  19. Rainer Mausfeld (2012). On Some Unwarranted Tacit Assumptions in Cognitive Neuroscience. Frontiers in Cognition 3 (67):1-13.
    The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons or neural networks constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. This paper brings to mind several arguments to the effect that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. It then scrutinizes the question why such conceptions are nevertheless currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. The paper argues that corresponding (...)
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  20. Ron McClamrock (1990). Marr's Three Levels: A Re-Evaluation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 1 (May):185-196.
    the _algorithmic_, and the _implementational_; Zenon Pylyshyn (1984) calls them the _semantic_, the _syntactic_, and the _physical_; and textbooks in cognitive psychology sometimes call them the levels of _content_, _form_, and _medium_ (e.g. Glass, Holyoak, and Santa 1979).
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  21. Thomas Metzinger (2008). Empirical Perspectives From the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples. In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.
  22. Bruno Mölder (2001). Inter-Level Explanation and the Category-Mistake. In Rein Vihalemm (ed.), Estonian studies in the history and philosophy of science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 283--294.
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  23. Karen Neander & Peter Menzies (1990). David Owens on Levels of Explanation. Mind 99 (395):459-466.
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  24. Allen Newell (1986). The Symbol Level and the Knowledge Level. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn & W. Demopolous (eds.), Meaning and Cognitive Structure. Ablex.
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  25. Allen Newell (1982). The Knowledge Level. Artificial Intelligence 18:81-132.
  26. Morten Overgaard & Mads Jensen (eds.) (2012). Consciousness and Neural Plasticity. Frontiers Books.
  27. Christopher Peacocke (1986). Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception and Level. Mind and Language 1 (2):101-23.
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  28. Claudine Provencher (2011). Towards A Better Understanding of Cognitive Polyphasia. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 41 (4):377-395.
    Despite its intuitive appeal and the empirical evidence for it, the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 1961/1976/2008) remains largely unexplored. This article attempts to clarify some of the ideas behind this concept by examining its operations at the level of individuals and by proposing a conceptual model that includes some elements of social cognition. Indeed, calls for a rapprochement between the theory of social representations and cognitive psychology have been made by Moscovici, in particular, in his 1984 paper on The (...)
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  29. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.) (1986). Meaning And Cognitive Structure: Issues In The Computational Theory Of Mind. Norwood: Ablex.
  30. Iris Rooij, Cory D. Wright & Todd Wareham (2012). Intractability and the Use of Heuristics in Psychological Explanations. Synthese 187 (2):471-487.
    Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity φ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five possible objections. We then propose computational-level theory revision as a principled and workable alternative.
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  31. Jay F. Rosenberg (1994). Comments on Bechtel, Levels of Description and Explanation in Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 4 (1):27-37.
    I begin by tracing some of the confusions regarding levels and reduction to a failure to distinguish two different principles according to which theories can be viewed as hierarchically arranged — epistemic authority and ontological constitution. I then argue that the notion of levels relevant to the debate between symbolic and connectionist paradigms of mental activity answers to neither of these models, but is rather correlative to the hierarchy of functional decompositions of cognitive tasks characteristic of homuncular functionalism. Finally, I (...)
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  32. Robert D. Rupert (2005). Minding One's Cognitive Systems: When Does a Group of Minds Constitute a Single Cognitive Unit? Episteme 1 (3):177-188.
    The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins 1995). An appeal to group minds might, in the end, do indispensable explanatory work in the social or cognitive sciences. I am skeptical, though, and this essay lays out some of the reasons for my skepticism. The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the advocates of group minds (or (...)
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  33. Nicholas Shea (2013). Neural Mechanisms of Decision-Making and the Personal Level. In Kwm Fulford, M. Davies, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini & T. Thornton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. OUP. 1063-1082.
    Can findings from psychology and cognitive neuroscience about the neural mechanisms involved in decision-making can tell us anything useful about the commonly-understood mental phenomenon of making voluntary choices? Two philosophical objections are considered. First, that the neural data is subpersonal, and so cannot enter into illuminating explanations of personal level phenomena like voluntary action. Secondly, that mental properties are multiply realized in the brain in such a way as to make them insusceptible to neuroscientific study. The paper argues that both (...)
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  34. Anne Springer, Simone Brandstädter & Wolfgang Prinz (2013). Dynamic Simulation and Static Matching for Action Prediction: Evidence From Body Part Priming. Cognitive Science 37 (5):936-952.
