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  1. Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2014). The Nature of Epistemic Feelings. Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):1-19.
    Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...)
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  2. Harald Atmanspacher (2010). Acategorial States in a Representational Theory of Mental Processes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5 - 6.
    We propose a distinction between precategorial, acategorial and categorial states within a scientifically oriented understanding of mental processes. This distinction can be specified by approaches developed in cognitive neuroscience and the analytical philosophy of mind. On the basis of a representational theory of mental processes, acategoriality refers to a form of knowledge that presumes fully developed categorial mental representations, yet refers to nonconceptual experiences in mental states beyond categorial states. It relies on a simultaneous experience of potential individual representations and (...)
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  3. Imants Baruss & M. Wammes (2009). Characteristics of Spontaneous Musical Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):37-61.
    This study follows upon Steven Brown's 2006 article in The Journal of Consciousness Studies about the ‘perpetual music track', a form of constant musical imagery. With Brown's assistance, a Musical Imagery Questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire was then administered to 67 participants with the intention of establishing relevant scales for quantifying the presence and extent of spontaneous musical imagery in individuals. In addition to the Musical Imagery Questionnaire, the Six Factor Personality Questionnaire, as well as the Transliminality Scale, which is (...)
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  4. Robert Binkley (1969). Intentionality, Minds and Behavior. Noûs 3 (1):49-60.
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  5. Lucinda Pearl Boggs (1904). The Attitude of Mind Called Interest. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (16):428-434.
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  6. Andrei A. Buckareff (2010). Acceptance Does Not Entail Belief. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):255-261.
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  7. Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (2014). Phenomenal Consciousness Disembodied. In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Bloomsbury 45-74.
    We evaluate the role of embodiment in ordinary mental state ascriptions. Presented are five experiments on phenomenal state ascriptions to disembodied entities such as ghosts and spirits. Results suggest that biological embodiment is not a central principle of folk psychology guiding ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness. By contrast, results continue to support the important role of functional considerations in theory of mind judgments.
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  8. Nicolas J. Bullot (2009). Material Anamnesis and the Prompting of Aesthetic Worlds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):85-109.
    Many scholars view artworks as the products of cultural history and arbitrary institutional conventions. Others construe art as the result of psychological mechanisms internal to the organism. These historical and psychological approaches are often viewed as foes rather than friends. Is it possible to combine these two approaches in a unified analysis of the perception and consciousness of artworks? I defend a positive answer to this question and propose a psycho-historical theory, which argues that artworks are historical and material artefacts (...)
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  9. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Perception and Computation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
    Students of perception have long puzzled over a range of cases in which perception seems to tell us distinct, and in some sense conflicting, things about the world. In the cases at issue, the perceptual system is capable of responding to a single stimulus — say, as manifested in the ways in which subjects sort that stimulus — in different ways. This paper is about these puzzling cases, and about how they should be characterized and accounted for within a general (...)
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  10. Simon David Dembitzer, On Mental Privacy: The Having of Mental States.
    In three chapters this thesis seeks to demonstrate that (i) there historically has been no consensus in the use of the term 'mental privacy' and that several problematic doctrines are based on confused accounts of this term; (ii) there are contemporary debates which are maintained, in large order, by the opposing sides subscribing to different notions of mental privacy; and (iii) a preliminary investigation makes clear that both mental states with propositional content and mental states with non-propositional content are private (...)
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  11. Tamás Demeter (2009). Where Rationality Is. In Barbara Merker (ed.), Verstehen: Nach Heidegger und Brandom. Meiner
    The paper contrasts Robert Brandom’s account of rationality with that of Daniel Dennett. It argues that neither of them is tenable, and sketches an alternative outlook that avoids the problems. In spite of their fundamental differences, both Brandom and Dennett employ a robust, i.e. explanatory and predictive notion of rationality, and for different reasons they both fail to offer a plausible theory supporting it. The lesson offered here is that rationality should not be treated alongside other norms prescribing behaviour, as (...)
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  12. Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo, Fragmentation and Information Access.
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .
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  13. Katalin Farkas (2009). Not Every Feeling is Intentional. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):39 - 52.
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  14. Ellen Fridland (2014). Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought: Making Our Way Through the Wilderness. In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications. Routledge
  15. Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas (2013). Do Expectations Have Time Span? Axiomathes 23 (4):665-681.
    If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at (...)
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  16. Dany Mauricio González Parra (2014). Contenido conceptual - contenido no conceptual: una distinción de tipo. Escritos 22 (49):369-397.
    La distinción entre contenidos conceptuales y no-conceptuales tiene claras repercusiones en el modo en que el hombre configura su mundo, así como en la posibilidad de atribuir pensamiento, en sentido estricto, a sistemas y organismos no humanos. Con el fin de clarificar dicha distinción, en el presente trabajo se plantea una noción básica de estado mental y, especialmente, una definición clara de lo que es un concepto y las características esenciales de los estados en que estos aparecen. Lo que se (...)
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  17. Allan Hazlett, Belief and Truth, Desire and Goodness.
    There seems to be a special relationship between belief and truth that can be metaphorically expressed by saying that belief “aims” at truth or that belief’s “direction of fit” is “to fit the world.” There is an Aristotelian thesis, according to which the special relationship between belief and truth is the same as the special relationship between desire and goodness. Assuming that belief “aims” at truth, then, desire “aims” at goodness. This contrasts with a Humean thesis, on which, while belief (...)
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  18. Eric Hochstein (2009). Endorsing Non-Occurrent Beliefs: Why Standard Belief Functioning is Problematic for the Extended Mind. In Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Nicolas Payetter (eds.), Beyond the Brain: Embodied, Situated and Distributed Cognition. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 205-214.
  19. Douglas Hollan (2012). Emerging Issues in the Cross-Cultural Study of Empathy. Emotion Review 4 (1):70-78.
    Especially since the discovery of mirror neurons, scholars in a variety of disciplines have made empathy a central focus of research. Yet despite this recent flurry of interest and activity, the cross-cultural study of empathy in context, as part of ongoing, naturally occurring behavior, remains in its infancy. In the present article, I review some of this recent work on the ethnography of empathy. I focus especially on the new issues and questions about empathy that the ethnographic approach raises and (...)
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  20. Steven Horst (forthcoming). Cognitive Pluralism. MIT Press.
    This book introduces an account of cognitive architecture, Cognitive Pluralism, on which the basic units of understanding are models of particular content domains. Having many mental models is a good adaptive strategy for cognition, but models can be incompatible with one another, leading to paradoxes and inconsistencies of belief, and it may not be possible to integrate the understanding supplied by multiple models into a comprehensive and self-consistent "super model". The book applies the theory to explaining intuitive reasoning and cognitive (...)
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  21. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2014). Faith. In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd edition. Cambridge
    A brief article on faith as a psychological attitude.
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  22. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2002). Nature and Nurture in Cognition. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):251-272.
    This paper advocates a dispositional account of innate cognitive capacities, which has an illustrious history from Plato to Chomsky. The ?triggering model? of innateness, first made explicit by Stich ([1975]), explicates the notion in terms of the relative informational content of the stimulus (input) and the competence (output). The advantage of this model of innateness is that it does not make a problematic reference to normal conditions and avoids relativizing innate traits to specific populations, as biological models of innateness are (...)
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  23. Maria Krudewig (1962). Die seelische gegenwart. Kant-Studien 53 (1-4):309-313.
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  24. Christian List & Franz Dietrich (forthcoming). Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective. Economics and Philosophy.
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...)
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  25. Emar Maier, Referential Dependencies Between Conflicting Attitudes.
    A number of puzzles about propositional attitudes in semantics and philosophy revolve around apparent referential dependencies between different attitudes within a single agent’s mental state. In a series of papers, Hans Kamp (2003. . . 2014) offers a general framework for describing such interconnected attitude complexes, building on DRT and dynamic semantics. I demonstrate that Kamp’s proposal cannot deal with referential dependencies between semantically conflicting attitudes, such as those in Ninan’s (2008) puzzle about de re imagination. To solve the problem (...)
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  26. Barbara Merker (ed.) (2009). Verstehen: Nach Heidegger Und Brandom. Meiner.
  27. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). Knowledge and Reliability. In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics. Blackwell
    Internalists have criticised reliabilism for overlooking the importance of the subject's point of view in the generation of knowledge. This paper argues that there is a troubling ambiguity in the intuitive examples that internalists have used to make their case, and on either way of resolving this ambiguity, reliabilism is untouched. However, the argument used to defend reliabilism against the internalist cases could also be used to defend a more radical form of externalism in epistemology.
