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  1. Andrea Borghini (2005). Counterpart Theory Vindicated: A Reply to Merricks. Dialectica 59 (1):67–73.
    The paper shows – contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks – that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merrick’s argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity.
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  2. Phillip Bricker (2015). Composition as a Kind of Identity. Inquiry 59 (3):264-294.
    Composition as identity, as I understand it, is a theory of the composite structure of reality. The theory’s underlying logic is irreducibly plural; its fundamental primitive is a generalized identity relation that takes either plural or singular arguments. Strong versions of the theory that incorporate a generalized version of the indiscernibility of identicals are incompatible with the framework of plural logic, and should be rejected. Weak versions of the theory that are based on the idea that composition is merely analogous (...)
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  3. Michael B. Burke (1994). Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):591-624.
    The article provides a novel, conservative account of material constitution, one that employs sortal essentialism and a theory of dominant sortals. It avoids coinciding objects, temporal parts, relativizations of identity, mereological essentialism, anti-essentialism, denials of the reality of the objects of our ordinary ontology, and other radical departures from the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. Defenses of the account against important objections are found in Burke 1997, 2003, and 2004, as well as in the often neglected six paragraphs (...)
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  4. Ross Cameron, Mereological Essentialism.
    There are various theses that go by the name ‘mereological essentialism’, but common to all is the thought that things have their parts essentially. The most obvious way of stating this is: for all objects x, for all parts y of x, x has y as a part in every world in which x exists. But there are various ways to read this claim.
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  5. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2000). Topological Essentialism. Philosophical Studies 100 (3):217-236.
    Considering topology as an extension of mereology, this paper analyses topological variants of mereological essentialism (the thesis that an object could not have different parts than the ones it has). In particular, we examine de dicto and de re versions of two theses: (i) that an object cannot change its external connections (e.g., adjacent objects cannot be separated), and (ii) that an object cannot change its topological genus (e.g., a doughnut cannot turn into a sphere). Stronger forms of structural essentialism, (...)
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  6. Roderick M. Chisholm (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court.
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  7. Roderick M. Chisholm (1975). Mereological Essentialism: Some Further Considerations. Review of Metaphysics 28 (3):477 - 484.
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  8. Roderick M. Chisholm (1973). Parts as Essential to Their Wholes. Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):581 - 603.
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  9. James Van Cleve (1986). Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):141-156.
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  10. James Van Cleve (1986). Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):141-156.
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  11. Robert Earl Frederick (1984). Mereology and Identity. Dissertation, Brown University
    The dissertation is a study of the relations between individual things, parts of individual things, and boundaries. In first chapter I present an expanded system of axioms and definitions for the primitive mereological relation "x is a part of y." I discuss alternatives to some of the axioms, particularly the axiom of mereological essentialism, i.e. the view that things have their parts essentially. I also give axioms and definitions that characterize the relations between three dimensional objects and their boundaries. I (...)
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  12. Mariusz Grygianiec (2007). Zasady mereologicznego esencjalizmu. Filozofia Nauki 3.
    Mereologcal essentialism is a metaphysical doctrine formulated and defended originally by Roderick M. Chisholm. The main principle of mereological essentialism states, that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). The principle may also be put by saying, that every object has the (...)
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  13. Mariusz Grygianiec (2006). Identyczność osobowa w czasie: konsekwencje esencjalizmu. Filozofia Nauki 3.
    The paper is an attempt to formulate some consequences of the metaphysical doctrine of mereological essentialism (ME) and the assumption that persons persisting through time remain identical in the strict and philosophical sense (Chisholm, following Butler and Reid). Those consequences are substantiality , non-constitutivity , constantiality , anti-identism ( non-bodility ), and simplicity of persons. The author tries to show that although the above stance has a great theoretical appeal, it leads to the many further difficulties, which remain without reasonable (...)
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  14. Mariusz Grygianiec (2005). W obronie mereologicznego esencjalizmu. Filozofia Nauki 3.
    The paper is an attempt to defend the Chisholm's metaphysical doctrine called mereological essentialism. The main thesis of mereological essentialism states that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). This radical theory gives a categorisation of all objects via entia per se (...)
