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  1. Amanda Anderson (1999). Realism, Universalism, and the Science of the Human. Diacritics 29 (2):3-17.
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). Review of Objects and Persons, by Trenton Merricks. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):597 – 598.
    Book Information Objects and Persons. Objects and Persons Trenton Merricks . Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2001 , pp. xii + 203 , £30 ( cloth ), £14.99 ( paper ) . By Trenton Merricks. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xii + 203. £30 (cloth:), £14.99 (paper:).
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  3. Yuri Balashov (2007). About Stage Universalism. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):21–39.
    Most four-dimensionalists, including both worm and stage theorists, endorse mereological universalism, the thesis that any class of objects has a fusion. But the marriage of fourdimensionalism and universalism is unfortunate and unprofitable: it creates a recalcitrant problem for stage theory’s account of lingering properties, such as writing ‘War and Piece’ and traveling across the tennis court, which take time to be instantiated. This makes it necessary to impose a natural restriction on diachronic composition.
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  4. Yuri Balashov (2005). On Vagueness, 4d and Diachronic Universalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):523 – 531.
  5. Yuri Balashov (2003). Restricted Diachronic Composition, Immanent Causality, and Objecthood: A Reply to Hudson. Philosophical Papers 32 (1):23-30.
    Composition, persistence, vagueness, and more constitute an interconnected network of problems. My criticism of Hud Hudson's provocative claims made in a recent paper (Hudson 2002) was focused almost exclusively on the issue of diachronic composition (Balashov 2003). Hudson's response (2003) has highlighted the dangers of such isolationism. But I want to hold to my strategy to the end. Part of the reason is to evade the appalling responsibility of presenting a full-blown theory of all the above phenomena; I must confess (...)
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  6. Yuri Balashov (2003). Temporal Parts and Superluminal Motion. Philosophical Papers 32 (1):1-13.
    Hud Hudson has recently suggested a scenario intended to show that, assuming the doctrine of temporal parts and a sufficiently liberal view of composition, there are material objects that move faster than light. I accept Hudson's conditional but contend that his modus ponens is less plausible that the corresponding modus tollens. Reversed in this way, the argument stemming from the scenario raises the cost of mereological liberalism and advances the case for a principled restriction on diachronic composition.
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  7. John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (2006). Real Work for Aggregates. Dialectica 60 (4):485–503.
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  8. Roland Paul Blum (1968). Universalism and Universalization in Ethics. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
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  9. Einar Duenger Bohn (forthcoming). Unrestricted Composition as Identity. In Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.
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  10. Einar Duenger Bohn (2009). An Argument Against the Necessity of Unrestricted Composition. Analysis 69 (1):27-31.
    Many metaphysicians accept the view that, necessarily, any collection of things composes some further thing. Necessarily, my arms, legs, head, and torso compose my body; necessarily, my arms, my heart, and the table compose something y; necessarily, my heart and the sun compose something z; and so on. 1 Though there have been a few recent attempts to argue against the necessity of this principle of unrestricted composition the consensus is that if it is true, it is necessarily true. 2In (...)
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  11. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499 - 534.
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are (...)
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  12. Phillip Bricker (forthcoming). Composition as a Kind of Identity. Inquiry:1-31.
    Composition as identity, as I understand it, is a theory of the composite structure of reality. The theory’s underlying logic is irreducibly plural; its fundamental primitive is a generalized identity relation that takes either plural or singular arguments. Strong versions of the theory that incorporate a generalized version of the indiscernibility of identicals are incompatible with the framework of plural logic, and should be rejected. Weak versions of the theory that are based on the idea that composition is merely analogous (...)
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  13. Jan Ryszard Błachnio (2007). The Universalism Philosophy of Seweryn Smolikowski (1850–1920) and Early 21st-Century Universalism. Dialogue and Universalism 17 (5/6):101-110.
    Generally speaking, philosophical reflection can assume two extreme forms: it can either be based on metaphysical reflection which gives it the traits of a universalistic philosophy, or empiricism, in which case it can be called philosophical minimalism. There are no others alternatives, and the above categories apply to all philosophical systems. Smolikowski’s philosophy is maximalistic and metaphysical, hence he was right to call the system universalism philosophy. As W. Tyburski writes, Smolikowski’s universalism philosophy has two main goals: to provide firmer (...)
