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Luminosity

Edited by Julien Dutant (University of Geneva, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
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  1. Selim Berker (2008). Luminosity Regained. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (2):1-22.
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...)
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  2. Thomas A. Blackson (2007). On Williamson's Argument for (Ii) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.
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  3. Jessica Brown (2005). Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):319–327.
    According to contextualism, the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists take their view to be supported by cases in which the intuitive correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the attributor's context. Williamson offers a complex invariantist account of such cases which appeals to two elements, psychological bias and a failure of luminosity. He provides independent reasons for thinking that contextualist cases are characterized by psychological bias and a failure of luminosity, and argues that some (...)
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  4. Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco (2002). Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.
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  5. Girdhari Lal Chaturvedi (1982). The Concept of Self-Luminosity of Knowledge in Advaita Vedānta. Adarsha Prakashan.
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  6. Stewart Cohen (2010). Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):718-730.
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  7. Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré (2009). Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge. Synthese 166 (1):1 - 20.
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective (...)
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  8. Richard Fumerton (2009). Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):67 - 76.
    In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of what we think we know and justifiably believe.
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  9. Patrick Greenough (2012). Discrimination and Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but (...)
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  10. Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.) (2009). Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    16 leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today.
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  11. T. Remington Harkness (2011). The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. By David Walsh. Heythrop Journal 52 (1):153-154.
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  12. Anna Mahtani (2008). Williamson on Inexact Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):171 - 180.
    Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
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  13. Kevin Meeker & Ted Poston (2010). Skeptics Without Borders. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):223.
    Timothy Williamson’s anti luminosity argument has received considerable attention. Escaping unnoticed, though, is a strikingly similar argument from David Hume. This paper highlights some of the arresting parallels between Williamson’s reasoning and Hume’s that will allow us to appreciate more deeply the plausibility of Williamson’s reasoning and to understand how, following Hume, we can extend this reasoning to undermine the “luminosity” of simple necessary truths. More broadly the parallels help us to identify a common skeptical predicament underlying both arguments, which (...)
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  14. P. X. Monaghan (2008). Williamson and the Argument From Luminosity. Dialogue 47 (3-4):619-.
    ABSTRACT: Many of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental states (...)
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  15. Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
    In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one (...)
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  16. David S. Pacini (2009). Review of David Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9).
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  17. Murali Ramachandran, Four Anti-Luminosity Strategies.
    Timothy Williamson (2000) reckons that hardly any mental state is luminous, i.e. is such that if one were in it, then one would invariably be in a position to know that one was. To this end he presents an argument against the luminosity of feeling cold— which he claims generalizes to other phenomenal states, such as e.g. being in pain. As we shall see, however, no fewer than four lines of argument for that conclusion can be extracted from Williamson’s remarks. (...)
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  18. Murali Ramachandran, Anti-Luminosity.
    Timothy Williamson (2000) reckons that hardly any mental state is luminous, i.e. is such that if one were in it, then one would invariably be in a position to know that one was. This paper examines an argument he presents against the luminosity of feeling cold, which he claims generalizes to other phenomenal states, such as e.g. being in pain. As we shall see, the argument fails. However, our deliberations do yield two anti-luminosity results: a simple refutation of the claim (...)
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  19. Murali Ramachandran (2009). Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673.
    In Knowledge and Its Limits Timothy Williamson argues against the luminosity of phenomenal states in general by way of arguing against the luminosity of feeling cold, that is, against the view that if one feels cold, one is at least in a position to know that one does. In this paper I consider four strategies that emerge from his discussion, and argue that none succeeds.
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  20. Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2008). Mr. Magoo's Mistake. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289 - 306.
    Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge (...)
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  21. Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
    Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson's argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it (...)
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  22. M. M. Trivedi (1987). Citsukha's View on Self-Luminosity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (2):115-123.
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  23. Jonathan Vogel (2010). Luminosity and Indiscriminability. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.
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  24. David Walsh (2008). The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. Cambridge University Press.
    The Modern Philosophical Revolution breaks new ground by demonstrating the continuity of European philosophy from Kant to Derrida. Much of the literature on European philosophy has emphasized the breaks that have occurred in the course of two centuries of thinking. But as David Walsh argues, such a reading overlooks the extent to which Kant, Hegel, and Schelling were already engaged in the turn toward existence as the only viable mode of philosophizing. Where many similar studies summarize individual thinkers, this book (...)
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  25. Wai-hung Wong (2008). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.
    Abstract: Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his (...)
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