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Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
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  1. added 2016-09-23
    Nadine Elzein (forthcoming). Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Acta Analytica:1-23.
    Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples generally accept that we cannot construct successful FSCs in which there are no alternative possibilities present. But they maintain that we can construct successful FSCs in which there are no morally significant alternatives present and that such examples succeed in breaking any conceptual link between alternative possibilities and free will. I argue that it is not possible to construct an FSC that succeeds even in this weaker sense. In cases where any alternatives are clearly insignificant, (...)
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  2. added 2016-09-23
    G. De Grandis (2007). Moral Actors and Political Spectators: On Some Virtues and Vices of Rawls's Liberalism. Journal of International Political Theory 3 (2):217-235.
    The paper defends the theoretical strength and consistency of Rawls’s constructivism, showing its ability to articulate and convincingly weave together several key ethical ideas; yet it questions the political relevance of this admirable normative architecture. After having illustrated Rawls’s conception of moral agency and practical reason, the paper tackles two criticisms raised by Scheffler. First the allegation of naturalism based on Rawls’s disdain of common sense ideas on desert is rebutted. It is then shown that, contrary to Scheffler’s contention, Rawls (...)
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  3. added 2016-09-22
    Pekka Väyrynen, Thick Ethical Concepts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Evaluative terms and concepts are often divided into “thin” and “thick”. We don’t evaluate actions and persons merely as good or bad, or right or wrong, but also as kind, courageous, tactful, selfish, boorish, and cruel. The latter evaluative concepts are "descriptively thick": their application somehow involves both evaluation and a substantial amount of non-evaluative description. This article surveys various attempts to answer four fundamental questions about thick terms and concepts. (1) A “combination question”: how exactly do thick terms and (...)
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  4. added 2016-09-19
    Ryan Jenkins (forthcoming). Rule Consequentialism and Moral Relativism in Advance. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Rule consequentialism is usually taken to recommend a single ideal code for all moral agents. Here I argue that, depending on their theoretical mo- tivations, some rule consequentialists have good reasons to be relativists. Rule consequentialists who are moved by consequentialist considerations ought to support a scheme of multiple relativized moral codes because we could expect such a scheme to have better consequences in terms of impartial aggregate well- being than a single universal code. Rule consequentialists who nd compelling the (...)
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  5. added 2016-09-19
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (forthcoming). On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of “evaluative moral progress-claims”, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and (...)
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  6. added 2016-09-19
    Daniel J. Miller (forthcoming). Reasonable Foreseeability and Blameless Ignorance. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper draws attention to a fundamental problem for a version of the tracing strategy defended by a number of theorists in the current literature :295–313, 2004; Fischer and Tognazzini in Noûs, 43:531–556, 2009). I argue that versions of the tracing strategy that require reasonable foreseeability are in tension with the view that blameless ignorance excuses. A stronger version of the tracing strategy is consistent with the view that blameless ignorance excuses and is therefore preferable for those tracing theorists who (...)
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  7. added 2016-09-19
    Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller (2015). Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and (...)
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  8. added 2016-09-15
    Debbie Roberts, Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?
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  9. added 2016-09-15
    Debbie Roberts (forthcoming). Thick Epistemic Concepts. In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press
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  10. added 2016-09-14
    Zsolt Ziegler, A Relational Theory of Moral Responsibility.
    This paper introduces a new theory of moral responsibility that does not rely on any concept of human control. Since an understanding of determinism shapes the possible set of views one can take regarding control, and there is no account of control that could be held simultaneously by both compatibilists and libertarians, the “relational theory of responsibility” is meant to create a common ground between compatibilism and libertarianism which are held to be mutually exclusive. Since the relational account of responsibility (...)
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  11. added 2016-09-12
    Vojko Strahovnik (2016). Defeasibility, Norms and Exceptions: Normalcy Model. Revus in print (29).
    The paper discusses the notion of defeasibility and focuses specifically on defeasible norms. First, it delineates a robust notion of the phenomenon of defeasibility, which poses a serious problem for both moral and legal theory. It does this by laying out the conditions and desiderata that a model of defeasibility should be able to meet. It further focuses on a specific model of defeasibility that utilises the notion of normal conditions to expound the robust notion of defeasibility. It argues that (...)
