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  1. Brian Ball (2014). Speech Acts: Natural or Normative Kinds? The Case of Assertion. Mind and Language 29 (3):336-350.
    There are two views of the essences of speech acts: according to one view, they are natural kinds; according to the other, they are what I call normative kinds—kinds in the (possibly non-reductive) definition of which some normative term occurs. In this article I show that speech acts can be normative but also natural kinds by deriving Williamson's account of assertion, on which it is an act individuated, and constitutively governed, by a norm (the knowledge rule), from a consideration of (...)
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  2. Brian Ball (2014). The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):552-574.
    In this paper I compare Timothy Williamson's knowledge rule of assertion with Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson's action rule. The paper is in two parts. In the first part I present and respond to Maitra and Weatherson's master argument against the knowledge rule. I argue that while its second premise, to the effect that an action X can be the thing to do though one is in no position to know that it is, is true, its first premise is not: (...)
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  3. Alex Barber (2009). John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind • by Savas L. Tsohatzidis. Analysis 69 (2):368-369.
    This collection should be welcomed by anyone working on the subtle interplay between theories of perception, internalism and externalism about mental and linguistic content, and the linguistic expression of mental states. Many of these connections have been put into focus by John Searle, and his views are here subjected to careful scrutiny from a variety of directions. The contributions do not sum to a general discussion of Searle's contributions to the philosophy of mind and language. There is little or nothing (...)
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  4. Stephen J. Barker (2007). Semantics Without the Distinction Between Sense and Force. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press
    At the heart of semantics in the 20th century is Frege’s distinction between sense and force. This is the idea that the content of a self-standing utterance of a sentence S can be divided into two components. One part, the sense, is the proposition that S’s linguistic meaning and context associates with it as its semantic interpretation. The second component is S’s illocutionary force. Illocutionary forces correspond to the three basic kinds of sentential speech acts: assertions, orders, and questions. Forces (...)
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  5. Monika Bednarek (2009). Dimensions of Evaluation: Cognitive and Linguistic Perspectives. Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (1):146-176.
    In the past two decades or so, a number of researchers from various fields within linguistics have turned their attention to interpersonal phenomena, such as the linguistic expression of speaker opinion or evaluation , or the encoding of subjectivity in language and its diachronic development . Many linguists have offered categorizations of evaluative meaning, based on authentic discourse data, but no connection has been made with cognitive approaches to appraisal processes. This paper offers a first meta-theoretical exploration of such issues. (...)
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  6. David Bogen (1991). Linguistic Forms and Social Obligations: A Critique of the Doctrine of Literal Expression in Searle. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (1):31–62.
  7. Gregory A. Bryant (2011). Verbal Irony in the Wild. Pragmatics and Cognition 19 (2):291-309.
    Verbal irony constitutes a rough class of indirect intentional communication involving a complex interaction of language-specific and communication-general phenomena. Conversationalists use verbal irony in conjunction with paralinguistic signals such as speech prosody. Researchers examining acoustic features of speech communication usually focus on how prosodic information relates to the surface structure of utterances, and often ignore prosodic phenomena associated with implied meaning. In the case of verbal irony, there exists some debate concerning how these prosodic features manifest themselves in conversation. A (...)
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  8. Rituparna Ray Chaudhuri (2015). William Shakespeare's Othello: The Way I Thought of Critical ...
    "But he that filches from me my good name Robs me of that which not enriches him, And makes me poor indeed." (Othello) -/- ( http://philpapers.org/profile/112741 ).
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  9. Herbert L. Colston (2000). On Necessary Conditions for Verbal Irony Comprehesion. Pragmatics and Cognition 8 (2):277-324.
    The conditions for verbal irony comprehension implicitly or directly claimed as necessary by all of the recent philosophic, linguistic and psycholinguistic theories of verbal irony (Clark and Gerrig 1984; Kreuz and Glucksberg 1989; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg and Brown 1995; Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1986) were experimentally tested. Allusion to a violation of expectations, predictions, desires, preferences, social norms, etc., was confirmed as a necessary condition, but pragmatic insincerity was not. Pragmatically sincere comments can be comprehended ironically. A revised set of conditions (...)
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  10. Antony Eagle (2007). Telling Tales. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):125 - 147.
    Utterances within the context of telling fictional tales that appear to be assertions are nevertheless not to be taken at face value. The present paper attempts to explain exactly what such 'pseudo-assertions' are, and how they behave. Many pseudo-assertions can take on multiple roles, both within fictions and in what I call 'participatory criticism' of a fiction, especially when they occur discourse-initially. This fact, taken together with problems for replacement accounts of pseudo-assertion based on the implicit prefixing of an 'in (...)
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  11. Matthias Gerner (2010). The Fuzzy Logic of Socialised Attitudes in Liangshan Nuosu. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (11):3031-3046.
