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  1. Abrantes, Paulo E. Amaral & Felipe (2005). Funcionalismo e causação mental. Manuscrito 25 (3).
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  2. Robert Ackermann (1967). Explanations of Human Action. Dialogue 6 (01):18-28.
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  3. E. M. Adams (1966). Mental Causality. Mind 75 (300):552-563.
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  4. Frederick R. Adams (1993). Reply to Russow's Fodor, Adams and Causal Properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63-65.
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  5. R. F. Alfred Hoernle (1917). The Mental and the Physical as a Problem for Philosophy. Philosophical Review 26 (3):297-314.
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  6. Peter Alward, Comments on Noa Latham’s €œIs There a Conception of Causation That Gives Rise to a Problem of Mental Causation?€.
    Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Latham defends the following argument against problems that putatively arise for mental causation: 1. A problem for mental causation arises for a conception of causation only if it attributes a causal role to physical but not mental entities.
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  7. Peter Alward (2008). Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes: A Critique of the Trope Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Dialogue 47 (01):53-.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
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  8. Peter Alward, Making Mind Matter More or Less.
    There comes a time in every young philosopher.
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  9. Thomasson Amie (1998). A Nonreductivist Solution to Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 89.
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  10. Louise Anthony (2009). The Mental and the Physical. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge
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  11. Louise M. Antony (1996). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 105 (4):564-566.
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  12. Louise M. Antony (1991). The Causal Relevance of the Mental. Mind and Language 6 (4):295-327.
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  13. Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine (1997). Reduction with Autonomy. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):83-105.
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  14. Gavin Ardley (1969). The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'. Philosophical Studies 18:227-228.
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  15. D. M. Armstrong (2002). 12 The Causal Theory of the Mind. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press 80.
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  16. Robert Audi (1980). Tuomela on the Explanation of Human Action. [REVIEW] Synthese 44 (2):285-306.
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  17. Robert Audi (1979). Wants and Intentions in the Explanation of Action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (3):227–249.
    This paper replies to criticisms of the author's accounts of intending ("journal of philosophy", 1973), wanting ("philosophical studies", 1973), and common-sense explanations of intentional actions; and it extends the nomological theory of intentional action developed in those and other articles. the paper argues, negatively, that theoretical construct accounts of intentional concepts do not entail implausible views of self-knowledge, nor assimilate reasons to mechanical causes; and, positively, that both the way in which reasons render intelligible the actions they explain and the (...)
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  18. Robert Audi (1971). Intentionalistic Explanations of Action. Metaphilosophy 2 (3):241–250.
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  19. Robert N. Audi (1993). Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
    I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that since (...)
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  20. Jeffrey David Auker (2000). Eidolons: An Argument Against Explanatory Exclusion. Dissertation, Brown University
    Having multiple explanations for an event without an understanding of how they are consistent with one another generates a sort of epistemic anxiety. The questions of why rationality compels us to feel this way and how we should go about resolving this competition between explanations combine to form the problem of explanatory compatibility. ;Jaegwon Kim proposes principled answers to both how and why explanatory competitions are to be resolved based upon his Metaphysical Principle of Explanatory Exclusion . I argue that (...)
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  21. William H. Austin (1984). Rational Credibility and Causal Explanations of Belief. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 26 (2-3):116-133.
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  22. Susan E. Babbitt (2005). Reasons, Explanation, and Saramago's Bell. Hypatia 20 (4):144-163.
    : In this essay, I suggest that significant insights of recent feminist philosophy lead, among other things, to the thought that it is not always better to choose than to be compelled to do what one might have done otherwise. However, few feminists, if any, would defend such a suggestion. I ask why it is difficult to consider certain ideas that, while challenging in theory, are, nonetheless, rather unproblematic in practice. I suggest that some questions are not pursued seriously enough (...)
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  23. Emmanuel Baierle (2013). Should the Standard Model of Mental Causation Be Abandoned? Philosophisches Jahrbuch 120 (1):124-130.
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  24. David Bakan (1980). Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press.
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  25. David Bakan (1980). On Effect of Mind on Matter. In Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press
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  26. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press 75-96.
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality consists of (...)
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  27. Charles Baldwin (1907). Macdonald, Coin Types. Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity 1:204.
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  28. Lorenzo Baravalle (2013). La venganza de Wilson: Una crítica a los enfoques seleccionistas analógicos de la evolución cultural. Dianoia 58 (70):113-132.
