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Logical Necessity

Edited by Barbara Vetter (Humboldt-University, Berlin)
Assistant editor: Steffen Koch (University of Cologne)
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  1. Arif Ahmed (2000). Hale on Some Arguments for the Necessity of Necessity. Mind 109 (433):81-91.
    The paper argues against Bob Hale's (1999) argument that enquirers must regard some truths as necessary truths. Hale's argument against Quinean skepticism. like many similar arguments due to McFetridge, Wright and others, involves a quantifier shift fallacy.
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  2. Kensuke Akiba (1994). Fictionalism in Logic: Modality, Truth, and Conservativeness. Dissertation, University of Southern California
    It is usually held that what distinguishes a good inference from a bad one is that the former is but the latter is not truth-preserving. What is behind this view is the basic assumption that whether a certain inference is truth-preserving or not is a genuine issue, an issue the answer to which is determined objectively. This view is called the realist view of logic. ;In this dissertation the realist view of logic is criticized and an alternative view is presented. (...)
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  3. Virgil C. Aldrich (1969). Logically Necessary A Posteriori Propositions. Analysis 29 (4):140 - 142.
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  4. Alice Ambrose (1956). XII.—On Entailment and Logical Necessity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1):241-258.
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  5. Alice Ambrose (1955). On Entailment and Logical Necessity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56:241 - 258.
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  6. Alice Ambrose & Morris Lazerowitz (1984). Assuming the Logically Impossible. Metaphilosophy 15 (2):91–99.
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  7. C. Anthony Anderson (2015). Logical Necessity, Conceptual Necessity, and the Ontological Argument. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. De Gruyter 3-14.
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  8. Gordon Barnes (2002). Hale’s Necessity: It’s Indispensable, But is It Real? Disputatio 13:3 - 10.
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  9. José A. Benardete (1962). Is There a Problem About Logical Possibility? Mind 71 (283):342-352.
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  10. J. Bennett (1961). A Myth About Logical Necessity. Analysis 21 (3):59-63.
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  11. Jonathan Bennett (1961). A Myth About Logical Necessity. Analysis 21 (3):59 - 63.
    In these few pages I shall try to demonstrate the emptiness of the most cumbersome piece of unexamined intellectual baggage at present being hauled about by English philosophers. I here cite one example to be going on with, at the end of the paper I shall give a handful more, and it would be easy to multiply the number by ten from the writings of reputable philosophers. The outstanding philosophical achievement of the ha1f-century which has just drawn to a close (...)
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  12. Stephen J. Boulter (2002). Hume on Induction: A Genuine Problem or Theology's Trojan Horse? Philosophy 77 (1):67-86.
    In this paper I offer a straight solution to Hume's problem of induction by defusing the assumptions on which it is based. I argue that Hume's problem only arises if we accept (i) that there is no necessity but logical necessity, or (ii) that it is unreasonable to believe that there is any form of necessity in addition to logical necessity. I show that Hume's arguments in favour of (i) and (ii) are unsound. I then offer a suggestion as to (...)
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  13. Phillip Bricker (1991). Plenitude of Possible Structures. Journal of Philosophy 88 (11):607-619.
    Which mathematical structures are possible, that is, instantiated by the concrete inhabitants of some possible world? Are there worlds with four-dimensional space? With infinite-dimensional space? Whence comes our knowledge of the possibility of structures? In this paper, I develop and defend a principle of plenitude according to which any mathematically natural generalization of possible structure is itself possible. I motivate the principle pragmatically by way of the role that logical possibility plays in our inquiry into the world.
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  14. Phillip Bricker (1983). Worlds and Propositions: The Structure and Ontology of Logical Space. Dissertation, Princeton University
    In sections 1 through 5, I develop in detail what I call the standard theory of worlds and propositions, and I discuss a number of purported objections. The theory consists of five theses. The first two theses, presented in section 1, assert that the propositions form a Boolean algebra with respect to implication, and that the algebra is complete, respectively. In section 2, I introduce the notion of logical space: it is a field of sets that represents the propositional structure (...)
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  15. John P. Burgess (2003). Which Modal Models Are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)? Theoria 18 (2):145-158.