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  12. added 2016-09-12
    Andrew Alwood (2014). Review of Michael Ridge Impassioned Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
    A critical review of Michael Ridge's book Impassioned Belief.
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  13. added 2016-09-11
    Mark Alfano, The Topology of Communities of Trust.
    Hobbes emphasized that the state of nature is a state of war because it is characterized by fundamental and generalized distrust. Exiting the state of nature and the conflicts it inevitably fosters is therefore a matter of establishing trust. Extant discussions of trust in the philosophical literature, however, focus either on isolated dyads of trusting individuals or trust in large, faceless institutions. In this paper, I fill the gap between these extremes by analyzing what I call the topology of communities (...)
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  14. added 2016-09-08
    Allard Tamminga & Hein Duijf (forthcoming). Collective Obligations, Group Plans, and Individual Actions. Economics and Philosophy.
    If group members aim to fulfill a collective obligation, they must act in such a way that the composition of their individual actions amounts to a group action that fulfills the collective obligation. We study a strong sense of joint action in which the members of a group design and then publicly adopt a group plan that coordinates the individual actions of the group members. We characterize the conditions under which a group plan successfully coordinates the group members' individual actions, (...)
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  15. added 2016-09-08
    Andrew T. W. Hung (2015). REVIEW: Minding the Modern: Human Agency, Intellectual Traditions, and Responsible Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophia Christi 17 (2):505-510.
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  16. added 2016-09-06
    Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch's Analogy. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    In a crucial chapter of his important book "Taking Morality Seriously", David Enoch offers a highly inventive argument for metanormative realism, the view that there are objective irreducibly normative truths. The argument appeals to the idea that irreducibly normative truths are indispensable for deliberation. This, Enoch claims, justifies us in believing in irreducibly normative truths. In making this argument, Enoch draws upon an analogy with the indispensability of other entities for explanation, and the idea that we are justified in believing (...)
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  17. added 2016-09-06
    Matthew Silverstein (2016). Reducing Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-22.
    Reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning. This is considered by many philosophers to be little more than a platitude. I argue that it actually has surprising and far-reaching metanormative implications. The view that reasons are linked to sound reasoning seems platitudinous only because we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another (soundness). I argue that soundness is also a descriptive phenomenon, one we can (...)
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  18. added 2016-09-06
    Matthew Silverstein (2016). Teleology and Normativity. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:214-240.
    Constitutivists seek to locate the metaphysical foundations of ethics in nonnormative facts about what is constitutive of agency. For most constitutivists, this involves grounding authoritative norms in the teleological structure of agency. Despite a recent surge in interest, the philosophical move at the heart of this sort of constitutivism remains underdeveloped. Some constitutivists—Foot, Thomson, and Korsgaard (at least in her recent *Self-Constitution*)—adopt a broadly Aristotelian approach. They claim that the functional nature of agency grounds normative judgments about agents in much (...)
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  19. added 2016-09-05
    Italo Testa (2016). Hegelian Resources for Contemporary Thought. Introductory Essay. In Testa Italo & Ruggiu Luigi (eds.), "I that is We, We that is I." Perspectives on Contemporary Hegel Social Ontology, Recognition, Naturalism, and the Critique of Kantian Constructivism. Brill 1-28.
    Introductory essay to the collection "I that is We, We that is I" (ed. by Italo Testa and Luigi Ruggiu, Brill Books, 2016). In this book an international group of philosophers explore the many facets of Hegel’s formula which expresses the recognitive and social structures of human life. The book offers a guiding thread for the reconstruction of crucial motifs of contemporary thought such as the socio-ontological paradigm; the action-theoretical model in moral and social philosophy; the question of naturalism; and (...)
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  20. added 2016-09-05
    Italo Testa (2015). Some Consequences of Thompson’s Life and Action for Social Philosophy. Philosophy and Public Issues:69-84.
  21. added 2016-09-05
    Matteo Bianchin & Italo Testa (2015). Introduction. Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche:3-6.
    Introduction to a Forum on Michael's Thompson "Life and Action".
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  22. added 2016-09-02
    Nathaniel Jezzi (2016). Rawls on Kantian Constructivism. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (8).
