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  1. Peter Achinstein (1963). Theoretical Terms and Partial Interpretation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (54):89-105.
  2. V. Bakoš (2007). Philosophical Production of the Association for Scientific Synthesis: Towards the 70th Anniversary of Its Foundation. Filozofia 62:853-869.
    The Association for Scientific Synthesis gathered a group of Slovak intellectuals, who tried to introduce modern scientific attitudes and structural methods into Slovak culture. In their systematic effort for a coordinated and convergent scientific research, for an exact scientific language and methods they were inspired by logical empiricism of Wiener Kreis, Czech Structuralism and Russian „formal“ school. Much of their attention was paid to such problems as the philosophy and methodology of science, concept of empirical knowledge, questions of logical syntax (...)
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  3. Erik C. Banks (2014). The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell: Neutral Monism Reconceived. Cambridge University Press.
    The book revives the neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell and applies the updated view to the problem of redefining physicalism, explaining the origins of sensation, and the problem of deriving extended physical objects and systems from an ontology of events.
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  4. Erik C. Banks (2013). Metaphysics for Positivists: Mach Versus the Vienna Circle. Discipline Filosophiche 23 (1):57-77.
    This article distinguishes between Machian empiricism and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and associated philosophers. Mach's natural philosophy was a first order attempt to reform and reorganize physics, not a second order reconstruction of the "language" of physics. Mach's elements were not sense data but realistic events in the natural world and in minds, and Mach admitted unobserved elements as part of his world view. Mach's critique of metaphysics was far more subtle and concerned the elimination of sensory (...)
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  5. Gustav Bergmann (1946). Some Comments on Carnap's Logic of Induction. Philosophy of Science 13 (1):71-78.
  6. Gustav Bergmann (1942). Remarks Concerning the Epistemology of Scientific Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 9 (3):283-293.
  7. Leonard Jay Berkowitz (1975). The Observational - Theoretical Distinction in the Philosophy of Science of Logical Empiricism. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
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  8. Davide Bordini (2011). Analitico, sintetico e a priori: questioni di forma. Il dibattito tra fenomenologia husserliana e empirismo logico. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 2.
    This article sketches out the key features of the debate on the analytic-synthetic distinction between phenomenology and logical empiricism, which took place in the early part of the twentieth century. On the one side, the author reconstructs the debate itself from an historical angle; on the other, he gives a theoretical account of the different positions and arguments. In particular, he has three main aims: a) to clarify how, according to Husserl, the analyticsynthetic opposition is to be understood as the (...)
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  9. Marco Buzzoni (1997). Erkenntnistheoretische Und Ontologische Probleme der Theoretischen Begriffe. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):19-53.
    Operationalism and theoretical entities. The thesis of the“theory ladenness” of observation leads to an antinomy. In order to solve this antinomy a technical operationalism is sketched, according to which theories should in principle not contain anything that cannot be reduced to technical procedures. This implies the rejection of Quine's underdeterminacy thesis and of many views about the theoretical-observational distinction, e.g. neopositivistic views, van Fraassen's view, Sneed-Stegmüller's view. Then I argue for the following theses: 1. All scientific concepts are theory laden (...)
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  10. V. C. C. (1956). The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 10 (2):369-369.
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  11. Rudolf Carnap (2015). Testabilité et Signification. Vrin.
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  12. Rudolf Carnap (1963). Replies and Systematic Expositions. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), ¸ Iteschilpp:Prc. Open Court 859--1013.
  13. Gustavo Cevolani (2015). A Systematic Companion to “Neoclassical” Philosophy of Science. Metascience 24 (2):295-299.
    After the demise of logical empiricism in the late fifties of the past century, philosophy of science entered a sort of Kuhnian revolutionary phase. Both its central problems and the methods used to address them underwent a profound change; under the pressure of the “new” philosophy of science—and of the various historical, sociological, cultural, or feminist approaches—the way of doing philosophy championed by Carnap and Popper was progressively abandoned by many scholars interested in the study of science. Today, it is (...)
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  14. Alan Chalmers (2011). Understanding Science Through its History: A Response to Newman. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):150-153.
    The paper is a response to William Newman’s rebuttal of a critique of his account of the origins of modern chemistry by Alan Chalmers. A way in which the nature of science can be illuminated by history of science is identified and an account of how this can be achieved in the context of a study of the work of Boyle defended in the face of Newman’s criticism. Texts from the writings of Boyle that are cited by Newman as posing (...)
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  15. Marc Champagne (2012). Russell and the Newman Problem Revisited. Analysis and Metaphysics 11:65 - 74.
    In his 1927 Analysis of Matter and elsewhere, Russell argued that we can successfully infer the structure of the external world from that of our explanatory schemes. While nothing guarantees that the intrinsic qualities of experiences are shared by their objects, he held that the relations tying together those relata perforce mirror relations that actually obtain (these being expressible in the formal idiom of the Principia Mathematica). This claim was subsequently criticized by the Cambridge mathematician Max Newman as true but (...)
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  16. James Child (1971). On the Theoretical Dependence of Correspondence Postulates. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):170-177.