    Recently it has become almost the received wisdom in certain quarters that Kripke models are appropriate only for something like metaphysical modalities, and not for logical modalities. Here the line of thought leading to Kripke models, and reasons why they are no less appropriate for logical than for other modalities, are explained. It is also indicated where the fallacy in the argument leading to the contrary conclusion lies. The lessons learned are then applied to the question of the status of (...)
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  16. F. K. C. (1975). The Nature of Necessity. Review of Metaphysics 28 (4):762-763.
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  17. John V. Canfield (1975). Anthropological Science Fiction and Logical Necessity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):467 - 479.
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  18. James Cargile (2000). Skepticism and Possibilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):157-171.
    One skeptical strategy against A’s claim to know that P is to hold that it is logically possible for someone to have the same “base” for P as A does in spite of its not being true that P. Philosophical replies have focussed on showing that these are not genuine possibilities. Whether they are can be an interesting question of metaphysics, but it is argued in this paper that this metaphysical discussion is not the proper focus for an assessment of (...)
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  19. Leo K. C. Cheung (2004). Showing, Analysis and the Truth-Functionality of Logical Necessity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Synthese 139 (1):81 - 105.
    This paper aims to explain how the Tractatus attempts to unify logic by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessity from the thesis that a proposition shows its sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion of showing as the displaying of what is intrinsic to an expression (or a symbol). Then I argue that, according to the Tractatus, the thesis that a proposition shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the complete elimination of non-primitive symbols, the analyticity (...)
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  20. Nino Cocchiarella (1975). On the Primary and Secondary Semantics of Logical Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):13 - 27.
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  21. Daniel Cohnitz (2003). Modal Skepticism: Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 10:281--296.
    One of the most basic methods of philosophy is, and has always been, the consideration of counterfactual cases and imaginary scenarios. One purpose of doing so obviously is to test our theories against such counterfactual cases. Although this method is widespread, it is far from being commonly accepted. Especially during the last two decades it has been confronted with criticism ranging from complete dismissal to denying only its critical powers to a cautious defense of the use of thought experiments as (...)
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  22. Gary Colwell (1982). On Defining Away the Miraculous. Philosophy 57 (221):327 - 337.
    HUME AND HIS FOLLOWERS HAVE TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO ESTABLISH THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES BY APPEALING SOLELY TO THE DEFINITIONS OF MIRACLE AND NATURAL LAW. HUME’S ARGUMENT TRADES UPON THAT PART OF THE DEFINITION OF MIRACLE WHICH PERTAINS TO THE NUMERICAL INSIGNIFICANCE OF MIRACULOUS EVENTS. HE DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE LARGE NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NON-REPEATABLE IRREGULAR EVENTS AND REPEATABLE REGULAR ONES LOGICALLY CANNOT BE USED AS A CRITERION BY WHICH TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENTIAL STATUS OF NUMERICALLY SMALL NON-REPEATABLE IRREGULAR EVENTS. (...)
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  23. Fabrice Correia (2012). On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):639-653.
    In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical necessity in (...)
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  24. Edward Craig, I. G. McFetridge, John Haldane & Roger Scruton (1991). Logical Necessity and Other Essays. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (164):352.
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  25. Max Cresswel, Edwin Mares & Adriane Rini (eds.) (2016). Logical Modalities From Aristotle to Carnap: The Story of Necessity. Cambridge University Press.
    Interest in the metaphysics and logic of possible worlds goes back at least as far as Aristotle, but few books address the history of these important concepts. This volume offers new essays on the theories about the logical modalities held by leading philosophers from Aristotle in ancient Greece to Rudolf Carnap in the twentieth century. The story begins with an illuminating discussion of Aristotle's views on the connection between logic and metaphysics, continues through the Stoic and mediaeval traditions, and then (...)
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  26. Adel Daher (1982). Divine and Conceptual Necessity. Philosophical Studies 29:34-47.
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  27. Jean David, Georges Kleiber & Université de Metz (1983). La Notion Sémantico-Logique de Modalité Colloque. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  28. Laverne Joseph Denning (1986). Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity. Dissertation, University of Kansas
    This dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part consists of a detailed descriptive summary of the interpretive commentaries following the publication of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics. The material, thus assembled and presented as a whole for the first time, reveals unities directly traceable to assumptions and issues introduced by one man, Michael Dummett, who gave the interpretive literature its impetus, form and substance. ;The second part of the dissertation is of a critical nature. In this (...)
