This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
48 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Elizabeth Barnes (2007). Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition. Mind 116 (461):105-113.
    In this paper I respond to Trenton Merricks's (2005) paper ‘Composition and Vagueness’. I argue that Merricks's paper faces the following difficulty: he claims to provide independent motivation for denying one of the premisses of the Lewis-Sider vagueness argument for unrestricted composition, but the alleged motivation he provides begs the question.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Einar Duenger Bohn (2009). Must There Be a Top Level? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):193-201.
    I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Andrea Borghini & Giorgio Lando (2011). Natural Properties, Supervenience, and Composition. Humana.Mente 19:79-104.
    The interpretation of Lewis?s doctrine of natural properties is difficult and controversial, especially when it comes to the bearers of natural properties. According to the prevailing reading ? the minimalist view ? perfectly natural properties pertain to the micro-physical realm and are instantiated by entities without proper parts or point-like. This paper argues that there are reasons internal to a broadly Lewisian kind of metaphysics to think that the minimalist view is fundamentally flawed and that a liberal view, according to (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Franz Brentano (1982/1995). Descriptive Psychology. Routledge.
    Franz Brentano (1838-1917) is a key figure in the development of Twentieth Century thought. It was his work that set Husserl on to the road of phenomenology and intentionality, that inspired Meinong's theory of the object which influenced Bertrand Russell, and the entire Polish school of philosophy. ^Descriptive Psychology presents a series of lectures given by Brentano in 1887; they were the culmination of his work, and the clearest statement of his mature thought. It was this later period which proved (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Franz Brentano (1982). Deskriptive Psychologie. Meiner.
  6. Ross P. Cameron (forthcoming). Parts Generate the Whole, but They Are Not Identical to It. In Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.
    The connection between whole and part is intimate: not only can we share the same space, but I’m incapable of leaving my parts behind; settle the nonmereological facts and you thereby settle what is a part of what; wholes don’t seem to be an additional ontological commitment over their parts. Composition as identity promises to explain this intimacy. But it threatens to make the connection too intimate, for surely the parts could have made a different whole and the whole have (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Sam Cowling (2014). No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):246-260.
    Mereological realism holds that the world has a mereological structure – i.e. a distribution of mereological properties and relations. In this article, I defend Eleaticism about properties, according to which there are no causally inert non-logical properties. I then present an Eleatic argument for mereological anti-realism, which denies the existence of both mereological composites and mereological simples. After defending Eleaticism and mereological anti-realism, I argue that mereological anti-realism is preferable to mereological nihilism. I then conclude by examining the thesis that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Paul R. Daniels (2013). Occupy Wall: A Mereological Puzzle and the Burdens of Endurantism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-11.
    Endurantists have recently faced a mereological puzzle in various forms. Here I argue that, instead of presenting a genuine worry, the puzzle actually reveals a common misunderstanding about the endurantist ontology. Furthermore, through this discussion of the alleged problem and the misunderstanding which motivates it, I reveal metaphysical commitments the endurantist has that may not be widely recognized. For instance, she is committed to interesting and perhaps controversial views about shape and location. I highlight these commitments and what they mean (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Simon Evnine (2011). Constitution and Composition: Three Approaches to Their Relation. Protosociology 27.
    Constitution is the relation between something and what it is made of. Composition is the relation between something and its parts. I examine three different approaches to the relation between constitution and composition. One approach, associated with neo-Aristotelians like Mark Johnston and Kathrin Koslicki, identifies constitution with composition. A second, popular with those sympathetic to classical mereology such as Judith Thomson, defines constitution in terms of parthood. A third, advocated strongly by Lynne Baker, takes constitution to be somehow inconsistent with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Kit Fine (2008). Coincidence and Form. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):101-118.
    How can a statue and a piece of alloy be coincident at any time at which they exist and yet differ in their modal properties? I argue that this question demands an answer and that the only plausible answer is one that posits a difference in the form of the two objects.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. A. R. J. Fisher (2013). Bennett on Parts Twice Over. Philosophia 41 (3):757-761.
    In this paper I outline the main features of Karen Bennett’s (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1–21, 2011) non-classical mereology, and identify its methodological costs. I argue that Bennett’s mereology cannot account for the composition of structural universals because it cannot explain the mereological difference between isomeric universals, such as being butane and being isobutane. I consider responses, which come at costs to the view.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Cody Gilmore (2013). Location and Mereology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  13. Nelson Goodman & W. V. Quine (1947). Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):105-122.
  14. Ghislain Guigon (2011). Spinoza on Composition and Priority. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This article has two goals: a historical and a speculative one. The historical goal is to offer a coherent account of Spinoza’s view on mereological composition. The speculative goal is to show that Spinoza’s substance monism is distinct from versions of monism that are currently defended in metaphysics and that it deserves the attention of contemporary metaphysicians. Regarding the second goal, two versions of monism are currently defended and discussed in contemporary metaphysics: existence monism according to which there actually exists (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. D. P. Henry (1992/3). Brentano and Some Medieval Mereologists. Brentano Studies 4:25-34.
  16. Paul Hovda, Two Defenses of Composition as Identity.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Hud Hudson (2001). A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. Cornell University Press.
    Introduction In the first four chapters of this book, I develop and defend a monistic account of human persons according to which human persons are highly ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Giorgio Lando (2007). Tractarian Ontology: Mereology or Set Theory? Forum Philosophicum 12 (2):24-39.
    I analyze the relations of constituency or ``being in'' that connect different ontological items in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus by Wittgenstein. A state of affairs is constituted by atoms, atoms are in a state of affairs. Atoms are also in an atomic fact. Moreover, the world is the totality of facts, thus it is in some sense made of facts. Many other kinds of Tractarian notions -- such as molecular facts, logical space, reality -- seem to be involved in constituency relations. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Henry Laycock (2011). Every Sum or Parts Which Are Water is Water. Humana.Mente 19 (1):41-55.
    Mereological entities often seem to violate ‘ordinary’ ideas of what a concrete object can be like, behaving more like sets than like Aristotelian substances. However, the mereological notions of ‘part’, ‘composition’, and ‘sum’ or ‘fusion’ appear to find concrete realisation in the actual semantics of mass nouns. Quine notes that ‘any sum of parts which are water is water’; and the wine from a single barrel can be distributed around the globe without affecting its identity. Is there here, as some (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Matt Leonard (2014). Locating Gunky Water and Wine. Ratio 27 (3):306-315.
    Can material objects be weakly located at regions of spacetime and yet fail to be exactly located anywhere? In this paper, I discuss a case which, at least according to one interpretation, answers affirmatively: the case of blending gunky water and wine, in gunky space. Perhaps after such a blend, the water and wine aren't exactly located anywhere while being weakly located at the location of the blend and any region which overlaps it. I show that the case is interesting (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Paul Lodge (2002). Leibniz on Divisibility, Aggregates, and Cartesian Bodies. Studia Leibnitiana 34 (1):59 - 80.
    Seine Kritik an Descartes' Auffassung vom Körper gründet Leibniz bekanntlich auf Erörterungen zur Teilbarkeit und Ausdehnung. Obgleich jene Argumentation im Fokus einer Auseinandersetzung mit Leibniz' Metaphysik angesiedelt werden muss, ist sie bisher nicht recht verstanden worden. Mein Anliegen hier ist im Kern, Leibniz' Gedankengang zu explizieren und dessen Stichhaltigkeit auszuleuchten. Das Argument, um das es geht, ist wohl am ehesten aus der Darlegung in Leibniz' Korrespondenz mit Antoine Arnauld bekannt, findet sich jedoch zudem im späteren Briefwechsel mit De Volder. Neben (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Ned Markosian (forthcoming). A Spatial Approach to Mereology. In Shieva Keinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press.
    When do several objects compose a further object? The last twenty years have seen a great deal of discussion of this question. According to the most popular view on the market, there is a physical object composed of your brain and Jeremy Bentham’s body. According to the second-most popular view on the market, there are no such objects as human brains or human bodies, and there are also no atoms, rocks, tables, or stars. And according to the third-ranked view, there (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Kris McDaniel (2006). Gunky Objects in a Simple World. Philo 9 (1):39-46.
    Suppose that a material object is gunky: all of its parts are located in space, and each of its parts has a proper part. Does it follow from this hypothesis that the space in which that object resides must itself be gunky? I argue that it does not. There is room for gunky objects in a space that decomposes without remainder into mereological simples.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Friederike Moltmann (2005). Two Kinds of Universals and Two Kinds of Collections. Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (6):739 - 776.
    This paper argues for an ontological distinction between two kinds of universals, 'kinds of tropes' such as 'wisdom' and properties such as 'the property of being wise'. It argues that the distinction is parallel to that between two kinds of collections, pluralities such as 'the students' and collective objects such as 'the class'. The paper argues for the priortity of distributive readings with pluralities on the basis of predicates of extent or shape, such 'large' or 'long'.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Friederike Moltmann (1992). Reciprocals and Same/Different: Towards a Semantic Analysis. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (4):411 - 462.
  26. Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith (1985). Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (4):627 - 644.
    Franz Brentano’s ‘philosophy of mind’ still means, as far as most philosophers are concerned, no more than a peculiarly influential account of intentionality. In fact, in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano has provided an account of mental phenomena which ranks with any to be found in the literature of philosophy. It differs as much from the conceptcentered Kantian approaches to ‘reason’ or ‘understanding’ as from more recent approaches, centered on the language used to report or to express ’propositional (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer, Folk Mereology Is Teleological.
    When do the folk think that mereological composition occurs? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that fits with folk intuitions, and yet there has been little agreement about what the folk intuit. We aim to put the tools of experimental philosophy to constructive use. Our studies suggest that folk mereology is teleological: people tend to intuit that composition occurs when the result serves a purpose. We thus conclude that metaphysicians should dismiss folk intuitions, as tied into a benighted (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. David H. Sanford (1996). Temporal Parts. Temporal Portions, and Temporal Slices: An Exercise in Naive Mereology. Acta Analytica 15:21-33.
    Naive mereology studies ordinary conceptions of part and whole. Parts, unlike portions, have objective boundaries and many things, such as dances and sermons have temporal parts. In order to deal with Mark Heller's claim that temporal parts "are ontologically no more or less basic than the wholes that they compose," we retell the story of Laplace's Genius, here named "Swifty." Although Swifty processes lots of information very quickly, his conceptual repertoire need not extend beyond fundamental physics. So we attempt to (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Johanna Seibt (2009). Forms of Emergent Interaction in General Process Theory. Synthese 166 (3):479 - 512.
    General Process Theory (GPT) is a new (non-Whiteheadian) process ontology. According to GPT the domains of scientific inquiry and everyday practice consist of configurations of ‘goings-on’ or ‘dynamics’ that can be technically defined as concrete, dynamic, non-particular individuals called general processes. The paper offers a brief introduction to GPT in order to provide ontological foundations for research programs such as interactivism that centrally rely on the notions of ‘process,’ ‘interaction,’ and ‘emergence.’ I begin with an analysis of our common sense (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Mark Sharlow, Where Reason Meets Poetry.
    This is a collection of articles and essays that bear on the relationship between scientific and poetical/romantic views of the world.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Theodore Sider (2009). Against Vague and Unnatural Existence: Reply to Liebesman and Eklund. Noûs 43 (3):557 - 567.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Theodore Sider (2004). Replies to Gallois, Hirsch and Markosian. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):674–687.
  33. Theodore Sider (2000). Simply Possible. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):585-590.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Alexander Skiles (2014). Primitivism About Intrinsicality. In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. 221-252.
  35. Barry Smith (2002). Truthmaker Realism: Response to Gregory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):231 – 234.
    We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Barry Smith (1999). A Theory of Divides. In .
    Some would conceive philosophy as being divided into Analytic and Continental. This, as John Searle points out, is rather like conceiving America as being divided into Business and Kansas. Searle’s wise saying has not, as yet, received the theoretical attention it deserves. In both cases we have a certain domain, which is conceived as being divided into two parts, one defined in spatial terms, the other defined in terms of objects, practices or features widely spread through some spatial area.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Barry Smith (1997). Boundaries: An Essay in Mereotopology. In Lewis H. Hahn (ed.), Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm (Library of Living Philosophers). Open Court.
    Of Chisholm’s many signal contributions to analytic metaphysics, perhaps the most important is his treatment of boundaries, a category of entity that has been neglected, to say the least, in the history of ontology. We can gain some preliminary idea of the sorts of problems which the Chisholmian ontology of boundaries is designed to solve, if we consider the following Zeno-inspired thought-experiment.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Barry Smith (1996). Mereotopology: A Theory of Parts and Boundaries. Data and Knowledge Engineering 20:287–303.
    The paper is a contribution to formal ontology. It seeks to use topological means in order to derive ontological laws pertaining to the boundaries and interiors of wholes, to relations of contact and connectedness, to the concepts of surface, point, neighbourhood, and so on. The basis of the theory is mereology, the formal theory of part and whole, a theory which is shown to have a number of advantages, for ontological purposes, over standard treatments of topology in set-theoretic terms. One (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Barry Smith & Achille C. Varzi (1999). The Niche. Noûs 33 (2):214-238.
    The concept of niche (setting, context, habitat, environment) has been little studied by ontologists, in spite of its wide application in a variety of disciplines from evolutionary biology to economics. What follows is a first formal theory of this concept, a theory of the relations between objects and their niches. The theory builds upon existing work on mereology, topology, and the theory of spatial location as tools of formal ontology. It will be illustrated above all by means of simple biological (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Joshua Spencer (2013). Strong Composition as Identity and Simplicity. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1177-1184.
    The general composition question asks “what are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions any xs and any y must satisfy in order for it to be true that those xs compose that y?” Although this question has received little attention, there is an interesting and theoretically fruitful answer. Namely, strong composition as identity (SCAI): necessarily, for any xs and any y, those xs compose y iff those xs are identical to y. SCAI is theoretically fruitful because if it is true, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Joshua Spencer (2010). A Tale of Two Simples. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):167 - 181.
    A material simple is a material object that has no proper parts. Some philosophers have argued for the possibility of extended simples. Some have even argued for the possibility of heterogeneous simples or simples that have intrinsic variations across their surfaces. There is a puzzle, though, that is meant to show that extended, heterogeneous simples are impossible. Although several plausible responses have been given to this puzzle, I wish to reopen the case against extended, heterogeneous simples. In this paper, I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Chris Tillman & Gregory Fowler (2012). Propositions and Parthood: The Universe and Anti-Symmetry. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):525 - 539.
    It is plausible that the universe exists: a thing such that absolutely everything is a part of it. It is also plausible that singular, structured propositions exist: propositions that literally have individuals as parts. Furthermore, it is plausible that for each thing, there is a singular, structured proposition that has it as a part. Finally, it is plausible that parthood is a partial ordering: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. These plausible claims cannot all be correct. We canvass some costs of denying (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Rafal Urbaniak (2013). Lesniewski's Systems of Logic and Foundations of Mathematics. Springer.
  44. Peter van Inwagen (2006). Can Mereological Sums Change Their Parts? Journal of Philosophy 103 (12):614-630.
    Many philosophers think not. Many philosophers, in fact, seem to suppose that anyone who raises the question whether mereological sums can change their parts displays thereby a failure to grasp an essential feature of the concept “mereological sum.” It is hard to point to an indisputable example of this in print,[i] but it is a thesis I hear put forward very frequently in conversation (sometimes it is put forward in the form of an incredulous stare after I have said something (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Peter van Inwagen (1987). When Are Objects Parts? Philosophical Perspectives 1:21-47.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (forthcoming). Causally Redundant Social Objects: Rejoinder to Elder-Vass. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393114521364.
    In Elder-Vass’s response to my critical discussion of his social ontology, it is maintained (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts, (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts, and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification. In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (forthcoming). Elder-Vass on the Causal Power of Social Structures. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393113500213.
    In this review essay, I examine the central tenets of sociologist Dave Elder-Vass’s recent contribution to social ontology, as put forth in his book The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency. Elder-Vass takes issue with ontological individualists and maintains that social structures exist and have causal powers in their own right. I argue that he fails to establish his main theses: he shows neither that social structures have causal powers “in their own right” (in any sense of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Jan Westerhoff (2004). A Taxonomy of Composition Operations. Logique and Analyse 2004 (47):375-393.
    A set of parameters for classifying composition operations is introduced. These parameters determine whether a composition operation is 1) universal, 2) determinate, 3) whether there is a difference between possible and actual compositions, 4) whether there can be singleton compositions, 5) whether they give rise to a hierarchy, and 6) whether components of compositions can be repeated. Philosophical implications of these parameters (in particular in relation to set theory) and mereology are discussed.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation