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  1. E. Bacon, J. M. Danion, F. Kauffmann-Muller & A. Bruant (2001). Consciousness in Schizophrenia: A Metacognitive Approach to Semantic Memory. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):473-484.
    Recent studies have shown that schizophrenia may be a disease affecting the states of consciousness. The present study is aimed at investigating metamemory, i.e., the knowledge about one's own memory capabilities, in patients with schizophrenia. The accuracy of the Confidence level (CL) in the correctness of the answers provided during a recall phase, and the predictability of the Feeling of Knowing (FOK) when recall fails were measured using a task consisting of general information questions and assessing semantic memory. Nineteen outpatients (...)
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  2. Simon Baron-Cohen (2001). Consciousness of the Physical and the Mental: Evidence From Autism. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins. 61-76.
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  3. John Barresi (2001). Extending Self-Consciousness Into the Future. In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. 141-161.
    As adults we have little difficulty thinking of ourselves as mental beings extended in time. Even though our conscious thoughts and experiences are constantly changing, we think of ourselves as the same self throughout these variations in mental content. Indeed, it is so natural for adults to think this way that it was not until the 18th century—at least in Western thought—that the issue of how we come to acquire such a concept of an identical but constantly changing self was (...)
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  4. R. Brown & David N. McNeill (1966). The "Tip of the Tongue" Phenomenon. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 5:325-37.
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  5. S. Brown (2000). Tip-of-the-Tongue Phenomena: An Introductory Phenomenological Analysis. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):516-537.
    The issue of meaningful yet unexpressed background-to language and to our experiences of the body-is one whose exploration is still in its infancy. There are various aspects of ''invisible,'' implicit, or background experiences which have been investigated from the viewpoints of phenomenology, cognitive psychology, and linguistics. I will argue that James's concept of the phenomenon of fringes, as explicated by Gurwitsch, provides a structural framework from which to investigate and better understand ideas and concepts that are indeterminate, particularly those experienced (...)
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  6. Steven Ravett Brown (2000). Reply to Bruce Mangan's Commentary on “What Feeling Is the 'Feeling of Knowing?'”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):545-549.
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  7. Peter Carruthers (2009). Mindreading Underlies Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):164-182.
    This response defends the view that human metacognition results from us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves, and that our access to our own propositional attitudes is through interpretation rather than introspection. Relevant evidence is considered, including that deriving from studies of childhood development and other animal species. Also discussed are data suggesting dissociations between metacognitive and mindreading capacities, especially in autism and schizophrenia.
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  8. Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.) (1997). Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  9. Justin J. Couchman, Mariana V. C. Coutinho, Michael J. Beran & J. David Smith (2009). Metacognition is Prior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):142-142.
    We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.
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  10. Jérôme Dokic (2001). Is Memory Purely Preservative? In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press. 213--232.
  11. Jérôme Dokic (1997). Une théorie réflexive du souvenir épisodique. Dialogue 36 (03):527-554.
    Cet article porte sur une distinction familière entre deux formes de souvenirs: les souvenirs factuels ('Je me souviens que p', où 'p' est une proposition) et les souvenirs épisodiques ('Je me souviens de x', où x est une entité particulière). Les souvenirs épisodiques ont, contrairement aux souvenirs factuels, un rapport immédiat et interne à une expérience particulière que le sujet a eue dans le passé. Les souvenirs épisodique et factuel sont des souvenirs explicites au sens de la psychologie cognitive. J'esquisse (...)
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  12. Diego Fernandez-Duque, J. A. Baird & Michael I. Posner (2000). Attention and Awareness in Self Regulation [Reply to Commentaries]. Consciousness and Cognition 9:324-326.
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  13. Diego Fernandez-Duque, J. A. Baird & Michael I. Posner (2000). Awareness and Metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):324-326.
    Kentridge and Heywood (this issue) extend the concept of metacognition to include unconscious processes. We acknowledge the possible contribution of unconscious processes, but favor a central role of awareness in metacognition. We welcome Shimamura's (this issue) extension of the concept of metacognitive regulation to include aspects of working memory, and its relation to executive attention.
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  14. Diego Fernandez-Duque, J. A. Baird & Michael I. Posner (2000). Executive Attention and Metacognitive Regulation. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):288-307.