    John Rawls’s 1980 Dewey Lectures are widely acknowledged to represent the locus classicus for contemporary discussions of moral constructivism. Nevertheless, few published works have engaged with the significant interpretive challenges one finds in these lectures, and those that have fail to offer a satisfactory reading of the view that Rawls presents there or the place the lectures occupy in the development of Rawls's thinking. Indeed, there is a surprising lack of consensus about how best to interpret the constructivism of these (...)
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  23. added 2016-09-02
    Heine A. Holmen (2011). Ethics and the Nature of Action. Dissertation, University of Oslo
  24. added 2016-09-01
    Robert J. Hartman (2017). In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness. Routledge.
    There is a contradiction in our idea of moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. Consider some examples in order to make that idea concrete. Two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would each freely take a bribe if one were offered. By luck of the courthouse draw, only one judge is offered a (...)
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  25. added 2016-08-30
    Luis R. G. Oliveira & Timothy Perrine (forthcoming). Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties. European Journal of Philosophy.
    The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable (ethical conservativism) seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview (ethical naturalism). Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a (...)
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  26. added 2016-08-29
    Cameron Boult (forthcoming). Knowledge and Attributability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    A prominent objection to the so-called ‘knowledge norm of belief’ is that it is too demanding or too strong. The objection is commonly framed in terms of the idea that there is a tight connection between norm violation and the appropriateness of criticism or blame. In this paper I do two things. First, I argue that this way of motivating the objection leads to an impasse in the epistemic norms debate. It leads to an impasse when knowledge normers invoke excuses (...)
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  27. added 2016-08-24
    Christine Tappolet (2016). Emotions, Values, and Agency. Oxford University Press.
    The emotions we experience are crucial to who we are, to what we think, and to what we do. But what are emotions, exactly, and how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of values, such (...)
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  28. added 2016-08-24
    A. Kalis & G. Meynen (2014). Mental Disorder and Legal Responsibility: The Relevance of Stages of Decision-Making. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 37 (6):601-8.
  29. added 2016-08-22
    Leland F. Saunders (2016). Reason and Emotion, Not Reason or Emotion in Moral Judgment. Philosophical Explorations:1-16.
    One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question relies on an overly simplified view of reason and emotion as two fully independent cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that (...)
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  30. added 2016-08-21
    Eric Sampson (2015). Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-6.
    We often say that one reason is stronger, or weightier, than another. These are metaphors. What does normative strength or weight really consist in? Scanlon (2014) offers a novel answer to this question. His answer appeals to counterfactuals of various kinds. I argue that appealing to counterfactuals leads to deep problems for his view.
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  31. added 2016-08-19
    Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini (2016). Why We Can Still Believe the Error Theory. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):523-536.
  32. added 2016-08-19
    Matthé Scholten (2013). Geen verwijt zonder fout: een kantiaans-strawsoniaanse visie op morele uitkomstenverantwoordelijkheid. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 105 (4):249-253.
  33. added 2016-08-18
    Robert Kane (2016). Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):229-246.
    In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential paper; and it has had numerous critics. The first purpose of this paper is to explain my own reasons for thinking that our (...)
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  34. added 2016-08-18
    Guy Fletcher (2016). Moral Testimony: Once More With Feeling. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: volume 11. Oxford University Press 45-73..
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  35. added 2016-08-17
    Patricia Greenspan (2016). Responsible Psychopaths Revisited. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):265-278.
    This paper updates, modifies, and extends an account of psychopaths’ responsibility and blameworthiness that depends on behavioral control rather than moral knowledge. Philosophers mainly focus on whether psychopaths can be said to grasp moral rules as such, whereas it seems to be important to their blameworthiness that typical psychopaths are hampered by impulsivity and other barriers to exercising self-control. I begin by discussing an atypical case, for contrast, of a young man who was diagnosed as a psychopath at one point (...)
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  36. added 2016-08-17
    Michael Smith (2016). Romance and Responsibility in Woody Allen’s “Manhattan”. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):317-339.
