This essay examines the so-called phenomenon of defensive medicine and the problematic aspects of attempting to maintain the safest legal position possible. While physicians face genuine litigation threats they frequently overestimate legal peril. Many defensive practices are benign, but others alter patient care and increase costs in ways that are ethically suspect. Physicians should learn to evaluate realistically the legal risks of their profession and weigh the emotional, physical, and financial costs to the patient before employing a defensive measure.

Malpractice insurance rates have created a crisis in American medicine. Rates are rising and reimbursements are not keeping pace. In response, physicians in the states hardest hit by this crisis are feeling compelled to take political action, and the current action of choice seems to be physician strikes. While the malpractice insurance crisis is acknowledged to be severe, does it justify the extreme action of a physician walkout? Should physicians engage in this type of collective action, and what are the (...) costs to patients and the profession when such action is taken? I will offer three related arguments against physician strikes that constitute a prima facie prohibition against such action: first, strikes are intended to cause harm to patients; second, strikes are an affront to the physician-patient relationship; and, third, strikes risk decreasing the public's respect for the medical profession. As with any prima facie obligation, there are justifying conditions that may override the moral prohibition, but I will argue that the current malpractice crisis does not rise to the level of such a justifying condition. While the malpractice crisis demands and justifies a political response on the part of the nation's physicians, strikes and slow-downs are not an ethically justified means to the legitimate end of controlling insurance costs. (shrink)

Traditionally, there have been few legal actions brought against psychotherapists that allege negligent psychotherapy and negligent treatment of psychiatric disorders. However, in the case of Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, a patient-physician (Dr. OsheroE) sued Chestnut Lodge, a private psychiatric facility, for negligence based on the staff's decision to apply a psychodynamic model of treatment (through psychotherapy) and not a biological model. The case sparked a heated debate between adherents of the psychodynamic model and those of the biological model. This article (...) explores the implications of the Osheroff litigation for mental health professionals. It is proposed that an interactive informed consent process be used to protect psychotherapists against Osheroff-type litigation. (shrink)