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  29. John Divers (2014). Modal Reality and (Modal) Logical Space. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):726-733.
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  30. John Divers & Daniel Elstein (2012). Manifesting Belief in Absolute Necessity. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):109-130.
    McFetridge (in Logical necessity and other essays . London: Blackwell, 1990 ) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary—to believe a proposition logically necessary, and to manifest that belief—is a matter of preparedness to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In Sect. 2, we explain the (...)
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  31. Mircea Dumitru (ed.) (forthcoming). Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality. Themes From Kit Fine. Oxford UP.
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  32. Robert Farrell (1981). Metaphysical Necessity is Not Logical Necessity. Philosophical Studies 39 (2):141 - 153.
    Kripke and putnam have argued that metaphysical necessity is truth in all possible worlds, Hence is a kind of logica necessity; it is this claim I argue against. My argument proceeds by way of my considering and elaborating an example to show that although 'gold has atomic number 79' be counted a metaphysically necessary truth, There is a possible world in which it is false; it turns out to be for all I show here at most a physical necessity, True (...)
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  33. A. R. J. Fisher (2011). Causal and Logical Necessity in Malebranche's Occasionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):523-548.
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  34. Milton Fisk (1970). Are There Necessary Connections in Nature? Philosophy of Science 37 (3):385-404.
    The following questions are discussed here. Is induction a reasonable procedure in the context of a denial of physically necessary connections? What is physical necessity? If induction does presuppose physical necessity, what amount of it is presupposed? It is argued that with logic as the only restriction on what is to count as a possible world, it is unreasonable to claim that observed connections, whether universal or statistical, will continue to hold. The concept of physical necessity is no more problematic (...)
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  35. Joel I. Friedman (2005). Modal Platonism: An Easy Way to Avoid Ontological Commitment to Abstract Entities. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (3):227 - 273.
    Modal Platonism utilizes "weak" logical possibility, such that it is logically possible there are abstract entities, and logically possible there are none. Modal Platonism also utilizes a non-indexical actuality operator. Modal Platonism is the EASY WAY, neither reductionist nor eliminativist, but embracing the Platonistic language of abstract entities while eliminating ontological commitment to them. Statement of Modal Platonism. Any consistent statement B ontologically committed to abstract entities may be replaced by an empirically equivalent modalization, MOD(B), not so ontologically committed. This (...)
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  36. Markus Gabriel (2010). Contingency or Necessity? Schelling and Hegel on the Modal Status of Logical Space. Ideas Y Valores 59 (142):5-23.
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  37. Angus Gellatly (1980). Logical Necessity and the Strong Programme for the Sociology of Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 11 (4):325-339.
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  38. Ghislain Guigon (2011). Merely Possible Explanation. Religious Studies 47 (3):359-370.
    Graham Oppy has argued that possible explanation entails explanation in order to object to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss’s new cosmological argument that it does not improve upon familiar cosmological arguments. Gale and Pruss as well as Pruss individually have granted Oppy’s inference from possible explanation to explanation and argue that this inference provides a reason to believe that the strong principle of sufficient reason is true. In this article, I shall undermine Oppy’s objection to the new cosmological argument by (...)
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  39. Bob Hale (2002). Knowledge of Possibility and of Necessity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):1–20.
    I investigate two asymmetrical approaches to knowledge of absolute possibility and of necessity--one which treats knowledge of possibility as more fundamental, the other according epistemological priority to necessity. Two necessary conditions for the success of an asymmetrical approach are proposed. I argue that a possibility-based approach seems unable to meet my second condition, but that on certain assumptions--including, pivotally, the assumption that logical and conceptual necessities, while absolute, do not exhaust the class of absolute necessities--a necessity-based approach may be able (...)
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  40. Bob Hale (2002). * Real Necessity: A Reply to Barnes. Disputatio 13:1 - 7.
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  41. Bob Hale (1999). On Some Arguments for the Necessity of Necessity. Mind 108 (429):23-52.
