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Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
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  1. added 2015-04-18
    Isthiyaque Haji (2001). Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):711-715.
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  2. added 2015-04-17
    Danny Frederick (2015). Book Review: Robert Audi, 'Moral Perception'. [REVIEW] Reason Papers 37 (1):164-69.
    I summarise Robert Audi's 'Moral Perception.' I concede that there is such a thing as moral perception. However, moral perceptions are culturally-relative, which refutes Audi’s claims that moral perception may ground moral knowledge and that it provides inter-subjectively accessible grounds which make ethical objectivity possible. Audi's attempt to avoid the refutation tends to convert rational disputes into ad hominem ones. I illustrate that with the example of the ethics of prostitution.
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  3. added 2015-04-14
    Bart Streumer, Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.
    According to Jonas Olson, "a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity". I agree. But unlike Olson, I think that we cannot believe this error theory. I first argue that Olson is wrong to think that reasons for belief need not be irreducibly normative. I then argue that if reasons for belief are irreducibly normative, we cannot believe an error theory about all irreducible normativity. I then show that if we cannot believe this error (...)
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  4. added 2015-04-13
    Hector Neri Castaneda (1954). The Logical Structure of Moral Reasoning. Dissertation, University of Minnesota
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  5. added 2015-04-12
    Vuko Andric & Attila Tanyi (forthcoming). Multidimensional Consequentialism and Risk. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    . In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson proposes a version of multi-dimensional consequentialism according to which risk is one among several dimensions. We argue that Peterson’s treatment of risk is unsatisfactory. More precisely, we want to show that all problems of one-dimensional (objective or subjective) consequentialism are also problems for Peterson’s proposal, although it may fall prey to them less often. In ending our paper, we address the objection that our discussion overlooks the fact that Peterson’s (...)
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  6. added 2015-04-10
    John M. Doris (forthcoming). Doing Without (Arguing About) Desert. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    This paper is a critical discussion of Manuel Vargas’ Building Better Beings, focusing on the treatment of desert therein. By means of an analogy between morality and sport, I examine some seemingly peculiar implications of Vargas’ teleological and revisionary account of desert. I also consider some general questions of philosophical methodology provoked by revisionary approaches.
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  7. added 2015-04-10
    Howard Nye (forthcoming). Directly Plausible Principles. In Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave MacMillan. 610-636.
    In this chapter I defend a methodological view about how we should conduct substantive ethical inquiries in the fields of normative and practical ethics. I maintain that the direct plausibility and implausibility of general ethical principles – once fully clarified and understood – should be foundational in our substantive ethical reasoning. I argue that, in order to expose our ethical intuitions about particular cases to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine whether they can be justified by directly plausible principles. To (...)
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  8. added 2015-04-09
    Matt King & Joshua May (forthcoming). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness. In N. Levy, M. Griffiths & K. Timpe (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
    In this chapter, we explore how mental illness affects the aptness for attributing responsibility to individuals as well as the justification for holding them responsible for their acts. We begin in Section 2 by tackling some preliminaries, both to refine our guiding question and the parameters relevant to that inquiry. In Section 3, we consider when mental illness surely excuses. In Section 4, we consider conditions that don’t excuse agents from responsibility. Section 5 looks at how the answer to the (...)
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  9. added 2015-04-07
    David E. Alexander (2010). Problems for Moral/Natural Supervenience: DAVID E. ALEXANDER. Religious Studies 47 (1):73-84.
    ???Everyone agrees that the moral features of things supervene on their natural features??? , 22). Everyone is wrong, or so I will argue. In the first section, I explain the version of moral supervenience that Smith and others argue everyone should accept. In the second section, I argue that the mere conceptual possibility of a divine command theory of morality is sufficient to refute the version of moral supervenience under consideration. Lastly, I consider and respond to two objections, showing, among (...)
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  10. added 2015-04-06
    Stephen Turner (forthcoming). The Present State of the Individual–Holism Debate. Metascience:1-3.
    The problem of holism in social science has, as Zahle and Collin, the editors of this volume note, a long history. It has revived, however, in a peculiar way, inspired by such things as the literature on corporate responsibility in ethics, the idea of supervenience, “Critical Realism” in sociology, ideas about emergence, the use of game-theoretic models to account for collective outcomes, and various notions of collective actors with collective intentions. These new inspirations interact with older problematics, such as the (...)
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  11. added 2015-04-06
    T. Boyer, C. Mayo-Wilson & M. Weisberg (eds.) (forthcoming). Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge.
  12. added 2015-04-06
    Iep Author, Metaethics, Constructivism In.
    Constructivism in Metaethics It is difficult to provide an uncontroversial statement of constructivism in metaethics, since the terms of this doctrine are themselves the focus of philosophical debate. However, this view is now perhaps most commonly understood as a metaphysical thesis concerning how we are to understand the nature of normative facts–that is, facts about … Continue reading Metaethics, Constructivism in →.
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  13. added 2015-04-06
    Edmund Wall (2015). Natural Morality, Descriptivism, and Non-Cognitivism. Philosophia 43 (1):233-248.
    I attempt to identify a problem running through the foundation of R. M. Hare’s ethical prescriptivism and the more recent sentimentalism/ethical expressivism of Simon Blackburn. The non-cognitivism to which Hare and Blackburn’s approaches are committed renders them unable to establish stable contents for basic moral principles and, thus, incapable of conducting a logical analysis of moral terms or statements. I argue that objective-descriptive-natural ethical theories are in a much better position to provide a satisfying account of the logical analysis of (...)
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  14. added 2015-04-06
    Roger M. White (2015). Peter Geach and “The Frege Point. Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):133-149.
    Peter Geach frequently showed the relevance of some of Frege's insights to contemporary philosophical debates, such as that which Geach called “the Frege Point” – “a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition”. Geach argued against a variety of “expressivist” accounts of certain propositions that their proponents could not explain the significance of such propositions in subordinate clauses. The paper extends Geach's argument to show that “the Frege Point” presents a powerful (...)
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  15. added 2015-04-06
    Z. J. Goldberg (2015). Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):280-282.
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  16. added 2015-04-06
    Simon Blackburn (2015). Blessed Are the Peacemakers. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):843-853.
    In this paper I explore the points of similarity and difference that distinguish expressivists such as myself from the position known as Cornell realism. I argue that there are considerable overlaps of doctrine, although these doctrines are arrived at in very different ways. I urge that Cornell realism can only benefit by taking on some of the commitments of expressivism.
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  17. added 2015-04-06
    John Eriksson (2015). Explaining Disagreement: A Problem for Hybrid Expressivists. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):39-53.
    Hybrid expressivists depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express beliefs and desires. Daniel Boisvert and Michael Ridge, two prominent defenders of hybrid views, also depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express general attitudes rather than an attitude towards the subject of the sentence. This article argues that even if the shift to general attitudes helps solve some of the traditional problems associated with pure expressivism, a view like Ridge's, according to which the descriptive meaning (...)
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  18. added 2015-04-06
    Howard Wettstein (2014). Forward-Looking Collective Responsibility. Wiley.
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  19. added 2015-04-06
    Robert Cowan, Review Of: Moral Perception by Robert Audi. [REVIEW]
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  20. added 2015-04-06
    Steven Patterson & Charles V. Blatz, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Conductive Argument.
    In this paper I compare and contrast Rawls’s notion of reflective equilibrium with Wellman‘s notion of conductive argument. In the course of so doing I will address two key questions: Are conduc-tive argument and reflective equilibrium best understood as modes of reasoning or types of argument? and What relationship , if any, is there between them?
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  21. added 2015-04-06
    John M. Cooper (2009). CHAPTER 12. Moral Theory and Moral Improvement: Seneca. In , Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy. Princeton University Press. 309-334.
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  22. added 2015-04-06
    James B. Freeman, Higher Level Moral Principles in Argumentation.
    Suppose two persons disagree over whether an act is right, justifying their judgments by appealing to divergent higher-level moral principles. These principles function as backing and rebuttals in their argumentation. To justify these principles, we may argue either that they would be accepted in some ideal model or that they are in reflective equilibrium with our considered moral judgments. Disagreement over the model indicates difference in philosophical anthropology but does not preclude resolution through argument.
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  23. added 2015-04-06
    Geoffrey Harrison Ferrari & Krister Bykvist, Explaining Right and Wrong.
    When an act is right or wrong, there may be an explanation why. Different moral theories recognize different moral facts and offer different explanations of them, but they offer no account of moral explanation itself. What, then, is its nature? This thesis seeks a systematic account of moral explanation within a framework of moral realism. In Chapter 1, I develop a pluralist theory of explanation. I argue that there is a prima facie distinctive normative mode of explanation that is essential (...)
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  24. added 2015-04-06
    Joseph Heath (2003). Christopher McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 23:53-56.
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  25. added 2015-04-06
    Trudy Govier, Collective Responsibility and the Fallacies of Composition and Division.
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  26. added 2015-04-06
    Harry van der Linden, Moral Relativism.
    Harry van der Linden's contribution to: American Justice, ed. Joseph M. Bessette.
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  27. added 2015-04-06
    Harry van der Linden, Cohen, Collective Responsibility, and Economic Democracy.
    My main objective in this paper is to show that Hermann Cohen's ethics offers an important but hitherto neglected contribution to the- current debate within Anglo-American ethics on the moral status of the modern business corporation.
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  28. added 2015-04-06
    Ronald Dmitri Milo (1984). Four: Moral Negligence. In , Immorality. Princeton University Press. 82-114.
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  29. added 2015-04-05
    Aaron Cobb (unknown). Do Objections to Motivational Judgment Internalism Cripple Gibbard's Account? Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 20.
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  30. added 2015-04-05
    Adam Leite Kate Abramson (2011). Love as a Reactive Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):673-699.
