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  1. Carla Bagnoli (2000). Blackburn Sulla Questione Normativa”. Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 30: 8-14.
    Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si ricostruisce (...)
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  2. Michael Gill (2009). Indeterminacy and Variability in Meta-Ethics. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):215 - 234.
    In the mid-20th century, descriptive meta-ethics addressed a number of central questions, such as whether there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, whether moral reasons are absolute or relative, and whether moral judgments express attitudes or describe states of affairs. I maintain that much of this work in mid-20th century meta-ethics proceeded on an assumption that there is good reason to question. The assumption was that our ordinary discourse is uniform and determinate enough to vindicate one side (...)
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  3. Patricia Greenspan (2010). Learning Emotions and Ethics. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press
    Innate emotional bases of ethics have been proposed by authors in evolutionary psychology, following Darwin and his sources in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Philosophers often tend to view such theories as irrelevant to, or even as tending to undermine, the project of moral philosophy. But the importance of emotions to early moral learning gives them a role to play in determining the content of morality. I argue, first, that research on neural circuits indicates that the basic elements or components of emotions (...)
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  4. Patricia Greenspan (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.
    In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a ...
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  5. Gerald K. Harrison (2014). The Euthyphro, Divine Command Theory and Moral Realism. Philosophy (1):107-123.
    Divine command theories of metaethics are commonly rejected on the basis of the Euthyphro problem. In this paper, I argue that the Euthyphro can be raised for all forms of moral realism. I go on to argue that this does not matter as the Euthyphro is not really a problem after all. I then briefly outline some of the attractions of a divine command theory of metaethics. I suggest that given one of the major reasons for rejecting such an analysis (...)
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  6. Gerald Hull, Tracking the Moral Truth: Debunking Street’s Darwinian Dilemma.
    Sharon Street’s 2006 article “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” challenges the epistemological pretensions of the moral realist, of the nonnaturalist in particular. Given that “Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes” – why should one suppose such attitudes and concomitant beliefs would track an independent moral reality? Especially since, on a nonnaturalist view, moral truth is causally inert. I abstract a logical skeleton of Street’s argument and, with its aid, (...)
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  7. Michael R. Kelly (2013). A Reading of Two Sources of Morality and Religion, or Bergsonian Wisdom, Emotion, and Integrity. In P. Adroin, S. Gontarski & L. Pattison (eds.), Understanding Bergson, Understanding Modernism. Bloomsbury
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  8. Max Kölbel (2007). How to Spell Out Genuine Relativism and How to Defend Indexical Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):281 - 288.
    It was the explicit aim of my paper ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ to ‘characterize and compare’ (p. 297) two different forms of relativism. One form, exemplified by Harman’s and Dreier’s moral relativism (Harman, 1975 and Dreier, 1990), involves the claim that certain sentences express different propositions in different contexts of utterance, much like indexical sentences – hence the name ‘indexical relativism’. The other form involves the claim that the truth-value of certain contents or propositions depends on certain non-standard parameters, (...)
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  9. Brent G. Kyle (2013). How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? Philosophers' Imprint 13 (1):1-20.
    Ethicists are typically willing to grant that thick terms (e.g. ‘courageous’ and ‘murder’) are somehow associated with evaluations. But they tend to disagree about what exactly this relationship is. Does a thick term’s evaluation come by way of its semantic content? Or is the evaluation pragmatically associated with the thick term (e.g. via conversational implicature)? In this paper, I argue that thick terms are semantically associated with evaluations. In particular, I argue that many thick concepts (if not all) conceptually entail (...)
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  10. Thaddeus Metz (2015). Review of Todd May, A Significant Life. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8 (19).
    Approx. 2000 word review of Todd May's _A Significant Life: Human Meaning in a Silent Universe_ (University of Chicago Press).
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  11. Philippe Mongin (2006). Value Judgements and Value Neutrality in Economics. Economica 73 (290):257-286.
    The paper analyses economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from actual value judgments. From this basis, it compares four solutions to the value neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak thesis does.
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  12. James Lindemann Nelson (2010). Book Reviews: Morality and Our Complicated Form of Life: Feminist Wittgensteinian Metaethics. By Peg O'Connor. [REVIEW] Hypatia 25 (1):242-244.
  13. Philip L. Quinn (2002). Obligation, Divine Commands and Abriham's Dilemma. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):459–466.
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  14. Alex Rajczi (2002). The Moral Theory Behind Moral Dilemmas. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (4):373-383.
