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  1. Erik C. Banks (2014). The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell. Cambridge University Press.
    The book revives the neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell and applies the updated view to the problem of redefining physicalism, explaining the origins of sensation, and the problem of deriving extended physical objects and systems from an ontology of events.
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  2. Erik C. Banks (2013). Metaphysics for Positivists: Mach Versus the Vienna Circle. Discipline Filosophiche 23 (1):57-77.
    This article distinguishes between Machian empiricism and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and associated philosophers. Mach's natural philosophy was a first order attempt to reform and reorganize physics, not a second order reconstruction of the "language" of physics. Mach's elements were not sense data but realistic events in the natural world and in minds, and Mach admitted unobserved elements as part of his world view. Mach's critique of metaphysics was far more subtle and concerned the elimination of sensory (...)
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  3. Rudolf Carnap (1963). Replies and Systematic Expositions. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), ¸ Iteschilpp:Prc. Open Court. 859--1013.
  4. Marc Champagne (2012). Russell and the Newman Problem Revisited. Analysis and Metaphysics 11:65 - 74.
    In his 1927 Analysis of Matter and elsewhere, Russell argued that we can successfully infer the structure of the external world from that of our explanatory schemes. While nothing guarantees that the intrinsic qualities of experiences are shared by their objects, he held that the relations tying together those relata perforce mirror relations that actually obtain (these being expressible in the formal idiom of the Principia Mathematica). This claim was subsequently criticized by the Cambridge mathematician Max Newman as true but (...)
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  5. Sean Crawford (2014). On the Logical Positivists' Philosophy of Psychology: Laying a Legend to Rest. In Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas Uebel & Marcel Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Vol. 5. Springer. 711-726.
    The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. It then (...)
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  6. Sean Crawford (2013). The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory. In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it is (...)
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  7. Richard Creath (forthcoming). Logical Empiricism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  8. Scott Edgar (2009). Logical Empiricism, Politics, and Professionalism. Science and Education 18 (2):177-189.
    This paper considers George A. Reisch’s account of the role of Cold War political forces in shaping the apolitical stance that came to dominate philosophy of science in the late 1940s and 1950s. It argues that at least as early as the 1930s, Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap already held that philosophy of science could not properly have political aims, and further suggests that political forces alone cannot explain this view’s rise to dominance during the Cold War, since political (...)
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  9. Matti Eklund (2000). The Aims of Logical Empiricism As a Philosophy of Science. Acta Analytica 15 (25):137-59.
    According to the received view on logical empiricism, the logical empiricists were involved in the same project as Popper, Lakatos and Kuhn: a project of describing actual scientific method and (with the exception of Kuhn) prescribing methodological rules for scientists. Even authors who seek to show that the logical empiricists were not as simpleminded as widely believed agree with this assumption. I argue that the received view has it wrong.
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  10. Theodore J. Everett (2010). Observation and Induction. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):303-324.
    This article offers a simple technical resolution to the problem of induction, which is to say that general facts are not always inferred from observations of particular facts, but are themselves sometimes defeasibly observed. The article suggests a holistic account of observation that allows for general statements in empirical theories to be interpreted as observation reports, in place of the common but arguably obsolete idea that observations are exclusively particular. Predictions and other particular statements about unobservable facts can then appear (...)
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  11. Gary Gutting (1971). Husserl and Logical Empiricism. Metaphilosophy 2 (3):197–226.
  12. Walter Horn (2013). The Roots of Representationism: An Introduction to Everett Hall. LAP Lambert.
    American philosopher Everett W. Hall (1901-1960) was among the first epistemologists writing in English to have promoted “representationism,” a currently popular explanation of cognition. According to this school, there are no private sense-data or qualia, because the ascription (representation) of public properties that are exemplified in the world of common sense is believed to be sufficient to explain mental content. In this timely volume, Walter Horn, perhaps the foremost living expert on Hall’s philosophy, not only provides copious excerpts from Hall’s (...)
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  13. Oskari Kuusela (2012). Carnap and the Tractatus' Philosophy of Logic. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
    This article discusses the relation between the early Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. In Carnapian terms, the Tractatus’ goal is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, syntactical principles and concepts to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore already part of the Tractatus’ view, (...)
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  14. Sebastian Lutz, Empirical Adequacy in the Received View.
