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Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
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  1. added 2015-02-27
    Nicole Vincent (2013). Enhancing Responsibility. In N. Vincent (ed.), Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 305-333.
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  2. added 2015-02-24
    Uri D. Leibowitz (forthcoming). Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer’s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (so called) ad hominem (...)
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  3. added 2015-02-24
    Raymond Aaron Younis (1995). Questions of Judgment. Metascience (8).
  4. added 2015-02-23
    Teresa Marques (2015). Disagreeing in Context. Frontiers in Psychology 6 (257).
    This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and evaluative predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparent resilient disagreements are to be explained. The present proposal is complementary to others that have been made in the recent literature. Several authors, for instance López de Sa (2008), Sundell (2011), Huvenes (2012), Marques (2014b), and Marques and García-Carpintero (2014), have recently defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from the accusation that it faces the problem of (...)
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  5. added 2015-02-23
    Teresa Marques, Desacordo. Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    Discordamos sobre todo o tipo de coisas: o que existe, como as coisas funcionam, o que fazer, de que gostamos, etc. Entre os vários tipos de desacordo discutidos em debates filosóficos contemporâneos encontram-se os desacordos irrepreensíveis, os desacordos meramente verbais, e os desacordos entre pares. Os diferentes tipos de desacordo dão lugar a diversos problemas filosóficos. Há filósofos defendem que se o desacordo sobre uma questão é irrepreensível, então talvez não haja verdades objectivas sobre essa questão, e que se um (...)
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  6. added 2015-02-20
    Fabrizio Cariani (2014). Attitudes, Deontics and Semantic Neutrality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):491-511.
    It has been recently suggested that a semantic theory for deontic modals should be neutral between a very large range of normative and evaluative theories. This article aims to clarify this talk of neutrality, in particular its scope and motivation. My thesis is that neutrality is best understood as an empirical thesis about a fragment of natural language that includes deontic modals – not as a new, sui generis methodological constraint on natural language semantics.
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  7. added 2015-02-19
    Rafael A. Araque-Padilla, María José Montero-Simó, Pilar Rivera-Torres & Carlos Aragón-Gutiérrez (forthcoming). Moderating the Relationship Between Price and Perceived Value of Ethical Products. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics:1-14.
    Interest in ethical aspects associated to product acquisition and consumption is a growing trend among consumers. In this context, the concept of “product with ethical attributes” has arisen to refer to products with explicit social and environmental characteristics. However, one of the factors that most hinders the purchasing of these products is certainly price. Given the difficulty of reducing price, the question that arises is the extent to which other product attributes can attenuate the negative impact of price on perceived (...)
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  8. added 2015-02-19
    Raymond Aaron Younis (2007). Nihilism Reconstruction and the Hero's Journey. In Angela Ndalianis Wendy Haslem & Chris Mackie (eds.), Super/Heroes. New Academia. 97-111.
  9. added 2015-02-16
    Brent G. Kyle (forthcoming). Review of 'The Lewd, the Rude, and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics'. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
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  10. added 2015-02-06
    Andrew Reisner & Joseph Van Weelden (forthcoming). Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism. Logos and Episteme.
    Moral testimony pessimists contend that at least sometimes, and possibly at all times, one ought not to defer to the testimony of identified moral experts. We argue that there is no viable epistemic defence of moral testimony pessimism. We consider moral reasons for moral testimony pessimism and conclude that none of the accounts currently on offer are persuasive. We argue that absent new consideration, both the epistemic and moral reasons weigh in favour of moral testimony optimism.
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  11. added 2015-02-05
    Philip Smith (2014). Why Faith is a Virtue. Wipf & Stock.
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  12. added 2015-02-02
    Jussi Suikkanen (2015). Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology, by Michael Devitt. Mind 124 (493):327-331.
    This is a review of Michael Devitt's collection of previous published articles entitled Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. The review also suggests a new way of formulation the realism/anti-realism contrast on the basis of Devitt's work. This contrast is understood in terms explanatory priority: should we in a given domain begin our theorizing from metaphysics (realism) or semantics (anti-realism)?
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  13. added 2015-01-31
    Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  14. added 2015-01-31
    Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, Then People Are Less Responsible Than We Think. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  15. added 2015-01-31
    Gregg Caruso (2014). Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism. Scientia Salon (2014).
  16. added 2015-01-28
    Ittay Nissan-Rozen (forthcoming). A Triviality Result for the “Desire by Necessity” Thesis. Synthese:1-22.
    A triviality result for what Lewis called “the Desire by Necessity Thesis” and Broome : 265–267, 1991) called “the Desire as Expectation Thesis” is presented. The result shows that this thesis and three other reasonable conditions can be jointly satisfied only in trivial cases. Some meta-ethical implications of the result are discussed. The discussion also highlights several issues regarding Lewis’ original triviality result for “the Desire as Belief Thesis” that have not been properly understood in the literature.