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  15. Tessa Jones, Amending and Defending Constitution.
    I begin by evaluating four theories: mereological essentialism, the occasional identity thesis, four-dimensionalism and the constitution view. I compare the solutions these theories offer to puzzles of material constitution with particular attention being paid to their treatment of Leibniz’s Law, the ontological status of objects and the distinction between objects and their matter. If a lump of clay constitutes a statue, the lump of clay and the statue are metaphysically distinct such that they are distinct kinds, but numerically one thing—the (...)
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  16. Ali Akhtar Kazmi (1990). Parthood and Persistence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (Supplement):227-250.
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  17. Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.) (2014). Mereology and Location. OUP Oxford.
    A team of leading philosophers presents original work on theories of parthood and location. Topics covered include how we ought to axiomatise our mereology; whether we can reduce mereological relations to identity or to locative relations; whether Mereological Essentialism is true; and what mereology and propositions can tell us about one another.
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  18. Trenton Merricks (1999). Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):192 – 195.
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  19. Kristie Miller (2008). Essential Stuff. Ratio 21 (1):55–63.
    Here is a common view. There exist things, and there exists stuff, where roughly, ‘thing’ is a count noun, and ‘stuff’ is a mass noun. Syntactically, ‘thing’ functions as a singular referring term that takes ‘a’ and ‘every’ and is subject to pluralisation, while ‘stuff’ functions as a plural referring term that takes ‘some’ and is not subject to pluralisation. Hence there exists a thing, and some stuff. Usual versions of the common view endorse two principles about portions of stuff. (...)
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  20. Dwayne Moore (2015). Mereological Essentialism and Mereological Inessentialism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):67-85.
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  21. David Nicolas (2009). Mereological Essentialism, Composition, and Stuff: A Reply to Kristie Miller. Erkenntnis 71 (3):425 - 429.
    In ‘Essential stuff' (2008) and ‘Stuff' (2009), Kristie Miller argues that two generally accepted theses, often formulated as follows, are incompatible: - (Temporal) mereological essentialism for stuff (or matter), the thesis that any portion of stuff has the same parts at every time it exists. - Stuff composition, the thesis that for any two portions of stuff, there exists a portion of stuff that is their mereological sum (or fusion). She does this by considering competing hypotheses about stuff, trying to (...)
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  22. David Nicolas (2009). Mereological Essentialism, Composition, and Stuff: A Reply to Kristie Miller. Erkenntnis 71 (3):425-429.
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  23. Alvin Plantinga (1975). On Mereological Essentialism. Review of Metaphysics 28 (3):468 - 476.
    This paper examines and comments on roderick chisholm's "parts as essential to their wholes", "review of metaphysics", Volume 26, 1973.
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  24. Joel Pust (2004). Natural Selection and the Traits of Individual Organisms. Biology and Philosophy 19 (5):765-779.
    I have recently argued that origin essentialism regarding individual organisms entails that natural selection does not explain why individual organisms have the traits that they do. This paper defends this and related theses against Mohan Matthen's recent objections.
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  25. Garry Rosenkrantz (1984). Nonexistent Possibles and Their Individuation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 22:127-147.
    A nonexistent possible is a particular concrete object which exists in some possible world but doesn't exist in the actual world. A definite description may be said to individuate a nonexistent possible if just one possible object satisfies the condition specified by that description, and this possible object doesn't exist in the actual world. Given a plausible form of mereological essentialism, certain mereological and causal descriptions which determine a thing's composition individuate nonexistent possible hunks of matter which are mereological or (...)
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  26. Theodore Sider (2008). Monism and Statespace Structure. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (62):129-150.
    Exotic ontologies are all the rage. Distant from common sense and often science as well, views like mereological essentialism, nihilism, and fourdimensionalism appeal to our desire to avoid arbitrariness, anthropocentrism, and metaphysical conundrums.1 Such views are defensible only if they are materially adequate, only if they can “reconstruct” the world of common sense and science. (No disrespect to the heroic metaphysicians of antiquity, but this world is not just an illusion.) In the world of common sense and science, bicycles survive (...)