    The nature of the connection between theory and observation has been a major source of difficulty for philosophers of science. It is most vexing for those who would reduce the terms of a theory to those of an observation language, e.g. Carnap, Braithwaite, and Nagel. Carnap's work, particularly his treatment of physical theories as partially interpreted formalisms, forms the point of focus of this paper. Carnap attempted to make the connection between theory and observation through correspondence postulates. It is pointed (...)
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  17. Sean Crawford (2014). On the Logical Positivists' Philosophy of Psychology: Laying a Legend to Rest. In Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas Uebel & Marcel Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Vol. 5. Springer 711-726.
    The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. It then (...)
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  18. Sean Crawford (2013). The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory. In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it is (...)
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  19. Wayne A. Davis (1983). The Science of Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 36 (4):929-930.
  20. Rolf Eberle, David Kaplan & Richard Montague (1961). Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation. Philosophy of Science 28 (4):418-428.
    Hempel and Oppenheim, in their paper 'The Logic of Explanation', have offered an analysis of the notion of scientific explanation. The present paper advances considerations in the light of which their analysis seems inadequate. In particular, several theorems are proved with roughly the following content: between almost any theory and almost any singular sentence, certain relations of explainability hold.
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  21. Scott Edgar (2009). Logical Empiricism, Politics, and Professionalism. Science and Education 18 (2):177-189.
    This paper considers George A. Reisch’s account of the role of Cold War political forces in shaping the apolitical stance that came to dominate philosophy of science in the late 1940s and 1950s. It argues that at least as early as the 1930s, Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap already held that philosophy of science could not properly have political aims, and further suggests that political forces alone cannot explain this view’s rise to dominance during the Cold War, since political (...)
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  22. Matti Eklund (2000). The Aims of Logical Empiricism As a Philosophy of Science. Acta Analytica 15 (25):137-59.
    According to the received view on logical empiricism, the logical empiricists were involved in the same project as Popper, Lakatos and Kuhn: a project of describing actual scientific method and (with the exception of Kuhn) prescribing methodological rules for scientists. Even authors who seek to show that the logical empiricists were not as simpleminded as widely believed agree with this assumption. I argue that the received view has it wrong.
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  23. Theodore J. Everett (2010). Observation and Induction. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):303-324.
    This article offers a simple technical resolution to the problem of induction, which is to say that general facts are not always inferred from observations of particular facts, but are themselves sometimes defeasibly observed. The article suggests a holistic account of observation that allows for general statements in empirical theories to be interpreted as observation reports, in place of the common but arguably obsolete idea that observations are exclusively particular. Predictions and other particular statements about unobservable facts can then appear (...)
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  24. W. A. F. (1974). Wittgenstein's Vienna. Review of Metaphysics 27 (3):612-613.
  25. Herbert Feigl & Grover Maxwell (1963). Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Volume III of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (2):287-289.
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  26. Juliet Floyd & Sanford Shieh (eds.) (2001). Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    This collection of previously unpublished essays presents a new approach to the history of analytic philosophy--one that does not assume at the outset a general characterization of the distinguishing elements of the analytic tradition. Drawing together a venerable group of contributors, including John Rawls and Hilary Putnam, this volume explores the historical contexts in which analytic philosophers have worked, revealing multiple discontinuities and misunderstandings as well as a complex interaction between science and philosophical reflection.
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  27. Philipp Frank (1948). Logical Empiricism I: The Problem of Physical Reality. Synthese 7 (6-B):458 - 465.
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  28. Christopher F. French (2015). Rudolf Carnap: Philosophy of Science as Engineering Explications. In Uskali Mäki, Stephanie Ruphy, Gerhard Schurz & Ioannis Votsis (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer 293-303.
    One way of explaining Rudolf Carnap’s mature philosophical view is by drawing an analogy between his technical projects—like his work on inductive logic—with a certain kind of conceptual engineering. After all, there are many mathematical similarities between Carnap’s work in inductive logic and a number of results from contemporary confirmation theory, statistics and mathematical probability theory. However, in stressing these similarities, the conceptual dependence of Carnap’s inductive logic on his work on semantics is downplayed. Yet it is precisely the conceptual (...)
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  29. Steven French (2015). Gerhard Schurz: Philosophy of Science—A Unified Approach. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):241-243.
    Professor Schurz has written a book that is ambitious in both scope and aims. It begins with an introductory chapter on the historical development and general aims of the philosophy of science itself, moves on to issues associated with establishing a basis for a unified approach to science, with extensive consideration of the conceptual toolkit required, then takes us through chapters on laws and empirical testing, the empirical evaluation of theories more generally, including issues of realism and empiricism, before concluding (...)
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  30. Micael Friedman (2001). Tolerance and Analyticty in Carnap’s Philosophy of Mathematics. In Juliet Floyd & Sanford Shieh (eds.), Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Oxford Univeristy Press 223-255.
  31. Michael Friedman (2008). Wissenschaftslogik : The Role of Logic in the Philosophy of Science. Synthese 164 (3):385 - 400.
