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  1. Peter Achinstein (1963). Theoretical Terms and Partial Interpretation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (54):89-105.
  2. Erik C. Banks (2014). The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell: Neutral Monism Reconceived. Cambridge University Press.
    The book revives the neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell and applies the updated view to the problem of redefining physicalism, explaining the origins of sensation, and the problem of deriving extended physical objects and systems from an ontology of events.
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  3. Erik C. Banks (2013). Metaphysics for Positivists: Mach Versus the Vienna Circle. Discipline Filosophiche 23 (1):57-77.
    This article distinguishes between Machian empiricism and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and associated philosophers. Mach's natural philosophy was a first order attempt to reform and reorganize physics, not a second order reconstruction of the "language" of physics. Mach's elements were not sense data but realistic events in the natural world and in minds, and Mach admitted unobserved elements as part of his world view. Mach's critique of metaphysics was far more subtle and concerned the elimination of sensory (...)
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  4. Gustav Bergmann (1946). Some Comments on Carnap's Logic of Induction. Philosophy of Science 13 (1):71-78.
  5. Gustav Bergmann (1942). Remarks Concerning the Epistemology of Scientific Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 9 (3):283-293.
  6. Leonard Jay Berkowitz (1975). The Observational - Theoretical Distinction in the Philosophy of Science of Logical Empiricism. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
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  7. Davide Bordini (2011). Analitico, sintetico e a priori: questioni di forma. Il dibattito tra fenomenologia husserliana e empirismo logico. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 2.
    This article sketches out the key features of the debate on the analytic-synthetic distinction between phenomenology and logical empiricism, which took place in the early part of the twentieth century. On the one side, the author reconstructs the debate itself from an historical angle; on the other, he gives a theoretical account of the different positions and arguments. In particular, he has three main aims: a) to clarify how, according to Husserl, the analyticsynthetic opposition is to be understood as the (...)
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  8. Marco Buzzoni (1997). Erkenntnistheoretische Und Ontologische Probleme der Theoretischen Begriffe. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):19-53.
    Operationalism and theoretical entities. The thesis of the“theory ladenness” of observation leads to an antinomy. In order to solve this antinomy a technical operationalism is sketched, according to which theories should in principle not contain anything that cannot be reduced to technical procedures. This implies the rejection of Quine's underdeterminacy thesis and of many views about the theoretical-observational distinction, e.g. neopositivistic views, van Fraassen's view, Sneed-Stegmüller's view. Then I argue for the following theses: 1. All scientific concepts are theory laden (...)
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  9. V. C. C. (1956). The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 10 (2):369-369.
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  10. Rudolf Carnap (2015). Testabilité et Signification. Vrin.
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  11. Rudolf Carnap (1963). Replies and Systematic Expositions. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), ¸ Iteschilpp:Prc. Open Court 859--1013.
  12. Marc Champagne (2012). Russell and the Newman Problem Revisited. Analysis and Metaphysics 11:65 - 74.
    In his 1927 Analysis of Matter and elsewhere, Russell argued that we can successfully infer the structure of the external world from that of our explanatory schemes. While nothing guarantees that the intrinsic qualities of experiences are shared by their objects, he held that the relations tying together those relata perforce mirror relations that actually obtain (these being expressible in the formal idiom of the Principia Mathematica). This claim was subsequently criticized by the Cambridge mathematician Max Newman as true but (...)
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  13. Sean Crawford (2014). On the Logical Positivists' Philosophy of Psychology: Laying a Legend to Rest. In Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas Uebel & Marcel Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Vol. 5. Springer 711-726.
    The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. It then (...)
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  14. Sean Crawford (2013). The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory. In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it is (...)
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  15. Scott Edgar (2009). Logical Empiricism, Politics, and Professionalism. Science and Education 18 (2):177-189.
    This paper considers George A. Reisch’s account of the role of Cold War political forces in shaping the apolitical stance that came to dominate philosophy of science in the late 1940s and 1950s. It argues that at least as early as the 1930s, Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap already held that philosophy of science could not properly have political aims, and further suggests that political forces alone cannot explain this view’s rise to dominance during the Cold War, since political (...)