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  28. Jennifer Nagel (2014). The Meanings of Metacognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):710-718.
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  29. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is traced back to a (...)
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  30. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Gendler on Alief. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (4):774-788.
    Contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.
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  31. Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar (2013). Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs. Cognition 129:652-661.
    Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as “Gettier cases.” Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers’ intuitions about these (...)
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  32. Kawalec Pawel (2010). Przyczynowość stanów mentalnych w modelach naukowych. Próba alternatywnego uzasadnienia antynaturalizmu eksplanacyjnego Urszuli Żegleń. In Muszyński Zbysław (ed.), Umysł. Natura i sposób istnienia. Wydawnictwo UMCS 45-57.
    An antinaturalist defense of causality of mental states. The argument is based on the properties of causal models in cognitive research. Bibliografia prac przywołanych w tekście -/- Damasio A., 1994/1999, Błąd Kartezjusza. Emocje, rozum i ludzki mózg, tłum. M. Karpiński, Poznań: Rebis. Davidson D., 1963/2001, „Actions, reasons, and causes”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 3-19. Davidson D., 1967/2001, „Causal relations”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 149-62. Davidson D., 1970/2001, „Mental events”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 207-25. Davidson D., 1976/2001, „Hempel on explaining action”, (...)
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  33. Diana Raffman (1999). What Autism May Tell Us About Self-Awareness: A Commentary on Frith and Happe, Theory of Mind and Self Consciousness: What is It Like to Be Autistic?. Mind and Language 14:23-31.
  34. Varanasi Ramabrahmam (2012). MODES OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AND COMMUNICATION. In In the Proceedings of waves conference at Boston, USA, July 13-15, 2012.
    Four modes of language acquisition and communication are presented translating ancient Indian expressions on human consciousness, mind, their form, structure and function clubbing with the Sabdabrahma theory of language acquisition and communication. The modern scientific understanding of such an insight is discussed. . A flowchart of language processing in humans will be given. A gross model of human language acquisition, comprehension and communication process forming the basis to develop software for relevantmind-machine modeling will be presented. The implications of such a (...)
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  35. Varanasi Ramabrahmam (2004). A Modern Scientific Awareness of Upanishadic Wisdom: Implications to Physiological Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. In In the Proceedings of World Congress on Vedic Sciences, 09-13 August 2004, Bangalore. 562-568.
    Upanishads are traditionally commented upon as texts of theology and religion. But the contents of the Upanishads can also be viewed and commented from modern science point of view. Elements of modern science present in the Upanishads and Advaita Siddhanta will be listed. -/- The nature of maya will be discussed with modern scientific awareness. This awareness will be further used in understanding human mental processes and the ways to model them contributing to the natural language comprehension field of artificial (...)
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  36. Hili Razinsky (2014). The Behavioral Conflict of Emotion. International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):159-173.
    ABSTRACT: This paper understands mental attitudes such as emotions and desires to be dispositions to behavior. It also acknowledges that people are often ambivalent, i.e., that they may hold opposed attitudes towards something or someone. Yet the first position seems to entail that ambivalence is either tantamount to paralysis or a contradictory notion. I identify the problem as based on a reductive interpretation of the dispositional character of attitudes and of ambivalence. The paper instead defends a post-Davidsonian view of the (...)
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  37. David Rose (forthcoming). Belief is Prior to Knowledge. Episteme:1-15.
    Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is a composite of belief and non-mental factors. However, Timothy Williamson suggests that orthodoxy implies that the concept of belief is acquired before the concept of knowledge, whereas developmental data suggest the reverse. More recently, Jennifer Nagel reviews the psychological evidence, building a psychological case that the concept of knowledge emerges prior to belief. I assess the psychological state of the art and find support for the opposite conclusion. Overall the empirical evidence supports the orthodox (...)
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  38. Robert D. Rupert (2013). Memory, Natural Kinds, and Cognitive Extension; or, Martians Don't Remember, and Cognitive Science Is Not About Cognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):25-47.