    En este artículo se hace una crítica de los enfoques teóricos, aquí llamados por analogía o analógicos, que pretenden abstraer conceptos darwinistas del sustrato biológico para aplicarlos a dominios ontológicos (parcialmente) distintos, estrategia adoptada por versiones de la epistemología evolutiva y, sobre todo, por la teoría memética. Para ello se utiliza el argumento de la exclusión causal, tomado en préstamo de la filosofía de la mente; se hace evidente la existencia de un paralelismo entre causalidad mental y memética, y se (...)
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  29. Ronald Lee Barnette (1972). Explanation of Human Action. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
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  30. J. Barrett (1995). Causal Relevance and Nonreductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 42 (3):339-62.
    It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to capture our (...)
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  31. J. Barrett (1994). Rationalizing Explanation and Causally Relevant Mental Properties. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):77-102.
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  32. Jonathan Barrett (1996). Mental Causation. Dissertation, University of Southern California
    This dissertation is concerned with whether mental properties can be causally relevant to behavior, that is, whether a mental event can cause a piece of behavior by virtue of its mental properties. Since it seems that my behavior is not just a causal consequence of my beliefs and desires, but is caused by those beliefs and desires precisely because they are those beliefs and desires, an affirmative answer to this question is commonly taken to be required for a successful philosophical (...)
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  33. Pierfrancesco Basile (2005). Whitehead's Ontology and Davidson's Anomalous Monism. Process Studies 34 (1):3-9.
  34. Umut Baysan (2014). Mental Causation and Ontology, Edited by S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson. Mind 123 (491):906-909.
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  35. Ansgar Beckermann (1992). States, State Types, and the Causation of Behavior. Erkenntnis 36 (3):267-282.
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  36. Hagit Benbaji (2005). The Nomological Principle and the Argument for Anomalous Monism. Iyyun 54 (January):90-108.
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  37. Daniel Bennett (1965). Action, Reason, and Purpose. Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):85-96.
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  38. Karen Bennett (2008). Exclusion Again. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press
    I think that there is an awful lot wrong with the exclusion problem. So, it seems, does just about everybody else. But of course everyone disagrees about exactly _what_ is wrong with it, and I think there is more to be said about that. So I propose to say a few more words about why the exclusion problem is not really a problem after all—at least, not for the nonreductive physicalist. The genuine _dualist_ is still in trouble. Indeed, one of (...)
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  39. Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316–337.
    Concerns about ‘mental causation’ are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem—including some forms of physicalism—make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.
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  40. Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.
    Concerns about ‘mental causation’ are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem—including some forms of physicalism—make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.
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  41. Sven Bernecker (2010). Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
    Sven Bernecker presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues ...
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  42. Sven Bernecker (2010). Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (1):61-64.
    Précis of memory: a philosophical study Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9639-4 Authors Sven Bernecker, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-4555, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  43. Sven Bernecker (ed.) (2008). The Metaphysics of Memory. Springer.
    This book investigates central issues in the philosophy of memory.
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  44. Sara Bernstein (2013). Review of Sophie Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson (Eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1 (1):1.
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  45. Peter Bieri (1993). Mental Concepts: Causal Because Anomalous. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. Hawthorne: De Gruyter
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  46. A. G. Bills (1935). Some Causal Factors in Mental Blocking. Journal of Experimental Psychology 18 (2):172.
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  47. Robert C. Bishop (2006). The Hidden Premise in the Causal Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 66 (289):44-52.
    The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.
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  48. Simon W. Blackburn (1991). Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identity, and Folk Burglar Prevention. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press 196.
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  49. Suzanne Bliss & Jordi Fernández (2008). Causal Inheritance and Second-Order Properties. Abstracta 4 (2):74-95.
    We defend Jaegwon Kim’s ‘causal inheritance’ principle from an objection raised by Jurgen Schröder. The objection is that the principle is inconsistent with a view about mental properties assumed by Kim, namely, that they are second-order properties. We argue that Schröder misconstrues the notion of second-order property. We distinguish three notions of second-order property and highlight their problems and virtues. Finally, we examine the consequence of Kim’s principle and discuss the issue of whether Kim’s ‘supervenience argument’ generalizes to all special (...)
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  50. Ned Block (1994). Two Kinds of Laws. In C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press
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