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  14. Ross P. Cameron (2012). Composition as Identity Doesn't Settle the Special Composition Question1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):531-554.
    Orthodoxy says that the thesis that composition is identity (CAI) entails universalism: the claim that any collection of entities has a sum. If this is true it counts in favour of CAI, since a thesis about the nature of composition that settles the otherwise intractable special composition question (SCQ) is desirable. But I argue that it is false: CAI is compatible with the many forms of restricted composition, and SCQ is no easier to answer given CAI than otherwise. Furthermore, in (...)
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  15. Ross P. Cameron, CAI Doesn't Settle SCQ.
    The thesis that composition is identity (CAI) is the thesis that the Xs compose A iff the Xs is identical to A.1 If this thesis is to be compatible with any mereological view other than mereological nihilism, we must allow that many-one identity statements make sense: that is, that it makes sense to say of a plurality of things that they are (collectively) identical to some one thing. Identity, on this view, holds between every thing and itself, but can also (...)
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  16. Marta Campdelacreu (2010). Stage Universalism, Voints and Sorts. Disputatio 3 (28):293-307.
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  17. Chad Carmichael (forthcoming). Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    The special composition question is the question ‘When do some things compose something?’ The answers to this question in the literature have largely been at odds with common sense, either by allowing that any two things (no matter how apparently unrelated) compose something, or by denying the existence of most ordinary composite objects. I propose a new “series-style” answer to the special composition question that accords much more closely with common sense, and I defend this answer from van Inwagen’s objections. (...)
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  18. Chad Carmichael (2011). Vague Composition Without Vague Existence. Noûs 45 (2):315-327.
    David Lewis (1986) criticizes moderate views of composition on the grounds that a restriction on composition must be vague, and vague composition leads, via a precisificational theory of vagueness, to an absurd vagueness of existence. I show how to resist this argument. Unlike the usual resistance, however, I do not jettison precisificational views of vagueness. Instead, I blur the connection between composition and existence that Lewis assumes. On the resulting view, in troublesome cases of vague composition, there is an object, (...)
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  19. Cesare Casarino (2009). Universalism of the Common. Diacritics 39 (4):162-176.
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  20. James Van Cleve (1986). Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):141-156.
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  21. Juan Comesaña (2008). Could There Be Exactly Two Things? Synthese 162 (1):31 - 35.
    Many philosophers think that, necessarily, any material objects have a fusion (let’s call that doctrine “Universalism”). In this paper I point out a couple of strange consequences of Universalism and related doctrines, and suggest that they are strange enough to constitute a powerful argument against those views.
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  22. Jesus Conill Sancho (2010). From the Natural Law to the Hermeneutic Universalism. Pensamiento 66 (248):227-244.
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  23. Gabriele Contessa (2012). The Junk Argument: Safe Disposal Guidelines for Mereological Universalists. Analysis 72 (3):455-457.
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  24. A. J. Cotnoir (2014). Does Universalism Entail Extensionalism? Noûs 48 (1).
    Does a commitment to mereological universalism automatically bring along a commitment to the controversial doctrine of mereological extensionalism—the view that objects with the same proper parts are identical? A recent argument suggests the answer is ‘yes’. This paper attempts a systematic response to the argument, considering nearly every available line of reply. It argues that only one approach—the mutual parts view—can yield a viable mereology where universalism does not entail extensionalism.
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  25. A. J. Cotnoir (2014). Universalism and Junk. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):649-664.
    Those who accept the necessity of mereological universalism face what has come to be known as the ‘junk argument’ due to Bohn [2009], which proceeds from the incompatibility of junk with universalism and the possibility of junk, to conclude that mereological universalism isn't metaphysically necessary. Most attention has focused on ; however, recent authors have cast doubt on . This paper undertakes a defence of premise against three main objections. The first is a new objection to the effect that Bohn's (...)
