This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
23 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
  2. Eduardo Castro (2009). Uma Solução para o Problema de Benacerraf. Principia 13 (1):7-28.
    The Benacerraf’s problem is a problem about how we can attain mathematical knowledge: mathematical entities are entities not located in space-time; we exist in spacetime; so, it does not seem that we could have a causal connection with mathematical entities in order to attain mathematical knowledge. In this paper, I propose a solution to the Benacerraf’s problem supported by the Quinean doctrines of naturalism, confirmational holism and postulation. I show that we have empirical knowledge of centres of mass and of (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    In an influential book, Harman writes, "In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles [1977, 9 – 10]." What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast? In this article, I argue that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what I shall call the justificatory challenge for realism about an area, D – (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). What is the Benacerraf Problem? In Fabrice Pataut (ed.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity.
    In "Mathematical Truth", Paul Benacerraf articulated an epistemological problem for mathematical realism. His formulation of the problem relied on a causal theory of knowledge which is now widely rejected. But it is generally agreed that Benacerraf was onto a genuine problem for mathematical realism nevertheless. Hartry Field describes it as the problem of explaining the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, realistically construed. In this paper, I argue that the Benacerraf Problem cannot be made out. There simply is no intelligible problem (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Justin Clarke-Doane (2014). Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy. Noûs 48 (2):238-255.
    There is a long tradition comparing moral knowledge to mathematical knowledge. In this paper, I discuss apparent similarities and differences between knowledge in the two areas, realistically conceived. I argue that many of these are only apparent, while others are less philosophically significant than might be thought. The picture that emerges is surprising. There are definitely differences between epistemological arguments in the two areas. However, these differences, if anything, increase the plausibility of moral realism as compared to mathematical realism. It (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Justin Clarke-Doane (2012). Morality and Mathematics: The Evolutionary Challenge. Ethics 122 (2):313-340.
    It is commonly suggested that evolutionary considerations generate an epistemological challenge for moral realism. At first approximation, the challenge for the moral realist is to explain our having many true moral beliefs, given that those beliefs are the products of evolutionary forces that would be indifferent to the moral truth. An important question surrounding this challenge is the extent to which it generalizes. In particular, it is of interest whether the Evolutionary Challenge for moral realism is equally a challenge for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Richard Creath (1980). Benacerraf and Mathematical Truth. Philosophical Studies 37 (4):335 - 340.
  8. Philip A. Ebert, What Mathematical Knowledge Could Not Be.
    This is an introductory survey article to the philosophy of mathematics. I provide a detailed account of what Benacerraf’s problem is and then discuss in general terms four different approaches to ….
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Hartry Field (1989). Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Basil Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Hartry Field (1988). Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
  11. Eduard Glas (1989). Testing the Philosophy of Mathematics in the History of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 20 (1):115-131.
    Recent philosophical accounts of mathematics increasingly focus on the quasi-Empirical rather than the formal aspects of the field, The praxis of how mathematics is done rather than the idealized logical structure and foundations of the theory. The ultimate test of any philosophy of mathematics, However idealized, Is its ability to account adequately for the factual development of the subject in real time. As a text case, The works and views of felix klein (1849-1925) were studied. Major advances in mathematics turn (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Ivan Kasa (2010). On Field's Epistemological Argument Against Platonism. Studia Logica 96 (2):141-147.
    Hartry Field's formulation of an epistemological argument against platonism is only valid if knowledge is constrained by a causal clause. Contrary to recent claims (e.g. in Liggins (2006), Liggins (2010)), Field's argument therefore fails the very same criterion usually taken to discredit Benacerraf's earlier version.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael D. Potter (eds.) (2007). Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    What is the nature of mathematical knowledge? Is it anything like scientific knowledge or is it sui generis? How do we acquire it? Should we believe what mathematicians themselves tell us about it? Are mathematical concepts innate or acquired? Eight new essays offer answers to these and many other questions. Written by some of the world's leading philosophers of mathematics, psychologists, and mathematicians, Mathematical Knowledge gives a lively sense of the current state of debate in this fascinating field. Contents 1. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Alex Levine (2005). Conjoining Mathematical Empiricism with Mathematical Realism: Maddy's Account of Set Perception Revisited. Synthese 145 (3):425 - 448.
