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  1. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind). Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  2. Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.) (2005). Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume discuss Putnam's major philosophical contributions.
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  3. John W. Bender (1988). Knotty, Knotty: Comments on Nelson's The New World Knot. In Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer
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  4. John W. Bender (1988). Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  5. William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.) (1967). Art, Mind, and Religion. [Pittsburgh]University of Pittsburgh Press.
    This volume offers an unusual variety of topics presented during the sixth annual Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy.
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  6. Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.) (1967). Intentionality, Minds and Perception. Wayne State University Press.
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  7. Chris Eliasmith (2002). The Myth of the Turing Machine: The Failings of Functionalism and Related Theses. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 14 (1):1-8.
    The properties of Turing’s famous ‘universal machine’ has long sustained functionalist intuitions about the nature of cognition. Here, I show that there is a logical problem with standard functionalist arguments for multiple realizability. These arguments rely essentially on Turing’s powerful insights regarding computation. In addressing a possible reply to this criticism, I further argue that functionalism is not a useful approach for understanding what it is to have a mind. In particular, I show that the difficulties involved in distinguishing implementation (...)
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  8. Reinaldo Elugardo (1983). Machine Realization and the New Lilliputian Argument. Philosophical Studies 43 (March):267-75.
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  9. Reinaldo Elugardo (1981). Machine Functionalism and the New Lilliputian Argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (March):256-61.
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  10. Joshua Fost (2013). The Extended Self, Functional Constancy, and Personal Identity. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 12:47-66.
    Personal indexicals are often taken to refer to the agent of an expression’s context, but deviant uses (e.g. ‘I’m parked out back’) complicate matters. I argue that personal indexicals refer to the extended self of the agent, where the extended self is a mereological chimera incorporating whatever determines our behavioral capacities. To ascertain the persistence conditions of personal identity, I propose a method for selecting a level of description and a set of functional properties at that level that remain constant (...)
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  11. Sidney Hook (ed.) (1960). Dimensions Of Mind: A Symposium. NY: NEW YORK University Press.
  12. Robert H. Kane (1966). Turing Machines and Mental Reports. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (December):344-52.
  13. William G. Lycan (1983). The Moral of the New Lilliputian Argument. Philosophical Studies 43 (March):277-80.
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  14. William G. Lycan (1979). A New Lilliputian Argument Against Machine Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 35 (April):279-87.
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  15. William G. Lycan (1974). Mental States and Putnam's Functionalist Hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (May):48-62.
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  16. Raymond J. Nelson (1974). Mechanism, Functionalism, and the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):365-86.
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  17. Tom Polger (web). Computational Functionalism. In J. Symons & P. Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge
    An introduction to functionalism in the philosophy of psychology/mind, and review of the current state of debate pro and con. Forthcoming in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology (John Symons and Paco Calvo, eds.).
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  18. Alexander R. Pruss, Functionalism and Counting Minds.
    I argue that standard functionalism leads to absurd conclusions as to the number of minds that would exist in the universe if persons were duplicated.
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  19. Hilary Putnam (1987). Representation and Reality. MIT Press.
    Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his...
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  20. Hilary Putnam (1975). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
    Professor Hilary Putnam has been one of the most influential and sharply original of recent American philosophers in a whole range of fields. His most important published work is collected here, together with several new and substantial studies, in two volumes. The first deals with the philosophy of mathematics and of science and the nature of philosophical and scientific enquiry; the second deals with the philosophy of language and mind. Volume one is now issued in a new edition, including an (...)
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  21. Hilary Putnam (1975). Philosophy and Our Mental Life. In Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press
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  22. Hilary Putnam (1967). The Mental Life of Some Machines. In Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.), Intentionality, Minds and Perception. Wayne State University Press
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  23. Hilary Putnam (1967). The Nature of Mental States. In W.H. Capitan & D.D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. Pittsburgh University Press 1--223.
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  24. Hilary Putnam (1960). Minds and Machines. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Journal of Symbolic Logic. New York University Press 57-80.
  25. Richard Rorty (1972). Functionalism, Machines and Incorrigibility. Journal of Philosophy 64 (April):203-20.
  26. Oron Shagrir (2005). The Rise and Fall of Computational Functionalism. In Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge University Press
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  27. Pierre Steiner (2013). C.S. Peirce and Artificial Intelligence: Historical Heritage and (New) Theoretical Stakes. SAPERE - Special Issue on Philosophy and Theory of AI 5:265-276.
  28. J. Symons & P. Calvo (eds.) (forthcoming). Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
  29. James E. Tomberlin (1965). About the Identity Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (December):295-99.
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  30. Steven J. Wagner (1988). The Liberal and the Lycanthrope. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (June):165-74.
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