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Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
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  1. added 2016-04-28
    Leslie Allan, A Defence of Emotivism.
    As a non-cognitivist analysis of moral language, Charles Stevenson's sophisticated emotivism is widely regarded by moral philosophers as a substantial improvement over its historical antecedent, radical emotivism. None the less, it has come in for its share of criticism. In this essay, Leslie Allan responds to the key philosophical objections to Stevenson's thesis, arguing that the criticisms levelled against his meta-ethical theory rest largely on a too hasty reading of his works.
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  2. added 2016-04-26
    Luca Ferrero, Inescapability Revisited.
    According to constitutivism, the objective authority of practical reason is to be grounded in the constitutive features of agency. In this paper, I offer a brief survey of the basic structure of constitutive argument about objectivity and consider how constitutivism might dispel the worry that it can only ground a *conditional* kind of authority. In response to Enoch's original shmagency challenge, in the past I argued that the inescapability of agency shows that we should not be worried by challenges that (...)
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  3. added 2016-04-25
    Justin Morton (forthcoming). A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism. Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) claim that evolution has influenced our moral faculties in such a way that, if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. I present several popular objections to the standard version of this argument, then give a new EDA that has clear advantages in responding to these objections. Whereas the Standard EDA argues that evolution has selected for many moral beliefs with certain contents, this New EDA claims that evolution has selected for one (...)
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  4. added 2016-04-25
    Jan Willem Wieland (forthcoming). Willful Ignorance. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch (2016).
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  5. added 2016-04-22
    Leonhard Menges (forthcoming). The Emotion Account of Blame. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...)
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  6. added 2016-04-21
    Isidora Stojanovic (forthcoming). Relativism. In David Plunkett & Tristram McPherson (eds.), The Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge
    Although relativism may be said to be one of the oldest doctrines in philosophy, dating back to the teachings of Protagoras in the 5th century B.C., when it comes to contemporary philosophy, there is no consensus on what makes a view qualify as "relativist". The problem is particularly accute in metaethics, since most of the views that up to a decade ago were described as “relativist” would be more accurately described as "contextualist" or even “expressivist” in light of the distinctions (...)
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  7. added 2016-04-15
    John Eriksson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (forthcoming). Non-Cognitivism and the Classification Account of Moral Uncertainty. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    ABSTRACTIt has been objected to moral non-cognitivism that it cannot account for fundamental moral uncertainty. A person is derivatively uncertain about whether an act is, say, morally wrong, when her certainty is at bottom due to uncertainty about whether the act has certain non-moral, descriptive, properties, which she takes to be wrong-making. She is fundamentally morally uncertain when her uncertainty directly concerns whether the properties of the act are wrong-making. In this paper we advance a new reply to the objection (...)
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  8. added 2016-04-14
    Julie Tannenbaum (2016). Richard Kraut, Against Absolute Goodness , Pp. Xii+ 224. Utilitas 28 (1):119-122.
    In Against Absolute Goodness Richard Kraut aims to show that absolute goodness (or badness) is not reason-giving; it plays no role is justifying or requiring certain attitudes and no role in reasoning about what to do. It passes the buck (it never adds to the weightiness of more specific reasons) and so for practical purposes can be ignored. However, he claims that the notions of ‘a good R’ (e.g. a good play) and ‘good for S’ do justify certain attitudes and (...)
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  9. added 2016-04-13
    Carla Bagnoli (forthcoming). Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical Reason. In Christine Strahele (ed.), Vulnerability in Context. Routledge chapter 4.
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  10. added 2016-04-13
    Eleonora Severini (forthcoming). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Moral Niche. Philosophia:1-11.
    The so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. When applied to morality, such arguments are intended to undermine moral realism. In this paper I will discuss Andreas Mogensen’s recent effort to secure moral realism against EDAs. Mogensen attempts to undermine the challenge provided by EDAs in metaethics through the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology. The problem with this move is that the proximate/ultimate distinction is misconceived. (...)
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  11. added 2016-04-11
    Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Outsourcing the Deep Self: Deep Self Discordance Does Not Explain Away Intuitions in Manipulation Arguments. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    According to manipulation arguments for incompatibilism, manipulation might undermine an agent’s responsibility even when the agent satisfies plausible compatibilist conditions on responsibility. According to Sripada, however, empirical data suggest that people take manipulation to undermine responsibility largely because they think that the manipulated act is in discord with the agent’s “deep self,” thus violating the plausible compatibilist condition of deep self concordance. This paper defends Sripada’s general methodological approach but presents data that strongly suggest that, contrary to Sripada’s contention, (...)