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  16. Matti Eklund (2000). The Aims of Logical Empiricism As a Philosophy of Science. Acta Analytica 15 (25):137-59.
    According to the received view on logical empiricism, the logical empiricists were involved in the same project as Popper, Lakatos and Kuhn: a project of describing actual scientific method and (with the exception of Kuhn) prescribing methodological rules for scientists. Even authors who seek to show that the logical empiricists were not as simpleminded as widely believed agree with this assumption. I argue that the received view has it wrong.
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  17. Theodore J. Everett (2010). Observation and Induction. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):303-324.
    This article offers a simple technical resolution to the problem of induction, which is to say that general facts are not always inferred from observations of particular facts, but are themselves sometimes defeasibly observed. The article suggests a holistic account of observation that allows for general statements in empirical theories to be interpreted as observation reports, in place of the common but arguably obsolete idea that observations are exclusively particular. Predictions and other particular statements about unobservable facts can then appear (...)
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  18. W. A. F. (1974). Wittgenstein's Vienna. Review of Metaphysics 27 (3):612-613.
  19. Micael Friedman (2001). Tolerance and Analyticty in Carnap’s Philosophy of Mathematics. In Juliet Floyd & Sanford Shieh (eds.), Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Oxford Univeristy Press 223-255.
  20. Ludovico Geymonat (1979). Paradossi e rivoluzioni. Il Saggiatore.
  21. Ludovico Geymonat (1967). Traduzione di Julius R. Weinberg, Introduzione al positivismo logico. Einaudi.
  22. Kamuran Gödelek (unknown). Logical Empiricism of Hans Reichenbach: A Critical Examination. Yeditepe'de Felsefe (Philosophy at Yeditepe) 3.
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  23. Yoji K. Gondor, A Simple View of the Mind, Instinct & Intuition.
    Abstract: The understanding our own mind seems to be an interesting topic in philosophy. I recall reading Kant, he ran far away in the metaphysical space when chalanged complex problems. He used the “intuition” as a mean to justify things, much before the awareness of scientific genetics and such things that made it feasible for such a use. Not much else he could do, the 18th century access to scientific knowledge was just very limited. My view of instinct and intuition (...)
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  24. Gary Gutting (1971). Husserl and Logical Empiricism. Metaphilosophy 2 (3):197–226.
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  25. Sasan Haghighi, Naturalism.
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  26. D. Wade Hands (2007). 2006 HES Presidential Address: A Tale of Two Mainstreams: Economics and Philosophy of Natural Science in the Mid-Twentieth Century. Journal of the History of Economic Thought 29:1-13.
    Abstract: The paper argues that mainstream economics and mainstream philosophy of natural science had much in common during the period 1945-1965. It examines seven common features of the two fields and suggests a number of historical developments that might help explain these similarities. The historical developments include: the Vienna Circle connection, the Samuelson-Harvard-Foundations connection, and the Cold War operations research connection.
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  27. Conrad Heilmann (2015). A New Interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement. Philosophy of Science 82 (5):787-797.
    On the received view, the Representational Theory of Measurement reduces measurement to the numerical representation of empirical relations. This account of measurement has been widely criticized. In this article, I provide a new interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement that sidesteps these debates. I propose to view the Representational Theory of Measurement as a library of theorems that investigate the numerical representability of qualitative relations. Such theorems are useful tools for concept formation that, in turn, is one crucial aspect (...)
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  28. Max Hocutt (1997). Review: From Logical Positivism to Scientific Realism. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 25 (1):77 - 80.
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  29. Arne Homann (1994). Lived Experience and Knowledge in Schlick. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 17 (1-2):217-244.
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  30. Walter Horn (2013). The Roots of Representationism: An Introduction to Everett Hall. Lap Lambert.
    American philosopher Everett W. Hall was among the first epistemologists writing in English to have promoted “ representationism,” a currently popular explanation of cognition. According to this school, there are no private sense-data or qualia, because the ascription of public properties that are exemplified in the world of common sense is believed to be sufficient to explain mental content. In this timely volume, Walter Horn, perhaps the foremost living expert on Hall’s philosophy, not only provides copious excerpts from Hall’s works (...)
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  31. Irving Louis Horowitz (1961). A. Edel's "Science and the Structure of Ethics". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (2):267.
  32. Wolfgang Huemer (2003). Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology: Felix Kaufmann. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 10:151-161.
  33. Andreas Kamlah (2013). Everybody Has the Right to Do What He Wants: Hans Reichenbach's Volitionism and Its Historical Roots. In Nikolay Milkov & Volker Peckhaus (eds.), The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Springer 151--175.
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  34. Yusuke Kaneko (2014). The Constitution of Space and Time in the Aufbau Viewed From a Kantian Perspective. Kagaku Tetsugaku 47 (1):19-36.
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  35. Richard F. Kitchener (2004). Logical Positivism, Naturalistic Epistemology, and the Foundations of Psychology. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):37 - 54.
    According to the standard account, logical positivism was the philosophical foundation of psychological neo-behaviorism. Smith (1986) has questioned this interpretation, suggesting that neo-behaviorism drew its philosophical inspiration from a different tradition, one more in keeping with naturalistic epistemology. Smith does not deny, however, the traditional interpretation of the philosophy of logical positivism, which sets it apart from naturalistic epistemology. In this article I suggest (following recent historical scholarship) that a more careful reading of the leading figure of logical positivism, Rudolph (...)
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  36. Jeff Kochan (2015). Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction. Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1):35-43.
    Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning because they typically see emotion as belonging to the context of discovery rather than of justification. I suggest, however, that recent work in epistemology challenges the authority usually granted the context distinction, taking a socially inflected reliabilism as (...)
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  37. Joseph Kronick (1987). Beyond Metaphysics? The Hermeneutic Circle in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):399-401.
  38. John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Outline of a Theory of Knowledge. JOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI.
    It is made clear what discursive knowledge is and how we acquire it, and some age-old skeptical views are shown to be incoherent. It is shown that all knowledge is to some degree inferential. At the same time, it is shown that there are three quite distinct senses in which empirical knowledge can be inferential. It is proved that we have a priori knowledge, and also that knowledge of non-empirical truths is needed to acquire empirical knowledge. Finally, it is clearly (...)
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  39. Oskari Kuusela (2012). Carnap and the Tractatus' Philosophy of Logic. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
    This article discusses the relation between the early Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. In Carnapian terms, the Tractatus’ goal is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, syntactical principles and concepts to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore already part of the Tractatus’ view, (...)
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  40. C. Lu (1989). Clarifying Ostensible Definition by the Logical Possibility of Inverted Spectrum. Modern Philosophy 2.
    How "red", "green" were defined? Through analyzing how two children with congenitally inverted color sensations corresponding to red flags and green grass accept their grand mothers’ teaching about colors, the paper get opposite conclusions against logical empiricism. The “red” and “green” and other names of properties of objects were defined by objective physical properties (or together with behavior, such as in defining “beauty”), instead our sensations. So language directly points to things in themselves passing through sensations and presentative world. It (...)
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  41. Sebastian Lutz (forthcoming). Carnap on Empirical Significance. Synthese.
    Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to the empirical significance (...)
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  42. Sebastian Lutz (2014). Empirical Adequacy in the Received View. Philosophy of Science 81 (5):1171-1183.
    I show that the central notion of Constructive Empiricism, empirical adequacy, can be expressed syntactically and specifically in the Received View of the logical empiricists. The formalization shows that the Received View is superior to Constructive Empiricism in the treatment of theories involving constants or functions from observable to unobservable objects. It also suggests a formalization of ‘full empirical informativeness’ in Constructive Empiricism.
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  43. Sebastian Lutz (2012). Criteria of Empirical Significance: Foundations, Relations, Applications. Dissertation, Utrecht University
    This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific (...)
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  44. Sebastian Lutz (2012). Artificial Language Philosophy of Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Browse Results) 2 (2):181–203.