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  17. added 2015-01-26
    Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Objectivity in Ethics and Mathematics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
    How do axioms, or first principles, in ethics compare to those in mathematics? I argue that while there are similarities between the cases, these are premised on an assumption which can be questioned, and which highlights the peculiarity of normative inquiry.
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  18. added 2015-01-25
    F. G. A. (1965). The Moral Philosophy of David Hume. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 18 (4):772-773.
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  19. added 2015-01-23
    Walter Glannon (2011). Brain, Body, and Mind: Neuroethics with a Human Face. Oxford University Press.
    This book is a discussion of the most timely and contentious issues in the two branches of neuroethics: the neuroscience of ethics; and the ethics of neuroscience. Drawing upon recent work in psychiatry, neurology, and neurosurgery, it develops a phenomenologically inspired theory of neuroscience to explain the brain-mind relation. The idea that the mind is shaped not just by the brain but also by the body and how the human subject interacts with the environment has significant implications for free will, (...)
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  20. added 2015-01-22
    Douglas W. Portmore, Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Control.
    I argue that when determining whether an agent ought to perform an act, we should not hold fixed the fact that she’s going to form certain attitudes (and, here, I’m concerned with only reasons-responsive attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and intentions). For, as I argue, agents have, in the relevant sense, just as much control over which attitudes they form as which acts they perform. This is important because what effect an act will have on the world depends not only (...)
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  21. added 2015-01-21
    Yishai Cohen (2015). Reasons-Responsiveness and Time Travel. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-7.
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  22. added 2015-01-20
    Cordelia Fine & Jeanette Kennett (2004). Mental Impairment, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility: Psychopathy and the Purposes of Punishment. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):425-443.
    We have argued here that to attribute criminal responsibility to psychopathic individuals is to ignore substantial and growing evidence that psychopathic individuals are significantly impaired in moral understanding. They do not appear to know why moral transgressions are wrong in the full sense required by the law. As morally blameless offenders, punishment as a basis for detention cannot be justified. Moreover, as there are currently no successful treatment programs for psychopathy, nor can detention be justified on grounds of treatment. Instead, (...)
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  23. added 2015-01-18
    Nomy Arpaly (2014). Duty, Desire and the Good Person: Towards a Non‐Aristotelian Account of Virtue. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):59-74.
    This paper presents an account of the virtuous person, which I take to be the same as the good person. I argue that goodness in a person is based on her desires. Contra Aristotelians, I argue that one does not need wisdom to be good. There can be a perfectly good person with mental retardation or autism. Contra Kantians, I argue that the sense of duty - which does exist! - is compatible with a desire-based moral psychology.
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  24. added 2015-01-17
    Andreas Dorschel (1991). A morál költségei – Kant nyomán számolva. Magyar Filozofiai Szemle (4-5):678-708.
    Acting morally comes at a price. The fewer people act morally, the dearer moral acts will be to those who perform them. Even if it could be proven that a certain moral norm were valid, the question might still be open whether, under certain circumstances, the demand to follow it meant asking too much. The validity of a moral norm is independent from actual compliance. In that regard, moral norms differ from legal rules. A law that nobody obeys has eroded (...)
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  25. added 2015-01-17
    Andreas Dorschel (1990). Die Kosten der Moral. Nachgerechnet an Kant. Concordia 18:2-25.
    Acting morally comes at a price. The fewer people act morally, the dearer moral acts will be to those who perform them. Even if it could be proven that a certain moral norm were valid, the question might still be open whether, under certain circumstances, the demand to follow it meant asking too much. The validity of a moral norm is independent from actual compliance. In that regard, moral norms differ from legal rules. A law that nobody obeys has eroded (...)
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  26. added 2015-01-06
    Tomasz Żuradzki (2014). Trzeci rodzaj normatywności – wymóg reagowania na racje. Filozofia Nauki 88 (4):35-51.
    Celem artykułu jest krytyka przyjętego przez niektórych filozofów podziału na normatywność w podstawowym sensie oraz normatywność wymogów wąsko rozumianej racjonalności. Pokazuję, że podział taki nie jest wyczerpujący, ponieważ pomija ważny typ wymogów normatywnych, a mianowicie reagowanie na racje. Z jednej strony tego rodzaju wymogi nie przypominają wymogów normatywnych w podstawowym sensie, a z drugiej — istotnie różnią się od racjonalności rozumianej jako spójność między nastawieniami. Dochodzę do wniosku, że reagowanie na racje należy uznać za trzeci typ wymogów normatywnych.
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  27. added 2015-01-06
    Tomasz Żuradzki (2012). Internalizm i eksternalizm w metaetyce. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
    Książka dotyczy trzech powiązanych z sobą zagadnień: internalizmu racji działania, internalizmu motywacyjnego i tzw. hume’owskiej teorii motywacji. Próbuje odpowiedzieć m.in. na następujące pytania: Czy wolno nam stwierdzić, że ktoś powinien coś zrobić, nawet gdy nie może być motywowany do tego działania? Czy można szczerze akceptować jakiś osąd moralny i nie być motywowanym do postępowania zgodnie z jego zaleceniami? Czy normy moralne służą tak naprawdę realizacji egoistycznych pragnień, czy może są fikcją wpajaną przez instytucje społeczne? Autor pokazuje, jak wiele współcześnie dyskutowanych (...)