    One variety of love is familiar in everyday life and qualifies in every reasonable sense as a reactive attitude. ‘Reactive love’ is paradigmatically an affectionate attachment to another person, appropriately felt as a non‐self‐interested response to particular kinds of morally laudable features of character expressed by the loved one in interaction with the lover, and paradigmatically manifested in certain kinds of acts of goodwill and characteristic affective, desiderative and other motivational responses . ‘Virtues of intimacy’ as expressed in interaction with (...)
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  31. added 2015-04-05
    Antonio Gaitán Torres (2010). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:333-337.
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  32. added 2015-04-05
    Jonas Olson Krister Bykvist (2009). Expressivism and Moral Certitude. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
    Michael Smith has recently argued that non‐cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non‐cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non‐cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non‐cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non‐cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...)
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  33. added 2015-04-05
    Ana González (2009). Éticas Sin Moral. Pensamiento y Cultura 12:303-320.
    En el debate ético contemporáneo coexisten planteamientos derivados de la filosofía moral moderna con otros enfoques que cuestionan sus ambiciones normativas. Estos enfoques se han descrito como “éticas sin moral”, dando por sentado que el término “moral” recoge un aspecto nuclear del pensamiento ético moderno: el deseo de identificar las normas universales objetivas. En este ensayo me propongo examinar si es posible defender la normatividad de la razón sustrayéndose a las críticas esgrimidas desde las contemporáneas éticas sin moral.
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  34. added 2015-04-05
    Sam Cowling (2006). Mark Kalderon, Ed., Fictionalism in Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 26:197-199.
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  35. added 2015-04-05
    Crystal Thorpe (2006). Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 26:163-165.
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  36. added 2015-04-05
    David Kahane (1999). George Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 19:148-152.
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  37. added 2015-04-05
    Ian Chowcat (1999). George Sher, Approximate Justice: Studies in Non-Ideal Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 19:146-148.
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  38. added 2015-04-05
    Michael Sean Brady (1998). Rejecting Internalism. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    Internalism is the view that the truth of normative propositions depends solely upon elements which are internal to subjects. In this dissertation I argue that we should reject the primary rationale for taking an internalist line in various areas of normative assessment, namely a principle known as the Internalism Requirement. In the first part of the dissertation I focus on epistemology, and argue that we should reject the internalism requirement on epistemic reasons, i.e., the claim that reasons for believing must (...)
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  39. added 2015-04-05
    Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson (1996). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Philosophy 71 (278):622-624.
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  40. added 2015-04-05
    John King-Farlow (1995). Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 15:4-6.
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  41. added 2015-04-05
    Thomas Cavanaugh (1995). R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility And The Moral Sentiments. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 15:296-298.
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  42. added 2015-04-05
    Ken Yasenchuk (1995). A Critique of Assimilative Moral Realism. Dissertation, Mcmaster University (Canada)
    David Brink, in his book Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, and other writers, have recently offered powerful new arguments for a form of moral realism that sees moral inquiry as being "on par" with scientific inquiry in many important epistemological and metaphysical respects. I call this theory "Assimilative Moral Realism" . AMR is marked by naturalism about moral facts, and by empiricism about moral knowledge. Moral facts are held to be facts about properties that are constituted by, and (...)
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  43. added 2015-04-05
    Gerald R. B. Lang (1994). An Enquiry Into Moral Realism.
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  44. added 2015-04-05
    Folke Tersman (1993). Reflective Equilibrium an Essay in Moral Epistemology.
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  45. added 2015-04-05
    Stefan S. Sencerz (1992). Moral Intuitions, Moral Facts, and Justification in Ethics. Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    A central and fundamental problem in moral philosophy is that of understanding how moral principles and theories can be justified. It involves finding rational solutions to both theoretical problems and to substantial moral questions . According to Moral Intuitionism, some normative judgments, usually called moral intuitions, justify moral principles and theories. Typically, moral intuitionists promise a method that is supposed to yield progress toward finding the answers to ethical disputes and controversies. ;I argue, first, that all versions of moral intuitionism (...)
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  46. added 2015-04-05
    Jonathan A. Jacobs (1990). Being True to the World Moral Realism and Practical Wisdom.
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  47. added 2015-04-05
    Richard Bett (1989). Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Ed., Essays on Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 9:252-254.
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  48. added 2015-04-05
    John Bricke (1988). Jonathan Dancy, Berkeley: An Introduction. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 8:89-92.
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  49. added 2015-04-05
    Oliver Johnson (1987). Stephen Satris, Ethical Emotivism. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 7:526-528.
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  50. added 2015-04-05
    Richard Arnot Home Bett (1986). Moral Scepticism: Why Ask "Why Should I Be Moral"? Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Many of us have a prereflective sense--or at least, a hope--that there are reasons to be moral which apply to an agent regardless of what his or her existing motivations may be. The view that there are no such reasons may, then, be regarded as a form of moral scepticism. The philosophical position which seems most fit to refute this form of moral scepticism, and hence to support our prereflective sense, is a Kantian view of morality, according to which we (...)
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1 — 50 / 214