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  1. Peter Alward (2008). Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes: A Critique of the Trope Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Dialogue 47 (01):53-.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
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  2. Peter Alward, Making Mind Matter More or Less.
    There comes a time in every young philosopher.
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  3. Louise M. Antony (1991). The Causal Relevance of the Mental. Mind and Language 6 (4):295-327.
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  4. Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine (1997). Reduction with Autonomy. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):83-105.
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  5. István Aranyosi (2008). Excluding Exclusion: The Natural(Istic) Dualist Approach. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67-78.
    The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind-body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism --its form, commitments, and intuitions?makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to (...)
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  6. Robert N. Audi (1993). Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that since (...)
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  7. David Bakan (1980). Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press.
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  8. David Bakan (1980). On Effect of Mind on Matter. In Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press.
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  9. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 75-96.
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality consists of (...)
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  10. Lorenzo Baravalle (2013). La venganza de Wilson: Una crítica a los enfoques seleccionistas analógicos de la evolución cultural. Dianoia 58 (70):113-132.
    En este artículo se hace una crítica de los enfoques teóricos, aquí llamados por analogía o analógicos, que pretenden abstraer conceptos darwinistas del sustrato biológico para aplicarlos a dominios ontológicos (parcialmente) distintos, estrategia adoptada por versiones de la epistemología evolutiva y, sobre todo, por la teoría memética. Para ello se utiliza el argumento de la exclusión causal, tomado en préstamo de la filosofía de la mente; se hace evidente la existencia de un paralelismo entre causalidad mental y memética, y se (...)
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  11. J. Barrett (1994). Rationalizing Explanation and Causally Relevant Mental Properties. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):77-102.
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  12. Ansgar Beckermann (1992). States, State Types, and the Causation of Behavior. Erkenntnis 36 (3):267-282.
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  13. Karen Bennett (2008). Exclusion Again. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    I think that there is an awful lot wrong with the exclusion problem. So, it seems, does just about everybody else. But of course everyone disagrees about exactly _what_ is wrong with it, and I think there is more to be said about that. So I propose to say a few more words about why the exclusion problem is not really a problem after all—at least, not for the nonreductive physicalist. The genuine _dualist_ is still in trouble. Indeed, one of (...)
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  14. Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316–337.
    Concerns about ‘mental causation’ are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem—including some forms of physicalism—make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.
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  15. Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.
    Concerns about ‘mental causation’ are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem—including some forms of physicalism—make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.
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  16. Sven Bernecker (2010). Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
    Sven Bernecker presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues ...
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  17. Sven Bernecker (2010). Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (1):61-64.
    Précis of memory: a philosophical study Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9639-4 Authors Sven Bernecker, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-4555, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  18. Sven Bernecker (ed.) (2008). The Metaphysics of Memory. Springer.
    This book investigates central issues in the philosophy of memory.
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  19. Simon W. Blackburn (1991). Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identity, and Folk Burglar Prevention. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. 196.
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  20. Ned Block (1994). Two Kinds of Laws. In C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press.
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  21. Ned Block (1989). Can the Mind Change the World? In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press. 137--170.
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  22. Thomas D. Bontly (2005). Exclusion, Overdetermination, and the Nature of Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:261-282.
    A typical thesis of contemporary materialism holds that mental properties and events supervene on, without being reducible to, physical properties and events. Many philosophers have grown skeptical about the causal efficacy of irreducibly supervenient properties, however, and one of the main reasons is an assumption about causation which Jaegwon Kim calls the causal exclusion principle. I argue here that this principle runs afoul of cases of genuine causal overdetermination.Many would argue that causal overdetermination is impossible anyway, but a careful analysis (...)
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  23. Thomas D. Bontly (2005). Proportionality, Causation, and Exclusion. Philosophia 32 (1-4):331-348.
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  24. Thomas D. Bontly (2002). The Supervenience Argument Generalizes. Philosophical Studies 109 (1):75-96.
    In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues thatpsychophysical supervenience withoutpsychophysical reduction renders mentalcausation `unintelligible'. He also claimsthat, contrary to popular opinion, his argumentagainst supervenient mental causation cannot begeneralized so as to threaten the causalefficacy of other `higher-level' properties:e.g., the properties of special sciences likebiology. In this paper, I argue that none ofthe considerations Kim advances are sufficientto keep the supervenience argument fromgeneralizing to all higher-level properties,and that Kim's position in fact entails thatonly the properties of fundamental physicalparticles are causally efficacious.
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  25. George S. Boolos (ed.) (1990). Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is a report on the state of philosophy in a number of significant areas.
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  26. David M. Braun (1995). Causally Relevant Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 9:447-75.
    In this paper I present an analysis of causal relevance for properties. I believe that most of us are already familiar with the notion of a causally relevant property. But some of us may not recognize it "under that description." So I begin below with some intuitive explanations and some illustrative examples.
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  27. Janez Bregant (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.
    It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation that rests on supervenience is an attractive theory. On the one hand, it secures uniqueness of the mental; on the other hand, it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalist view. However, Kim reminds us that anti-reductionists face the following dilemma: either mental properties have causal powers or they do not. If they have them, we risk a violation of (...)
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  28. Geoffrey Brennan, Robert E. Goodin & Michael A. Smith (eds.) (2007). Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Oxford University Press.
    During a career spanning over thirty years Philip Pettit has made seminal contributions in moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of mind and action, and metaphysics. The corpus of work Pettit has contributed and stimulated is all the more remarkable because of the way in which Pettit and his circle adapt lessons learned when thinking about problems in one area of philosophy to problems in a completely different area. -/- Common Minds presents specially written papers by (...)
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  29. Bill Brewer (1995). Compulsion by Reason (Mental Causation II). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69:237-53.
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  30. Bill Brewer (1995). Mental Causation: Compulsion by Reason. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (69):237-253.
    The standard paradigm for mental causation is a person’s acting for a reason. Something happens - she intentionally φ’s - the occurrence of which we explain by citing a relevant belief or desire. In the present context, I simply take for granted the following two conditions on the appropriateness of this explanation. First, the agent φ’s _because_ she believes/desires what we say she does, where this is expressive of a _causal_ dependence.1 Second, her believing/desiring this gives her a _reason_ for (...)
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  31. Bill Brewer (1995). Mental Causation, II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69 (69):237-253.
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  32. R. Philip Buckley (2001). Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
    In this paper I argue that the problem of mental causation can be solved by distinguishing between classificatory mental properties, like being a pain, and instances of those properties.Antireductive physicalism allows only that the former be irreducibly mental. Consequently, properties like being a pain cannot have causal commerce with the physical without violating causal closure. But instances of painfulness, according to the token identity thesis, are identical with various physical tokens and can therefore have causal efficacy in the physical world. (...)
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  33. John Campbell (2010). Independence of Variables in Mental Causation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):64-79.
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  34. John Campbell (2006). An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology. In Alison Gopnik & Larry J. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation. Oup. 58--66.
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  35. Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
    Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism about mental properties or (...)
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  36. William Child (1997). Crane on Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):97-102.
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  37. J. Christensen & J. Kallestrup (2012). Counterfactuals and Downward Causation: A Reply to Zhong. Analysis 72 (3):513-517.
    Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
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  38. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2004). Content, Rationality and Mental Causation. Axiomathes 14 (4):307-340.
    In this paper I will address the question of rationalizing mental causation which is involved in the processes of epistemic justification. The main problem concerning mental causation consists in the apparent incompatibility of the three following claims: (i) the subject's mental states (in particular his belief states) are realized by neural states of the subject's brain; (ii) the justifying character of belief transition consists in the fact that there are certain broadly logical relations between the contents of the relevant beliefs; (...)
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  39. Randolph Clarke (2010). Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J. Lowe. Mind 119 (475):820-823.
  40. Randolph Clarke (1999). Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):295-322.
    Nonreductive physicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the causal powers (...)
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  41. Arthur B. Cody (1997). Consciousness: Of David Chalmers and Other Philosophers of Mind. Inquiry 40 (4):379 – 405.
    On reading David Chalmers's book, The Conscious Mind (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), one is struck by the author's efforts to meet the difficulties and obscurities in understanding the human mind, as indeed most other philosophers have, by hazarding theories. Such undertakings rest on two broad, usually unexamined, assumptions. One is that we have direct access to our conscious minds such that pronouncements about it and its contents are descriptive. The other is that our actions have causal explanations which (...)
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  42. Josep E. Corbí & Josep L. Prades (2000). Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing Mechanisms. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1-11.
    In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that fine-grained (...)
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  43. Josep E. Corbí & Josep L. Prades (2000). The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr.
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  44. Edward T. Cox (2008). Crimson Brain, Red Mind: Yablo on Mental Causation. Dialectica 62 (1):77–99.
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  45. Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalität als Merkmal des Geistigen: Sechs Essays zur Philosophie des Geistes. Fischer Verlag.
    A German translation of six essays (‘The Non-Conceptual Content of Experience’, ‘The Mental Causation Debate’, ‘Mental Substances’, ‘Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental’, ‘Subjective Knowledge’, ‘The Intentional Structure of Consciousness’) with a new introduction, ‘The Mental and the Physical’.
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  46. Tim Crane (2001). Jacob on Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 16 (26):15-21.
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  47. Tim Crane (1997). Reply to Child. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):103-108.
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  48. Tim Crane (1992). Mental Causation and Mental Reality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (425):185-202.
    Argues that anomalism and causal closure don't pose problems for mental causation as they are false, and that functional properties can efficacious. States with content may be efficacious, although content itself may not be.
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  49. Tim Crane (1990). An Alleged Analogy Between Numbers and Propositions. Analysis 50 (4):224-230.
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  50. Carl F. Craver & William P. Bechtel, Explaining Top-Down Causation (Away).
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