    Liangshan Nuosu (Tibeto-Burman: P.R. China) exhibits two cross-linguistically rare attitude particles which ascribe wishes and fears to an impersonal socialised agent serving as a speaker-hedge. Linguistic properties of these particles not covered by (Potts, 2007a) and (Potts, 2007b) features of expressive content are elaborated upon. It is proposed to analyse the Nuosu attitude operators as illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs, see Searle and Vanderveken, 1985) and the utterances which host them as speech acts of the expressive type. Success conditions for (...)
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  12. Mitchell Green (1999). Illocutions, Implicata, and What a Conversation Requires. Pragmatics and Cognition 7 (1):65-92.
    An approach is provided to the prediction and explanation of quantity implicata that, unlike the majority of approaches available, does not construe Quantity as requiring speakers to make the strongest claim that their evidence permits. Central to this treatment is an elaboration of the notion of what a conversation requires as appealed to in the Cooperative Principle and the Quantity maxim. What a conversation requires is construed as depending, at any given point, upon the aim of the conversation taking place, (...)
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  13. Mitchell S. Green (2011). How to Express Yourself: Refinements and Elaborations on the Central Ideas of Self-Expression. Protosociology Forum.
    This articles gives an overview of the main themes and arguments of _Self-Expression_ (OUP,2007; paper, 2011), and responds to some recent publications in which that book is discussed. In the process of these responses, the article provides refinements and elaborations on some of the book's central claims.
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  14. Mitchell S. Green (2008). Expression, Indication and Showing What's Within. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):389 - 398.
    This essay offers a constructive criticism of Part I of Davis’ Meaning, Expression and Thought. After a brief exposition, in Sect. 2, of the main points of the theory that will concern us, I raise a challenge in Sect. 3 for the characterization of expression that is so central to his program. I argue first of all that a sincere expression of a thought, feeling, or mood shows it. Yet attention to this fact reveals that it does not go without (...)
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  15. Mitchell S. Green (2000). Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):435-473.
    Illocutionary force and semantic content are widely held to occupy utterly different categories in at least two ways: Any expression serving as an indicator of illocutionary force must be without semantic content, and no such expression can embed. A refined account of the force/content distinction is offered here that does the explanatory work that the standard distinction does, while, in accounting for the behavior of a range of parenthetical expressions, shows neither nor to be compulsory. The refined account also motivates (...)
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  16. D. Greimann (2000). The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege's Scientific Language. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 52 (2):213-238.
    The syntax of Frege's scientific language is commonly taken to be characterized by two oddities: the representation of the intended illocutionary role of sentences by a special sign, the judgement-stroke, and the treatment of sentences as a species of singular terms. In this paper, an alternative view is defended. The main theses are: the syntax of Frege's scientific language aims at an explication of the logical form of judgements; the judgement-stroke is, therefore, a truth-operator, not a pragmatic operator; in Frege's (...)
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  17. Benj Hellie (2016). Obligation and Aspect. Inquiry 59 (4):398-449.
    ‘Fred must open the door’ concerns Fred’s obligations. This obligative meaning is turned off by adding aspect: ‘Fred must have opened/be opening/have been opening the door’ are one and all epistemic. Why? In a nutshell: obligative ’must’ operates on procedural contents of imperative sentences, epistemic ‘must’ on propositional contents of declarative sentences; and adding aspect converts procedural into propositional content.
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  18. Edward Hinchman (2014). Assurance and Warrant. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (17).
    Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...)
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  19. Kirk Ludwig (1997). The Truth About Moods. ProtoSociology 10.
    Assertoric sentences are sentences which admit of truth or falsity. Non-assertoric sentences, imperatives and interrogatives, have long been a source of difficulty for the view that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as the core of a theory of meaning. The trouble for truth-theoretic semantics posed by non-assertoric sentences is that, prima facie, it does not make sense to say that imperatives, such as 'Cut your hair', or interrogatives such as 'What time is it?', are truth (...)
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  20. Teresa Marques (2010). What Can Modes Do for (Moderate) Relativism. [REVIEW] Critica - Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia 42 (124):77-100.
    I critically discuss some aspects of Recanati's Perspectival Thought, while offering a detailed overview of the book. I suggest that the main aim Recanati proposes to achieve —that a moderate relativist should adopt a Kaplanian framework with three levels of content, rather than a Lewisian framework with only two— seems nonetheless insufficiently motivated, and the arguments offered do not settle the issue. I suggest furthermore that the claim that subjects’ mental states and cognitive situations can determine parameters or indices in (...)
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  21. Neri Marsili (2012). Le facce della menzogna - Una rassegna critica delle definizioni filosofiche di menzogna. Dissertation, University of Torino
    Secondo la definizione “standard”, la menzogna è definita da quattro condizioni necessarie, congiuntamente sufficienti. La prima (condizione dell’asserto) richiede che il parlante proferisca un asserto in una frase dichiarativa dotata di senso compiuto. La seconda (condizione dell’insincerità), stabilisce che il parlante debba credere falso il contenuto proposizionale (p) del suo asserto, e la terza (condizione dell’interlocutore) richiede che l’asserto sia rivolto a un interlocutore. Secondo l’ultima condizione (condizione dell’intenzione di ingannare), il parlante deve avere l’intenzione di far credere all’interlocutore che (...)