    Must we believe in logical necessity? I examine an argument for an affirmative answer given by Ian McFetridge in his posthumously published paper 'Logical Necessity: Some Issues', and explain why it fails, as it stands, to establish his conclusion. I contend, however, that McFetridge's argument can be effectively buttressed by drawing upon another argument aimed at establishing that we ought to believe that some propositions are logically necessary, given by Crispin Wright in his paper 'Inventing Logical necessity'. My contention is (...)
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  42. Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.) (2009). Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    The philosophy of modality investigates necessity and possibility, and related notions--are they objective features of mind-independent reality? If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be explained in other terms? This volume presents new work on modality by established leaders in the field and by up-and-coming philosophers. Between them, the papers address fundamental questions concerning realism and anti-realism about modality, the nature and basis of facts about what is possible and what is necessary, the nature of modal knowledge, modal (...)
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  43. Stuart Hampshire (1948). Logical Necessity. Philosophy 23 (87):332 - 345.
    It may sometimes be useful in philosophy to state a method of argument in very simple and even over-simplified terms; it may at a certain stage be useful to ignore for the moment the details and difficulties of particular philosophical arguments, and to try to state simply what is commonly assumed in a variety of different and even opposing arguments.
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  44. Peter W. Hanks (2008). A Dilemma About Necessity. Erkenntnis 68 (1):129 - 148.
    The problem of the source of necessity is the problem of explaining what makes necessary truths necessarily true. Simon Blackburn has presented a dilemma intended to show that any reductive, realist account of the source of necessity is bound to fail. Although Blackburn's dilemma faces serious problems, reflection on the form of explanations of necessities reveals that a revised dilemma succeeds in defeating any reductive account of the source of necessity. The lesson is that necessity is metaphysically primitive and irreducible.
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  45. Ph P. Hanson (1983). On logical necessity. Logique Et Analyse 26 (3):265.
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  46. John C. Harsanyi (1983). Mathematics, the Empirical Facts, and Logical Necessity. Erkenntnis 19 (1-3):167 - 192.
    It is argued that mathematical statements are "a posteriori synthetic" statements of a very special sort, To be called "structure-Analytic" statements. They follow logically from the axioms defining the mathematical structure they are describing--Provided that these axioms are "consistent". Yet, Consistency of these axioms is an empirical claim: it may be "empirically verifiable" by existence of a finite model, Or may have the nature of an "empirically falsifiable hypothesis" that no contradiction can be derived from the axioms.
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  47. Charles Hartshorne (1977). John Hick on Logical and Ontological Necessity. Religious Studies 13 (2):155 - 165.
    A number of writers have recently taken fresh looks at the many centuries-old ontological proof of Anselm. 1 Three of these writers seem to agree with me that traditional ways of treating this topic have been inadequate and that the proof, whether or not it is a sufficient reason for belief, is not without important bearings for philosophy of religion. These writers are Malcolm, Findlay, and Plantinga. With each of these I find considerable common ground, and they have all indicated (...)
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  48. José Hierro Pescador (1985). Mundos imposibles. Theoria 1 (1):143-157.
    An impossible world is a world which necessarily does not exist. Besides the paradigm of necessity, wich is logical necesslty, we must consider physical necessity and ethical necessity, both of wich can beexpressed in terms of logical necessity, in the way suggested by Montague. Accordingly, an impossible world can be logically impossible, physically impossible or ethically impossible, but in every case the impossibility can be reduced to logical impossibility, and in consequence an impossible world is irrational and cannot be understood (...)
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  49. Donald D. Hoffman (2006). The Scrambling Theorem: A Simple Proof of the Logical Possibility of Spectrum Inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):31-45.
    The possibility of spectrum inversion has been debated since it was raised by Locke and is still discussed because of its implications for functionalist theories of conscious experience . This paper provides a mathematical formulation of the question of spectrum inversion and proves that such inversions, and indeed bijective scramblings of color in general, are logically possible. Symmetries in the structure of color space are, for purposes of the proof, irrelevant. The proof entails that conscious experiences are not identical with (...)
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  50. Christopher Hookway (1992). MCFETRIDGE, I. G. Logical Necessity and Other Essays. [REVIEW] Philosophy 67:264.
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