About this topic
Summary Logical Pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. What this claim amounts to depends on a specification both of what a logic is and of what it means for a logic to be correct. One of the strongest and most controversial varieties of logical pluralism is the claim that there is more than one correct account of logical consequence, that is, that multiple distinct logics correctly capture the logical consequence relation of natural language.
Key works The recent flurry of interest in strong forms of logical pluralism was initiated by Beall & Restall 2000, in which Beall and Restall argue that there is no single logical consequence relation in natural language, and so no single correct logic. Beall & Restall 2006 further develops the argument. Carnap 1937 argues for pluralism on linguistic grounds: for Carnap, the correctness of logic is relative to the choice of language, and there is no neutral standpoint from which the choice of language can be made. Shapiro 2006 and Cook 2002 independently argue that we should understand logic as a modelling tool: if this is right, then it is certainly possible that there could be two equally good and incommensurable models of the same unitary phenomena. Field 2009 argues that very few forms of logical pluralism are both interesting and true, and Priest 2006 defends logical monism: the view that there is just one correct logic.
Introductions Cook 2010 Russell forthcoming
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
63 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 63
  1. Andrew Aberdein (2001). Classical Recapture. In V. Fano, M. Stanzione & G. Tarozzi (eds.), Prospettive Della Logica E Della Filosofia Della Scienza. Rubettino. 11-18.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Musa Akrami (2007). From Logical Complementarity and Pluralism to Super-Logic. In Jean-Yves Béziau & Alexandre Costa-Leite (eds.), Perspectives on Universal Logic. 67.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Patrick Allo (2007). Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.
    Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Patrick Allo & Edwin Mares (2012). Informational Semantics as a Third Alternative? Erkenntnis 77 (2):167-185.
    Informational semantics were first developed as an interpretation of the model-theory of substructural (and especially relevant) logics. In this paper we argue that such a semantics is of independent value and that it should be considered as a genuine alternative explication of the notion of logical consequence alongside the traditional model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical accounts. Our starting point is the content-nonexpansion platitude which stipulates that an argument is valid iff the content of the conclusion does not exceed the combined content (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jc Beall (2014). Strict-Choice Validities: A Note on a Familiar Pluralism. Erkenntnis 79 (2):301-307.
    My aim here is a modest one: to note another example in which the theory of validity and the theory of ‘inference’ naturally come apart. The setting is multiple-conclusion logic. At least on one philosophy of multiple-conclusion logic, there are very clear examples of where logic qua validity and logic qua normative guide to inference are essentially different things. On the given conception, logic tells us only what follows from what, what our ‘choices’ are given a set of premises; it (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. JC Beall & Greg Restall, Defending Logical Pluralism.
    We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2006). Logical Pluralism. Oxford University Press.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2000). Logical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Francesco Berto (2006). Characterizing Negation to Face Dialetheism. Logique Et Analyse 49 (195):241-263.
  10. Manuel Bremer, What is Logical Pluralism?
    Within the philosophy of logic there has been an old debate about strengths and weaknesses of so-called “deviant” logics, as compared to standard logic (i.e. First Order Logic with Identity). With the development of a multitude of many-valued and modal logical systems and the various ways they can be employed in various fields of philosophy, linguistics and computer science, former “deviant” logics have become well accepted. Nowadays we seem to have a new and almost contrary debate about whether there is (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Manuel Bremer (2014). Restall and Beall on Logical Pluralism: A Critique. Erkenntnis 79 (2):293-299.
    With their book Logical Pluralism, Jc Beall and Greg Restall have elaborated on their previous statements on logical pluralism. Their view of logical pluralism is centred on ways of understanding logical consequence. The essay tries to come to grips with their doctrine of logical pluralism by highlighting some points that might be made clearer, and questioning the force of some of Beall’s and Restall’s central arguments. In that connection seven problems for their approach are put forth: (1) The Informal Common (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski (2009). Modalism and Logical Pluralism. Mind 118 (470):295-321.
    Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one relation of logical consequence, even within a given language. A recent articulation of this view has been developed in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases. We argue that this formulation causes pluralism to collapse into either logical nihilism or logical universalism. In its place, we (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. J. A. Burgess (2010). Review of J.C. Beall and Greg Restall, Logical Pluralism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):519-522.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Rudolf Carnap (1937). The Logical Syntax of Language. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd..
    Available for the first time in 20 years, here is the Rudolf Carnap's famous principle of tolerance by which everyone is free to mix and match the rules of ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Nicola Ciprotti & Luca Moretti (2009). Logical Pluralism is Compatible with Monism About Metaphysical Modality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):275-284.
