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Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
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  1. added 2016-12-01
    Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Creditworthiness and Matching Principles. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press
    You are creditworthy for φ-ing only if φ-ing is the right thing to do. Famously though, further conditions are needed too – Kant’s shopkeeper did the right thing, but is not creditworthy for doing so. This case shows that creditworthiness requires that there be a certain kind of explanation of why you did the right thing. The reasons for which you act – your motivating reasons – must meet some further conditions. In this paper, I defend a new account of (...)
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  2. added 2016-11-28
    Christian Miller (2016). In Defense of a Supernatural Foundation to Morality: Reply to Shermer. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences:91-96.
    In my original paper, I claimed that our moral obligations are real, objective, and grounded in the supernatural. In particular, I endorsed the claim that God's will is the basis or source of our moral obligations, where “God” is to be understood as the theistic being who is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent, who created the universe, and who is still actively involved in the universe after creating it. In his critical article, Michael Shermer has raised a number of important challenges (...)
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  3. added 2016-11-28
    James Beebe, Runya Qiaoan, Tomasz Wysocki & Miguel A. Endara (2015). “Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective”. Journal of Cognition and Culture 15:386-401.
    Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to the study of folk metaethical beliefs. We report the results of a cross-cultural study using Chinese, Polish and Ecuadorian participants that seeks to advance this line of investigation. Individuals in all three demographic groups were observed to attribute objectivity to ethical statements in very similar patterns. Differences in participants’ strength of opinion about an issue, the level of societal agreement or disagreement about an issue, and participants’ age were found to significantly affect (...)
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  4. added 2016-11-28
    James R. Beebe (2015). The Empirical Study of Folk Metaethics. Etyka 15.
    In this paper, I review recent attempts by experimental philosophers and psychologists to study folk metaethics empirically and discuss some of the difficulties that researchers face when trying to construct the right kind of research materials and interpreting the results that they obtain. At first glance, the findings obtained so far do not look good for the thesis that people are everywhere moral realists about every moral issue. However, because of difficulties in interpreting these results, I argue that better research (...)
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  5. added 2016-11-28
    James R. Beebe (2014). How Different Kinds of Disagreement Impact Folk Metaethical Judgments. In Jennifer Cole Wright & Hagop Sarkissian (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology. Bloomsbury 167-187.
    Th e present article reports a series of experiments designed to extend the empirical investigation of folk metaethical intuitions by examining how different kinds of ethical disagreement can impact attributions of objectivity to ethical claims.
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  6. added 2016-11-27
    Alfred Gierer (2008). Was ist der Mensch? In D. Ganten, V. Gerhardt, J. Nida-Rümelin & J. C. Heilinger (eds.), Was ist der Mensch? Humanprojekt der BBAW. De Gruyter 103-105.
    Der Text ist eines von achtzig Kurzessays zum Thema „Was ist der Mensch“, zu denen unsere Arbeitsgruppe „Humanprojekt“ der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften eingeladen hat. So genau Aussagen inhaltlicher Naturwissenschaft oft sind, auf der metatheoretischen Ebene bleibt die Gesamtheit unseres Wissens, und damit auch die Stellung des Menschen in der Natur deutungsfähig und deutungsbedürftig; sie ist mit verschiedenen, natürlich nicht mit allen, philosophischen, kulturellen und religiösen Interpretationen vereinbar; erkenntnislogisch gesehen dürfen und können wir wählen. Worum es dabei eigentlich geht, ist (...)
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  7. added 2016-11-26
    Christian Miller (2016). On Shermer On Morality. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences:63-68.
    This paper is part of a six paper exchange with Michael Shermer. This is my critical commentary on Michael Shermer's paper “Morality is real, objective, and natural.” Shermer and I agree that morality is both real and objective. Here I raise serious reservations about both Shermer's account of where morality comes from and his account of what morality tells us to do. His approach to the foundations of morality would allow some very disturbing behaviors to count as moral, and his (...)
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  8. added 2016-11-25
    Christian Miller (forthcoming). Rationalism and Intuitionism. In Mark Timmons, Karen Jones & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge
    One of the liveliest areas in moral psychology in recent years has been research on the extent to which conscious reasoning leads to the formation of moral judgments. The goal of this chapter is to review and briefly assess three of the leading positions today on this topic - traditional rationalism, social intuitionism, and morphological rationalism - each of which has significant implications for moral epistemology.
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  9. added 2016-11-24
    Michael Ridge & Sean McKeever (2016). Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  10. added 2016-11-22
    Robert J. Hartman (forthcoming). Accepting Moral Luck. In Ian Church (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck.