    This paper evaluates the Natural-Kinds Argument for cognitive extension, which purports to show that the kinds presupposed by our best cognitive science have instances external to human organism. Various interpretations of the argument are articulated and evaluated, using the overarching categories of memory and cognition as test cases. Particular emphasis is placed on criteria for the scientific legitimacy of generic kinds, that is, kinds characterized in very broad terms rather than in terms of their fine-grained causal roles. Given the current (...)
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  39. John Schwenkler (forthcoming). Rational Causation, by Eric Marcus. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    This is an excellent book that deserves careful attention from anyone whose work touches on issues in the philosophy of mind and action. In it, Marcus challenges the dominant philosophical conception of the mind’s place in nature, according to which mentalistic explanations hold true only when mental states or events cause things to happen in the same way as physical states and events do. Against this conception, Marcus argues that mental causation is utterly dissimilar to most of the causation we (...)
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  40. Michael J. Shaffer (2013). Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of Acceptance. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25:337-353.
    Paradoxes have played an important role both in philosophy and in mathematics and paradox resolution is an important topic in both fields. Paradox resolution is deeply important because if such resolution cannot be achieved, we are threatened with the charge of debilitating irrationality. This is supposed to be the case for the following reason. Paradoxes consist of jointly contradictory sets of statements that are individually plausible or believable. These facts about paradoxes then give rise to a deeply troubling epistemic problem. (...)
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  41. Marilyn Shatz, Henry M. Wellman & Sharon Silber (1983). The Acquisition of Mental Verbs: A Systematic Investigation of the First Reference to Mental State. Cognition 14 (3):301-321.
  42. Desh Raj Sirswal (2013). MENTAL HEALTH IN INDIA: POLICIES AND ISSUES. Milestone Education Review 4 (02):35-54.
    Mental health generally refers to an individual’s thoughts, feelings and actions, particularly when he faced with life challenges and stresses. A good mental health isn’t just the absence of mental health problems. It is the achievement and the maintenance of psychological well-being. Mental Health is the state of one’s peace of mind, happiness and harmony brought out by one’s level of adjustment with himself and his environment. In describing mental health, Anwar said, “…mental health is the health of one’s mind (...)
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  43. Martin Smith (forthcoming). The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State. In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First, Approaches to Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press
    My concern in this paper is with the claim that knowledge is a mental state – a claim that Williamson places front and centre in Knowledge and Its Limits. While I am not by any means convinced that the claim is false, I do think it carries certain costs that have not been widely appreciated. One source of resistance to this claim derives from internalism about the mental – the view, roughly speaking, that one’s mental states are determined by one’s (...)
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  44. John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter & Peter Blouw (2015). Knowledge and Luck. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 22 (2):378-390.
    Nearly all success is due to some mix of ability and luck. But some successes we attribute to the agent’s ability, whereas others we attribute to luck. To better understand the criteria distinguishing credit from luck, we conducted a series of four studies on knowledge attributions. Knowledge is an achievement that involves reaching the truth. But many factors affecting the truth are beyond our control and reaching the truth is often partly due to luck. Which sorts of luck are compatible (...)
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  45. Maciej Witek, Contextual Facilitation of Colour Recognition: Penetrating Beliefs or Colour-Shape Associations?
    My aim in this paper is to defend the view that the processes underlying early vision are informationally encapsulated. Following Marr (1982) and Pylyshyn (1999) I take early vision to be a cognitive process that takes sensory information as its input and produces the so-called primal sketches or shallow visual outputs: informational states that represent visual objects in terms of their shape, location, size, colour and luminosity. Recently, some researchers (Schirillo 1999, Macpherson 2012) have attempted to undermine the idea of (...)
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  46. C. M. Yang & Timothy Lane (2010). What Subjective Experiences Determine the Perception of Falling Asleep During the Sleep Onset Period? Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1084-1092.
    Sleep onset is associated with marked changes in behavioral, physiological, and subjective phenomena. In daily life though subjective experience is the main criterion in terms of which we identify it. But very few studies have focused on these experiences. This study seeks to identify the subjective variables that reflect sleep onset. Twenty young subjects took an afternoon nap in the laboratory while polysomnographic recordings were made. They were awakened four times in order to assess subjective experiences that correlate with the (...)
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  47. Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Intentions Are Mental States. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.
    Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.
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