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  1. Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2013). The Nature of Epistemic Feelings. Philosophical Psychology (2):1-19.
    Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...)
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  2. Harald Atmanspacher (2010). Acategorial States in a Representational Theory of Mental Processes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5 - 6.
    We propose a distinction between precategorial, acategorial and categorial states within a scientifically oriented understanding of mental processes. This distinction can be specified by approaches developed in cognitive neuroscience and the analytical philosophy of mind. On the basis of a representational theory of mental processes, acategoriality refers to a form of knowledge that presumes fully developed categorial mental representations, yet refers to nonconceptual experiences in mental states beyond categorial states. It relies on a simultaneous experience of potential individual representations and (...)
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  3. Imants Baruss & M. Wammes (2009). Characteristics of Spontaneous Musical Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):37-61.
    This study follows upon Steven Brown's 2006 article in The Journal of Consciousness Studies about the ‘perpetual music track', a form of constant musical imagery. With Brown's assistance, a Musical Imagery Questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire was then administered to 67 participants with the intention of establishing relevant scales for quantifying the presence and extent of spontaneous musical imagery in individuals. In addition to the Musical Imagery Questionnaire, the Six Factor Personality Questionnaire, as well as the Transliminality Scale, which is (...)
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  4. Robert Binkley (1969). Intentionality, Minds and Behavior. Noûs 3 (1):49-60.
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  5. Lucinda Pearl Boggs (1904). The Attitude of Mind Called Interest. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (16):428-434.
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  6. Andrei A. Buckareff (2010). Acceptance Does Not Entail Belief. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):255-261.
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  7. Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (forthcoming). Phenomenal Consciousness Disembodied. In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Continuum.
    We evaluate the role of embodiment in ordinary mental state ascriptions. Presented are five experiments on phenomenal state ascriptions to disembodied entities such as ghosts and spirits. Results suggest that biological embodiment is not a central principle of folk psychology guiding ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness. By contrast, results continue to support the important role of functional considerations in theory of mind judgments.
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  8. Nicolas J. Bullot (2009). Material Anamnesis and the Prompting of Aesthetic Worlds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):85-109.
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  9. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Perception and Computation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
    Students of perception have long puzzled over a range of cases in which perception seems to tell us distinct, and in some sense conflicting, things about the world. In the cases at issue, the perceptual system is capable of responding to a single stimulus — say, as manifested in the ways in which subjects sort that stimulus — in different ways. This paper is about these puzzling cases, and about how they should be characterized and accounted for within a general (...)
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  10. Tamás Demeter (2009). Where Rationality Is. In Barbara Merker (ed.), Verstehen: Nach Heidegger und Brandom. Meiner.
    The paper contrasts Robert Brandom’s account of rationality with that of Daniel Dennett. It argues that neither of them is tenable, and sketches an alternative outlook that avoids the problems. In spite of their fundamental differences, both Brandom and Dennett employ a robust, i.e. explanatory and predictive notion of rationality, and for different reasons they both fail to offer a plausible theory supporting it. The lesson offered here is that rationality should not be treated alongside other norms prescribing behaviour, as (...)
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  11. Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo, Fragmentation and Information Access.
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .
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  12. Katalin Farkas (2009). Not Every Feeling is Intentional. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):39 - 52.
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  13. Ellen Fridland (2014). Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought: Making Our Way Through the Wilderness. In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications. Routledge.
  14. Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas (2013). Do Expectations Have Time Span? Axiomathes 23 (4):665-681.
    If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at (...)
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  15. Allan Hazlett, Belief and Truth, Desire and Goodness.
    There seems to be a special relationship between belief and truth that can be metaphorically expressed by saying that belief “aims” at truth or that belief’s “direction of fit” is “to fit the world.” There is an Aristotelian thesis, according to which the special relationship between belief and truth is the same as the special relationship between desire and goodness. Assuming that belief “aims” at truth, then, desire “aims” at goodness. This contrasts with a Humean thesis, on which, while belief (...)
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  16. Douglas Hollan (2012). Emerging Issues in the Cross-Cultural Study of Empathy. Emotion Review 4 (1):70-78.
    Especially since the discovery of mirror neurons, scholars in a variety of disciplines have made empathy a central focus of research. Yet despite this recent flurry of interest and activity, the cross-cultural study of empathy in context, as part of ongoing, naturally occurring behavior, remains in its infancy. In the present article, I review some of this recent work on the ethnography of empathy. I focus especially on the new issues and questions about empathy that the ethnographic approach raises and (...)
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  17. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2014). Faith. In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd edition. Cambridge.
    A brief article on faith as a psychological attitude.
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  18. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2002). Nature and Nurture in Cognition. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):251-272.
    This paper advocates a dispositional account of innate cognitive capacities, which has an illustrious history from Plato to Chomsky. The ?triggering model? of innateness, first made explicit by Stich ([1975]), explicates the notion in terms of the relative informational content of the stimulus (input) and the competence (output). The advantage of this model of innateness is that it does not make a problematic reference to normal conditions and avoids relativizing innate traits to specific populations, as biological models of innateness are (...)