    I argue for the view that certain kinds of luck in results, circumstances, and constitutive properties can partially determine an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two agents drive recklessly, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. But only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue (...)
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  11. added 2016-11-19
    Nathan Stout (forthcoming). Salience, Imagination, and Moral Luck. Philosophical Papers.
    In this paper, I begin by addressing the way in which T.M. Scanlon's account of blame aims to solve the problem of moral luck by appealing to the significance of an agent’s actions. I then attempt to show that this solution to the problem fails in an important way insofar as there may be cases of outcome luck in which one’s being a member of a particular relationship with normative standards is itself a matter of luck. After presenting this challenge, (...)
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  12. added 2016-11-18
    Thomas Pölzler (forthcoming). Are Moral Judgements Adaptations? Three Reasons Why It Is so Difficult to Tell. South African Journal of Philosophy.
    An increasing number of scholars argue that moral judgements are adaptations, i.e., that they have been shaped by natural selection. Is this hypothesis true? In this paper I shall not attempt to answer this important question. Rather, I pursue the more modest aim of pointing out three difficulties that anybody who sets out to determine the adaptedness of moral judgments should be aware of (though some so far have not been aware of). First, the hypothesis that moral judgements are adaptations (...)
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  13. added 2016-11-15
    Frédéric Minner (2015). From Indignation to Norms Against Violence in Occupy Geneva: A Case Study for the Problem of the Emergence of Norms. Social Science Information 54 (4):497-524.
    Why and how do norms emerge? Which norms emerge and why these ones in particular? Such questions belong to the ‘problem of the emergence of norms’, which consists of an inquiry into the production of norms in social collectives. I address this question through the ethnographic study of the emergence of ‘norms against violence’ in the political collective Occupy Geneva. I do this, first, empirically, with the analysis of my field observations; and, second, theoretically, by discussing my findings. In consequence (...)
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  14. added 2016-11-11
    Levy Arnon & Levy Yair (forthcoming). The Debunking Challenge to Realism: How Evolution (Ultimately) Matters. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) have attracted extensive attention in meta-ethics, as they pose an important challenge to moral realism. Mogensen (2015) suggests that EDAs contain a fallacy, by confusing two distinct forms of biological explanation – ultimate and proximate. If correct, the point is of considerable importance: evolutionary genealogies of human morality are simply irrelevant for debunking. But we argue that the actual situation is subtler: while ultimate claims do not strictly entail proximate ones, there are important evidential connections between (...)
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  15. added 2016-11-10
    Douglas I. Campbell (forthcoming). Doxastic Desire and Attitudinal Monism. Synthese:1-23.
    How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively explain all the rest? Motivational Humeans hold that at least two attitudes are indispensable, belief and desire. Desire-As-Belief theorists beg to differ. They hold that the belief attitude can do the all the work the desire attitude is supposed to do, because desires are in fact nothing but beliefs of a certain kind. If this is correct it has major implications both for the philosophy (...)
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  16. added 2016-11-09
    Rune Lines & Marcus Selart (2013). Participation and Organizational Commitment During Change: From Utopist to Realist Perspectives. In Skipton Leonard, Rachel Lewis, Arthur Freedman & Jonathan Passmore (eds.), Handbook of the psychology of leadership, change, and organizational development. Wiley-Blackwell 289-313.
    Trust has a great potential for furthering our understanding of organizational change and learning. This potential however remains largely untapped. It is argued that two reasons as for why this potential remains unrealized are: (i) A narrow conceptualization of change as implementation and (ii) an emphasis on direct and aggregated effects of individual trust to the exclusion of other effects. It is further suggested that our understanding of the effects of trust on organizational change, should benefit from including effects of (...)
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  17. added 2016-11-08
    Svein Tvedt Johansen, Marcus Selart & Kjell Grønhaug (2013). The Effects of Risk on Initial Trust Formation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 43:1185-1199.
    This paper seeks to expand our understanding of initial trust by looking at how variation in risk influences the nature of trust and the process of initial trust formation. Four hypotheses were tested in two experiments involving participants with and without work experience. A first hypothesis suggested a positive relationship between a general propensity to trust and initial trust; a second hypothesis, a negative relationship between risk and initial trust; whereas a third hypothesis posited that risk would increase the importance (...)
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  18. added 2016-11-07
    Daniele Bertini (forthcoming). Others Matter. The Failure of the Autonomous Approach to Ethics. Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 2017.
