This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
178 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 178
  1. Fred Ablondi (2008). Retroactive Identity Ascriptions, Empty Questions, and Intrinsic Relations. Think 7 (20):93-96.
    If a statue and lump of clay have the same life-histories, are they numerically identical?
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Laird Addis (1992). J. K. Swindler, Weaving: An Analysis Of The Constitution Of Objects. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 12:199-203.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Laird Addis (1992). JK Swindler, Weaving: An Analysis of the Constitution of Objects Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 12 (3):199-203.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Yuval Adler (1999). Identity and Exception: An Essay in Metaphysics. Dissertation, Columbia University
    What Quine describes as divorcing essence from objects and wedding it to words promotes a certain conception of the opposition between concept and object. Detaching essences from reality makes room for the idea that one and the same reality is compatible with the different determinations of essences that different concepts impose. ;The problem is this: if notions of sameness make sense only relative to a concept, how can we think of the same reality as underlying the manifold of possible concepts? (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Mahrad Almotahari (2014). Metalinguistic Negation and Metaphysical Affirmation. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):497-517.
    In a series of articles, Fine (Monist 83:357–361, 2000; Mind 112:195–234, 2003; Mind 115:1059–1082, 2006) presents some highly compelling objections to monism, the doctrine that spatially coincident objects are identical. His objections rely on Leibniz’s Law and linguistic environments that appear to be immune to the standard charge of non-transparency and substitution failure. In this paper, I respond to Fine’s objections on behalf of the monist. Following Schnieder (Philosophical Quarterly 56:39–54, 2006), I observe that arguments from Leibniz’s Law are valid (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. István Aranyosi (2007). Shadows of Constitution. The Monist 90 (3):415-431.
    Mainstream metaphysics has been preoccupied by inquiring into the nature of major kinds of entities, like objects, properties and events, while avoiding minor entities, like shadows or holes. However, one might want to hope that dealing with such minor entities could be profitable for even solving puzzles about major entities. I propose a new ontological puzzle, the Shadow of Constitution Puzzle, incorporating the old puzzle of material constitution, with shadows in the role of the minor entity to guide our approach (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Michael R. Ayers (1974). Individuals Without Sortals. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):113 - 148.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Lynne Baker (2007). Persons and Other Things. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):17-36.
    In the large recent literature on the nature of human persons, persons are usually studied in isolation from the world in which they live. What persons are most fundamentally, philosophers say, are human animals, or brains, or perhaps souls -- without any consideration of the social and physical environments without which persons would not exist. In this article, I want to compensate for such overly narrow focus. Instead of beginning with the nature of persons cut off from any environment, I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Lynne Rudder Baker, The Very Idea of Material Constitution.
    We run into instances of material constitution everywhere we turn. Material constitution is the relation that obtains between an octagonal piece of metal and a Stop sign, between strands of DNA molecules and genes, between pieces of paper and dollar bills, between stones and monuments, between lumps of clay and statues, between human persons and their bodies—the list is endless. Although there has been a great deal of controversy recently about the nature of material constitution, I want to enter the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Lynne Rudder Baker, Amie Thomasson on Ordinary Objects.
    Amie Thomasson has won well-deserved praise for her book, Ordinary Objects. She defends a commonsense world view and gives us “reason to think that there are fundamental particles, plants and animals, sticks and stones, tables and chairs, and even marriages and mortgages.” (p. 181) Ordinary objects comprise a vast array of things—natural objects both scientific and commonsensical, artifacts, organisms, abstract social objects.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Lynne Rudder Baker (2013). Technology and the Future of Persons. The Monist 96:37-53.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, mountains and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). The Ontology of Artifacts. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):99 – 111.
    Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers have taken artifacts to be ontologically deficient. This paper proposes a theory of artifacts, according to which artifacts are ontologically on a par with other material objects. I formulate a nonreductive theory that regards artifacts as constituted by - but not identical to - aggregates of particles. After setting out the theory, I rebut a number of arguments that disparage the ontological status of artifacts.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). Review of Objects and Persons, by Trenton Merricks. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):597 – 598.
    Book Information Objects and Persons. Objects and Persons Trenton Merricks . Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2001 , pp. xii + 203 , £30 ( cloth ), £14.99 ( paper ) . By Trenton Merricks. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xii + 203. £30 (cloth:), £14.99 (paper:).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):623–635.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). On Making Things Up: Constitution and its Critics. Philosophical Topics 30 (1):31-52.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
    What is a human person, and what is the relation between a person and his or her body? In her third book on the philosophy of mind, Lynne Rudder Baker investigates what she terms the person/body problem and offers a detailed account of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Baker's argument is based on the 'Constitution View' of persons and bodies, which aims to show what distinguishes persons from all other beings and to show how we can be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151 - 159.
    Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable—namely, that I was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):144–165.
    relation between, say, a lump of clay and a statue that it makes up, or between a red and white piece of metal and a stop sign, or between a person and her body? Assuming that there is a single relation between members of each of these pairs, is the relation “strict” identity, “contingent” identity or something else?1 Although this question has generated substantial controversy recently,2 I believe that there is philo- sophical gain to be had from thinking through the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Lynne Rudder Baker (1997). Why Constitution is Not Identity. Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599-621.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Stephen Barker & Mark Jago (2014). Monism and Material Constitution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):189-204.
    Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We motivate (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Gordon P. Barnes (2003). The Paradoxes of Hylomorphism. Review of Metaphysics 56 (3):501 - 523.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Andrea Bellantone (2011). The Constitution of Metaphysics. Notes Oa French Debate. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 66 (1):103-111.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Hagit Benbaji (2008). Constitution and the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 161 (2):183-202.
    Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to a phenomenal one. We fully understand the identity between water and H2O but the identity between pain and the firing of C-fibers is inconceivable. Mark Johnston [Journal of philosophy , 564–583] suggests that if water is constituted by H2O, not identical to it, then the explanatory gap becomes a pseudo-problem. This is because all (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Hagit Benbaji (2008). Material Objects, Constitution, and Mysterianism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-26.
    It is sometimes claimed that ordinary objects, such as mountains and chairs, are not material in their own right, but only in virtue of the fact that they are constituted by matter. As Fine puts it, they are “onlyderivatively material” (2003, 211). In this paper I argue that invoking “constitution” to account for the materiality of things that are not material in their own right explains nothing and renders the admission that these objects are indeed material completely mysterious. Although there (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Hagit Benbaji (2008). Material Objects, Constitution, and Mysterianism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-26.
    It is sometimes claimed that ordinary objects, such as mountains and chairs, are not material in their own right, but only in virtue of the fact that they are constituted by matter. As Fine puts it, they are “onlyderivatively material” (2003, 211). In this paper I argue that invoking “constitution” to account for the materiality of things that are not material in their own right explains nothing and renders the admission that these objects are indeed material completely mysterious. Although there (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Karen Bennett (2009). Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press
    The paper is an extended discussion of what I call the ‘dismissive attitude’ towards metaphysical questions. It has three parts. In the first part, I distinguish three quite different versions of dismissivism. I also argue that there is little reason to think that any of these positions is correct about the discipline of metaphysics as a whole; it is entirely possible that some metaphysical disputes should be dismissed and others should not be. Doing metametaphysics properly requires doing metaphysics first. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Karen Bennett (2004). Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem. Philosophical Studies 118 (3):339-371.
    A lot of people believe that distinct objectscan occupy precisely the same place for theentire time during which they exist. Suchpeople have to provide an answer to the`grounding problem' – they have to explain howsuch things, alike in so many ways, nonethelessmanage to fall under different sortals, or havedifferent modal properties. I argue in detailthat they cannot say that there is anything invirtue of which spatio-temporally coincidentthings have those properties. However, I alsoargue that this may not be as bad as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Stephan Blatti, Animalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its rivals, this (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Stephan Blatti (2012). A New Argument for Animalism. Analysis 72 (4):685-690.
    The view known as animalism asserts that we are human animals—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens species. The standard argument for this view is known as the thinking animal argument . But this argument has recently come under attack. So, here, a new argument for animalism is introduced. The animal ancestors argument illustrates how the case for animalism can be seen to piggyback on the credibility of evolutionary theory. Two objections are then considered and answered.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Stephan Blatti (2012). Material Constitution. In Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum Publishing 149-69.
    This paper reviews four leading strategies for addressing the problem of material constitution, along with some of the prominent objections faced by each approach. Sections include (1) "The Orthodox View: Coincident Objects," (2) "Dominant Kinds," (3) "Nihilism," (4) "Revising the Logic of Identity," and (5) "Future Research." Also included is an annotated bibliography.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.) (forthcoming). Essays on Animalism: Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Arguably the most significant development in the recent history of the personal identity debate has been the emergence of the view known as "animalism." This volume brings together original contributions on this topic written by both well-known and emerging philosophers. Contributors: Lynne Rudder Baker, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov, Jens Johansson, Mark Johnston, Rory Madden, Jeff McMahan & Tim Campbell, Eric Olson, Derek Parfit, Mark Reid, Denis Robinson, David Shoemaker, Sydney Shoemaker, Paul Snowdon.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Wylie Breckenridge, Making.
    (Last modified 17th July 2007) I use Williamson’s results about necessary existents to argue that making something never involves bringing into existence something that does not exist. Rather, to make x is, for some kind k, to change x from being a non-k into being a k. I use this result to defend the position that the statue is identical to the lump of clay against one otherwise problematic appeal to Leibniz’s Law. I have presented this paper at the Cornell (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Teresa Britton (2012). The Limits of Hylomorphism. Metaphysica 13 (2):145-153.
    Aristotle’s theory of physical objects, hylomorphism, has resurfaced in contemporary metaphysics. In its current version, hylomorphism is proposed as a general theory of mereology, its purview extending beyond material objects to chemical composites, events, and non-physical mathematical, linguistic, and musical objects. While I agree that hylomorphism works well in all of the newly proposed applications, it fails as a theory of properties and their parts. I show that this is the case and then theorize about why this is so.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Jeffrey E. Brower (2014). Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects. Oxford University Press.
    Jeffrey E. Brower presents and explains the hylomorphic conception of the material world developed by Thomas Aquinas, according to which material objects are composed of both matter and form. In addition to presenting and explaining Aquinas's views, Brower seeks wherever possible to bring them into dialogue with the best recent literature on related topics. Along the way, he highlights the contribution that Aquinas's views make to a host of contemporary metaphysical debates, including the nature of change, composition, material constitution, the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Jeffrey E. Brower & Michael Rea (2005). Material Constitution and the Trinity. Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):57-76.
    The Christian doctrine of the Trinity poses a serious philosophical problem. On the one hand, it seems to imply that there is exactly one divine being; on the other hand, it seems to imply that there are three. There is another well-known philosophical problem that presents us with a similar sort of tension: the problem of material constitution. We argue in this paper that a relatively neglected solution to the problem of material constitution can be developed into a novel solution (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Christopher Mark Brown (2002). Pluralism and Material Substance: Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Material Constitution. Dissertation, Saint Louis University
    A number of contemporary philosophers argue that puzzles about material objects such as the Ship of Theseus show that our common-sense intuitions about compound material objects are logically incompatible with one another. This "problem of material constitution" thus suggests that common sense and logic are at odds where the nature of material objects is concerned. Most contemporary philosophers solve the PMC by defending the denial of a common-sense intuition about material objects, although there is no consensus on just which intuition (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Vern Bullough (2000). The New Constitution and Sex. Free Inquiry 20.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Michael B. Burke (1997). Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel. Analysis 57 (1):11–18.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Michael B. Burke (ed.) (1997). Material Constitution: A Reader. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    The only anthology available on material constitution, this book collects important recent work on well known puzzles in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The extensive, clearly written introduction helps to make the essays accessible to a wide audience.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Michael B. Burke (1994). Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):591-624.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Michael B. Burke (1992). Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account. Analysis 52 (1):12 - 17.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. H. C. (1965). La Constitution de Texte des Regulae. Review of Metaphysics 19 (2):387-387.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Ross Cameron (2008). There Are No Things That Are Musical Works. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (3):295-314.
    Works of music do not appear to be concrete objects; but they do appear to be created by composers, and abstract objects do not seem to be the kind of things that can be created. In this paper I aim to develop an ontological position that lets us salvage the creativity intuition without either adopting an ontology of created abstracta or identifying musical works with concreta. I will argue that there are no musical works in our ontology, but nevertheless the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Marta Campdelacreu (2014). The Constitution Relation and Baker’s Account of It. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):1-19.
    A traditional argument based on Leibniz’s Law concludes that, for example, a statue and the piece of marble of which it is made are two different objects. This is because they have different properties: the statue can survive the loss of some of its parts but the piece of marble cannot. Lynne Rudder Baker adds that the piece of marble constitutes the statue. In this paper I focus on what I think is the most powerful objection to Baker’s account of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Marta Campdelacreu (2013). Do We Need Two Notions of Constitution? Philosophia 41 (2):503-519.
    Traditionally, constitutionalists have offered just one notion of constitution to analyse the relation that an object, such as a statue or a chain, bears to the object/s from which it is made: let us say, a piece of marble in the first case or a piece of metal in the second. Robert Wilson proposes to differentiate two notions of constitution and, in this way, to offer constitutionalists a more varied range of metaphysical tools. To justify the introduction of the difference, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Ernst Cassirer (2007). L'idée de la Constitution Républicaine. Philosophie 95 (3):7.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Ulrich Claesges (1972). Intentionality and Transcendence: On the Constitution of Material Nature. Analecta Husserliana 2:283.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. William Lane Craig (2005). Does the Problem of Material Constitution Illuminate the Doctrine of the Trinity? Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):77-86.
    Michael Rea and Jeffery Brower have offered a provocative new model of the Trinity on the analogy of the Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution. Just as a fist and a hand can be distinct entities composed of a common matter and yet numerically the same object, so the persons of the Trinity can be distinct entities (persons) composed of a common "matter" (the divine essence) and yet numerically the same object (God). I express doubts about the degree (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Judith Crane (2012). Biological-Mereological Coincidence. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):309-325.
    This paper presents and defends an account of the coincidence of biological organisms with mereological sums of their material components. That is, an organism and the sum of its material components are distinct material objects existing in the same place at the same time. Instead of relying on historical or modal differences to show how such coincident entities are distinct, this paper argues that there is a class of physiological properties of biological organisms that their coincident mereological sums do not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 178