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Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
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  1. added 2014-04-15
    Caj Strandberg (forthcoming). Options for Hybrid Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    In contemporary metaethics, various versions of hybrid expressivism have been proposed according to which moral sentences express both non-cognitive attitudes and beliefs. One important advantage with such positions, its proponents argue, is that they, in contrast to pure expressivism, have a straightforward way of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem. In this paper, I provide a systematic examination of different versions of hybrid expressivism with particular regard to how they are assumed to evade this problem. The major conclusion is that none of (...)
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  2. added 2014-04-14
    Michael Quinn (2014). Bentham on Mensuration: Calculation and Moral Reasoning. Utilitas 26 (1):61-104.
    This article argues that Bentham was committed to attempting to measure the outcomes of rules by calculating the values of the pains and pleasures to which they gave rise. That pleasure was preferable to pain, and greater pleasure to less, were, for Bentham, foundational premises of rationality, whilst to abjure calculation was to abjure rationality. However, Bentham knew that the experience of pleasure and pain, the entities which provided his objective moral standard, was not only subjective, and only indirectly accessible (...)
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  3. added 2014-04-14
    Practical Reason (2007). Humean Reflections in the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Utilitas 19 (3).
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  4. added 2014-04-14
    Bart Schultz (2007). Schultz's Sidgwick. Utilitas 19 (1).
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  5. added 2014-04-14
    Michele M. Moody-Adams (1999). James Griffin's Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs Is. Utilitas 11 (1).
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  6. added 2014-04-14
    Robert Nozick (1999). Reasoning About Rationality. Utilitas 11 (3).
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  7. added 2014-04-14
    I. An Everyday Story & A. Commonsense (1999). The Non-Arbitrariness of Reasons: Reply to Lenman. Utilitas 11 (2).
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  8. added 2014-04-14
    N. J. H. Dent (1996). Jonathan Harrison Ethical Essays, Volumes I-III. Journal of Applied Philosophy 13:221-223.
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  9. added 2014-04-11
    Michael Huemer, A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skepticism: The Empirical Case for Realism.
    Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.
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  10. added 2014-04-09
    F. M. Kamm (2000). Collaboration and Responsibility. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (3):169-204.
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  11. added 2014-04-08
    Diego E. Machuca (2010). Review of Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. Philosophy in Review 28 (5):343-346.
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  12. added 2014-04-08
    Diego E. Machuca (2009). Review of David Wong, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism. Philosophy in Review 29 (2):148-150.
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  13. added 2014-04-07
    Frank Jackson (2008). The Argument From the Persistence of Moral Disagreement. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oup Oxford.
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  14. added 2014-04-07
    William Fitzpatrick (2008). Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism, and Normativity. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:159-205.
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  15. added 2014-04-07
    Thomas Baldwin (2008). Rawls and Moral Psychology. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oup Oxford.
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  16. added 2014-04-07
    Sharon Street (2008). Constructivism About Reasons. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:207-45.
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  17. added 2014-04-07
    David O. Brink (2008). The Significance of Desire. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:5-45.
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  18. added 2014-04-07
    Stephen Darwall (2007). Moral Obligation and Accountability. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  19. added 2014-04-07
    T. M. Scanlon (2007). Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-Examination. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  20. added 2014-04-07
    Robert N. Johnson (2007). Value and Autonomy in Kantian Ethics. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  21. added 2014-04-07
    David Enoch (2007). An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2 (2007):21-50.
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  22. added 2014-04-07
    Mark Lance & Margaret Little (2007). Where the Laws Are. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:149-171.
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  23. added 2014-04-07
    Michael Ridge (2007). Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds? Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:51-76.
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  24. added 2014-04-07
    Joshua Gert (2007). Cognitivism, Expressivism, and Agreement in Response. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  25. added 2014-04-07
    Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2006). Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No! Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:73-98.
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  26. added 2014-04-07
    Terence Cuneo (2006). Saying What We Mean: An Argument Against Expressivism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:35-71.
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  27. added 2014-04-07
    Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2006). Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:99-126.
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  28. added 2014-04-07
    Allan Gibbard (2006). Moral Feelings and Moral Concepts. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:195-215.
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  29. added 2014-04-07
    Derek Parfit (2006). Normativity. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:325-80.
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  30. added 2014-04-07
    James Dreier (2006). Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for Their Solution. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:217-233.
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  31. added 2014-04-05
    David Shoemaker (2013). Qualities of Will. Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):95-120.
    One of P. F. Strawson's suggestions in was that there might be an elegant theory of moral responsibility that accounted for all of our responsibility responses (our in his words) in a way that also explained why we get off the hook from those responses. Such a theory would appeal exclusively to quality of will: when we react with any of a variety of responsibility responses to someone, we are responding to the quality of her will with respect to us, (...)
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  32. added 2014-04-05
    Debbie Roberts, Tom Dougherty, Ian Carter, Anna Stilz & David Shoemaker (2011). 10. George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness (Pp. 675-680). [REVIEW] Ethics 121 (3).
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  33. added 2014-04-04
    Matthew Talbert (forthcoming). Symmetry, Rational Abilities, and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-14.
    In Making Sense of Free Will and Moral Responsibility Dana Nelkin defends the “rational abilities view.” According to this view, agents are responsible for their behavior if and only if they act with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. It follows that agents who act well are open to praise regardless of whether they could have acted differently, but agents who act badly are open to blame only if they could have acted on the moral reasons that (...)
