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  1. Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves (2013). Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Making Moral Judgments? Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 12 (1):113-126.
    Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism (...)
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  2. Andrew Alwood (2010). Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):105-117.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  3. Marcus Arvan (2016). Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory. Palgrave MacMillan.
    This book argues that moral philosophy should be based on seven scientific principles of theory selection. It then argues that a new moral theory—Rightness as Fairness—satisfies those principles more successfully than existing theories. Chapter 1 explicates the seven principles of theory-selection, arguing that moral philosophy must conform them to be truth-apt. Chapter 2 argues those principles jointly support founding moral philosophy in known facts of empirical moral psychology: specifically, our capacities for mental time-travel and modal imagination. Chapter 2 then shows (...)
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  4. Marcus Arvan (2013). Bad News for Conservatives? Moral Judgments and the Dark Triad Personality Traits: A Correlational Study. Neuroethics 6 (2):307-318.
    This study examined correlations between moral value judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey (MIS), and participant scores on the Short-D3 “Dark Triad” Personality Inventory—a measure of three related “dark and socially destructive” personality traits: Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy. Five hundred sixty-seven participants (302 male, 257 female, 2 transgendered; median age 28) were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk and Yale Experiment Month web advertisements. Different responses to MIS items were initially hypothesized to be “conservative” or “liberal” in line with (...)
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  5. Nicholas Baima (2014). The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.
    Ethical vagueness has garnered little attention. This is rather surprising since many philosophers have remarked that the science of ethics lacks the precision that other fields of inquiry have. Of the few philosophers who have discussed ethical vagueness the majority have focused on the implications of vagueness for moral realism. Because the relevance of ethical vagueness for other metaethical positions has been underexplored, my aim in this paper is to investigate the ramifications of ethical vagueness for expressivism. Ultimately, I shall (...)
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  6. Peter Boltuc (2007). Why Common Sense Morality is Not Collectively Self-Defeating. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):17-26.
    The so-called Common Sense Morality (C) is any moral theory that allows, or requires, an agent to accept special, non-instrumental reasons to give advantage to certain other persons, usually the agent’s friends or kin, over the interests of others. Opponents charge C with violating the requirement of impartiality defined as independence on positional characteristics of moral agents and moral patients. Advocates of C claim that C is impartial, but only in a positional manner in which every moral agent would acquire (...)
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  7. Andrew Boucher, On Descriptive Ethics.
    In its descriptive sense ethical language allows one to make assertions, which like other assertions may be true or not. “One should not torture,” descriptively, makes an assertion about torture - that it is an act that one should not do. While the peculiar force of ethical language comes from its overloading of different types of uses - descriptive, imperative, and emotive -, our concern here will be with the descriptive. Many of our assertions will focus on the English word (...)
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  8. Michael Brady (ed.) (2011). New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Metaethics occupies a central place in analytical philosophy, and the last forty years has seen an upsurge of interest in questions about the nature and practice of morality. This collection presents original and ground-breaking research on metaethical issues from some of the very best of a new generation of philosophers working in this field.
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  9. Eric Brandstedt (2015). The Circumstances of Intergenerational Justice. Moral Philosophy and Politics 2 (1):33-56.
    Some key political challenges today, e.g. climate change, are future oriented. The intergenerational setting differs in some notable ways from the intragenerational one, creating obstacles to theorizing about intergenerational justice. One concern is that as the circumstances of justice do not pertain intergenerationally, intergenerational justice is not meaningful. In this paper, I scrutinize this worry by analysing the presentations of the doctrine of the circumstances of justice by David Hume and John Rawls. I argue that we should accept the upshot (...)
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  10. Stephen Darwall (1999). Why Ethics is Part of Philosophy. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:19-28.
    Ethics is frequently divided into three parts: metaethics, normative ethical theory, and the more specific normative ethics. However, only metaethics is explicitly philosophical insofar as it is concerned with fundamental questions about the content, objects, and status of ethical thought and discourse. During the heyday of conceptual analysis, philosophers were admonished to restrict themselves entirely to metaethics. Since, it was said, they lacked any special expertise as philosophers on normative questions, their pronouncements could be no more than hortatory. I will (...)
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  11. Cory Davia & Michele Palmira (2015). Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):605-625.
    Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
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  12. Olavo de Carvalho (2011). Maquiavel ou a Confusão Demoníaca. Vide Editorial.
    Dos pensadores modernos mais célebres, Nicolau Maquiavel é talvez o primeiro a entregar ao público uma doutrina tão desencontrada e confusa. Tão desencontrada e tão confusa que um de seus melhores intérpretes, Benedetto Croce, resumiu quatro séculos de investigações com a conclusão desencantada de que o pensador florentino é ‘um enigma que jamais será resolvido’. Depois de Croce, outros estudiosos de primeira ordem, como Leo Strauss, Quentin Skinner, Hans Baron e Maurizio Viroli acreditaram poder resolver o enigma; porém as soluções (...)
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  13. Tim Dean (2012). Evolution and Moral Diversity. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7 (1):1-16.
    If humans have an evolved moral psychology, then we should not expect it to function in an identical way between individuals. Instead, we should expect a diversity in the function of our moral psychology between individuals that varies along genetic lines, and a corresponding diversity of moral attitudes and moral judgements that emerge from it. This is because there was no one psychological type that would reliably produce adaptive social behaviour in the highly heterogeneous environments in which our minds evolved. (...)
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  14. Andrzej Elżanowski (2013). Moral Progress: A Present-Day Perspective on the Leading Enlightenment Idea. ARGUMENT 3 (1):9-26.
    Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that the World’s order (as ultimately based on divine laws) is good and thus every gain of knowledge will have good consequences. Scientific process was assumed to entail moral progress. In fact some moral progress did occur in the Western civilization and science contributed to it, but it is widely incommensurate with the progress of science. The Enlightenment’s concept of a concerted scientific and moral progress proved largely wrong for several reasons. (1) Public morality and science (...)
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  15. Jeremy Fantl (2006). Is Metaethics Morally Neutral? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument generalizes (...)
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  16. Luca Ferrero, Inescapability Revisited.
    According to constitutivism, the objective authority of practical reason is to be grounded in the constitutive features of agency. In this paper, I offer a brief survey of the basic structure of constitutive argument about objectivity and consider how constitutivism might dispel the worry that it can only ground a *conditional* kind of authority. In response to Enoch's original shmagency challenge, in the past I argued that the inescapability of agency shows that we should not be worried by challenges that (...)
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  17. Andrew Fisher (2011). Metaethics: An Introduction. Acumen.
    Do moral facts exist? What would they be like if they did? What does it mean to say that a moral claim is true? What is the link between moral judgement and motivation? Can we know whether something is right and wrong? And is morality a fiction? " Metaethics : An Introduction" presents a very clear and engaging survey of the key concepts and positions in what has become one of the most exciting and influential fields of philosophy. Free from (...)
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  18. Susan Fowler, A Further Problem for Contextualism About "Ought".
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  19. Jon Garthoff (2012). Review of Christian Miller (Ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
  20. Samuel Green (2011). Morality is Not Good. Emergent Australasian Philosophers 4 (1).
    Moral nihilism (the denial of the existence of objective moral values) has been argued for for thousands of years. Despite such arguments this view is by no means the majority view. One of the most influential moral nihilists of the 20th Century was John Leslie Mackie, who gave arguments for this position. These arguments, despite many objections, have not been convincingly or decisively overcome. If the arguments are still good, why is moral nihilism such an uncommon view? One possible reason (...)
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  21. Robert S. Hartman, Arthur Ellis & Rem B. Edwards (eds.) (2002). The Knowledge of Good: Critique of Axiological Reason. Rodopi.
    This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson.
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  22. Chris Heathwood (2013). Reductionism in Ethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley
    An encyclopedia entry on the issue of whether morality is reducible -- that is, whether moral facts are identical to facts that can be expressed in non-moral terms.
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  23. Ulrike Heuer (2010). Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan
  24. Christopher Howard (2016). In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):53-62.
    Skepticism about the ‘wrong kind’ of reasons—the view that wrong-kind reasons are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes, but not reasons for those attitudes—is more often assumed than argued for. Jonathan Way sets out to remedy this: he argues that skeptics about, but not defenders of, wrong-kind reasons can explain a distinctive pattern of transmission among such reasons and claims that this fact lends significant support to the skeptical view. I argue that Way's positive case for wrong-kind reason (...)
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  25. Matthew Carey Jordan (2013). Divine Commands or Divine Attitudes? Faith and Philosophy 30 (2):159-70.
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  26. Long Joseph (2015). Rightness = Right-Maker. Disputatio 7 (41):193-206.
    I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my <em>reductio</em> by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends my <em>reductio</em> while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.
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  27. Long Joseph (2015). Rightness = Right-Maker. Disputatio 7 (41):193-206.
    I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my <em>reductio</em> by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends my <em>reductio</em> while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.
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  28. Richard Joyce, Metaethical Pluralism: How Both Moral Naturalism and Moral Skepticism May Be Permissible Positions.
    This paper concerns the relation between two metaethical theses: moral naturalism and moral skepticism. It is important that we distinguish both from a couple of methodological principles with which they might be confused. Let us give the label “Cartesian skepticism” to the method of subjecting to doubt everything for which it is possible to do so—usually by introducing alternative hypotheses that are consistent with all available evidence (e.g., brains in vats). Let us give the label “global naturalism” to the principle (...)
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  29. Machiel Keestra (2012). Bounded Mirroring. Joint Action and Group Membership in Political Theory and Cognitive Neuroscience. In Frank Vandervalk (ed.), Thinking About the Body Politic: Essays on Neuroscience and Political Theory. Routledge 222--249.
    A crucial socio-political challenge for our age is how to rede!ne or extend group membership in such a way that it adequately responds to phenomena related to globalization like the prevalence of migration, the transformation of family and social networks, and changes in the position of the nation state. Two centuries ago Immanuel Kant assumed that international connectedness between humans would inevitably lead to the realization of world citizen rights. Nonetheless, globalization does not just foster cosmopolitanism but simultaneously yields the (...)
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  30. Marc Krellenstein, A Modern Nihilism.
  31. Alexander Krémer (2012). Etika richarda rortyho. Filozofia 67 (6):442-449.
    Rirchard Rorty has criticized the riiditiy of the classical ethics of Kant, and he claims that we do not have absolute moral norms in metaphysical sense.
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  32. Michael Lacewing (2004). Moral Philosophy (Unit 2). In Elizabeth Burns & Stephen Law (eds.), Philosophy for as and A. Routledge
  33. Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.) (2016). Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press Uk.
    How far should our realism extend? For many years philosophers of mathematics and philosophers of ethics have worked independently to address the question of how best to understand the entities apparently referred to by mathematical and ethical talk. But the similarities between their endeavours are not often emphasised. This book provides that emphasis. In particular, it focuses on two types of argumentative strategies deployed in both areas. The first aims to put pressure on realism by emphasising the redundancy of mathematical (...)
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  34. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions. Philosophy 86 (336):175-200.
    Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substantially ethical one. (...)
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  35. Andrés Luco (2014). The Definition of Morality : Threading the Needle. Social Theory and Practice 40 (3):361-387.
    This essay proposes and defends a descriptive definition of morality.Under this definition, a moral system is a system of rules, psychological states,and modes of character development which performs the function of enabling mutually beneficial social cooperation.I shall argue that the methodologies employed by two prominent moral psychologists rely upon to establish a descriptive definition of morality only serve to track patterns in people’s uses of moral terms.However,these methods at best reveal a nominal definition of morality, since moral appraisers may be (...)
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  36. Emilian Mihailov (2015). Is Deontology a Moral Confabulation? Neuroethics:1-13.
    Joshua Greene has put forward the bold empirical hypothesis that deontology is a confabulation of moral emotions. Deontological philosophy does not steam from "true" moral reasoning, but from emotional reactions, backed up by post hoc rationalizations which play no role in generating the initial moral beliefs. In this paper, I will argue against the confabulation hypothesis. First, I will highlight several points in Greene’s discussion of confabulation, and identify two possible models. Then, I will argue that the evidence does not (...)
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  37. Christian Miller (2013). The Euthyphro Dilemma. In Blackwell International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell 1-7.
    The Euthyphro Dilemma is named after a particular exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro in Plato‟s dialogue Euthyphro. In a famous passage, Socrates asks, “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” (Plato 1981: 10a), and proceeds to advance arguments which clearly favor the first of these two options (see PLATO). The primary interest in the Euthyphro Dilemma over the years, however, has primarily concerned the relationship between (...)
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  38. Christian Miller (2011). Resources for the Fields of Metaethics and Normative Theory. In The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum 293-316.
    This is a comprehensive list of websites for resources pertaining to meta-ethics and normative ethics. It is current up to 2010.
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  39. Christian Miller (ed.) (2011). Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.
    The Continuum Companion to Ethics offers a definitive guide to a key area of contemporary philosophy. The book covers all the fundamental questions asked by meta-ethics and normative ethical theory - areas that have continued to attract interest historically as well as topics that have emerged more recently as active areas of research. Fourteen specially commissioned essays from an international team of experts reveal where important work continues to be done in the field and, most valuably, the exciting new directions (...)
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  40. Christian Miller (2011). Selected Works in Contemporary Metaethics and Normative Theory. In Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum 293-316.
    A detailed list of leading articles and books in a variety of areas of normative and meta-ethics. Current to 2010.
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  41. Christian Miller (2011). Overview of Contemporary Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethical Theory. In The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum
    The study of morality continues to flourish in contemporary philosophy. As the chapters of this Companion illustrate, new and exciting work is being done on a wide range of topics from the objectivity of morality to the relationship between morality and religious, biological, and feminist concerns. Along with this vast amount of work has come a proliferation of technical terminology and competing positions. The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the terrain in contemporary ethics.
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  42. Motsamai Molefe, An African Religious Ethics and the Euthyphro Problem.
    This article exposes the moral resources contained in the ontological notion of vitality (or life force) in the African moral tradition. Firstly, this article presents, not argue for, an under-explored religious ethics qua vitality. By ‘religious ethics’, I mean, both a meta-ethical view, an account about the nature of moral properties, that they are religious/spiritual rather than physical; and, I also mean a principle of right action. I articulate three such principles: a perfectionist, consequentialist and deontological. Secondly, the heart of (...)
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  43. Andrew Moon (forthcoming). Debunking Morality: Lessons From the EAAN Literature. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper explores evolutionary debunking arguments as they arise in metaethics against moral realism and in philosophy of religion against naturalism. Both literatures have independently grappled with the question of which beliefs one may use to respond to a potential defeater. In this paper, I show how the literature on the argument against naturalism can help clarify and bring progress to the literature on moral realism with respect to this question. Of note, it will become clear that the objection that (...)
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  44. Justin Morton (forthcoming). A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism. Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) claim that evolution has influenced our moral faculties in such a way that, if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. I present several popular objections to the standard version of this argument, then give a new EDA that has clear advantages in responding to these objections. Whereas the Standard EDA argues that evolution has selected for many moral beliefs with certain contents, this New EDA claims that evolution has selected for one (...)
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  45. Daniel Moseley (forthcoming). Review of Robert Kane, "Ethics and the Quest for Wisdom.". [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Kane's ambitious and bold book presents a sustained argument for an ethical theory that gives an account of right action and the good life. The general structure of the main argument is presented and specific points are critically discussed.
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  46. Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton (2014). Of Reasons and Recognition. Analysis 74 (2):339-348.
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  47. David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell (2013). Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23).
    In constructing semantic theories of normative and evaluative terms, philosophers have commonly deployed a certain type of disagreement -based argument. The premise of the argument observes the possibility of genuine disagreement between users of a certain normative or evaluative term, while the conclusion of the argument is that, however differently those speakers employ the term, they must mean the same thing by it. After all, if they did not, then they would not really disagree. We argue that in many of (...)
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  48. Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Wright & Joshua Knobe (2011). Folk Moral Relativism. Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.
    It has often been suggested that people's ordinary understanding of morality involves a belief in objective moral truths and a rejection of moral relativism. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist moral intuitions when considering individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions considering individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. The authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend (...)
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  49. Eleonora Severini (forthcoming). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Moral Niche. Philosophia:1-11.
    The so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. When applied to morality, such arguments are intended to undermine moral realism. In this paper I will discuss Andreas Mogensen’s recent effort to secure moral realism against EDAs. Mogensen attempts to undermine the challenge provided by EDAs in metaethics through the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology. The problem with this move is that the proximate/ultimate distinction (...)
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  50. Neil Sinclair (2013). Moral Explanations. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell
    "The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends towards justice." (Martin Luther King) -/- A moral explanation is an explanation of a particular or type of event (or fact or state of affairs) that features moral terms in the explaining phrase. Here are some examples. First, one way of the above quote is as the claim that, in the broad sweep of history, societies tend toward more just institutions, and that they do so precisely because these institutions (...)
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