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  1. Brian Ball (forthcoming). Speech Acts: Natural or Normative Kinds? Mind and Language.
    There are two views of the essences of speech acts: according to one view, they are natural kinds; according to the other, they are what I call normative kinds – kinds in the (possibly non-reductive) definition of which some normative term occurs. In this paper I show that speech acts can be normative but also natural kinds by deriving Williamson’s account of assertion, on which it is an act individuated, and constitutively governed, by a norm (the knowledge rule), from a (...)
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  2. Brian Ball (forthcoming). The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule. Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper I compare Timothy Williamson’s knowledge rule of assertion with Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson’s action rule. The paper is in two parts. In the first part I present and respond to Maitra and Weatherson’s master argument against the knowledge rule. I argue that while its second premise, to the effect that an action X can be the thing to do though one is in no position to know that it is, is true, its first premise is not: (...)
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  3. Alex Barber (2009). John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind • by Savas L. Tsohatzidis. Analysis 69 (2):368-369.
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  4. David Bogen (1991). Linguistic Forms and Social Obligations: A Critique of the Doctrine of Literal Expression in Searle. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (1):31–62.
  5. Antony Eagle (2007). Telling Tales. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):125 - 147.
    Utterances within the context of telling fictional tales that appear to be assertions are nevertheless not to be taken at face value. The present paper attempts to explain exactly what such 'pseudo-assertions' are, and how they behave. Many pseudo-assertions can take on multiple roles, both within fictions and in what I call 'participatory criticism' of a fiction, especially when they occur discourse-initially. This fact, taken together with problems for replacement accounts of pseudo-assertion based on the implicit prefixing of an 'in (...)
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  6. Mitchell Green (1999). Illocutions, Implicata, and What a Conversation Requires. Pragmatics and Cognition 7 (1):65-92.
  7. Mitchell S. Green, How to Express Yourself: Refinements and Elaborations on the Central Ideas of Self-Expression. Protosociology Forum.
    This articles gives an overview of the main themes and arguments of _Self-Expression_ (OUP,2007; paper, 2011), and responds to some recent publications in which that book is discussed. In the process of these responses, the article provides refinements and elaborations on some of the book's central claims.
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  8. Mitchell S. Green (2008). Expression, Indication and Showing What's Within. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):389 - 398.
    This essay offers a constructive criticism of Part I of Davis’ Meaning, Expression and Thought. After a brief exposition, in Sect. 2, of the main points of the theory that will concern us, I raise a challenge in Sect. 3 for the characterization of expression that is so central to his program. I argue first of all that a sincere expression of a thought, feeling, or mood shows it. Yet attention to this fact reveals that it does not go without (...)
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  9. Mitchell S. Green (2000). Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):435-473.
    Illocutionary force and semantic content are widely held to occupy utterly different categories in at least two ways: (1) Any expression serving as an indicator of illocutionary force must be without semantic content, and (2) no such expression can embed. A refined account of the force/content distinction is offered here that (a) does the explanatory work that the standard distinction does, while, in accounting for the behavior of a range of parenthetical expressions, (b) shows neither (1) nor (2) to (...)
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  10. D. Greimann (2000). The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege's Scientific Language. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 52 (2):213-238.
    The syntax of Frege's scientific language iscommonly taken to be characterized by two oddities:the representation of the intended illocutionary roleof sentences by a special sign, the judgement-stroke,and the treatment of sentences as a species ofsingular terms. In this paper, an alternative view isdefended. The main theses are: (i) the syntax ofFrege's scientific language aims at an explication ofthe logical form of judgements; (ii) thejudgement-stroke is, therefore, a truth-operator, nota pragmatic operator; (iii) in Frege's first system,` ' expresses that the circumstance (...)
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  11. Edward Hinchman (forthcoming). Assurance and Warrant. Philosophers' Imprint.
    Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...)
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  12. Teresa Marques (2010). What Can Modes Do for (Moderate) Relativism. [REVIEW] Critica - Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia 42 (124):77-100.
    I critically discuss some aspects of Recanati's Perspectival Thought, while offering a detailed overview of the book. I suggest that the main aim Recanati proposes to achieve —that a moderate relativist should adopt a Kaplanian framework with three levels of content, rather than a Lewisian framework with only two— seems nonetheless insufficiently motivated, and the arguments offered do not settle the issue. I suggest furthermore that the claim that subjects’ mental states and cognitive situations can determine parameters or indices in (...)
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  13. Paul Portner (1997). The Semantics of Mood, Complementation, and Conversational Force. Natural Language Semantics 5 (2):167-212.
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  14. François Recanati (2013). Content, Mood, and Force. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):622-632.
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  15. David Simpson (1992). Communicative Skills in the Constitution of Illocutionary Acts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):82 – 92.
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  16. Eleni Staraki & Anastasia Giannakidou, Ability, Action, and Causation: From Pure Ability to Force.
    Abstract In this paper, we show that Greek distinguishes empirically ability as a precondition for action, and ability as initiating and sustaining force for action. In this latter case, the ability verb behaves like an action verb, and the sentence has the logical form of a causative structure φ CAUSE [BECOME ψ] (Dowty 1979). The distinction between ability as potential for action and ability as action itself has a venerable tradition that goes back to Aristotle, and is recently implied in (...)
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  17. William B. Starr, A Preference Semantics for Imperatives.
    There is a rich canon of work on the meaning of imperative sentences, e.g. "Dance!", in philosophy and much recent research in linguistics has made its own exciting advances. However, in this paper I argue that three observations about English imperatives are problematic for approaches from both traditions. In response, I offer a new analysis according to which the meaning of an imperative is identified with the characteristic effect its uses have on the agents’ attitudes. More specifically: an imperative’s meaning (...)
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  18. William B. Starr (forthcoming). Force, Mood and Truth. In Ernest Lepore Jiang Yi (ed.), Language and Value. Oxford University Press.
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  19. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) (1994). Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. Routledge.
    Foundations of Speech Act Theory investigates the importance of speech act theory to the problem of meaning in linguistics and philosophy. The papers in this volume, written by respected philosophers and linguists, significantly advance standards of debate in this area.
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  20. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (1989). Two Consequences of Hinting. Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (4):288 - 293.
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  21. Maciej Witek (2013). Three Approaches to the Study of Speech Acts. Dialogue and Universalism 23 (1):129-141.
    The paper reconstructs and discusses three different approaches to the study of speech acts: (i) the intentionalist approach, according to which most illocutionary acts are to be analysed as utterances made with the Gricean communicative intentions, (ii) the institutionalist approach, which is based on the idea of illocutions as institutional acts constituted by systems of collectively accepted rules, and (iii) the interactionalist approach the main tenet of which is to perform illocutionary acts by making conventional moves in accordance with patterns (...)
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