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  34. added 2014-04-03
    Antoine C. Dussault (2013). In Search of Ecocentric Sentiments: Insights From the CAD Model in Moral Psychology. Environmental Ethics 35 (4):419-437.
    One aspect of J. Baird Callicott’s foundational project for ecocentrism consists in explaining how moral consideration for ecological wholes can be grounded in moral sentiments. Some critics of Callicott have objected that moral consideration for ecological wholes is impossible under a sentimentalist conception of ethics because, on both Hume and Smith’s views, sympathy is our main moral sentiment and it cannot be elicited by holistic entities. This conclusion is premature. The relevant question is not whether such moral consideration is compatible (...)
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  35. added 2014-04-02
    Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Avoiding and Alternate Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-7.
    Greg Janzen has recently criticised my defence of Frankfurt’s counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by arguing that Jones avoids killing Smith in the counterfactual scenario. Janzen’s argument consists in introducing a new thought-experiment which is supposed to be analogous to Frankfurt’s and where the agent is supposed to avoid A-ing. Here I argue that Janzen’s argument fails on two counts, because his new scenario is not analogous to Frankfurt’s and because the agent in his new scenario does not (...)
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  36. added 2014-04-02
    Johan E. Gustafsson & Olle Torpman (2014). In Defence of My Favourite Theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):159–174.
    One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the (...)
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  37. added 2014-04-02
    Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton (2014). Of Reasons and Recognition. Analysis 74 (2):339-348.
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  38. added 2014-04-02
    Owen Ware (2014). Skepticism in Kant's Groundwork. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4).
    This paper offers a new interpretation of Kant's relationship with skepticism in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. My position differs from commonly held views in the literature in two ways. On the one hand, I argue that Kant's relationship with skepticism is active and systematic (contrary to Hill, Wood, Rawls, Timmermann, and Allison). On the other hand, I argue that the kind of skepticism Kant is interested in does not speak to the philosophical tradition in any straightforward sense (...)
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  39. added 2014-04-02
    Paul Barry (2014). In Defence of Morality: A Response to a Moral Error Theory. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):63-85.
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  40. added 2014-04-02
    Martin Marchman Andersen (2014). What Does Society Owe Me If I Am Responsible for Being Worse Off? Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (1).
    Luck egalitarians need to address the question of cost-responsibility: If an individual is responsible for being worse off than others, then what benefits, if any, is that individual uniquely cost-responsible for? By applying luck egalitarianism to justice in health I discuss different answers to this question inspired by two different interpretations of luck egalitarianism, namely ‘standard luck egalitarianism’ and ‘all luck egalitarianism’, respectively. Even though I argue that the latter is more plausible than the former, I ultimately suggest and defend (...)
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  41. added 2014-04-01
    Christian Miller (forthcoming). Naturalism and Ethics. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Blackwell.
    In this chapter I consider the work of four leading naturalistic moral psychologists – Joshua Greene, Shaun Nichols, Jesse Prinz, and John Doris. Each of them draws a different meta-ethical conclusion, and they would likely disagree amongst themselves on a number of points. But here my goal is to consider, as much as space allows, whether the moral realist should feel threatened by the empirical work which they cite and the arguments which they base upon it.
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  42. added 2014-03-30
    Shaun Nichols, Shikhar Kumar & Theresa Lopez, Rational Learners and Non-Utilitarian Rules.
  43. added 2014-03-30
    Barry Smith (2001). The Chinese Rune Argument. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-74.
    Searle’s tool for understanding culture, law and society is the opposition between brute reality and institutional reality, or in other words between: observer-independent features of the world, such as force, mass and gravitational attraction, and observer-relative features of the world, such as money, property, marriage and government. The question posed here is: under which of these two headings do moral concepts fall? This is an important question because there are moral facts – for example pertaining to guilt and responsibility – (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-28
    Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (forthcoming). Weighing Explanations. In Andrew Reisner & Iwao Hirose (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome. Oxford University Press.
  45. added 2014-03-27
    T. M. Scanlon (2014). Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford University Press.
    Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T. M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action.
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  46. added 2014-03-26
    John Martin Fischer (ed.) (2005). Free Will. Routledge.
    Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous amount of philosophical work in the Anglo-American tradition on the cluster of topics pertaining to Free Will. Contemporary work has in some instances been in the form of lively debates between proponents of different viewpoints, and literature surrounding the area is therefore characterized by a genuine vitality. This collection selects the very best of this material and presents it in a single, accessible set of volumes.
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  47. added 2014-03-25
    Michael Cholbi (forthcoming). The Implications of Ego Depletion for the Ethics and Politics of Manipulation. In C. Coons M. E. Weber (ed.), Manipulation:Theory and Practice. Oxford University Press. 201-220.
    A significant body of research suggests that self-control and willpower are resources that become depleted as they are exercised. Having to exert self-control and willpower draws down the reservoir of these resources and make subsequent such exercises more difficult. This “ego depletion” renders individuals more susceptible to manipulation by exerting non-rational influences on our choice and conduct. In particular, ego depletion results in later choices being less governable by our powers of self-control and willpower than earlier choices. I draw out (...)
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  48. added 2014-03-25
    Stan Husi (2014). Against Moral Fictionalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):80-96.
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  49. added 2014-03-25
    Jonas Olson (2014). Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Oup Oxford.
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
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  50. added 2014-03-11
    Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay (2010). Defending Metaethical Contextualism. Ethics 121:7-36.
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1 — 50 / 104