    Beall and Restall 2000; 2001; 2006 advocate a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism, according to which there is not one true logic but many equally acceptable logical systems. They maintain that Logical Pluralism is compatible with monism about metaphysical modality, according to which there is just one correct logic of metaphysical modality. Wyatt 2004 contends that Logical Pluralism is incompatible with monism about metaphysical modality. We first suggest that if Wyatt were right, Logical Pluralism would (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Daniel Cohnitz, Peter Pagin & Marcus Rossberg (2014). Monism, Pluralism and Relativism: New Essays on the Status of Logic. Erkenntnis 79 (2):201-210.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Roy T. Cook (2010). Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism. Philosophy Compass 5 (6):492-504.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. In this article, I explore what logical pluralism is, and what it entails, by: (i) distinguishing clearly between relativism about a particular domain and pluralism about that domain; (ii) distinguishing between a number of forms logical pluralism might take; (iii) attempting to distinguish between those versions of pluralism that are clearly true and those that are might be controversial; and (iv) surveying three prominent attempts to argue for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Antonino Drago (2012). Pluralism in Logic: The Square of Opposition, Leibniz'Principle of Sufficient Reason and Markov's Principle. In J.-Y. Beziau & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Birkhäuser. 175--189.
    No categories
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Matti Eklund (2012). Multitude, Tolerance and Language-Transcendence. Synthese 187 (3):833-847.
    Rudolf Carnap's 1930s philosophy of logic, including his adherence to the principle of tolerance, is discussed. What theses did Carnap commit himself to, exactly? I argue that while Carnap did commit himself to a certain multitude thesis—there are different logics of different languages, and the choice between these languages is merely a matter of expediency—there is no evidence that he rejected a language-transcendent notion of fact, contrary to what Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts have prominently argued. (In fact, it is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Hartry Field (2009). Pluralism in Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):342-359.
    There are quite a few theses about logic that are in one way or another pluralist: they hold (i) that there is no uniquely correct logic, and (ii) that because of this, some or all debates about logic are illusory, or need to be somehow reconceived as not straightforwardly factual. Pluralist theses differ markedly over the reasons offered for there being no uniquely correct logic. Some such theses are more interesting than others, because they more radically affect how we are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Antonio García Gutiérrez (2007). Desclasificados: Pluralismo Lógico y Violencia de la Clasificación. Feder.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. G. C. Goddu (2002). What Exactly is Logical Pluralism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):218 – 230.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Ivor Grattan-Guinness (2011). Was Hugh MacColl a Logical Pluralist or a Logical Monist? A Case Study in the Slow Emergence of Metatheorising. Philosophia Scientiae 15:189-203.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Owen Griffiths (2013). Problems for Logical Pluralism. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (2):170 - 182.
    I argue that Beall and Restall's logical pluralism fails. Beall?Restall pluralism is the claim that there are different, equally correct logical consequence relations in a single language. Their position fails for two, related, reasons: first, it relies on an unmotivated conception of the ?settled core? of consequence: they believe that truth-preservation, necessity, formality and normativity are ?settled? features of logical consequence and that any relation satisfying these criteria is a logical consequence relation. I consider historical evidence and argue that their (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Lucas P. Halpin (2012). Analyticity and Substantive Inquiry. Self-Published.
    In this book, a Grice/Strawson account of analyticity is explained and formalized, and a corresponding account of logic is offered. The implications of these views for science/substantive inquiry are explored and a neo-Carnapian/verificationist meta-theory is presented.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2013). Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):355-373.
    Logical pluralism has been in vogue since JC Beall and Greg Restall 2006 articulated and defended a new pluralist thesis. Recent criticisms such as Priest 2006a and Field 2009 have suggested that there is a relationship between their type of logical pluralism and the meaning-variance thesis for logic. This is the claim, often associated with Quine 1970, that a change of logic entails a change of meaning. Here we explore the connection between logical pluralism and meaning-variance, both in general and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Lloyd Humberstone (2009). Logical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):162 – 168.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Rosanna Keefe (2014). What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be. Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390.
    Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. N. Kurbis (2007). Pluralism and the Logical Basis of Metaphysics. In Logica Yearbook.
    I argue for a kind of logical pluralism on the basis of a difficulty with defining the meaning of negation in the framework of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic semantics.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Nils Kurbis, A Pluralist Justification of Deduction.
    Ph.D. thesis submitted for Philosophy (KCL) on 24 July 2007. Supervisors: Keith Hossack, Mark Sainsbury and Wilfried Meyer-Viol.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Armin Methadžević (2013). Monism Versus Pluralism: Hegel and Russell on Logic and Mathematics. Hegel-Jahrbuch 19 (1).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. María G. Navarro (2004). Pluralidad En la Actualidad de la Razón. In Aavv (ed.), Congreso Internacional de Hermenéutica filosófica. El legado de Gadamer. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Granada.
  33. Timothy J. Nulty (2010). The Metaphysics of Mixed Inferences: Problems with Functionalist Accounts of Alethic Pluralism. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 11 (2):153-162.
    <span class='Hi'>Alethic</span> pluralists argue truth is a metaphysically robust higher-order property that is multiply realized by a set of diverse and domain-specific subvening <span class='Hi'>alethic</span> properties. The higher-order truth property legitimizes mixed inferences and accounts for a univocal truth predicate. Absent of this higher-order property, pluralists lack an account of the validity of mixed inferences and an adequate semantics for the truth predicate and thereby appear forced to abandon the central tenets of <span class='Hi'>alethic</span> pluralism. I argue the use of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. A. Paseau (2007). Review: Logical Pluralism. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):391-396.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2014). Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics. Erkenntnis 79 (2):259-277.