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  26. A. J. Cotnoir (2013). Parts as Counterparts. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):228-241.
    Mereological nihilists are faced with a difficult challenge: explaining ordinary talk about material objects. Popular paraphrase strategies involve plurals, arrangements of particles, or fictions. In this paper, a new paraphrase strategy is put forward that has distinct advantages over its rivals: it is compatible with gunk and emergent properties of macro-objects. The only assumption is a commitment to a liberal view of the nature of simples; the nihilist must be willing to accept the possibility of heterogeneous extended simples. The author (...)
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  27. Maureen Donnelly (2009). Mereological Vagueness and Existential Vagueness. Synthese 168 (1):53 - 79.
    It is often assumed that indeterminacy in mereological relations—in particular, indeterminacy in which collections of objects have fusions—leads immediately to indeterminacy in what objects there are in the world. This assumption is generally taken as a reason for rejecting mereological vagueness. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between mereological vagueness and existential vagueness. I hope to show that the connection between the two forms of vagueness is not nearly so clear-cut as has been supposed.
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  28. W. E. Dooley (1938). Medieval Universalism and It's Present Value. Modern Schoolman 15 (2):45-45.
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  29. Cian Dorr & Gideon Rosen (2002). Composition as a Fiction. In Richard Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics. Blackwell. 151--174.
    Region R Question: How many objects — entities, things — are contained in R? Ignore the empty space. Our question might better be put, 'How many material objects does R contain?' Let's stipulate that A, B and C are metaphysical atoms: absolutely simple entities with no parts whatsoever besides themselves. So you don't have to worry about counting a particle's top half and bottom half as different objects. Perhaps they are 'point-particles', with no length, width or breadth. Perhaps they are (...)
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  30. Nikk Effingham, Cultural Prejudice and the Plenitude Principle.
    The Plenitude Principle is that for every filled spacetime region, there is an object that is exactly located at that region. Hawthorne motivates it on the grounds that it’s the only way to avoid cultural prejudice with regards to what material objects exist (the argument from cultural prejudice). There is a similar argument for a perdurantist-universalist theory, and the content of this paper applies mutatis mutandis to that argument as well.
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  31. Nikk Effingham, Debunking a Mereological Myth: If Composition as Identity is True, Universalism Need Not Be.
    It is a common view that if composition as identity is true, then so is mereological universalism (the thesis that all objects have a mereological fusion). Various arguments have been advanced in favour of this: (i) there has been a recent argument by Merricks, (ii) some claim that Universalism is entailed by the ontological innocence of the identity relation, (or that ontological innocence undermines objections to universalism) and (iii) it is entailed by the law of selfidentity. After a preliminary introduction (...)
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  32. Nikk Effingham (2011). Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):241 - 250.
    The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider's argument from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley's argument rests on the same premise as Sider's argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to demonstrate (...)
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  33. Nikk Effingham (2011). Universalism and Classes. Dialectica 65 (3):451-472.
    Universalism (the thesis that distinct objects always compose a further object) has come under much scrutiny in recent years. What has been largely ignored is its role in the metaphysics of classes. Not only does universalism provide ways to deal with classes in a metaphysically pleasing fashion, its success on these grounds has been offered as a motivation for believing it. This paper argues that such treatments of classes can be achieved without universalism, examining theories from Goodman and Quine, Armstrong (...)
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  34. Nikk Effingham (2009). Universalism, Vagueness and Supersubstantivalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):35 – 42.
    Sider has a favourable view of supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given supersubstantivalism, Sider's argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider's vagueness argument (§§II-III), and explain why - given supersubstantivalism - some but not all regions must be concrete in order for the argument to work (§IV). Given this restriction on what regions can be concrete, I give a reductio of Sider's (...)
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  35. Crawford L. Elder (2011). Familiar Objects and Their Shadows. Cambridge University Press.
    Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny. Tiny microparticles 'dog-wise arranged' explain the appearance, they say, that there are dogs; microparticles obeying microphysics collectively cause anything that a baseball appears to cause; temporal stages collectively sustain the illusion of enduring objects that persist across changes. Crawford L. Elder argues that all such attempts to 'explain (...)