    The critical target of my paper is the normativist stance of Kantian meta ethics. After a very short introduction, I develop a characterization of contemporary mainstream Kantism as a conjunction of a normativist claim, a rationalist claim and a proceduralist claim. In the subsequent section I make the case against the normativist claim by drawing a counterexample, and defend the relevance of such counterexample as a reason that defeats the appeal of the Kantian approach to meta ethics. I finally conclude (...)
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  19. added 2016-11-07
    G. Cavallo (forthcoming). Genealogical Inquiry and Universal Moral Values. Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 2017.
  20. added 2016-11-07
    Daniele Bertini (forthcoming). Introduction to Moral Heteronomy. History, Proposals, Arguments. Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 2017.
    An introduction to how heteronomous views address the topic of moral autonomy. In the first section I provide a short history of the rise of the autonomy stance in meta ethics. Then I sketch the relationship between Kant and mainstream contemporary Kantians. I finally outline a summary of the papers in the special issue of Dialegesthai.
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  21. added 2016-11-07
    Sean Allen-Hermanson (2016). Review: Implicit Bias and Philosophy (Vol. 1 & 2). Philosophy:1-8.
  22. added 2016-11-07
    James Edwin Mahon (2016). Review of Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016.
    In this review I examine Cuneo's comparison of the non-normative, perlocutionary-intention theory of speech acts (Grice) with the normative theory of speech acts (Searle and Alston) and the moral theory of speech acts (Wolterstorff, Cuneo) in his transcendental argument for moral realism (since moral facts are among the necessary conditions for the possibility of speech acts, and since there are speech acts (asserting, promising, asking questions, issuing commands, etc.), it follows that moral facts exist). I argue that Cuneo does not (...)
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  23. added 2016-11-07
    Adrian M. S. Piper (2012). Kant's Self-Legislation Procedure Reconsidered. Kant Studies Online 2012:203-277.
    Most published discussions in contemporary metaethics include some textual exegesis of the relevant contemporary authors, but little or none of the historical authors who provide the underpinnings of their general approach. The latter is usually relegated to the historical, or dismissed as expository. Sometimes this can be a useful division of labor. But it can also lead to grave confusion about the views under discussion, and even about whose views are, in fact, under discussion. Elijah Millgram’s article, “Does the Categorical (...)
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  24. added 2016-11-05
    William B. Starr (2016). Dynamic Expressivism About Deontic Modality. In Nate Charlow Matthew Chrisman (ed.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press 355-394.
  25. added 2016-11-04
    William B. Starr (2016). Expressing Permission. Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26:325-349.
    This paper proposes a semantics for free choice permission that explains both the non-classical behavior of modals and disjunction in sentences used to grant permission, and their classical behavior under negation. It also explains why permissions can expire when new information comes in and why free choice arises even when modals scope under disjunction. On the proposed approach, deontic modals update preference orderings, and connectives operate on these updates rather than propositions. The success of this approach stems from its capacity (...)
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  26. added 2016-11-01
    Nate Charlow (forthcoming). Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of Imperatives. In Daniel Fogal Daniel Harris & Matt Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts. Oxford University Press
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  27. added 2016-10-31
    Uri Harris, The Is-Ought Problem Stems From Morality as a Simplifying Framework.
    In this paper, I argue that David Hume's is-ought problem stems from morality as a simplifying framework. Morality is the attempt to describe human behaviour and its relation to nature through a court framework, dating to prehistoric times. Such a court does not really exist, hence we are not referring to anything directly when we make moral statements, and therefore 'is' and 'ought' do not align. The solution is to replace morality with what it's really trying to describe: patterns in (...)
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  28. added 2016-10-31
    Joseph Long (2016). Non-Cognitivism and the Problem of Moral-Based Epistemic Reasons: A Sympathetic Reply to Cian Dorr. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:N/A.
    According to Cian Dorr, non-cognitivism has the implausible implication that arguments like the following are cases of wishful thinking: If lying is wrong, then the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife; lying is wrong; therefore, the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife. Dorr further claims that if non-cognitivism implies that the above argument and similar arguments are cases of wishful thinking, then non-cognitivism remains implausible even if one solves the so-called Frege-Geach problem. Dorr’s claims (...)
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  29. added 2016-10-30
    Aleksandr Mishura (forthcoming). Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases. Axiomathes:1-10.