    This paper offers a discussion of metaphysical pluralism, alethic pluralism, and logical pluralism. According to the metaphysical pluralist, there are several ways of being. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true, and according to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. Each of these three forms of pluralism will be considered on its own, but the ambition of the paper is to explore possible connections between them. My primary objective is to present (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Graham Priest (2014). Logical Pluralism: Another Application for Chunk and Permeate. Erkenntnis 79 (2):331-338.
    A motivation behind one kind of logical pluralism is the thought that there are different kinds of objects, and that reasoning about situations involving these different kinds requires different kinds of logics. Given this picture, a natural question arises: what kind of logical apparatus is appropriate for situations which concern more than one kind of objects, such as may arise, for example, when considering the interactions between the different kinds? The paper articulates an answer to this question, deploying the methodology (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Graham Priest (2008). Logical Pluralism Hollandaise. Australasian Journal of Logic 6:210-214.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Graham Priest (2006). Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. Oxford University Press.
    Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true. This is a view which runs against orthodoxy in logic and metaphysics since Aristotle, and has implications for many of the core notions of philosophy. Doubt Truth to Be a Liar explores these implications for truth, rationality, negation, and the nature of logic, and develops further the defense of dialetheism first mounted in Priest's In Contradiction, a second edition of which is also available.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Stephen Read (2006). Monism: The One True Logic. In D. de Vidi & T. Kenyon (eds.), A Logical Approach to Philosophy: Essays in Memory of Graham Solomon. Springer.
    Logical pluralism is the claim that different accounts of validity can be equally correct. Beall and Restall have recently defended this position. Validity is a matter of truth-preservation over cases, they say: the conclusion should be true in every case in which the premises are true. Each logic specifies a class of cases, but differs over which cases should be considered. I show that this account of logic is incoherent. Validity indeed is truth-preservation, provided this is properly understood. Once understood, (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Stephen Read (2006). Review of J.C.Beall, Greg Restall, Logical Pluralism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Greg Restall, Carnap's Tolerance, Language Change and Logical Pluralism.
    In this paper, I distinguish different kinds of pluralism about logical consequence. In particular, I distinguish the pluralism about logic arising from Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance from a pluralism which maintains that there are different, equally “good” logical consequence relations on the one language. I will argue that this second form of pluralism does more justice to the contemporary state of logical theory and practice than does Carnap’s more moderate pluralism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Greg Restall (2014). Pluralism and Proofs. Erkenntnis 79 (2):279-291.
    Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism (2006) characterises pluralism about logical consequence in terms of the different ways cases can be selected in the analysis of logical consequence as preservation of truth over a class of cases. This is not the only way to understand or to motivate pluralism about logical consequence. Here, I will examine pluralism about logical consequence in terms of different standards of proof. We will focus on sequent derivations for classical logic, imposing two different restrictions on classical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Greg Restall (2004). Logical Pluralism and the Preservation of Warrant. In S. Rahman (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Dordrecht, Kluwer. 163--173.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Greg Restall (2002). Carnap's Tolerance, Meaning, and Logical Pluralism. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):426 - 443.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Penelope Rush (ed.) (2014). The Metaphysics of Logic. Cambridge University Press.
  46. Gillian Russell (forthcoming). Logical Pluralism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Gillian Russell (2008). One True Logic? Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):593 - 611.
    This is a paper about the constituents of arguments. It argues that several different kinds of truth-bearer may be taken to compose arguments, but that none of the obvious candidates—sentences, propositions, sentence/truth-value pairs etc.—make sense of logic as it is actually practiced. The paper goes on to argue that by answering the question in different ways, we can generate different logics, thus ensuring a kind of logical pluralism that is different from that of J. Beall and Greg Restall.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Joshua Schechter (2011). Juxtaposition: A New Way to Combine Logics. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):560-606.
    This paper develops a new framework for combining propositional logics, called "juxtaposition". Several general metalogical theorems are proved concerning the combination of logics by juxtaposition. In particular, it is shown that under reasonable conditions, juxtaposition preserves strong soundness. Under reasonable conditions, the juxtaposition of two consequence relations is a conservative extension of each of them. A general strong completeness result is proved. The paper then examines the philosophically important case of the combination of classical and intuitionist logics. Particular attention is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Gregor Schiemann (2009). Welt im Wandel: Werner Heisenbergs Ansätze zu einer pluralistischen Philosophie. In A. Schwarz & A. Nordmann (eds.), Philosophierende Forscher. Alber.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Stewart Shapiro (2014). Structures and Logics: A Case for (a) Relativism. Erkenntnis 79 (2):309-329.
    In this paper, I use the cases of intuitionistic arithmetic with Church’s thesis, intuitionistic analysis, and smooth infinitesimal analysis to argue for a sort of pluralism or relativism about logic. The thesis is that logic is relative to a structure. There are classical structures, intuitionistic structures, and (possibly) paraconsistent structures. Each such structure is a legitimate branch of mathematics, and there does not seem to be an interesting logic that is common to all of them. One main theme of my (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 63