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  28. added 2015-01-04
    Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Values and Emotions. In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory.
    Evaluative concepts and emotions appear closely connected. According to a prominent account, this relation can be expressed by propositions of the form ‘something is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to it’. The first section discusses various interpretations of such ‘Value-Emotion Equivalences’, for example the Fitting Attitude Analysis, and it offers a plausible way to read them. The main virtue of the proposed way to read them is that it is well-supported by a promising account (...)
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  29. added 2014-12-29
    David Wong (2014). Integrating Philosophy with Anthropology in an Approach to Morality. Anthropological Theory 14 (3).
    Philosophy and anthropology need to integrate their accounts of what a morality is. I identify three desiderata that an account of morality should satisfy: (1) it should recognize significant diversity and variation in the major kinds of value, (2) it should specify a set of criteria for what counts as a morality, and (3) it should indicate the basis for distinguishing between more or less justifiable moralities, or true and false moralities. I will discuss why these three desiderata are hard (...)
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  30. added 2014-12-28
    Helga Varden (2014). The Terrorist Attacks in Norway, July 22nd 2011— Some Kantian Reflection. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 49 (3-4):236-259.
    This paper provides a Kantian interpretation of core issues involved in the trial following the terrorist attacks that struck Norway on July 22nd 2011. After a sketch of the controversies surrounding the trial itself, a Kantian theory of why the wrongdoer’s mind struck us as so endlessly disturbed is presented. This Kantian theory, I proceed by arguing, also helps us understand why it was so important to respond to the violence through the legal system and to treat the perpetrator, Anders (...)
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  31. added 2014-12-18
    Christopher Evan Franklin (forthcoming). If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, Then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist. Mind.
    Nearly all defenses of the agent-causal theory of free will portray the theory as a distinctively libertarian one—a theory that only libertarians have reason to accept. According to what I call ‘the standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free will’, the reason to embrace agent-causal libertarianism is that libertarians can solve the problem of enhanced control only if they furnish agents with the agent-causal power. In this way it is assumed that there is only reason to accept the agent-causal (...)
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  32. added 2014-12-16
    Nikil Mukerji (2014). Why Moral Philosophers Should Watch Sci-Fi Movies. In Fiorella Battaglia & Nathalie Weidenfeld (eds.), Roboethics in Film. Pisa University Press. 79-92.
    In this short piece, I explore why we, as moral philosophers, should watch sci-fi movies. Though I do not believe that sci-fi material is ne- cessary for doing good moral philosophy, I give three broad reasons why good sci-fi movies should nevertheless be worth our time. These reasons lie in the fact that they can illustrate moral-philosophical pro- blems, probe into possible solutions and, perhaps most importantly, an- ticipate new issues that may go along with the use of new technologies. (...)
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  33. added 2014-12-08
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental Study. Methode.
    In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental (...)
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  34. added 2014-12-05
    Sven Nyholm (forthcoming). Reason with Me: Confabulation and Interpersonal Moral Reasoning. Ethical Perspectives.
    According to Haidt’s “social intuitionist model”, empirical moral psychology supports the following conclusion: intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second. Critics have responded by arguing that intuitions can depend on non-conscious reasons, that not being able to articulate one’s reasons doesn’t entail not being responsive to reasons, and that the relations between intuitions and reasoning can be truth-tracking and principled in ways overlooked by Haidt. This debate involves a false dichotomy: that either reasoning is truth-tracking, or else our reasoning is purely (...)
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  35. added 2014-12-03
    Frieder Vogelmann (2013). Verantwortung als Subjektivierung. Zur Genealogie einer Selbstverständlichkeit. In Andreas Gelhard, Thomas Alkemeyer & Norbert Ricken (eds.), Techniken der Subjektivierung. Fink. 149–161.
    Die Behauptung, dass Verantwortung eine Subjektform sowie die Technik zu ihrer Herstellung bezeichnet, wird kaum Erstaunen auslösen. Wozu wären all die auf Verantwortung sich stützenden ethisch-moralischen Normen auch gut, wenn sie nicht unsere Subjektivität formen könnten? Dieses Selbstverständnis als verantwortliche Subjekte ist Nietzsches zentralen Angriffspunkt in der zweiten Abhandlung von "Zur Genealogie der Moral". Doch sein Verständnis von Verantwortung als Subjektivierungstechnik und Subjektform war im Kontext des philosophischen Diskurses, in dem er sich selbst verortet, alles andere als eine Selbstverständlichkeit. Der (...)
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