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  1. Raziel Abelson (1966). Persons, P-Predicates, and Robots. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (October):306-311.
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  2. Laird Addis (2003). Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949): A Method and a Theory. In J. E. Gracia, G. M. Reichberg & B. N. Schumacher (eds.), The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's Guide. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing.
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  3. David M. Armstrong (1993). Reply to Jackson's "Block's Challenge". In John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  4. John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.) (1993). Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays, all especially written for this volume, explore the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests.
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  5. Renford Bambrough (ed.) (1974). Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Blackwell.
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  6. David L. Boyer (1985). True Christians and Straw Behaviorists: Remarks on Hocutt. Behaviorism 13 (2):163-170.
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  7. David L. Boyer (1984). A Widely Accepted but Nonetheless Astonishingly Flimsy Argument Against Analytical Behaviorism. Philosophia 14 (August):153-172.
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  8. John Bricke (1972). Privacy and the Mental in Ryle's Concept of Mind. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):45-54.
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  9. José E. Burgos (2004). Realism About Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):69-95.
    Behavior analysis emphasizes the study of overt animal (human and nonhuman) behavior as a subject matter in its own right. This paper provides a metaphysical foundation for such an emphasis via an elucidation of a thesis that I generically call "realism about behavior," where by "realism" I mean an assertion of mind-independent existence. The elucidation takes the form of a conceptual framework that combines a property-exemplification account of events with modal realism in the context of three opposing philosophies of mind: (...)
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  10. Ronald J. Butler (ed.) (1963). Analytical Philosophy: Second Series. Blackwell.
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  11. Alex Byrne (1996). Behaviourism. In S. D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Introductory texts in the philosophy of mind often begin with a discussion of behaviourism, presented as one of the few theories of mind that have been conclusively refuted. But matters are not that simple: behaviourism, in one form or another, is still alive and kicking.
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  12. Charles A. Campbell (1953). Ryle on the Intellect. Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April):115-38.
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  13. R. Carnap (1959). Psychology in Physical Language. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Logical Positivism. Free Press.
  14. R. Carnap (1959). Logical Positivism. Free Press.
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  15. L. Carrier (1973). Professor Shaffer's Refutation of Behaviourism. Mind 80 (April):249-52.
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  16. Anthony Chemero (2002). Reconsidering Ryle: Editor's Introduction. Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7.
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  17. Roderick M. Chisholm (1958). Sentences About Believing. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:125 - 148.
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  18. Roderick M. Chisholm (1955). A Note on Carnap's Meaning Analysis. Philosophical Studies 6 (6):87-88.
  19. Roderick M. Chisholm (1952). Intentionality and the Theory of Signs. Philosophical Studies 3 (June):56-63.
  20. Sean Crawford (forthcoming). ON THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS’ PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY: LAYING A LEGEND TO REST. In Thomas Uebel (ed.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science. Springer.
    The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. It then (...)
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  21. Sean Crawford (2013). The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory. In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it is (...)
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  22. Houghton Dalrymple (1977). Some Logical Muddles in Behaviorism. Southwestern Philosophical Studies 2 (April):64-72.
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  23. Lawrence H. Davis (1974). Disembodied Brains. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):121-132.
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  24. Willard F. Day (1977). On Skinner's Treatment of the First-Person, Third-Person Psychological Sentence Distinction. Behaviorism 5 (1):33-37.
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  25. Daniel C. Dennett, Reintroducing The Concept of Mind.
    _shazam!–_ the explosive generation of £100.03 of ordinary cash (minus a small quantity extracted by the bank) plus, perhaps, a few stray photons or quarks or gravity waves. He wonders: What kind of containers does the bank use to hold the anti-cash till the regular cash arrives? How are they insulated? Can you store cash and anti-cash in the same box and somehow prevent them from getting in contact? Might there be zombanks that only _seemed_ to store cash and anti-cash? (...)
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  26. Alfred C. Ewing (1953). Professor Ryle's Attack on Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53:47-78.
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  27. B. A. Farrell (1950). Experience. Mind 59 (April):170-98.
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  28. D. R. Finn (1971). Putnam and Logical Behaviourism. Mind 80 (July):432-36.
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  29. Owen J. Flanagan & T. McCreadie-Albright (1974). Malcolm and the Fallacy of Behaviorism. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):425-30.
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  30. A. Campbell Garnett (1950). Must Empiricism Be Materialistic and Behavioristic? Journal of Philosophy 47 (April):250-255.
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  31. Dean Geuras (1977). Ryle's Analysis of Mind and Matter. Southwest Philosophical Studies 2 (April):56-59.
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  32. Benjamin Gibbs (1969). Putnam on Brains and Behaviour. Analysis 30 (December):53-55.
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  33. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  34. Thomas A. Goudge (1982). Ryle's Last Thoughts on Thinking. Dialogue 21 (March):125-32.
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  35. Jorge J. E. Gracia, Gregory M. Reichberg & Bernard N. Schumacher (eds.) (2003). The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's Guide. Blackwell Pub..
    Surveying the history of philosophy, the book focuses on historical texts rather than historical figures and covers the entire range of classics in a single ...
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  36. George Graham, Behaviorism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  37. George Graham (1982). Spartans and Behaviorists. Behaviorism 10:137-149.
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  38. Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.) (1994). A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  39. Colin Hamer (1970). Why Ryle is Not a Behaviourist. Philosophical Studies 17:7-25.
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  40. David W. Hamlyn (1953). Behaviour. Philosophy 28 (April):132-45.
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  41. Norwood Russell Hanson (1952). Professor Ryle's "Mind". Philosophical Quarterly 2 (July):246-48.
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  42. P. Harzem (2004). Behaviorism for New Psychology: What Was Wrong with Behaviorism and What is Wrong with It Now. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):5-12.
    The evolution of behaviorism from its explicit beginning with John B. Watson's declaration in 1913 to the behaviorisms of the present is considered briefly. Contributions of behaviorism to scientific psychology then and now are critically assessed, arriving at the conclusion that regardless of whether or not its opponents and proponents are aware, the essential points of behaviorism have now been absorbed into all of scientific psychology. It will assist the progress of the science of psychology if its focus now shifts (...)
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  43. Herbert Heidelberger (1966). On Characterizing the Psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (June):529-536.
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  44. Herbert I. Hochberg (1959). Physicalism, Behaviorism and Phenomena. Philosophy of Science 26 (April):93-103.
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  45. Max O. Hocutt (1986). Witches and Behaviorists: A Reply to Robinson and Boyer. Behaviorism 14 (1):97-101.
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  46. Max O. Hocutt (1985). Spartans, Strawmen, and Symptoms. Behaviorism 13 (2):87-97.
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  47. Albert Hofstadter (1951). Professor Ryle's Category-Mistake. Journal of Philosophy 48 (April):257-269.
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  48. Sidney Hook (ed.) (1960). Dimensions Of Mind: A Symposium. NY: NEW YORK University Press.
  49. William H. Hyde (1979). Response to Professor Putnam's Psychological Concepts, Explication, and Ordinary Language. Philosophical Investigations 2:73-75.
    The article is a brief response to h putnam's brief response to my article, "empirical realism and other minds" ("philosophical investigations", Volume 2, 13-21, April 79). Putnam, In his response, Says that we might determine that an oddly behaving/talking person in an odd tribe was really in pain by discovering that he in fact has what (a further developed) science has determined he must have in order to be in pain. In my response I work out the imagined example with (...)
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  50. Frank Jackson (1993). Block's Challenge. In Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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1 — 50 / 117