    Metacognition refers to any knowledge or cognitive process that monitors or controls cognition. We highlight similarities between metacognitive and executive control functions, and ask how these processes might be implemented in the human brain. A review of brain imaging studies reveals a circuitry of attentional networks involved in these control processes, with its source located in midfrontal areas. These areas are active during conflict resolution, error correction, and emotional regulation. A developmental approach to the organization of the anatomy involved in (...)
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  15. Joseph P. Forgas, Kipling D. Williams & Simon M. Laham (eds.) (2004). Social Motivation: Conscious and Unconscious Processes. Cambridge University Press.
    Ground-breaking research by leading international researchers on the nature, functions and characteristics of social motivation.
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  16. Peter Gardenfors, Petter Johansson & N. J. Mahwah (eds.) (2005). Cognition, Education, and Communication Technology. Erlbaum Associates.
  17. George Graham & J. Neisser (2000). Probing for Relevance: What Metacognition Tells Us About the Power of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):172-177.
    Metacognitive attitudes can affect behavior but do they do so, as Koriat claims, because they enhance voluntary control? This Commentary makes a case for saying that metacognitive consciousness may enhance not control but subjective predictability and may be best studied by examining not just healthy, well-integrated cognizers, but victims of multilevel mental disorders.
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  18. Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.) (2001). Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.
  19. J. T. Hart (1965). Memory and the Feeling-of-Knowing Experience. Journal of Educational Psychology 56:208-16.
  20. M. K. Johnson (1991). Reflection, Reality Monitoring, and the Self. In Robert G. Kunzendorf (ed.), Mental Imagery. Plenum Press.
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  21. M. K. Johnson & J. A. Reeder (1997). Consciousness as Meta-Processing. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.
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  22. Tracey L. Kahan & S. LaBerge (1994). Lucid Dreaming as Metacognition: Implications for Cognitive Science. Consciousness and Cognition 3 (2):246-64.
  23. Robert W. Kentridge & Charles A. Heywood (2000). Metacognition and Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):308-312.
    It is tempting to assume that metacognitive processes necessarily evoke awareness. We review a number of experiments in which cognitive schema have been shown to develop without awareness. Implicit learning of a novel schema may not involve metacognitive regulation per se. Substitution of one automatic process by another as a result of the inadequacy of the former as circumstances change does, however, clearly involve metacognitive and executive processes of error correction and schema selection. We describe a recently published study in (...)
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  24. David Kirsh (2005). Metacognition, Distributed Cognition and Visual Design. In Peter Gardenfors, Petter Johansson & N. J. Mahwah (eds.), Cognition, education, and communication technology. Erlbaum Associates. 147--180.
    Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition and metacognition are part (...)
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  25. David Kirsh (2004). Metacognition, Distributed Cognition and Visual Design. Cognition, Education and Communication Technology:147--180.
    Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition and metacognition are part (...)
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  26. Bernard W. Kobes (1997). Metacognition and Consciousness: Review Essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. Shimamura (Eds), Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):93-102.
    The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness supplies us (...)
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  27. A. Koriat (2000). The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):149-171.
    The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (''noetic feeling'') occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once (...)
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  28. A. Koriat & R. Levy-Sadot (2000). Conscious and Unconscious Metacognition: A Rejoinder. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):193-202.
    In this rejoinder we clarify several issues raised by the commentators with the hope of resolving some disagreements. In particular, we address the distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments and the idea that memory monitoring may be mediated by direct access to internal representations. We then examine the possibility of unconscious metacognitive processes and expand on the critical role that conscious metacognitive feelings play in mediating between unconscious activations and explicit-controlled action. Finally, several open questions are articulated for further (...)
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  29. Robert G. Kunzendorf (ed.) (1990). Mental Imagery. Plenum Press.
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  30. Bruce Mangan (2000). What Feeling Is the “Feeling of Knowing?”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):538-544.
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  31. Jean-Rémy Martin & Jérôme Dokic (2013). Seeing Absence or Absence of Seeing? Thought 2 (1):117-125.
    Imagine that in entering a café, you are struck by the absence of Pierre, with whom you have an appointment. Or imagine that you realize that your keys are missing because they are not hanging from the usual ring-holder. What is the nature of these absence experiences? In this article, we discuss a recent view defended by Farennikova (2012) according to which we literally perceive absences of things in much the same way as we perceive present things. We criticize and (...)
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  32. J. Metcalfe (2000). Feelings and Judgments of Knowing: Is There a Special Noetic State? Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):178-186.
    A. Koriat distinguishes between feeling-based and inferentially based feeling-of-knowing judgments. The former are attributable to partial information that is activated in implicit memory but not fully articulated. They are not, however, attributable to direct access to the target-an hypothesis that Koriat specifically repudiates. While there is considerable merit in the distinction that Koriat draws, and his emphasis on the possibility that people base at least some of their metacognitive judgments on implicit information seems well founded, it is argued that his (...)
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  33. John F. Metcalfe & P. Shimamura (1994). Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. MIT Press.
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  34. C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.) (2001). The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum.
    This book brings together the leading researchers on these issues and for the first time in literature, illustrates how a unified approach based on the idea of ...
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  35. Dominic Murphy (2009). Varieties of Self-Explanation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):155-156.
    Carruthers is right to reject the idea of a dedicated piece of cognitive architecture with the exclusive job of reading our own minds. But his mistake is in trying to explain introspection in terms of any one mindreading system. We understand ourselves in many different ways via many systems.
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  36. Kristina Musholt (2012). Concepts or Metacognition - What is the Issue? Commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness”. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):721-722.
    The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at issue here are not so (...)
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  37. T. O. Nelson (2000). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):220-223.
  38. T. O. Nelson (1996). Consciousness and Metacognition. American Psychologist 51:102-16.
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  39. T. O. Nelson (1992). Metacognition: Core Readings. Allyn and Bacon.
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  40. M. K. NJohnson (1988). Reality Monitoring: An Experimental Phenomenological Approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology 117:390-94.
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  41. H. Otani & M. Hodge (1991). Mechanisms of Feelings of Knowing: The Role of Elaloration and Familiarity. Psychological Record 41:523-35.
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  42. Joel Pust (2014). Critical Notice of Hilary Kornblith's On Reflection. Episteme 11:53-61.
    Hilary Kornblith's On Reflection is a sustained and detailed criticism of philosophical appeals to reflection. Kornblith argues, on both conceptual and empirical grounds, that a large number of appeals to reflective belief and desire in philosophical theorizing about knowledge and justification, reasoning, free will and normativity are deeply flawed. In this paper, I discuss Kornblith's arguments, finding some quite compelling and some wanting. Moreover, I argue that an important ambiguity about the nature of reflection renders the book less clear than (...)
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  43. L. M. Reder (1996). Implicit Memory and Metacognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    The editor of this volume takes it to mean that a prior experience affects behavior without the individual's appreciation (ability to report) of this...
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  44. L. M. Reder & C. D. Schunn (1996). Metacognition Does Not Imply Awareness: Strategy Choice is Governed by Implicit Learning and Memory. In , Implicit Memory and Metacognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  45. L. A. Ricciardelli (1993). Two Components of Metalinguistic Awareness: Control of Linguistic Processing and Analysis of Linguistic Knowledge. Applied Psycholinguistics 14:349-367.
  46. David M. Rosenthal (1998). Consciousness and Metacognition. In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentation. Oxford University Press.
  47. Jonathan W. Schooler (2002). Re-Representing Consciousness: Dissociations Between Experience and Meta-Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):339-344.
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  48. Jonathan W. Schooler & Charles A. Schreiber (2005). To Know or Not to Know: Consciousness, Meta-Consciousness, and Motivation. In Joseph P. Forgas, Kipling D. Williams & Simon M. Laham (eds.), Social Motivation: Conscious and Unconscious Processes. Cambridge University Press. 351-372.
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  49. Miguel Angel Sebastian (2013). Not a HOT Dream. In Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
    Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...)
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  50. A. P. Shimamura (2000). Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):313-323.
    The relationship between metacognition and executive control is explored. According to an analysis by Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner (this issue), metacognitive regulation involves attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory control, and emotional regulation. These aspects of metacognition are presumed to be mediated by a neural circuit involving midfrontal brain regions. An evaluation of the proposal by Fernandez-Duque et al. is made, and it is suggested that there is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory, and frontal (...)
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