    I show that the central notion of Constructive Empiricism, empirical adequacy, can be expressed syntactically and specifically in the Received View of the logical empiricists. The formalization shows that the Received View is superior to Constructive Empiricism in the treatment of theories involving unobservable objects or functions from observable to unobserv- able objects. It also suggests a formalization of ‘full empirical informative- ness’ in Constructive Empiricism.
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  15. Sebastian Lutz (2012). Artificial Language Philosophy of Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Browse Results) 2 (2):181–203.
    Abstract Artificial language philosophy (also called ‘ideal language philosophy’) is the position that philosophical problems are best solved or dissolved through a reform of language. Its underlying methodology—the development of languages for specific purposes—leads to a conventionalist view of language in general and of concepts in particular. I argue that many philosophical practices can be reinterpreted as applications of artificial language philosophy. In addition, many factually occurring interrelations between the sciences and philosophy of science are justified and clarified by the (...)
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  16. Sebastian Lutz (2012). Criteria of Empirical Significance: Foundations, Relations, Applications. Dissertation, Utrecht University
    This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific (...)
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  17. Nicholas Maxwell (2014). What Philosophy Ought to Be. In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 11: Ten Years After Donald Davidson (1917-2003). Ria University Press. 125-162.
    The proper task of philosophy is to keep alive awareness of what our most fundamental, important, urgent problems are, what our best attempts are at solving them and, if possible, what needs to be done to improve these attempts. Unfortunately, academic philosophy fails disastrously even to conceive of the task in these terms. It makes no attempt to ensure that universities tackle global problems - global intellectually, and global in the sense of concerning the future of the earth and humanity. (...)
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  18. Nikolay Milkov (2013). Carl Hempel: Whose Philosopher? In N. Milkov & V. Peckhaus (eds.), The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Springer, pp. 293-308. 293--309.
    Recently, Michael Friedman has claimed that virtually all the seeds of Hempel’s philosophical development trace back to his early encounter with the Vienna Circle (Friedman 2003, 94). As opposed, however, to Friedman’s view of the principal early influences on Hempel, we shall see that those formative influences originated rather with the Berlin Group. Hempel, it is true, spent the fall term of 1929 as a student at the University of Vienna, and, thanks to a letter of recommendation from Hans Reichenbach, (...)
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  19. Nikolay Milkov (2013). The Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle: Affinities and Divergences. In N. Milkov & V. Peckhaus (eds.), The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Springer, pp. 3-32. 3--32.
    The Berlin Group was an equal partner with the Vienna Circle as a school of scientific philosophy, albeit one that pursued an itinerary of its own. But while the latter presented its defining projects in readily discernible terms and became immediately popular, the Berlin Group, whose project was at least as sig-nificant as that of its Austrian counterpart, remained largely unrecognized. The task of this chapter is to distinguish the Berliners’ work from that of the Vienna Circle and to bring (...)
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  20. Nikolay Milkov (2012). Karl Popper's Debt to Leonard Nelson. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):137-56.
    Karl Popper has often been cast as one of the most solitary figures of twentieth-century philosophy. The received image is of a thinker who developed his scientific philosophy virtually alone and in opposition to a crowd of brilliant members of the Vienna Circle. This paper challenges the received view and undertakes to correctly situate on the map of the history of philosophy Popper’s contribution, in particular, his renowned fallibilist theory of knowledge. The motive for doing so is the conviction that (...)
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  21. Nikolay Milkov & Volker Peckhaus (eds.) (2013). The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Springer.
    The Berlin Group for scientific philosophy was active between 1928 and 1933 and was closely related to the Vienna Circle. In 1930, the leaders of the two Groups, Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap, launched the journal Erkenntnis. However, between the Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle, there was not only close relatedness but also significant difference. Above all, while the Berlin Group explored philosophical problems of the actual practice of science, the Vienna Circle, closely following Wittgenstein, was more interested in (...)
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  22. Bradley Monton & Bas C. Van Fraassen (2003). Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405 - 422.
    James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term 'observable' has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are objective, non-modal facts about what is observable. Both modal nominalism and constructive empiricism require clarification in the face (...)
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  23. Thomas Mormann (forthcoming). Ilkka Niiniluoto, Sami Pihlström (Eds.), Reappraisals of Eino Kaila's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook.
  24. Thomas Mormann (2014). Matthias Neuber: Die Grenzen des Revisionismus: Schlick, Cassirer und das "Raumproblem". [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (1):127 - 131.
  25. Thomas Mormann (2013). Wiener wissenschaftliche Weltanschauungen - zwischen Wissenschaft, Philosophie, Politik und "Leben". In Elisabeth Nemeth & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Die europäische Wissenschaftsphilosophie und das Wiener Erbe. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis Band 18, 105 - 127, Springer.
  26. Charles W. Morris (1935). The Relation of the Formal and Empirical Sciences Within Scientific Empiricism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 5 (1):6-16.
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  27. Matthias Neuber (2012). Invariance, Structure, Measurement – Eino Kaila and the History of Logical Empiricism. Theoria 78 (4):358-383.
    Eino Kaila's thought occupies a curious position within the logical empiricist movement. Along with Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, and the early Moritz Schlick, Kaila advocates a realist approach towards science and the project of a “scientific world conception”. This realist approach was chiefly directed at both Kantianism and Poincaréan conventionalism. The case in point was the theory of measurement. According to Kaila, the foundations of physical reality are characterized by the existence of invariant systems of relations, which he called structures. (...)
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  28. Matthias Neuber (2011). Feigl's 'Scientific Realism'. Philosophy of Science 78 (1):165-183.
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  29. Alyssa Ney (2012). Neo-Positivist Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):53-78.
    Some philosophers argue that many contemporary debates in metaphysics are “illegitimate,” “shallow,” or “trivial,” and that “contemporary analytic metaphysics, a professional activity engaged in by some extremely intelligent and morally serious people, fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued” (Ladyman and Ross, Every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalized , 2007 ). Many of these critics are explicit about their sympathies with Rudolf Carnap and his circle, calling themselves ‘neo-positivists’ or ‘neo-Carnapians.’ Yet (...)
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  30. Robert C. Olby (1990). The Convergence of Behaviourism and Logical Positivism. [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 12 (1):117 - 122.
  31. Lydia Patton (forthcoming). Methodology of the Sciences. In Michael Forster & Kristin Gjesdal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford University Press.
    In the growing Prussian university system of the early nineteenth century, "Wissenschaft" (science) was seen as an endeavor common to university faculties, characterized by a rigorous methodology. On this view, history and jurisprudence are sciences, as much as is physics. Nineteenth century trends challenged this view: the increasing influence of materialist and positivist philosophies, profound changes in the relationships between university faculties, and the defense of Kant's classification of the sciences by neo-Kantians. Wilhelm Dilthey's defense of the independence of the (...)
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  32. Charles Pigden (1987). Two Dogmatists. Inquiry 30 (1 & 2):173 – 193.
    Grice and Strawson's 'In Defense of a Dogma is admired even by revisionist Quineans such as Putnam (1962) who should know better. The analytic/synthetic distinction they defend is distinct from that which Putnam successfully rehabilitates. Theirs is the post-positivist distinction bounding a grossly enlarged analytic. It is not, as they claim, the sanctified product of a long philosophic tradition, but the cast-off of a defunct philosophy - logical positivism. The fact that the distinction can be communally drawn does not show (...)
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  33. Michael David Resnik (1972). Review of M. Przelecki, The Logic of Empirical Theories. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 39 (3):421-.
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  34. Donata Romizi (2012). The Vienna Circle’s “Scientific World-Conception”: Philosophy of Science in the Political Arena. Hopos 2 (2):205-242.
    This article is intended as a contribution to the current debates about the relationship between politics and the philosophy of science in the Vienna Circle. I reconsider this issue by shifting the focus from philosophy of science as theory to philosophy of science as practice. From this perspective I take as a starting point the Vienna Circle’s scientific world-conception and emphasize its practical nature: I reinterpret its tenets as a set of recommendations that express the particular epistemological attitude in which (...)
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  35. Don Ross, James Ladyman & David Spurrett (2007). In Defence of Scientism. In James Ladyman (ed.), Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press.
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  36. Thomas A. Ryckman (1990). Designation and Convention: A Chapter of Early Logical Empiricism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:149 - 157.