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  36. Crawford L. Elder (2008). Against Universal Mereological Composition. Dialectica 62 (4):433-454.
    This paper opposes universal mereological composition (UMC). Sider defends it: unless UMC were true, he says, it could be indeterminate how many objects there are in the world. I argue that there is no general connection between how widely composition occurs and how many objects there are in the world. Sider fails to support UMC. I further argue that we should disbelieve in UMC objects. Existing objections against them say that they are radically unlike Aristotelian substances. True, but there is (...)
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  37. R. W. Fischer (2009). Ordinary Objects. By Amy L. Thomasson. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):296-302.
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  38. André Gallois (2004). Comments on Ted Sider: Four Dimensionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):648–657.
  39. Krzysztof Gawlikowski (2004). From False \"Western Universalism\" Towards True \"Universal Universalism\". Dialogue and Universalism 14 (10-12):31-58.
    The article outlines tragic consequences of wrong, Euro- and Americano-centric views of the world, with the military intervention “to introduce democracy” in Iraq as its most recent example. The study presents the roots of “false universalism” identified with Western civilization, the intricate way of dialogue among civilizations as leading towards a true “universal universalism”, which considers all civilizations as valuable sources and treats them as equal. The reasons and consequences of the Western and American domination in the world, including the (...)
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  40. Pierdaniele Giaretta, Individuation and Meteorological Universalism.
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  41. Cody Gilmore (2010). Sider, The Inheritance of Intrinsicality, and Theories of Composition. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):177-197.
    I defend coincidentalism (the view that some pluralities have more than one mereological fusion) and restricted composition (the view that some pluralities lack mereological fusions) against recent arguments due to Theodore Sider.
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  42. P. Goggans (1999). How Not to Have an Ontology of Physical OBJECTS. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):295-308.
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  43. Eugeniusz Górski (2006). John Paul II's Idea of Universalism. Dialogue and Universalism 16 (11/12):7-34.
    In the history of human thought, various writers have called their philosophies universal, universalistic or simply “universalism”. Almost every philosophical or scientific theory claims to be of universal importance, to be a generalization and universality, but relatively few have believed that the term “universalism” to be the only adequate, and therefore only viable, description of their own thought system or newly constructed theory. Efforts to construct, develop or reconstruct a theory, viewpoint, vision or universalistic attitude—or merely to reinforce universalistic postulates—have (...)
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  44. Jean Grimshaw (1996). Philosophy, Feminism and Universalism. Radical Philosophy 76.
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  45. Giséle Halimi (2004). A Deceptive Universalism. In Kelly Oliver & Lisa Walsh (eds.), Contemporary French Feminism. Oup Oxford.
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  46. Daniel Halperin (2001). Janusz Korczak in Vietnam: An Example of Universalism. Dialogue and Universalism 11 (9-10):211-212.
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  47. J. Wilson Harper (1922). A True Universalism. Hibbert Journal 21:306.
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  48. Mark Heller (1984). Hunks: An Ontology of Physical Objects. Dissertation, Syracuse University
    This text is devoted to arguing for the thesis that our standard ontology of physical objects is not correct, and to offering a replacement for that ontology. None of the things that we normally take to exist really do exist. There are no animals, vegetables, or minerals. Nothing that I say against the specific physical objects of our standard ontology counts against the general claim that there are physical objects. In fact, I propose an ontology of physical objects that does (...)
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  49. John Horden (2014). Ontology in Plain English. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):225-242.
    In a series of papers, Eli Hirsch develops a deflationary account of certain ontological debates, specifically those regarding the composition and persistence of physical objects. He argues that these debates are merely verbal disputes between philosophers who fail to correctly express themselves in a common language. To establish the truth in plain English about these issues, Hirsch contends, we need only listen to the assertions of ordinary speakers and interpret them charitably. In this paper, I argue that Hirsch's conclusions rest (...)
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  50. Jerzy Z. Hubert (1990). Towards a Positive Universalism. Dialectics and Humanism 17 (3):157-168.
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