    Penelope Maddy’s original solution to the dilemma posed by Benacerraf in his (1973) ‘Mathematical Truth’ was to reconcile mathematical empiricism with mathematical realism by arguing that we can perceive realistically construed sets. Though her hypothesis has attracted considerable critical attention, much of it, in my view, misses the point. In this paper I vigorously defend Maddy’s (1990) account against published criticisms, not because I think it is true, but because these criticisms have functioned to obscure a more fundamental issue that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David Liggins (2010). Epistemological Objections to Platonism. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):67-77.
    Many philosophers posit abstract entities – where something is abstract if it is acausal and lacks spatio-temporal location. Theories, types, characteristics, meanings, values and responsibilities are all good candidates for abstractness. Such things raise an epistemological puzzle: if they are abstract, then how can we have any epistemic access to how they are? If they are invisible, intangible and never make anything happen, then how can we ever discover anything about them? In this article, I critically examine epistemological objections to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Øystein Linnebo (2006). Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):545-574.
    Since Benacerraf’s “Mathematical Truth” a number of epistemological challenges have been launched against mathematical platonism. I first argue that these challenges fail because they unduely assimilate mathematics to empirical science. Then I develop an improved challenge which is immune to this criticism. Very roughly, what I demand is an account of how people’s mathematical beliefs are responsive to the truth of these beliefs. Finally I argue that if we employ a semantic truth-predicate rather than just a deflationary one, there surprisingly (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jennifer Wilson Mulnix (2008). Reliabilism, Intuition, and Mathematical Knowledge. Filozofia 62 (8):715-723.
    It is alleged that the causal inertness of abstract objects and the causal conditions of certain naturalized epistemologies precludes the possibility of mathematical know- ledge. This paper rejects this alleged incompatibility, while also maintaining that the objects of mathematical beliefs are abstract objects, by incorporating a naturalistically acceptable account of ‘rational intuition.’ On this view, rational intuition consists in a non-inferential belief-forming process where the entertaining of propositions or certain contemplations results in true beliefs. This view is free of any (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Anne Newstead & Franklin James, The Epistemology of Geometry I: The Problem of Exactness. ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (pp. 254-260). Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science.
    We show how an epistemology informed by cognitive science promises to shed light on an ancient problem in the philosophy of mathematics: the problem of exactness. The problem of exactness arises because geometrical knowledge is thought to concern perfect geometrical forms, whereas the embodiment of such forms in the natural world may be imperfect. There thus arises an apparent mismatch between mathematical concepts and physical reality. We propose that the problem can be solved by emphasizing the ways in which the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. M. Potter (ed.) (2007). Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    What is the nature of mathematical knowledge?
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Michael Potter (2007). What is the Problem of Mathematical Knowledge? In Michael Potter, Mary Leng & Alexander Paseau (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge.
    Suggests that the recent emphasis on Benacerraf's access problem locates the peculiarity of mathematical knowledge in the wrong place. Instead we should focus on the sense in which mathematical concepts are or might be "armchair concepts" – concepts about which non-trivial knowledge is obtainable a priori.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Michael D. Resnik (1990). Between Mathematics and Physics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:369 - 378.
    Nothing has been more central to philosophy of mathematics than the distinction between mathematical and physical objects. Yet consideration of quantum particles shows the inadequacy of the popular spacetime and causal characterizations of the distinction. It also raises problems for an assumption used recently by Field, Hellman and Horgan, namely, that the mathematical realm is metaphysically independent of the physical one.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Michael J. Shaffer (2006). Some Recent Appeals to Mathematical Experience. Principia 10 (2):143-170.
    ome recent work by philosophers of mathematics has been aimed at showing that our knowledge of the existence of at least some mathematical objects and/or sets can be epistemically grounded by appealing to perceptual experience. The sensory capacity that they refer to in doing so is the ability to perceive numbers, mathematical properties and/or sets. The chief defense of this view as it applies to the perception of sets is found in Penelope Maddy’s Realism in Mathematics, but a number of (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Thomas Tymoczko (1991). Mathematics, Science and Ontology. Synthese 88 (2):201 - 228.
    According to quasi-empiricism, mathematics is very like a branch of natural science. But if mathematics is like a branch of science, and science studies real objects, then mathematics should study real objects. Thus a quasi-empirical account of mathematics must answer the old epistemological question: How is knowledge of abstract objects possible? This paper attempts to show how it is possible.The second section examines the problem as it was posed by Benacerraf in Mathematical Truth and the next section presents a way (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation