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Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
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  1. added 2015-03-30
    Gabriella Crocco & Eva-Maria Engelen (forthcoming). Kurt Gödel's Philosophical Remarks (Max Phil). In Gabriella Crocco & Eva-Maria Engelen (eds.), Kurt Gödel: Philosopher-Scientist. Presses Universitaires de Provence.
    Kurt Gödel left Philosophical Remarks in his Nachlass that he himself entitled Max Phil (Maximen Philosophie). The opus originally comprised 16 notebooks but one has been lost. The content is on the whole the outline of a rational metaphysics able to relate the different domains of knowledge and of moral investigations to each other. The notebooks were at first started as an intellectual diary in which Gödel writes an account of what he does and especially about what he should do (...)
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  2. added 2015-03-29
    Sergio Tenenbaum (2015). Moral Faith and Moral Reason. In Sophie-Grace Chappell (ed.), Intuition, Theory, Anti-Theory in Ethics. 76-103.
    Robert Adams argues that often our moral commitment outstrips what we are epistemically entitled to believe; in these cases, the virtuous agent doxastic states are instances of “moral faith”. I argue against Adams’ views on the need for moral faith; at least in some cases, our moral “intuitions” provide us with certain moral knowledge. The appearance that there can be no certainty here is the result of dubious views about second-order or indirect doubts. Nonetheless, discussing the phenomena that lead Adams (...)
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  3. added 2015-03-29
    Linda Alcoff, Debra B. Bergoffen & Merold Westphal (1997). Remembrance and Responsibility. Depaul University.
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  4. added 2015-03-28
    Mark Douglas Warren (forthcoming). Moral Inferentialism and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-27.
    Despite its many advantages as a metaethical theory, moral expressivism faces difficulties as a semantic theory of the meaning of moral claims, an issue underscored by the notorious Frege-Geach problem. I consider a distinct metaethical view, inferentialism, which like expressivism rejects a representational account of meaning, but unlike expressivism explains meaning in terms of inferential role instead of expressive function. Drawing on Michael Williams’ recent work on inferential theories of meaning, I argue that an appropriate understanding of the pragmatic role (...)
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  5. added 2015-03-28
    Trevor Curnow (1999). Wisdom, Intuition and Ethics. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  6. added 2015-03-28
    Srinivasa Rao (1998). Perceptual Error the Indian Theories. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  7. added 2015-03-28
    Carl Elliott (1996). The Rules of Insanity Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill Offender. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  8. added 2015-03-28
    Alan Weir (1994). Simon Blackburn, "Essays in Quasi-Realism". [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2):345.
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  9. added 2015-03-28
    David D. V. Fisher (1991). An Introduction to Constructivism for Social Workers. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  10. added 2015-03-28
    Marie Mcginn (1986). J. Dancy, "Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 36 (45):574.
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  11. added 2015-03-28
    Arthur O. Lovejoy (1908). Harp's Study of the Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 5 (20):548.
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  12. added 2015-03-27
    A. Fisher (forthcoming). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique and Defence by Jonas Olson. Analysis:anu152.
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  13. added 2015-03-27
    Joel Marks (2006). Moral Moments: Unprincipled Principles. Philosophy Now 57:47-47.
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  14. added 2015-03-26
    Anne Schwenkenbecher (2010). Online Exclusive: How To Punish Collective Agents: Non-Compliance With Moral Duties By States. Ethics & International Affairs 24 (3).
    If individual moral agents do wrong they usually deserve and are liable to some kind of punishment. But how can states be punished for failing to comply with moral duties without therewith also punishing their citizens who are not necessarily deserving of any punishment?
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  15. added 2015-03-26
    Douglas Den Uyl (1981). Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge. [REVIEW] Reason Papers 7:109-114.