    Reflection on the wrongs done by characters in Woody Allen’s romantic comedy “Manhattan” helps us get clear about the evidence required to judge them responsible and so liable to blame them for those wrongs. On the positive side, what is required is evidence that trust remains a possibility, despite the fact that they wrong, and this in turn requires evidence that the wrongdoer had, but failed to exercise, the capacity to do the right thing when they did that wrong. On (...)
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  37. added 2016-08-16
    Yuri Cath (2016). Reflective Equilibrium. In H. Cappelen, T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford University Press 213-230.
    This article examines the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) and its role in philosophical inquiry. It begins with an overview of RE before discussing some of the subtleties involved in its interpretation, including challenges to the standard assumption that RE is a form of coherentism. It then evaluates some of the main objections to RE, in particular, the criticism that this method generates unreasonable beliefs. It concludes by considering how RE relates to recent debates about the role of intuitions in (...)
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  38. added 2016-08-16
    Pete Fossey (2015). Illusions of Value. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:01-06.
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  39. added 2016-08-15
    Richard Joyce (2016). Reply to ‘On the Validity of a Simple Argument for Moral Error Theory’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):518-522.
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  40. added 2016-08-15
    Kasper Højbjerg Christensen (2016). On The Validity of a Simple Argument for Moral Error Theory. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):508-517.
    In The Myth of Morality Richard Joyce presents a simple and very influential argument for the truth of moral error theory. In this paper I point out that the argument does not have the form Joyce attributes to it, the argument is not valid in an extensional propositional logic and on the most natural way of explicating the meanings of the involved terms, it remains invalid. I conclude that more explanation is needed if we are to accept this particular argument (...)
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  41. added 2016-08-11
    Caroline T. Arruda (forthcoming). Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement. Philosophia:1-19.
    Constitutivists explicitly emphasize the importance of self-reflection in a variety of ways. For Korsgaard (1996: Lecture 3; 2009: 25-ff), it is a necessary feature of the process of deciding which principles we want to guide our actions and to comprise the kinds of agents that we become. For Velleman (1989: 32; 2000a: 193), it is a product of the constitutivist aim of autonomy (or, later (2006a), the aim of intelligibility) that we have in action. Interestingly enough, however, there is no (...)
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  42. added 2016-08-11
    Facundo M. Alonso (2016). A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention. Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
    In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose (...)
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  43. added 2016-08-08
    Bianca Cepollaro (2015). In Defense of a Presuppositional Account of Slurs. Language Sciences 52:36-45.
    Abstract In the last fifteen years philosophers and linguists have turned their attention to slurs: derogatory expressions that target certain groups on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, nationality and so on. This interest is due to the fact that, on the one hand, slurs possess puzzling linguistic properties; on the other hand, the questions they pose are related to other crucial issues, such as the descriptivism/expressivism divide, the semantics/pragmatics divide and, generally speaking, the theory of meaning. Despite these (...)
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  44. added 2016-08-06
    Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (2013). An Introduction to Metaethics. In Exploring the Philosophical Terrain. C&E
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  45. added 2016-08-04
    Danielle Bromwich (2016). Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):452-471.
    Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to reject or modify (...)
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  46. added 2016-08-04
    Dal-Wha Namkung (2004). Moral Motivation and Moral Education. Journal of Moral Education 16 (1):117.
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  47. added 2016-08-02
    Clarke-Doane Justin (forthcoming). Objectivity and Reliability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons (BRR) is a beautiful book – sleek, sophisticated, and programmatic. One of its key aims is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths. In this paper, I develop an epistemological challenge that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that his “metaphysical pluralism” can be understood as a response to that challenge. However, it affords an answer to the challenge only if it undercuts the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry.
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  48. added 2016-07-30
    Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini (2016). Why We Can Still Believe the Error Theory. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):523-536.
    The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this (...)
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  49. added 2016-07-27
    Michael R. Kelly (2013). A Reading of Two Sources of Morality and Religion, or Bergsonian Wisdom, Emotion, and Integrity. In P. Adroin, S. Gontarski & L. Pattison (eds.), Understanding Bergson, Understanding Modernism. Bloomsbury
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  50. added 2016-07-26
    Jihan Lyou (2015). Biologicization of Ethics: Beyond Naturalistic Fallacy and Counter-Naturalistic Fallacy. Journal of Ethics 1 (103):1-30.
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