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  27. Theodore Sider (1999). Michael Jubien, Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference. [REVIEW] Noûs 33 (2):284–294.
    Michael Jubien’s Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference is an interesting and lively discussion of those three topics. In ontology, Jubien defends, to a first approximation, a Quinean conception: a world of objects that may be arbitrarily sliced or summed. Slicing yields temporal parts; summing yields aggregates, or fusions. Jubien is very unQuinean in his explicit Platonism regarding properties and propositions, but concerns about abstracta are peripheral to much of the argumentation in the book.1 His version of the doctrine (...)
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  28. Peter Simons (2000). Parts Study in Ontology: A Study in Ontology. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is, yet until now there has been no full-length study of this concept. This book shows that mereology, the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology. Peter Simons surveys and criticizes previous theories, especially the standard extensional view, and proposes a more adequate account which encompasses both temporal and modal considerations in detail. This has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of such classical philosophical concepts (...)
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  29. Mark Steen, Bare Objects, Ordinary Objects, and Mereological Essentialism.
    From five plausible premises about ordinary objects it follows that ordinary objects are either functions, fictions or processes. Assuming that the function and fiction accounts of ordinary objects are not plausible, in this paper I develop and defend a (non-Whiteheadian) process account of ordinary objects. I first offer an extended deduction that argues for mereological essentialism for masses or quantities, and then offer an inductive argument in favor of interpreting ordinary objects as processes. The ontology has two main types of (...)
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  30. Mark Steen (2008). Chisholm's Changing Conception of Ordinary Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):1-56.
    Roderick Chisholm changed his mind about ordinary objects. Circa 1973-1976, his analysis of them required the positing of two kinds of entities—part-changing ens successiva and non-part-changing, non-scatterable primary objects. This view has been well noted and frequently discussed (e.g., recently in Gallois 1998 and Sider 2001). Less often treated is his later view of ordinary objects (1986-1989), where the two kinds of posited entities change, from ens successiva to modes, and, while retaining primary objects, he now allows them to survive (...)
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  31. James Van Cleve (1986). Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):141-156.
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  32. Peter van Inwagen (2006). Can Mereological Sums Change Their Parts? Journal of Philosophy 103 (12):614-630.
    Many philosophers think not. Many philosophers, in fact, seem to suppose that anyone who raises the question whether mereological sums can change their parts displays thereby a failure to grasp an essential feature of the concept “mereological sum.” It is hard to point to an indisputable example of this in print,[i] but it is a thesis I hear put forward very frequently in conversation (sometimes it is put forward in the form of an incredulous stare after I have said something (...)
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  33. Achille C. Varzi, Mereology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of contemporary part-whole theories, with reference to both their axiomatic developments and their philosophical underpinnings.
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  34. David Wiggins (1979). Mereological Essentialism: Asymmetrical Essential Dependence and the Nature of Continuants. Grazer Philosophische Studien 7:297-315.
    The author expounds critically Roderick Chisholm's theory of modal mereology and undertakes to redeploy and reconcile this with the Lesniewski-Tarski theory of part-whole, modally augmented. An argument is presented for the principle that what belongs to an aggregate as a part belongs essentially to it. This principle is argued not to imply that every part of an ordinary substance is essentially part of it (such substances not being aggregates), and to give no particular support to Roderick Chisholm's postulation of entia (...)
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  35. Dallas Willard (1994). Mereological Essentialism Restricted. Axiomathes 5 (1):123-144.
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  36. Dean Wallace Zimmerman (1992). An Argument for Mereological Essentialism. Dissertation, Brown University
    If extended objects were just sums of unextended parts, no satisfactory theory of contact would be possible. So extended objects are not decomposable into sets of simples. The fact that extended things do not possess a single decomposition into a set of smallest, indivisible parts places important constraints upon the analysis of propositions involving mass terms. In particular, it rules out those which construe masses of matter as set-theoretical constructions out of the parts of things. Consequently, any correct "semantics for (...)
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