    In the last forty years there has been a resurgence of interest in moral dilemmas—situations in which through no fault of a person’s own, he or she is morally required to do one thing, required to do another, but cannot do both. Some prominent figures have argued that such things could be. Opponents have marshaled several anti-dilemma arguments in response. For the most part, this debate has centered on issues in metaethics. Those metaethical questions are interesting, and resolving them could (...)
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  15. Debbie Roberts (2013). 'It's Evaluation, Only Thicker'. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press
  16. Pekka Väyrynen (2014). Essential Contestability and Evaluation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (3):1-18.
    Evaluative and normative terms and concepts are often said to be ?essentially contestable?. This notion has been used in political and legal theory and applied ethics to analyse disputes concerning the proper usage of terms like democracy, freedom, genocide, rape, coercion, and the rule of law. Many philosophers have also thought that essential contestability tells us something important about the evaluative in particular. Gallie (who coined the term), for instance, argues that the central structural features of essentially contestable concepts secure (...)
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  17. Steven E. Wallis (2010). Developing Effective Ethics for Effective Behavior. Social Responsibility Journal 6 (4):536-550.
    Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the internal structure of Gandhi's ethics as a way to determine opportunities for improving that system's ability to influence behavior. In this paper, the author aims to work under the idea that a system of ethics is a guide for social responsibility. -/- Design/methodology/approach – The data source is Gandhi's set of ethics as described by Naess. These simple (primarily quantitative) studies compare the concepts within the code of ethics, and (...)
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Meta-Ethics, General Works
  1. Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves (2013). Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Making Moral Judgments? Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 12 (1):113-126.
    Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007) claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism (...)
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  2. Andrew Alwood (2010). Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):105-117.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  3. Caroline T. Arruda (forthcoming). Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement. Philosophia:1-19.
    Constitutivists explicitly emphasize the importance of self-reflection in a variety of ways. For Korsgaard (1996: Lecture 3; 2009: 25-ff), it is a necessary feature of the process of deciding which principles we want to guide our actions and to comprise the kinds of agents that we become. For Velleman (1989: 32; 2000a: 193), it is a product of the constitutivist aim of autonomy (or, later (2006a), the aim of intelligibility) that we have in action. Interestingly enough, however, there is no (...)
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  4. Caroline T. Arruda (forthcoming). The Varieties of Moral Improvement, Or Why Metaethical Constructivism Must Explain Moral Progress. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-22.
    Among the available metaethical views, it would seem that moral realism—in particular moral naturalism—must explain the possibility of moral progress. We see this in the oft-used argument from disagreement against various moral realist views. My suggestion in this paper is that, surprisingly, metaethical constructivism has at least as pressing a need to explain moral progress. I take moral progress to be, minimally, the opportunity to access and to act in light of moral facts of the matter, whether they are mind-independent (...)
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  5. Caroline T. Arruda (2016). What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation? Ratio 29 (2).
    I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation. Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a plausible interpretation of HTM's (...)
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  6. Marcus Arvan (2016). Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory. Palgrave MacMillan.
    This book argues that moral philosophy should be based on seven scientific principles of theory selection. It then argues that a new moral theory—Rightness as Fairness—satisfies those principles more successfully than existing theories. Chapter 1 explicates the seven principles of theory-selection, arguing that moral philosophy must conform them to be truth-apt. Chapter 2 argues those principles jointly support founding moral philosophy in known facts of empirical moral psychology: specifically, our capacities for mental time-travel and modal imagination. Chapter 2 then shows (...)
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  7. Marcus Arvan (2013). Bad News for Conservatives? Moral Judgments and the Dark Triad Personality Traits: A Correlational Study. Neuroethics 6 (2):307-318.
    This study examined correlations between moral value judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey (MIS), and participant scores on the Short-D3 “Dark Triad” Personality Inventory—a measure of three related “dark and socially destructive” personality traits: Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy. Five hundred sixty-seven participants (302 male, 257 female, 2 transgendered; median age 28) were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk and Yale Experiment Month web advertisements. Different responses to MIS items were initially hypothesized to be “conservative” or “liberal” in line with (...)
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  8. Nicholas Baima (2014). The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.
    Ethical vagueness has garnered little attention. This is rather surprising since many philosophers have remarked that the science of ethics lacks the precision that other fields of inquiry have. Of the few philosophers who have discussed ethical vagueness the majority have focused on the implications of vagueness for moral realism. Because the relevance of ethical vagueness for other metaethical positions has been underexplored, my aim in this paper is to investigate the ramifications of ethical vagueness for expressivism. Ultimately, I shall (...)
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  9. Peter Boltuc (2007). Why Common Sense Morality is Not Collectively Self-Defeating. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):17-26.
    The so-called Common Sense Morality (C) is any moral theory that allows, or requires, an agent to accept special, non-instrumental reasons to give advantage to certain other persons, usually the agent’s friends or kin, over the interests of others. Opponents charge C with violating the requirement of impartiality defined as independence on positional characteristics of moral agents and moral patients. Advocates of C claim that C is impartial, but only in a positional manner in which every moral agent would acquire (...)
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  10. Andrew Boucher, On Descriptive Ethics.
    In its descriptive sense ethical language allows one to make assertions, which like other assertions may be true or not. “One should not torture,” descriptively, makes an assertion about torture - that it is an act that one should not do. While the peculiar force of ethical language comes from its overloading of different types of uses - descriptive, imperative, and emotive -, our concern here will be with the descriptive. Many of our assertions will focus on the English word (...)
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  11. Michael Brady (ed.) (2011). New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Metaethics occupies a central place in analytical philosophy, and the last forty years has seen an upsurge of interest in questions about the nature and practice of morality. This collection presents original and ground-breaking research on metaethical issues from some of the very best of a new generation of philosophers working in this field.
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  12. Eric Brandstedt (2015). The Circumstances of Intergenerational Justice. Moral Philosophy and Politics 2 (1):33-56.
    Some key political challenges today, e.g. climate change, are future oriented. The intergenerational setting differs in some notable ways from the intragenerational one, creating obstacles to theorizing about intergenerational justice. One concern is that as the circumstances of justice do not pertain intergenerationally, intergenerational justice is not meaningful. In this paper, I scrutinize this worry by analysing the presentations of the doctrine of the circumstances of justice by David Hume and John Rawls. I argue that we should accept the upshot (...)
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  13. Stephen Darwall (1999). Why Ethics is Part of Philosophy. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:19-28.
    Ethics is frequently divided into three parts: metaethics, normative ethical theory, and the more specific normative ethics. However, only metaethics is explicitly philosophical insofar as it is concerned with fundamental questions about the content, objects, and status of ethical thought and discourse. During the heyday of conceptual analysis, philosophers were admonished to restrict themselves entirely to metaethics. Since, it was said, they lacked any special expertise as philosophers on normative questions, their pronouncements could be no more than hortatory. I will (...)
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  14. Cory Davia & Michele Palmira (2015). Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):605-625.
    Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
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  15. Olavo de Carvalho (2011). Maquiavel ou a Confusão Demoníaca. Vide Editorial.
    Dos pensadores modernos mais célebres, Nicolau Maquiavel é talvez o primeiro a entregar ao público uma doutrina tão desencontrada e confusa. Tão desencontrada e tão confusa que um de seus melhores intérpretes, Benedetto Croce, resumiu quatro séculos de investigações com a conclusão desencantada de que o pensador florentino é ‘um enigma que jamais será resolvido’. Depois de Croce, outros estudiosos de primeira ordem, como Leo Strauss, Quentin Skinner, Hans Baron e Maurizio Viroli acreditaram poder resolver o enigma; porém as soluções (...)
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  16. Tim Dean (2012). Evolution and Moral Diversity. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7 (1):1-16.
    If humans have an evolved moral psychology, then we should not expect it to function in an identical way between individuals. Instead, we should expect a diversity in the function of our moral psychology between individuals that varies along genetic lines, and a corresponding diversity of moral attitudes and moral judgements that emerge from it. This is because there was no one psychological type that would reliably produce adaptive social behaviour in the highly heterogeneous environments in which our minds evolved. (...)
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  17. Andrzej Elżanowski (2013). Moral Progress: A Present-Day Perspective on the Leading Enlightenment Idea. Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 3 (1):9-26.
    Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that the World’s order (as ultimately based on divine laws) is good and thus every gain of knowledge will have good consequences. Scientific process was assumed to entail moral progress. In fact some moral progress did occur in the Western civilization and science contributed to it, but it is widely incommensurate with the progress of science. The Enlightenment’s concept of a concerted scientific and moral progress proved largely wrong for several reasons. (1) Public morality and science (...)
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  18. Jeremy Fantl (2006). Is Metaethics Morally Neutral? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument generalizes (...)
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  19. Luca Ferrero, Inescapability Revisited.
    According to constitutivism, the objective authority of practical reason is to be grounded in the constitutive features of agency. In this paper, I offer a brief survey of the basic structure of constitutive argument about objectivity and consider how constitutivism might dispel the worry that it can only ground a *conditional* kind of authority. In response to Enoch's original shmagency challenge, in the past I argued that the inescapability of agency shows that we should not be worried by challenges that (...)
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  20. Andrew Fisher (2011). Metaethics: An Introduction. Acumen.
    Do moral facts exist? What would they be like if they did? What does it mean to say that a moral claim is true? What is the link between moral judgement and motivation? Can we know whether something is right and wrong? And is morality a fiction? " Metaethics : An Introduction" presents a very clear and engaging survey of the key concepts and positions in what has become one of the most exciting and influential fields of philosophy. Free from (...)
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  21. Susan Fowler, A Further Problem for Contextualism About "Ought".
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  22. Jon Garthoff (2012). Review of Christian Miller (Ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
  23. Segun Gbadegesin, Sandra A. McCalla, Kevin Behrens, Munamato Chemhuru, Isaac E. Ukpokolo, Justina O. Ehiakhamen, Jim I. Unah, Motsamai Molefe, Elizabeth Oluwafunmilayo Kehinde, Chris Tasie Osegenwune & Thaddeus Metz (eds.) (2013). Ontologized Ethics: New Essays in African Meta-Ethics. Lexington Books.
    Ontologized Ethics is a collection of essays in meta-ethics with an emphasis on philosophical discourse in the African context. It focuses primarily on the extent to which metaphysical beliefs may or may not justify moral beliefs, thereby revisiting the issue of the ‘is-ought’ relationship.
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  24. Samuel Green (2011). Morality is Not Good. Emergent Australasian Philosophers 4 (1).
    Moral nihilism (the denial of the existence of objective moral values) has been argued for for thousands of years. Despite such arguments this view is by no means the majority view. One of the most influential moral nihilists of the 20th Century was John Leslie Mackie, who gave arguments for this position. These arguments, despite many objections, have not been convincingly or decisively overcome. If the arguments are still good, why is moral nihilism such an uncommon view? One possible reason (...)
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  25. Robert S. Hartman, Arthur Ellis & Rem B. Edwards (eds.) (2002). The Knowledge of Good: Critique of Axiological Reason. Rodopi.
    This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson.
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  26. Chris Heathwood (2013). Reductionism in Ethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley
    An encyclopedia entry on the issue of whether morality is reducible -- that is, whether moral facts are identical to facts that can be expressed in non-moral terms.
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  27. Ulrike Heuer (2010). Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan
  28. Christopher Howard (2016). In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):53-62.
    Skepticism about the ‘wrong kind’ of reasons—the view that wrong-kind reasons are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes, but not reasons for those attitudes—is more often assumed than argued for. Jonathan Way sets out to remedy this: he argues that skeptics about, but not defenders of, wrong-kind reasons can explain a distinctive pattern of transmission among such reasons and claims that this fact lends significant support to the skeptical view. I argue that Way's positive case for wrong-kind reason (...)
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  29. Nathaniel Jezzi (2016). Rawls on Kantian Constructivism. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (8).
    John Rawls’s 1980 Dewey Lectures are widely acknowledged to represent the locus classicus for contemporary discussions of moral constructivism. Nevertheless, few published works have engaged with the significant interpretive challenges one finds in these lectures, and those that have fail to offer a satisfactory reading of the view that Rawls presents there or the place the lectures occupy in the development of Rawls's thinking. Indeed, there is a surprising lack of consensus about how best to interpret the constructivism of these (...)
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  30. Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (2013). An Introduction to Metaethics. In Exploring the Philosophical Terrain. C&E
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  31. Matthew Carey Jordan (2013). Divine Commands or Divine Attitudes? Faith and Philosophy 30 (2):159-70.
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  32. Long Joseph (2015). Rightness = Right-Maker. Disputatio 7 (41):193-206.
    I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my <em>reductio</em> by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends my <em>reductio</em> while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.
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  33. Long Joseph (2015). Rightness = Right-Maker. Disputatio 7 (41):193-206.
    I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my <em>reductio</em> by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends my <em>reductio</em> while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.
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