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  1. Ian J. Carroll (2009). Neutrality and the Social Contract. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):134-150.
    Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of (...)
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  2. Michael Garnett (2016). Value Neutrality and the Ranking of Opportunity Sets. Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):99-119.
    I defend the idea that a liberal commitment to value neutrality is best honoured by maintaining a pure cardinality component in our rankings of opportunity or liberty sets. I consider two challenges to this idea. The first holds that cardinality rankings are unnecessary for neutrality, because what is valuable about a set of liberties from a liberal point of view is not its size but rather its variety. The second holds that pure cardinality metrics are insufficient for neutrality, because liberties (...)
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  3. Lendell Horne (2009). Liberal Neutrality: Constructivist, Not Foundationalist. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):151-158.
    In defending the principle of neutrality, liberals have often appealed to a more general moral principle that forbids coercing persons in the name of reasons those persons themselves cannot reasonably be expected to share. Yet liberals have struggled to articulate a non-arbitrary, non- dogmatic distinction between the reasons that persons can reasonably be expected to share and those they cannot. The reason for this, I argue, is that what it means to “share a reason” is itself obscure. In this paper (...)
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  4. Mariano Garreta Leclercq (2009). An Epistemic Argument in Support of Liberal Neutrality. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):187-201.
    My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contex- tual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a (...)
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  5. Christopher Lowry (2009). Beyond Equality of What: Sen and Neutrality. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):226-235.
    This paper looks at the intersection of three issues in liberal theory: the metric of advantage, neutrality vs. perfectionism, and justice and disability. I argue that Sen's capability approach has implications for neutrality vs. perfectionism that demand a reconception of that debate. I draw out these implications to defend a third position, which I call 'public value liberalism'. Measuring effective freedom in terms of capability requires a public ranking of valuable activities and states of being, which ultimately puts Sen's view (...)
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  6. Roberto Merrill & Geneviève Rousselière (2009). Introduction : Sur la neutralité libérale / On Liberal Neutrality. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):130-133.
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  7. D. E. Miller (2001). Atomists, Liberals and Civic Republicans: Taylor on the Ontology of Citizenship. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):465 – 478.
    (2001). Atomists, Liberals and Civic Republicans: Taylor on the Ontology of Citizenship. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 465-478.
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  8. Oran Moked (2009). Perfectionism, Economic (Dis)Incentives, and Political Coercion. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):214-225.
    May a government attempt to improve the lives of its citizens by promoting the activities it deems valuable and discouraging those it disvalues? May it engage in such a practice even when doing so is not a requirement of justice in some strict sense, and even when the judgments of value and disvalue in question are likely to be subject to controversy among its citizens? These questions have long stood at the center of debates between political perfectionists and political neutralists. (...)
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  9. Thomas Porter (2011). Colburn on Anti-Perfectionism and Autonomy. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    I argue against the strategy recently proposed by Ben Colburn for reconciling two apparently conflicting theses, the “Autonomy Claim” and “Anti-Perfectionism.” The strategy turns on demonstrating that the conception of Anti-Perfectionism that captures the intuitions of most anti-perfectionists is not opposed to state promotion of what Colburn calls “second-order values,” and that autonomy is just such a value. I object that Anti-Perfectionism should be understood as opposed to some second-order values, and that autonomy is just such a value.
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  10. Enzo Rossi (2014). Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls' Political Liberalism Versus Gaus' Justificatory Liberalism. Res Publica 20 (1):9-25.
    Public justification-based accounts of liberal legitimacy rely on the idea that a polity’s basic structure should, in some sense, be acceptable to its citizens. In this paper I discuss the prospects of that approach through the lens of Gerald Gaus’ critique of John Rawls’ paradigmatic account of democratic public justification. I argue that Gaus does succeed in pointing out some significant problems for Rawls’ political liberalism; yet his alternative, justificatory liberalism, is not voluntaristic enough to satisfy the desiderata of a (...)
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  11. Marc Rüegger (2009). Tolérance et neutralité : incompatibles ou complémentaires ? Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):175-186.
    La tolérance et la neutralité sont habituellement considérées comme des réponses interchangeables ou du moins complémentaires à des situations de conflit et de désaccord moral. Malgré cette association traditionnelle, plusieurs auteurs ont récemment contesté la complémentarité, voire même la compatibilité, de ces deux notions. Cet article examine tout d’abord deux arguments qui visent à établir l’incompatibilité de la tolérance et de la neutralité. Il montre ensuite que si ces arguments ne sont pas probants, en ce sens qu’ils ne parviennent pas (...)
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  12. Jonathan Seglow (2004). Liberalism and Value Pluralism. Contemporary Political Theory 3 (1):122.
  13. Titus Stahl (2016). Indiscriminate Mass Surveillance and the Public Sphere. Ethics and Information Technology 18.
    Recent disclosures suggest that many governments apply indiscriminate mass surveillance technologies that allow them to capture and store a massive amount of communications data belonging to citizens and non-citizens alike. This article argues that traditional liberal critiques of government surveillance that center on an individual right to privacy cannot completely capture the harm that is caused by such surveillance because they ignore its distinctive political dimension. As a complement to standard liberal approaches to privacy, the article develops a critique of (...)
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  14. Robert B. Talisse (2004). Can Value Pluralists Be Comprehensive Liberals? Galston's Liberal Pluralism. Contemporary Political Theory 3 (2):127.
    In this paper, the author engages William Galston's recent attempt to revive the Berlinian project of developing a comprehensive theory of liberalism from value pluralist premises. The author's argument maintains that, despite Galston's attempts, the value pluralist in fact has no resources with which to recommend a liberal political order over a variety of illiberal regimes, and that, further, Galston's own justificatory strategy is indistinguishable from the later Rawls's noncomprehensive, ‘political' liberalism. Although the argument engages the work of Berlin and (...)
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  15. Patrick Turmel (2009). Are Cities Illiberal? Municipal Jurisdictions and the Scope of Liberal Neutrality. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):202-213.
    One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regard- less of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number (...)
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  16. Piers Norris Turner (2014). On Felix Adler’s “The Freedom of Ethical Fellowship”. Ethics 125 (1):208-210,.
    From its inception in 1890, the journal Ethics declared that it was “Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice.” Although the latter concern may seem anachronistic, the extensive practical work of the Journal’s founders was inspired by an aim shared by many of today’s liberals: establishing a public morality that respects well-intentioned individuals holding a diversity of philosophical and religious commitments. Felix Adler, the guiding force behind the journal and the founder of the Society for Ethical Culture, argued (...)
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  17. Alexa Zellentin (2009). Neutrality as a Twofold Concept. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):159-174.
    Under the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral towards its citizens’ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality – neutrality of impact, neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory (...)
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