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  12. added 2016-04-11
    Subhasis Chattopadhyay (2016). Review of Giorgio Agamben's Pilate and Jesus. [REVIEW] Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 121 (4):431-33.
    This review shows Agamben as (mis)reading Dante and misunderstanding the Jesus event.
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  13. added 2016-04-10
    Yishai Cohen (forthcoming). Fischer's Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    According to the Dilemma Defense, it is question-begging against the incompatibilist defender of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) to assume that the agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case (FSC) cannot do otherwise in light of causal determinism, but is nevertheless morally responsible. As a result, Fischer (Philos Rev 119:315–336, 2010; Analysis 73:489–496, 2013) attempts to undermine PAP in a different manner via a deterministic FSC. More specifically, Fischer attempts to show that if causal determinism rules out an agent’s moral (...)
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  14. added 2016-04-10
    Jonathan Webber (2009). The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. Routledge.
    Webber argues for a new interpretation of Sartrean existentialism. On this reading, Sartre is arguing that each person’s character consists in the projects they choose to pursue and that we are all already aware of this but prefer not to face it. Careful consideration of his existentialist writings shows this to be the unifying theme of his theories of consciousness, freedom, the self, bad faith, personal relationships, existential psychoanalysis, and the possibility of authenticity. Developing this account affords many insights into (...)
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  15. added 2016-04-10
    Edgar Dahl (2003). Das Recht des Stärkeren. Aufklärung Und Kritik 7:84-88.
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  16. added 2016-04-09
    Douglas W. Portmore, Uncertainty, Indeterminacy, and Agent-Centered Constraints.
    Commonsense morality includes various agent-centered constraints, including ones against killing unnecessarily, breaking a promise, and punishing the innocent. However, it’s not always clear whether, had an agent φ-ed, she would have violated a constraint. And sometimes the reason for this is not that we lack knowledge of the relevant facts, but that there is no fact about whether her φ-ing would have constituted a constraint-violation. What, then, is a constraint-accepting theory (i.e., a theory that accepts that there are (...)
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  17. added 2016-04-09
    Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Maximalism and Moral Harmony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Maximalism is the view that an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking) if and only if she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking a pie), where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. Now, the aim of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when combined with maximalism results in (...)
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  18. added 2016-04-09
    Douglas Portmore (2008). Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.
    In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that moral reasons morally (...)
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  19. added 2016-04-08
    Zachary J. Goldberg (2016). Evil, "Evil", and Taking Responsibility. In Birgit Recki (ed.), Wozu ist das Böse gut? Mentis
    This essay will address the question for what good or purpose is evil. First, an examination of the use-mention distinction between evil and “evil” produces two distinct questions: what good is the presence of evil in the world, and what good is the concept of evil as part of our ethical vocabulary describing human interaction. By severing all logically necessary connections between evil and greater goods, we discover that the answer to the first question—what good is evil in the world—is (...)
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  20. added 2016-04-08
    Marcus Arvan (2016). Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory. Palgrave MacMillan.
    This book argues that moral philosophy should be based on seven scientific principles of theory selection. It then argues that a new moral theory—Rightness as Fairness—satisfies those principles more successfully than existing theories. Chapter 1 explicates the seven principles of theory-selection, arguing that moral philosophy must conform them to be truth-apt. Chapter 2 argues those principles jointly support founding moral philosophy in known facts of empirical moral psychology: specifically, our capacities for mental time-travel and modal imagination. Chapter 2 then shows (...)
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  21. added 2016-04-07
    Errol Lord (forthcoming). On the Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper I'm interested in the prospects for the Right Reasons theory of creditworthiness. The Right Reasons theory says that what it is for an (...)agent to be creditworthy for X-ing is for that agent to X for the right reasons. The paper has a negative goal and a positive goal. The negative goal is to show that a class of Right Reasons theories are doomed. These theories all have a Conceptualization Condition on acting for the right reasons. Conceptualization Conditions demand that agents who act for the right reasons deploy or be able to deploy certain normative concepts in acting. I argue that views of this type run into a host of overintellectualization problems. The positive aim is to argue for my Right Reasons view, which appeals to know-how to avoid overintellectualization. (shrink)
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  22. added 2016-04-03
    H. Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolyanatz, Alyssa N. Crittenden, Daniel M. T. Fessler, Simon Fitzpatrick, Michael Gurven, Joseph Henrich, Martin Kanovsky, Geoff Kushnick, Anne Pisor, Brooke A. Scelza, Stephen Stich, Chris von Rueden, Wanying Zhao & Stephen Laurence (forthcoming). Small-Scale Societies Exhibit Fundamental Variation in the Role of Intentions in Moral Judgment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
    Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Al- though these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating circumstances influence (...)