    Accurately predicting other people's actions may involve two processes: internal real-time simulation (dynamic updating) and matching recently perceived action images (static matching). Using a priming of body parts, this study aimed to differentiate the two processes. Specifically, participants played a motion-controlled video game with either their arms or legs. They then observed arm movements of a point-light actor, which were briefly occluded from view, followed by a static test pose. Participants judged whether this test pose depicted a coherent continuation of (...)
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  35. Georg Theiner & John Sutton (2014). The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition: Commentary on Paul E. Smaldino, "The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits&Quot;. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):277-278.
    We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision-making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
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  36. Gabriel Vacariu (2013). Troubles with Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophia Scientiæ 17:151-170.
    In few words, we present the main actual problems of cognitive neuroscience: the binding problem, localization, differentiation–integration in the brain, the troubles created by the brain imaging, and optimism vs. skepticism in cognitive neuroscience. Surprisingly, even if there are more and more experimental results in recent years, we notice no real hope for solving these troubles in the future. Cognitive neuroscience is a science constructed on “correlations” between mental and neuronal states, mainly furnished by the brain imaging—fMRI of the last (...)
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  37. Gabriel Vacariu (2012). Cognitive Neuroscience Versus Epistemologically Different Worlds. University of Bucharest Press.
    From the “epistemologically different worlds” perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman’s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentiation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. I want to show that these problems are pseudo-problems and this “science” has “No ontology landscape”.
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  38. Gabriel Vacariu (2012). Cognitive Neuroscience Versus Epistemologically Different Worlds. University of Bucharest Publishing Company.
    From the “epistemologically different worlds” perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman’s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. The conclusion is that this “science” has “No ontology landscape” and, therefore, cognitive neuroscience is a pseudo-science.
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  39. Gabriel Vacariu (2008). Epistemologically Different Worlds. Bucharest University Press.
    A fundamental error has dominated philosophy and science since ancient times, the assumption of the existence of the 'unicorn-world', that is, the existence of one unique world. In order to avoid this error, it is necessary to replace the unicorn-world with epistemologically different worlds (which presuppose that each class of entities forms a single, unique epistemological world within the same spatio-temporal framework). Within this new framework, we analyze the definition of the “I” in neural (physical) terms and psychological terms and (...)
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  40. Gabriel Vacariu & Vacariu (2013). The Mind-Brain Problem in Cognitive Neuroscience (Only Content).
    (June 2013) “The mind-body problem in cognitive neuroscience”, Philosophia Scientiae 17/2, Gabriel Vacariu and Mihai Vacariu (eds.): 1. William Bechtel (Philosophy, Center for Chronobiology, and Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science University of California, San Diego) “The endogenously active brain: the need for an alternative cognitive architecture” 2. Rolls T. Edmund (Oxford Centre for Computational Neuroscience, Oxford, UK) “On the relation between the mind and the brain: a neuroscience perspective” 3. Cees van Leeuwen (University of Leuven, Belgium; Riken Brain Science Institute, (...)
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  41. Gabriel Vacariu & Mihai Vacariu (2008). The "I" as an Epistemological World. Annals of Philosophy, Bucharest University 1:47-64.
    The first part of this article contains certain elements of the epistemologically different worlds perspective that focus on the idea that the "I" or human subjectivity is an epistemological world which corresponds to the brain and body. The second part shows that Bechtel's notion of mechanism is, in fact, a more "technical" functionalism that tries to avoid the mind-brain problem. However, by avoiding the mind-brain problem, many cognitive issues remain unsolved. Thus, we consider that Bechtel's solution is only a surrogate-alternative (...)
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  42. Joel Walmsley (2010). Emergence and Reduction in Dynamical Cognitive Science. New Ideas in Psychology 28:274-282.
    This paper examines the widespread intuition that the dynamical approach to cognitive science is importantly related to emergentism about the mind. The explanatory practices adopted by dynamical cognitive science rule out some conceptions of emergence; covering law explanations require a deducibility relationship between explanans and explanandum, whereas canonical theories of emergence require the absence of such deducibility. A response to this problem – one which would save the intuition that dynamics and emergence are related – is to reconstrue the concept (...)
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  43. Cory D. Wright & William P. Bechtel (2007). Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge levels rather than (...)
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