    Carl Hempel introduced what he called "Craig's theorem" into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the "problem of theoretical terms." Beginning with Hempel's use of 'Craig's theorem," I shall bring out some of the key differences between Hempel's treatment of the "problem of theoretical terms" and Carnap's in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap's mature philosophy. Carnap's treatment, in particular, is fundamentally antimetaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather (...)
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  32. Greg Frost-Arnold (forthcoming). Replies to Creath, Ebbs, and Lavers. [REVIEW] Metascience:1-7.
  33. Ken Gemes, Logical Content and Empirical Significance.
    Logical Positivism, could not be said to be au courant as a philosophical movement.1 Indeed not only is the movement no longer in existence, it's projects are no longer central to philosophical investigations, even to the investigations of those who specialize in the philosophy of science. If Positivism has been making a comeback it is primarily as an object of historical inquiry, perhaps as a means to answering the question of how we got from there (our forefathers' primary philosophical interests (...)
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  34. Ludovico Geymonat (1979). Paradossi e rivoluzioni. Il Saggiatore.
  35. Ludovico Geymonat (1967). Traduzione di Julius R. Weinberg, Introduzione al positivismo logico. Einaudi.
  36. Kamuran Gödelek, Logical Empiricism of Hans Reichenbach: A Critical Examination. Yeditepe'de Felsefe (Philosophy at Yeditepe) 3.
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  37. Yoji K. Gondor, A Simple View of the Mind, Instinct & Intuition.
    Abstract: The understanding our own mind seems to be an interesting topic in philosophy. I recall reading Kant, he ran far away in the metaphysical space when chalanged complex problems. He used the “intuition” as a mean to justify things, much before the awareness of scientific genetics and such things that made it feasible for such a use. Not much else he could do, the 18th century access to scientific knowledge was just very limited. My view of instinct and intuition (...)
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  38. Gary Gutting (1971). Husserl and Logical Empiricism. Metaphilosophy 2 (3):197–226.
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  39. Sasan Haghighi, Naturalism.
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  40. D. Wade Hands (2007). 2006 HES Presidential Address: A Tale of Two Mainstreams: Economics and Philosophy of Natural Science in the Mid-Twentieth Century. Journal of the History of Economic Thought 29:1-13.
    Abstract: The paper argues that mainstream economics and mainstream philosophy of natural science had much in common during the period 1945-1965. It examines seven common features of the two fields and suggests a number of historical developments that might help explain these similarities. The historical developments include: the Vienna Circle connection, the Samuelson-Harvard-Foundations connection, and the Cold War operations research connection.
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  41. Conrad Heilmann (2015). A New Interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement. Philosophy of Science 82 (5):787-797.
    On the received view, the Representational Theory of Measurement reduces measurement to the numerical representation of empirical relations. This account of measurement has been widely criticized. In this article, I provide a new interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement that sidesteps these debates. I propose to view the Representational Theory of Measurement as a library of theorems that investigate the numerical representability of qualitative relations. Such theorems are useful tools for concept formation that, in turn, is one crucial aspect (...)
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  42. Max Hocutt (1997). Review: From Logical Positivism to Scientific Realism. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 25 (1):77 - 80.
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  43. Harmon Holcomb (1987). Logicism and Achinstein's Pragmatic Theory of Scientific Explanation. Dialectica 41 (3):239-248.
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  44. Arne Homann (1994). Lived Experience and Knowledge in Schlick. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 17 (1-2):217-244.
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  45. Walter Horn (2013). The Roots of Representationism: An Introduction to Everett Hall. Lap Lambert.
    American philosopher Everett W. Hall was among the first epistemologists writing in English to have promoted “ representationism,” a currently popular explanation of cognition. According to this school, there are no private sense-data or qualia, because the ascription of public properties that are exemplified in the world of common sense is believed to be sufficient to explain mental content. In this timely volume, Walter Horn, perhaps the foremost living expert on Hall’s philosophy, not only provides copious excerpts from Hall’s works (...)
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  46. Irving Louis Horowitz (1961). A. Edel's "Science and the Structure of Ethics". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (2):267.
  47. Colin Howson & John Worrall (1974). The Contemporary State of Philosophy of Science in Britain. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5 (2):363-374.
    Some of the problem areas in which British philosophers of science have recently been engaged are described and some of the major contributions noted. Two sets of problems are given special attention: one concerned with the analysis of probability statements and one concerned with the appraisal of scientific theories. Three traditions in the approach to this second set of problems are distinguished. These might be called the Carnapian, the Popperian and the Wittgensteinian traditions.
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  48. Wolfgang Huemer (2003). Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology: Felix Kaufmann. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 10:151-161.
  49. Lars‐Göran Johansson (2014). Gerhard Schurz Philosophy of Science. A Unified Approach. Routledge, New York and Abingdon, 2014. Xix + 459 Pp. Isbn 978‐0‐415‐82936‐6. [REVIEW] Theoria 80 (4):368-376.
  50. Andreas Kamlah (2013). Everybody Has the Right to Do What He Wants: Hans Reichenbach's Volitionism and Its Historical Roots. In Nikolay Milkov & Volker Peckhaus (eds.), The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Springer 151--175.
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