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  22. Paul Portner (1997). The Semantics of Mood, Complementation, and Conversational Force. Natural Language Semantics 5 (2):167-212.
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  23. François Recanati (2013). Content, Mood, and Force. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):622-632.
    In this survey paper, I start from two classical theses of speech act theory: that speech act content is uniformly propositional and that sentence mood encodes illocutionary force. These theses have been questioned in recent work, both in philosophy and linguistics. The force/content distinction itself – a cornerstone of 20‐century philosophy of language – has come to be rejected by some theorists, unmoved by the famous ‘Frege–Geach’ argument. The paper reviews some of these debates.
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  24. Francois Recanati (1998). Meaning and Force: An Introduction. In Asa Kasher (ed.), Pragmatics: Critical Concepts. Routledge 126-143.
  25. Lionel Shapiro (2014). Assertoric Force Perspectivalism: Relativism Without Relative Truth. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1 (6).
    According to relativist accounts of discourse about, e.g., epistemic possibility and matters of taste, the truth of propositions must be relativized to nonstandard parameters. This paper argues that the central thrust of such accounts should be understood independently of relative truth, in terms of a perspectival account of assertoric force. My point of departure is a stripped-down version of Brandom’s analysis of the normative structure of discursive practice. By generalizing that structure, I make room for an analogue of the “assessment (...)
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  26. David Simpson (1992). Communicative Skills in the Constitution of Illocutionary Acts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):82 – 92.
    Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts has offered a fruitful way of focussing the relation between language and communication. In particular, by adopting the distinction we attend to linguistic and communicative subjects as actors, not just processors or conduits of information. Yet in many attempts to explicate the constitution of illocutionary acts the subject as actor is subsumed within the role of linguistic rules or conventions. I propose an account of illocutionary acts in which rules or conventions are secondary (...)
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  27. Eleni Staraki & Anastasia Giannakidou, Ability, Action, and Causation: From Pure Ability to Force.
    Abstract In this paper, we show that Greek distinguishes empirically ability as a precondition for action, and ability as initiating and sustaining force for action. In this latter case, the ability verb behaves like an action verb, and the sentence has the logical form of a causative structure φ CAUSE [BECOME ψ] (Dowty 1979). The distinction between ability as potential for action and ability as action itself has a venerable tradition that goes back to Aristotle, and is recently implied in (...)
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  28. William B. Starr, A Preference Semantics for Imperatives.
    Imperative sentences like Dance! do not seem to represent the world. Recent modal analyses challenge this idea, but its intuitive and historical appeal remain strong. This paper presents three new challenges for a non-representational analysis, showing that the obstacles facing it are even steeper than previously appreciated. I will argue that the only way for the non-representationalist to meet these three challenges is to adopt a dynamic semantics. Such a dynamic semantics is proposed here: imperatives introduce preferences between alternatives. This (...)
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  29. William B. Starr (2014). Force, Mood and Truth. Protosociology 31:160-181.
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  30. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) (1994). Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. Routledge.
  31. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (1989). Two Consequences of Hinting. Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (4):288 - 293.
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  32. Maciej Witek (2015). Mechanisms of Illocutionary Games. Language and Communication 42:11-22.
    The paper develops a score-keeping model of illocutionary games and uses it to account for mechanisms responsible for creating institutional facts construed as rights and commitments of participants in a dialogue. After introducing the idea of Austinian games—understood as abstract entities representing different levels of the functioning of discourse—the paper defines the main categories of the proposed model: interactional negotiation, illocutionary score, appropriateness rules and kinematics rules. Finally, it discusses the phenomenon of accommodation as it occurs in illocutionary games and (...)
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  33. Maciej Witek (2015). An Interactional Account of Illocutionary Practice. Language Sciences 47:43-55.
    The paper aims to develop an interactional account of illocutionary practice, which results from integrating elements of Millikan's biological model of language within the framework of Austin's theory of speech acts. The proposed account rests on the assumption that the force of an act depends on what counts as its interactional effect or, in other words, on the response that it conventionally invites or attempts to elicit. The discussion is divided into two parts. The first one reconsiders Austin's and Millikan's (...)
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  34. Maciej Witek (2013). Three Approaches to the Study of Speech Acts. Dialogue and Universalism 23 (1):129-141.
    The paper reconstructs and discusses three different approaches to the study of speech acts: (i) the intentionalist approach, according to which most illocutionary acts are to be analysed as utterances made with the Gricean communicative intentions, (ii) the institutionalist approach, which is based on the idea of illocutions as institutional acts constituted by systems of collectively accepted rules, and (iii) the interactionalist approach the main tenet of which is to perform illocutionary acts by making conventional moves in accordance with patterns (...)
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  35. Seth Yalcin (forthcoming). Expressivism by Force. In D. Fogal, D. Harris & M. Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts. Oxford University Press