    Abstract Artificial language philosophy (also called ‘ideal language philosophy’) is the position that philosophical problems are best solved or dissolved through a reform of language. Its underlying methodology—the development of languages for specific purposes—leads to a conventionalist view of language in general and of concepts in particular. I argue that many philosophical practices can be reinterpreted as applications of artificial language philosophy. In addition, many factually occurring interrelations between the sciences and philosophy of science are justified and clarified by the (...)
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  45. Sebastian Lutz (2012). Artificial Language Philosophy of Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):181–203.
    Artificial language philosophy is the position that philosophical problems are best solved or dissolved through a reform of language. Its underlying methodology, the development of languages for specific purposes, leads to a conventionalist view of language in general and of concepts in particular. I argue that many philosophical practices can be reinterpreted as applications of artificial language philosophy. And many factually occurring interrelations between the sciences and philosophy of science are justified and clarified by the assumption that an artificial language (...)
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  46. Nicholas Maxwell (2014). What Philosophy Ought to Be. In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 11: Ten Years After Donald Davidson (1917-2003). Ria University Press 125-162.
    The proper task of philosophy is to keep alive awareness of what our most fundamental, important, urgent problems are, what our best attempts are at solving them and, if possible, what needs to be done to improve these attempts. Unfortunately, academic philosophy fails disastrously even to conceive of the task in these terms. It makes no attempt to ensure that universities tackle global problems - global intellectually, and global in the sense of concerning the future of the earth and humanity. (...)
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  47. Pablo Melogno (2011). Estudios de Filosofía Contemporánea by Ricardo Navia. Filosofia Unisinos 12 (2):187-191.
    Estudios de filosofía contemporánea, lleva por título este volumen que reúne varios trabajos del Prof. Ricardo Navia, algunos publicados previamente en revistas especializadas de Brasil y Perú, otros que se editan por primera vez. No obstante tratarse de artículos independientes, la obra presenta continuidad temática en torno a problemas de teoría del conocimiento, filosofía del lenguaje y metafilosofía, especialmente centrados en la filosofía de la segunda mitad del siglo XX.
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  48. Nikolay Milkov (2016). Walter Dubislav’s Philosophy of Science and Mathematics. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1):96-116.
    Walter Dubislav (1895–1937) was a leading member of the Berlin Group for scientific philosophy. This “sister group” of the more famous Vienna Circle emerged around Hans Reichenbach’s seminars at the University of Berlin in 1927 and 1928. Dubislav was to collaborate with Reichenbach, an association that eventuated in their conjointly conducting university colloquia. Dubislav produced original work in philosophy of mathematics, logic, and science, consequently following David Hilbert’s axiomatic method. This brought him to defend formalism in these disciplines as well (...)
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  49. Nikolay Milkov (ed.) (2015). Die Berliner Gruppe: Texte zum Logischen Empirismus. Felix Meiner.
    Die Berliner Gruppe um Hans Reichenbach, Kurt Lewin, Walter Dubislav, Alexander Herzberg, Kurt Grelling und Carl Gustav Hempel, die die »Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Philosophie« in Berlin leitete, verstand sich als gleichberechtigter Partner der Wiener Kollegen und schlug durchaus einen eigenständigen Weg zu »einer an der exakten Wissenschaft geschulten Philosophie« (Reichenbach) ein. Im öffentlichen und geistigen Leben der deutschen Hauptstadt spielte sie eine bedeutende Rolle, bevor ihre Mitglieder durch den Nationalsozialismus ins Exil gezwungen wurden. Nach ihrer Emigration haben Reichenbach, Hempel und (...)
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  50. Nikolay Milkov (2015). On Walter Dubislav. History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (2):147-161.
    This paper outlines the intellectual biography of Walter Dubislav. Besides being a leading member of the Berlin Group headed by Hans Reichenbach, Dubislav played a defining role as well in the Society for Empirical/Scientific Philosophy in Berlin. A student of David Hilbert, Dubislav applied the method of axiomatic to produce original work in logic and formalist philosophy of mathematics. He also introduced the elements of a formalist philosophy of science and addressed more general problems concerning the substantiation of human knowledge. (...)
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