    Frankfurt-type cases with covered manipulation received a great attention in the debates about freedom of will and moral responsibility. They pretend to give the refutation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities and to show that we can intuitively blame or praise an agent who was not able to do otherwise. In this paper, I will try to make explicit some basic intuitions underlying the agent’s responsibility in Frankfurt-type cases, which were surprisingly ignored in the contemporary debates. The key intuition is (...)
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  30. added 2016-10-27
    Uri Harris, Morality is Neither an External Object nor a Personal Preference, It's a Simplifying Framework.
    The central question in meta-ethics, and arguably all of ethics, is the question of what moral statements refer to. Several candidates have been proposed, including Platonic objects, natural objects, commands, and personal preferences. The answer, I suggest, is that it is none of these. Rather, morality is a framework. We see this by looking at common moral terms: ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘justice’, ‘guilt’, ‘responsibility’, ‘blame’, and ‘rights’. These terms all have something in common: they are legal terms. Since morality dates (...)
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  31. added 2016-10-27
    Alfred Archer (forthcoming). Aesthetic Judgements and Motivation. Inquiry.
    Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from Non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical Non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting Non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing (...)
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  32. added 2016-10-26
    Uri Harris, The Amoral Society.
    In this paper, I argue that morality is a simplifying framework for describing human behaviour and its relation to nature, based on the analogy of a human court, and that the correct framework is functional, informed by evolutionary theory. Because of this, morality breaks down when extended beyond everyday situations, and this has led to severely negative consequences in some situations where it has been used as a guide for large-scale societal change. It also blocks progress in the social sciences (...)
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  33. added 2016-10-20
    Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism About Culpability. In Shoemaker David (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press
    Recently, a number of authors have suggested that reflection on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility shows that cases of blameworthiness are much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This paper argues that such skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases motivating epistemic skepticism and (...)
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  34. added 2016-10-19
    Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (forthcoming). Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life. In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press
    As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some (...)
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  35. added 2016-10-19
    Adam R. Thompson (forthcoming). Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Philosophia.
    A classic, though basically neglected question about motivation arises when we attempt to account for blame’s nature—namely, does the recognition central to blame need help from an independent desire in order to motivate the blame-characteristic dispositions that arise in the blamer? Those who have attended to the question think the answer is yes. Hence, they adopt what I call a Humean Construal of blame on which blame is (a) a judgment that an individual S is blameworthy and (b) an independent (...)
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  36. added 2016-10-18
    Blake McAllister (2016). Divine Command Theory and Moral Supervenience. Philosophia Christi 18 (1):65-78.
    Mark Murphy argues that the property identity version of divine command theory, coupled with the doctrine that God has freedom in commanding, violates the supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral. In other words, they permit two situations exactly alike in nonmoral facts to differ in moral facts. I give three arguments to show that a divine command theorist of this sort can consistently affirm moral supervenience. Each argument contends that there are always nonmoral differences between worlds with different divine (...)
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  37. added 2016-10-17
    Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2016). Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
    This book explores the nature of moral responsibilities of affluent individuals in the developed world, addressing global poverty and arguments that philosophers have offered for having these responsibilities. The first type of argument grounds responsibilities in ability to avert serious suffering by taking on some cost. The second argument seeks to ground responsibilities in the fact that the affluent are contributing to such poverty. The authors criticise many of the claims advanced by those who seek to ground stringent responsibilities to (...)
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  38. added 2016-10-16
    William D. Melaney (2011). Ricoeur’s Transcendental Concern: A Hermeneutics of Discourse. In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana. Springer 495-513.
    This paper argues that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy attempts to reopen the question of human transcendence in contemporary terms. While his conception of language as self-transcending is deeply Husserlian, Ricoeur also responds to the analytical challenge when he deploys a basic distinction in Fregean logic in order to clarify Heidegger’s phenomenology of world. Ricoeur’s commitment to a transcendental view is evident in his conception of narrative, which enables him to emphasize the role of the performative in literary reading. The meaning (...)
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  39. added 2016-10-15
    Earl Conee (2016). A Mysterious Case of Missing Value. Philosophic Exchange 45 (1):1-22.
    Sometimes there are conflicts about what we ought to do according to differing evaluative dimensions, like morality and self-interest. After sketching an interpretation of "ought" claims of all sorts, it is argued that there is no overriding evaluation that authoritatively resolves the conflicts. It is further argued that this is not altogether disappointing.
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  40. added 2016-10-14
    W. Scott Clifton (2016). A Notorious Example of Failed Mindreading: Dramatic Irony and the Moral and Epistemic Value of Art. Journal of Aesthetic Education 50 (3):73-90.
    The act of mindreading has been recognized to have great moral and epistemic value. Unfortunately, psychological research has shown that we are naturally inaccurate at mindreading, which should worry us quite a bit. It has also been shown that when motivated to mindread well, subjects become more accurate. In this paper I argue that some kinds of artwork—specifically, those utilizing dramatic irony—can educate us as to how valuable accurate mindreading is and motivate us to try to mindread well. The primary (...)
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  41. added 2016-10-12
    Caroline T. Arruda (forthcoming). Why Care About Being An Agent? Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?,’ or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative commitments (...)
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  42. added 2016-10-12
    Carla Bagnoli (forthcoming). Constructivism and the Moral Problem. Philosophia.
    According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate (...)
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  43. added 2016-10-12
    Carla Bagnoli (forthcoming). Kant in Metaethics: The Paradox of Moral Autonomy, Solved by Publicity. In M. Altman (ed.), Kant Handbook. Palgrave chapter 14.
    This chapter aims to situate Kant’s account of practical reason in metaethical debates. First, it explains the reasons why it is legitimate and instructive to discuss Kant’s relevance in contemporary metaethics, hence addressing some issues about the intended scope of metaethics and its relation to practical reason and psychology. Second, it defends an interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy, which avoids some paradoxes traditionally associated with self-legislation. Third, it shows that constructivism best captures Kant’s conception of practical reason and of (...)
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  44. added 2016-10-12
    Carla Bagnoli (2016). Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical Reason. In C. Strahele (ed.), Vulnerability, Autonomy, and Applied Ethics. Rutledge 13-32.
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  45. added 2016-10-12
    Lydia Schumacher (2016). Divine Command Theory in Early Franciscan Thought: A Response to the Autonomy Objection. Studies in Christian Ethics 29 (4):461-476.
    In recent years, many scholars have bemoaned the gradual demise of traditional virtue ethics, and its eventual replacement in the later Middle Ages by divine command theory. Where virtue ethics nurtures a capacity for spontaneous moral judgement, this theory turns on adherence to ordained duties and laws. Thus, virtue ethicists among others have tended to object to the theory on the grounds that it undermines the role of the moral agent in moral adjudication. In this article, by contrast, I will (...)
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  46. added 2016-10-12
    Carla Bagnoli (2016). Change in View: Sensitivity to Facts in Prospective Rationality. In G. Marchetti & S. Marchetti (eds.), The Contingency of Fact and the Objectivity of Values. Routledge 137-158.
    In this chapter, I offer a constructivist account of practical reasoning as both generative and transformative in response to calls from philosophers as diverse as Iris Murdoch and Gilbert Harman, who have urged the development of a more nuanced picture of reasoning that incorporates revisionary and revelatory changes in viewpoint. Within this context, I describe sensitivity to facts as a form of emotional engagement that is also partially constitutive of facts. I consider both the epistemological and ontological aspects of this (...)
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  47. added 2016-10-12
    Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Motivational Internalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Motivational Internalism is a collection of thirteen new essays on exactly the topic you expect it to be, given the title. It also contains an introductory chapter, in which the editors attach an excellent overview of the current state of play to an intimidating bibliography. The essays in the volume are divided into three sections, each with its own, shorter, introduction by the editors. The first section concerns evidence for and against motivational internalism; the second concerns the relevance of internalism (...)
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  48. added 2016-10-11
    Ragnar Francén Olinder (2016). Some Varieties of Metaethical Relativism. Philosophy Compass 11 (10):529-540.
    This opinionated survey article discusses a relativist view in metaethics that we can call Appraiser-standard Relativism. According to this view, the truth value of moral judgments varies depending on the moral standard of the appraiser – that is, someone who makes or assesses the judgments. On this view, when two persons judge that, say, lying is always morally wrong; one of the judgments might be true and the other false. The paper presents various forms of this view, contrasts it against (...)
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  49. added 2016-10-10
    Uri D. Leibowitz (forthcoming). Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World. [REVIEW] Ethics.
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  50. added 2016-10-09
    Christos Kyriacou (forthcoming). Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking? Philosophia.
    I argue that, at least on the assumption that if there are epistemic facts they are irreducible, the evolutionary debunking maneuver is prima facie self-debunking because it seems to debunk a certain class of facts, namely, epistemic facts that prima facie it needs to rely on in order to launch its debunking arguments. I then appeal to two recent reconstructions of the evolutionary debunking maneuver (Kahane (2011), Griffiths and Wilkins (2015)) and find them wanting. Along the way I set aside (...)
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