    An examination of Carnap's Aufbau in the context of Schlick's Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre of ten years earlier, suggests that Carnap's focus there on the sign-relation (Zeichenbeziehung) is an effort to retrieve a verificationist account of the meaning of individual scientific statements from the abyss of meaning-holism entailed by Schlick's proposal that scientific concepts be implicitly defined. The Aufbau's antipodal aspects, its reductive phenomenalism and quasi-Kantian concern with the constitution of objectivity, are seen as complementary moments of the marriage of empiricism and (...)
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  37. Wilfrid Sellars (1947). Epistemology and the New Way of Words. Journal of Philosophy 44 (24):645-660.
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  38. Neven Sesardić (1979). The Heritage of the Vienna Circle. Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:121-129.
    This article presents a criticism of the widespread assumption that the programme of the Vienna Circle has been proven to be unrealizable and, therefore, that it is today quite uninteresting and to be entirely abandoned. The basic aim of logical positivists was to raise philosophy to the rigour and high standards of contemporary science. It must be admitted that they were unsuccessful in their attempts to eliminate old-fashioned and conservative philosophy by proving it to be senseless. There is in fact (...)
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  39. Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (2008). Bas Van Fraassen's “Argument From Public Hallucination” and the Quest for the Real Behind Representations. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:199-205.
    In his article “Constructive Empiricism Now” van Fraassen chooses an extremely interesting example to defend his thesis that scientific theories are only representations, so that the aim of science is to give us reliable, empirically adequate, descriptions of the observable aspects of the world. For him, there is no continuum of observable/unobservable, as he draws a line of distinction at a point that eliminates from his ontology such cases as fields of forces and sub-atomic particles. As a result, he puts (...)
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  40. Anne Siegetsleitner (2014). Ethik und Moral im Wiener Kreis. Zur Geschichte eines engagierten Humanismus. Böhlau.
    Die vorliegende Schrift unternimmt eine Revision des vorherrschenden Bildes der Rolle und der Konzeptionen von Moral und Ethik im Wiener Kreis. Dieses Bild wird als zu einseitig und undifferenziert zurückgewiesen. Die Ansicht, die Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises hätten kein Interesse an Moral und Ethik gezeigt, wird widerlegt. Viele Mitglieder waren nicht nur moralisch und politisch interessiert, sondern auch engagiert. Des Weiteren vertraten nicht alle die Standardauffassung logisch-empiristischer Ethik, die neben der Anerkennung deskriptiv-empirischer Untersuchungen durch die Ablehnung jeglicher normativer und inhaltlicher (...)
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  41. Anne Siegetsleitner (2008). Evolution und ihre Beziehung zur Ethik in Moritz Schlicks Jugendwerk "Lebensweisheit". In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.), Analysen, Argumente, Ansätze. Beiträge zum 8. Internationalen Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Graz. Ontos. 75-83.
  42. David G. Stern (2007). Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Physicalism: A Reassessment. In Alan Richardson & Thomas Uebel (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press. 305--31.
    The "standard account" of Wittgenstein’s relations with the Vienna Circle is that the early Wittgenstein was a principal source and inspiration for the Circle’s positivistic and scientific philosophy, while the later Wittgenstein was deeply opposed to the logical empiricist project of articulating a "scientific conception of the world." However, this telegraphic summary is at best only half-true and at worst deeply misleading. For it prevents us appreciating the fluidity and protean character of their philosophical dialogue. In retrospectively attributing clear-cut positions (...)
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  43. Iulian D. Toader (2004). A Diagrammatic Reconstruction of Carnap's "Quasianalysis&Quot;. Synthese 142 (1):43 - 59.
    In this paper, I am zeroing in on Carnap's formal method of quasianalysis, arguing against two interpretations of it, offered by Nelson Goodman and Thomas Mormann. In order to overcome their inadequacy, I propose a diagrammatic reconstruction, which takes advantage of the fact that the concept of local sign is no longer ignored. This will give me the opportunity to show that Quine's criticism of Carnap's constitution of physical space fails, and will allow me to describe QUASIMODOS (QUASIanalytical Machine Oriented (...)
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  44. Terrance Tomkow, Blackburn, Truth and Other Hot Topics.
    Quine taught us that the collapse of positivism entails that empirical theories are, in principle, undetermined-- not just by the available evidence-- but by all possible evidence. Without disputing that conclusion, contemporary philosophers-- exampled here by Simon Blackburn and Jerry Fodor-- have wanted to treat this as a merely abstract possibility that need not undermine our confidence in actual scientific theory and practice. I argue that there is no basis for this complacency.
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