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  19. Maria Krudewig (1962). Die seelische gegenwart. Kant-Studien 53 (1-4):309-313.
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  20. Christian List & Franz Dietrich, Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective.
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behavioural dispositions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has long gone out of fashion in psychology and linguistics, it remains influential in economics, especially in `revealed preference' theory. We aim to (i) clear up some common confusions (...)
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  21. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). Knowledge and Reliability. In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics. Blackwell.
    Internalists have criticised reliabilism for overlooking the importance of the subject's point of view in the generation of knowledge. This paper argues that there is a troubling ambiguity in the intuitive examples that internalists have used to make their case, and on either way of resolving this ambiguity, reliabilism is untouched. However, the argument used to defend reliabilism against the internalist cases could also be used to defend a more radical form of externalism in epistemology.
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  22. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Meanings of Metacognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Noetic feelings, like the feeling of certainty and the tip-of-the-tongue state, have an interesting place in our cognitive economy. Joelle Proust’s account of these feelings emphasizes the procedural guidance they supply, while arguing that this guidance does not depend on any conceptual ability to attribute mental states. I argue that she has made a strong case for their procedural value but hasn’t conclusively shown that they work in a way that is independent of our capacities for mental state attribution.
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  23. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is traced back to a (...)
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  24. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Gendler on Alief. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (4):774-788.
    Contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.
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  25. Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar (2013). Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs. Cognition 129:652-661.
    Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as “Gettier cases.” Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers’ intuitions about these (...)
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  26. Diana Raffman (1999). What Autism May Tell Us About Self-Awareness: A Commentary on Frith and Happe, Theory of Mind and Self Consciousness: What is It Like to Be Autistic?. Mind and Language 14:23-31.
  27. Robert D. Rupert (2013). Memory, Natural Kinds, and Cognitive Extension; or, Martians Don't Remember, and Cognitive Science Is Not About Cognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):25-47.
    This paper evaluates the Natural-Kinds Argument for cognitive extension, which purports to show that the kinds presupposed by our best cognitive science have instances external to human organism. Various interpretations of the argument are articulated and evaluated, using the overarching categories of memory and cognition as test cases. Particular emphasis is placed on criteria for the scientific legitimacy of generic kinds, that is, kinds characterized in very broad terms rather than in terms of their fine-grained causal roles. Given the current (...)
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  28. John Schwenkler (forthcoming). Rational Causation, by Eric Marcus. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    This is an excellent book that deserves careful attention from anyone whose work touches on issues in the philosophy of mind and action. In it, Marcus challenges the dominant philosophical conception of the mind’s place in nature, according to which mentalistic explanations hold true only when mental states or events cause things to happen in the same way as physical states and events do. Against this conception, Marcus argues that mental causation is utterly dissimilar to most of the causation we (...)
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  29. Michael J. Shaffer (2013). Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of Acceptance. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25:337-353.
    Paradoxes have played an important role both in philosophy and in mathematics and paradox resolution is an important topic in both fields. Paradox resolution is deeply important because if such resolution cannot be achieved, we are threatened with the charge of debilitating irrationality. This is supposed to be the case for the following reason. Paradoxes consist of jointly contradictory sets of statements that are individually plausible or believable. These facts about paradoxes then give rise to a deeply troubling epistemic problem. (...)
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  30. Marilyn Shatz, Henry M. Wellman & Sharon Silber (1983). The Acquisition of Mental Verbs: A Systematic Investigation of the First Reference to Mental State. Cognition 14 (3):301-321.
  31. John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter & Peter Blouw (forthcoming). Knowledge and Luck. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review.
    Nearly all success is due to some mix of ability and luck. But some successes we attribute to the agent’s ability, whereas others we attribute to luck. To better understand the criteria distinguishing credit from luck, we conducted a series of four studies on knowledge attributions. Knowledge is an achievement that involves reaching the truth. But many factors affecting the truth are beyond our control and reaching the truth is often partly due to luck. Which sorts of luck are compatible (...)
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  32. Maciej Witek, Contextual Facilitation of Colour Recognition: Penetrating Beliefs or Colour-Shape Associations?
    My aim in this paper is to defend the view that the processes underlying early vision are informationally encapsulated. Following Marr (1982) and Pylyshyn (1999) I take early vision to be a cognitive process that takes sensory information as its input and produces the so-called primal sketches or shallow visual outputs: informational states that represent visual objects in terms of their shape, location, size, colour and luminosity. Recently, some researchers (Schirillo 1999, Macpherson 2012) have attempted to undermine the idea of (...)
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  33. C. M. Yang & Timothy Lane (2010). What Subjective Experiences Determine the Perception of Falling Asleep During the Sleep Onset Period? Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1084-1092.
    Sleep onset is associated with marked changes in behavioral, physiological, and subjective phenomena. In daily life though subjective experience is the main criterion in terms of which we identify it. But very few studies have focused on these experiences. This study seeks to identify the subjective variables that reflect sleep onset. Twenty young subjects took an afternoon nap in the laboratory while polysomnographic recordings were made. They were awakened four times in order to assess subjective experiences that correlate with the (...)
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  34. Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Intentions Are Mental States. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.
    Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.
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