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  23. added 2016-04-01
    Eric Vogelstein (forthcoming). A New Moral Sentimentalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.
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  24. added 2016-03-31
    Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (forthcoming). Hard-Incompatbilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life. In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press
  25. added 2016-03-31
    Errol Lord (forthcoming). The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism About Practical Reason. In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Practical and Epistemic.
    Cognitivists about practical reason hold that we can explain why certain wide-scope requirements of practical rationality are true by appealing to certain epistemic requirements. Extant discussions of cognitivism focus solely on two claims. The first is the claim that intentions involve beliefs. The second is that whenever your intentions are incoherent in certain ways, you will be epistemically irrational (given that intentions involve beliefs). Even if the cognitivist successfully defends these claims, she still needs to show that they entail (...)
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  26. added 2016-03-31
    Stanley I. Benn (2011). A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosophy of action, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Its central idea is a radically unorthodox theory of rational action. Most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers believe that action is motivated by desire. Professor Benn rejects the doctrine and replaces it with a reformulation of Kant's ethical and political theory, in which rational action can be determined simply by principles, regardless of consequences. The book analyzes the way in which value conflicts can (...)
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  27. added 2016-03-31
    Alan H. Goldman (2010). Is Moral Motivation Rationally Required? Journal of Ethics 14 (1):1-16.
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  28. added 2016-03-31
    Jennie Louise (2009). I Won’T Do It! Self-Prediction, Moral Obligation and Moral Deliberation. Philosophical Studies 146 (3):327-348.
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  29. added 2016-03-31
    Stanley I. Benn (2009). A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosophy of action, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Its central idea is a radically unorthodox theory of rational action. Most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers believe that action is motivated by desire. Professor Benn rejects the doctrine and replaces it with a reformulation of Kant's ethical and political theory, in which rational action can be determined simply by principles, regardless of consequences. The book analyzes the way in which value conflicts can (...)
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  30. added 2016-03-31
    Johan Brännmark, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology.
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  31. added 2016-03-29
    Amrei Bahr & Markus Seidel (2016). Rule-Following and A Priori Biconditionals - A Sea of Tears? In Simon Derpmann & David Schweikard (eds.), Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Springer 19-31.
  32. added 2016-03-25
    Jan Willem Wieland & Philip Robichaud (forthcoming). Blame Transfer. In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press
    Many philosophers accept derivative blameworthiness for ignorant conduct – the idea that the blameworthiness for one’s ignorance can ‘transfer’ to blameworthiness for one’s subsequent ignorant conduct. In this chapter we ask the question what it actually means that blameworthiness would transfer, and explore four distinct views and their merits. On views (I) and (II), one’s overall degree of blameworthiness is determined by factors relevant to one’s ignorance and/or one’s subsequent conduct, and transfer only involves an increase in scope. On views (...)
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  33. added 2016-03-25
    Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.) (forthcoming). Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars, and it is high time for a full volume on the topic. The chapters in this volume address the following central questions. Does the epistemic condition require (...)
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  34. added 2016-03-25
    Jan Willem Wieland (forthcoming). The Epistemic Condition. In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press
    This introduction provides an overview of the current state of the debate on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In sect. 1, we discuss the main concepts ‘ignorance’ and ‘responsibility’. In sect. 2, we ask why agents should inform themselves. In sect. 3, we describe what we take to be the core agreement among main participants in the debate. In sect. 4, we explain how this agreement invites a regress argument with a revisionist implication. In sect. 5, we provide (...)
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  35. added 2016-03-25
    Paulo Vélez León (2012). Nicolai Hartmann: Una apostilla bio-bibliográfica a propósito de la traducción de su Ética [Nicolai Hartmann: A bibliographical apostille regarding the translation of his Ethics]. Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 1 (1):113-129.
    [ES] En este trabajo [1] se especifican los aspectos centrales de la estructura y contenido de la monumental obra de Nicolai Hartmann, recientemente traducida al castellano, Ética, y [2] en correspondencia con lo anterior, se indica sumariamente el propósito de su planteamiento ético. [EN] In this work (1) it is specified the central aspects of the structure and content of Nicolai Hartmann´s monumental oeuvre, recently translated into Spanish, Ethics, and (2) in correspondence with the above, it is summarily indicated the (...)
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  36. added 2016-03-24
    Gavin Keeney, Mad Square.
    Review of “The Mad Square: Modernity in German Art 1910-37”, National Gallery of Victoria, Melbourne, Australia, November 25, 2011-March 4, 2012. A version of this essay appeared in the Appendices of Gavin Keeney, Not-I/Thou: The Other Subject of Art and Architecture (CSP, 2014), pp. 153-57.
