Normative Ethics > Consequentialism > Varieties of Consequentialism > Maximizing and Satisficing Consequentialism
Maximizing and Satisficing Consequentialism
Edited by Douglas W. Portmore (Arizona State University)
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| Summary | Maximizing consequentialism holds that an act X is permissible if and only if there is no alternative act Y that would produce more good than X would. There are several worries associated with formulating consequentialism as a maximizing theory: the resulting theory is (1) very demanding in that requires that agents always produce as much good as possible, (2) unable to accommodate supererogatory actions -- acts that are optional despite their being morally superior to other permissible alternatives, and (3) unable to allow for a wide range of moral options in that it allows for moral options only when two or more available acts are tied for first-place in terms of their production of goodness. Satisficing consequentialism is motivated in large part out of a concern to avoid (or at least to dissipate the force of) these objections. Satisficing consequentialism does so by holding that an act X is permissible if and only if its outcome is good enough. |
| Key works | The key early works are Slote 1985 and Slote & Pettit 1984. Since the development of satisficing consequentialism, there have been several major critiques: see, for instance, Mulgan 2001 and, especially, Bradley 2006. |
| Introductions | For a general introduction to satisficing consequentialism, see Slote & Pettit 1984. |
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