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  16. added 2015-03-26
    B. M. M. (1968). The Grounds of Moral Judgment. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 21 (4):751-752.
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  17. added 2015-03-26
    L. H. C. (1967). Ethical Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 21 (2):371-372.
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  18. added 2015-03-26
    J. M. P. (1966). Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 20 (1):153-153.
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  19. added 2015-03-26
    S. C. N. (1964). The Moral Judgment. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 17 (3):485-486.
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  20. added 2015-03-26
    D. T. J. (1961). The Principles of Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 14 (4):724-724.
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  21. added 2015-03-26
    H. R. (1956). Moral Judgment. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 10 (1):182-183.
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  22. added 2015-03-25
    Abraham D. Graber (forthcoming). Towards a Cognitive Scientific Vindication of Moral Realism: The Semantic Argument. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-11.
    In a methodological milieu characterized by efforts to bring the methods of philosophy closer to the methods of the sciences, one can find, with increasing regularity, meta-ethical arguments relying on scientific theory or data. The received view appears to be that, not only is it implausible to think that a scientific vindication of a non-mentalist moral semantics will be forthcoming but that evidence from a variety of sciences threatens to undermine non-mentalist views. My aim is to push back against this (...)
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  23. added 2015-03-25
    Michael Rubin (2015). Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2).
    In order to defend the Cornell variety of naturalistic moral realism from Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth objection, several philosophers have proposed what I call Normatively Enriched Moral Meta-Semantics . According to NEMMS, the natural properties that serve as the contents of moral predicates are fixed by non-moral normative facts. In this paper, I elucidate two versions of NEMMS: one proposed by David Brink, and the other proposed by Mark van Roojen. I show what these meta-semantics have in common, (...)
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  24. added 2015-03-25
    Robert N. Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.) (2015). Passions and Projections: Themes From the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn. Oup Oxford.
    This volume presents fourteen original essays which explore the philosophy of Simon Blackburn, and his lifetime pursuit of a distinctive projectivist and anti-realist research program. The essays document the range and influence of Blackburn's work and reveal, among other things, the resourcefulness of his brand of philosophical pragmatism.
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  25. added 2015-03-25
    Ibo van de Poel, Lambèr Royakkers & Sjoerd D. Zwart (2015). Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Many Hands. Routledge.
    When many people are involved in an activity, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint who is morally responsible for what, a phenomenon known as the ‘problem of many hands.’ This term is increasingly used to describe problems with attributing individual responsibility in collective settings in such diverse areas as public administration, corporate management, law and regulation, technological development and innovation, healthcare, and finance. This volume provides an in-depth philosophical analysis of this problem, examining the notion of moral (...)
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  26. added 2015-03-25
    David Shoemaker & Neal Tognazzini (eds.) (2014). Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 2: 'Freedom and Resentment' at 50. Oup Oxford.
    This special volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility presents ten new papers marking the fiftieth anniversary of P. F. Strawson's landmark essay, 'Freedom and Resentment'. They offer critical interpretation of Strawson's essay, expand on his insights into interpersonal relationships, and develop his themes in challenging directions.
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  27. added 2015-03-25
    Heidi Chamberlin Giannini, Neo-Kantian Wickedness : Constructivist and Realist Responses to Moral Skepticism.
    Neo-Kantian constructivism aspires to respond to moral skepticism by compelling agents to act morally on pain of irrationality. According to Christine Korsgaard, a leading proponent of constructivism, we construct all reasons for action by following correct deliberative procedures. But if we follow these procedures we will find that we only have reasons to act in morally permissible ways. Thus, we can show the skeptic that he is rationally constrained to act morally. Unfortunately, as I argue in my first chapter, this (...)
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  28. added 2015-03-25
    Russell Cornett, Moral Objectivism.
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  29. added 2015-03-25
    Mark Silcox (2011). The Cry of Nature: Dissolving the Frege/Geach Problem. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):215-223.
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  30. added 2015-03-25
    Nicholas Rescher (2009). Error. University of Pittsburgh Press.
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  31. added 2015-03-25
    Jussi Suikkanen (2007). The Argument From Intransigence For Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Writings 35 (2).
    There is a classic disagreement in moral psychology about the mental states that constitute the sincere acceptance of moral claims. Cognitivists hold that these states are beliefs aiming at a correct description of the world; whereas non-cognitivists argue that they must be some other kind of attitude. Mark Eli Kalderon has recently presented a new argument for non-cognitivism. He argues that all cognitivist inquiries include certain epistemic obligations for the participants in cases of disagreement in the inquiry. I will provide (...)
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  32. added 2015-03-25
    Sami Pihlström (ed.) (2005). Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defense. Rodopi.
    This book examines the issue of moral realism from a pragmatist point of view, drawing attention to our human practices of ethical evaluation and deliberation. It defends the essentially ungrounded and humanly fundamental place of ethics in our thought and action. Ethics must remain beyond justification and ubiquitous in our human form of life.
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  33. added 2015-03-25
    Paul Benson (1996). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments by R.Jay Wallace. Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):574-578.
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  34. added 2015-03-25
    B. C. Postow (1982). Renford Bambrough., Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge. [REVIEW] International Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):70-72.
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  35. added 2015-03-25
    Robert J. Fogelin (1982). Hume's Moral Theory by J. L. Mackie. Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):210-213.
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  36. added 2015-03-24
    Jack Woods (2015). Expressivism Worth the Name -- A Reply to Teemu Toppinen. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    I respond to an interesting objection to my 2014 argument against hermeneutic expressivism. I argue that even though Toppinen has identified an intriguing route for the expressivist to tread, the plausible developments of it would not fall to my argument anyways---as they do not make direct use of the parity thesis which claims that expression works the same way in the case of conative and cognitive attitudes. I close by sketching a few other problems plaguing such views.
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  37. added 2015-03-23
    Teresa Marques (2015). Disagreeing in Context. Frontiers in Psychology 6 (257):1-12.
    This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and evaluative predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparently resilient disagreements are to be explained. The present proposal is complementary to others that have been made in the recent literature. Several authors, for instance (López de Sa, 2008; Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014; Marques, 2014a), have recently defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from the accusation that it faces the problem of lost (...)
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  38. added 2015-03-21
    Pierre Baumann (2014). Interrogando a Musonio Rufo sobre el bien y el placer. Cadernos Do Pet Filosofia 5 (9):33-39.
    Este trabajo examina críticamente un argumento de Musonio Rufo en favor de la conclusión de que el placer no es bueno. Se esquematiza el argumento en lógica de primer orden y se evalúa para determinar validez y corrección. Se demuestra que el argumento sólo es válido bajo una esquematización que debilita la conclusión, y que no parece corresponder a la conclusión que tiene en mente Musonio. Se arguye, además, que el razonamiento de Musonio no es determinadamente correcto, puesto que sus (...)
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  39. added 2015-03-20
    Gunnar Björnsson & Bengt Brülde (forthcoming). Normative Responsibilities: Structure and Sources. In Kristien Hens, Dorothee Horstkötter & Daniela Cutas (eds.), Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics. Springer.
    Attributions of what we shall call normative responsibilities play a central role in everyday moral thinking. It is commonly thought, for example, that parents are responsible for the wellbeing of their children, and that this has important normative consequences. Depending on context, it might mean that parents are morally required to bring their children to the doctor, feed them well, attend to their emotional needs, or to see to it that someone else does. Similarly, it is sometimes argued that countries (...)
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  40. added 2015-03-16
    Stephen Ingram (forthcoming). I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi! Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non-natural, and mind-independent moral properties. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify and respond (...)
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  41. added 2015-03-16
    Stephen Ingram (2015). The Moral Fixed Points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-5.
  42. added 2015-03-12
    Alan Tapper (2014). From Meaning to Morality in Kovesi and Harrison. In Patricia Hanna (ed.), Reality and Culture: Essays on the Philosophy of Bernard Harrison. Rodopi Press. 97-112.
    The paper shows that Bernard Harrison and Julius Kovesi are complementary thinkers, interested in similar questions, and arriving at closely comparable answers. It summarizes the theory of concepts and meaning that they shared and the way they have used this theory to make sense of morality.
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  43. added 2015-03-11
    Robert S. Hartman, Arthur Ellis & Rem B. Edwards (eds.) (2002). The Knowledge of Good: Critique of Axiological Reason. Rodopi.
    This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson.
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  44. added 2015-03-10
    Danny Frederick, Defective Equilibrium.
    I argue that the static conception of reflective equilibrium that is standard in contemporary philosophy is defective and should be replaced with a dynamic conception which prohibits ad hoc manoeuvres, encourages temporary reflective disequilibrium, and eschews all justification in favour of continuous improvement. I show how the dynamic conception can be applied to moral theory to encourage progress in moral knowledge and to make moral theory empirically testable, and how it can improve our understanding of human action.
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  45. added 2015-03-09
    Nikil Mukerji (forthcoming). Experimentelle Ethik. In Julian Nida-Rümelin, Irina Spiegel & Markus Tiedemann (eds.), Philosophie und Ethik - Band 2: Disziplinen und Themen. UTB.
    Was tun Philosophen eigentlich, wenn sie Philosophie treiben? Oder besser: Was sollten Philosophen tun, wenn sie Philosophie treiben? Diese Frage ist selbst eine philosophische. Und sie wird seit einigen Jahren wieder mit zunehmender Intensität diskutiert. Dafür ist vor allem eine neue philosophische Bewegung verantwortlich, die man als „experimentelle Philosophie“ oder kurz „x-phi“ bezeichnet. Anhänger dieser Bewegung glauben, die Philosophie solle sich in Vorgehensweise und Methodik den empirischen Wissenschaften annähern und philosophischen Fragestellungen mithilfe empirischer Tests zu Leibe rücken. Diese Ansicht steht (...)
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  46. added 2015-03-09
    Hannah Altehenger, Simon Gaus & Andreas Leonhard Menges (2015). Being Realistic About Reflective Equilibrium. Analysis:1-10.
    In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This correlation (...)
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  47. added 2015-03-08
    Knut Olav Skarsaune (2015). How To Be a Moral Platonist. Oxford Studies in Metaethics (10).
    Contrary to popular opinion, non-natural realism can explain both why normative properties supervene on descriptive properties, and why this pattern is analytic. The explanation proceeds by positing a subtle polysemy in normative predicates like “good”. Such predicates express slightly different senses when they are applied to particulars (like Florence Nightingale) and to kinds (like altruism). The former sense, “goodPAR”, can be defined in terms of the latter, “goodKIN”, as follows: x is goodPAR iff there is a kind K such that (...)
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  48. added 2015-03-06
    Jens Gillessen (2014). Was, wenn jeder...? Ethische Verallgemeinerung seit Kant. Eine Kritik. Verlag Karl Alber.
    Occasionally, moral critique is often put forward by asking: What if everyone acted the way you do? Such criticism seems to be grounded in some form of moral reasoning, which has in the past been the aim of various efforts of clarification, refutation and defense, in the guise of interpretations of Kant's Categorical Imperative as well as in Analytic Ethics. The book forms the first monographic attempt since decades to establish systematic order among contributions to the field. It examines a (...)
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  49. added 2015-03-05
    Daan Evers (forthcoming). Street on Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons. Synthese:1-14.
    Sharon Street (2009) argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent's (or anyone else's) attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons (...)
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  50. added 2015-03-01
    Dustin Locke (2014). Darwinian Normative Skepticism. In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press.
    Sharon Street (2006) has argued that, given certain plausible evolutionary considerations, normative realism leads to normative skepticism. Street calls this ‘the Darwinian dilemma’. This paper considers the two most popular responses to the Darwinian dilemma and argues that both are problematic. According to the naturalist response, the evolutionary account of our normative dispositions reveals that there was selection for normative dispositions that were reliable with respect to normative truth. According to the minimalist response, the evolutionary account reveals that there was (...)
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