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  37. added 2016-03-21
    Eric Brandstedt (2015). The Circumstances of Intergenerational Justice. Moral Philosophy and Politics 2 (1):33-56.
    Some key political challenges today, e.g. climate change, are future oriented. The intergenerational setting differs in some notable ways from the intragenerational one, creating obstacles to theorizing about intergenerational justice. One concern is that as the circumstances of justice do not pertain intergenerationally, intergenerational justice is not meaningful. In this paper, I scrutinize this worry by analysing the presentations of the doctrine of the circumstances of justice by David Hume and John Rawls. I argue that we should accept the upshot (...)
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  38. added 2016-03-18
    Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). The Emergence of the Drive Concept and the Collapse of the Animal/Human Divide. In Peter Adamson & G. Fay Edwards (eds.), Oxford Philosophical Concepts: Animals.
    In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, philosophers including Kant and Hegel draw a sharp distinction between the human and the animal. The human is self-conscious, the animal is not; the human has moral worth, the animal does not. By the mid to late nineteenth century, these claims are widely rejected. As scientific and philosophical work on the cognitive and motivational capacities of animals increases in sophistication, many philosophers become suspicious of the idea that there is any divide between (...)
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  39. added 2016-03-18
    Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Nietzsche and Murdoch on the Moral Significance of Perceptual Experience. European Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper examines a claim defended by an unlikely pair: Friedrich Nietzsche and Iris Murdoch. The claim is that perceptual experience itself—as distinct from perceptually based judgments and beliefs—can be morally significant. In particular, Nietzsche and Murdoch hold that two agents in the same circumstances attending to the same objects can have experiences with different contents, depending on the concepts that they possess and employ. Moreover, they maintain that this renders perception an object of moral concern. This paper explicates these (...)
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  40. added 2016-03-18
    Alejandro Pérez Carballo (2014). Semantic Hermeneutics. In Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. Oxford University Press 119-146.
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  41. added 2016-03-18
    N. Sinhababu (2009). The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended. Philosophical Review 118 (4):465-500.
    This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of them have proposed counterexamples to it. Using a novel account of desire, this essay handles the proposed counterexamples in a way that shows the superiority of the Humean theory. The essay addresses the classic (...)
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  42. added 2016-03-17
    Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder (2016). Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):101-112.
    Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch’s two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also (...)
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  43. added 2016-03-17
    N. Roughley & T. Schramme (eds.) (2015). On Moral Sentimentalism. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
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  44. added 2016-03-17
    N. Roughley & T. Schramme (2015). Introduction: Moral Sentimentalism: Context and Critique. In Neil Roughley & Thomas Schramme (eds.), On Moral Sentimentalism. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 1-18.
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  45. added 2016-03-17
    Thomas Schramme (2015). Amoralität und Psychopathologie. Psycho Im Fokus: Das Magazin der DGPPN:38-40.
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  46. added 2016-03-17
    Thomas Schramme (2015). On Empathy as the Cement of the Moral Universe. In Neil Roughley & Thomas Schramme (eds.), On Moral Sentimentalism. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 42-49.
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  47. added 2016-03-17
    Thomas Schramme (2014). Being a (A-)Moral Person and Caring About Morality. In Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity. MIT Press 227-244.
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  48. added 2016-03-17
    Thomas Schramme (2014). Introduction. In Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity. MIT Press 1-39.
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  49. added 2016-03-16
    Brendan Cline (forthcoming). Against Deliberative Indispensability as an Independent Guide to What There Is. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    David Enoch has recently proposed that the deliberative indispensability of irreducibly normative facts suffices to support their inclusion in our ontology, even if they are not necessary for the explanation of any observable phenomena. He challenges dissenters to point to a relevant asymmetry between explanation and deliberation that shows why explanatory indispensability, but not deliberative indispensability, is a legitimate guide to ontology. In this paper, I aim to do just that. Given that an entity figures in the actual explanation of (...)
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  50. added 2016-03-16
    Logi Gunnarsson (2009). Making Moral Sense: Beyond Habermas and Gauthier. Cambridge University Press.
    Is it rational to be moral? Can moral disputes be settled rationally? Which criteria determine what we have a good reason to do? In this innovative book, Logi Gunnarsson takes issue with the assumption made by many philosophers faced with the problem of reconciling moral norms with a scientific world view, namely that morality must be offered a non-moral justification based on a formal concept of rationality. He argues that the criteria for the rationality of an action are irreducibly substantive, (...)
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