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Metaphilosophy

Edited by Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)
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  1. added 2016-02-11
    James J. Delaney & David Martin (forthcoming). Therapy, Enhancement, and Medicine: Challenges for the Doctor–Patient Relationship and Patient Safety. Journal of Business Ethics.
  2. added 2016-02-10
    Michael C. Rea (2007). How Successful is Naturalism? In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Ontos-Verlag 105-116.
    The question raised by this volume is “How successful is naturalism?” The question presupposes that we already know what naturalism is and what counts as success. But, as anyone familiar with the literature on naturalism knows, both suppositions are suspect. To answer the question, then, we must first say what we mean in this context by both ‘naturalism’ and ‘success’. I’ll start with ‘success’. I will then argue that, by the standard of measurement that I shall identify here, naturalism is (...)
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  3. added 2016-02-09
    Laszlo Katona (ed.) (2015). The Flying Termite. Vernon Press.
    ABSTRACT of The Flying Termite by L.L. Katona -/- In this book I would like to show the term “intelligence“ has a universal, non-anthropomorphic meaning. We can perceive intelligence in dogs, dolphins or gorillas without understanding of it, but intelligence can be also seen in many other things from insects and the Solar System to elementary particles or the rules of a triangle. But that doesn’t mean intelligence comes from Intelligent Design, yet alone a Designer, they seems to be the (...)
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  4. added 2016-02-08
    Michael Hannon (forthcoming). Skepticism About Meta-Skepticism: Meditations on Experimental Philosophy. Episteme.
    Drawing on new empirical data, a group of experimental philosophers have argued that one of the most popular and influential forms of skepticism is much less interesting and much less worrisome than philosophers have thought. Contrary to this claim, I argue that this brand of skepticism remains as threatening as ever. My argument also reveals an important limitation of experimental philosophy and sheds light on the way professional philosophers should go about the business of doing philosophy.
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  5. added 2016-02-08
    Jared Warren (forthcoming). Sider on the Epistemology of Structure. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Theodore Sider’s recent book, “Writing the Book of the World”, employs a primitive notion of metaphysical structure in order to make sense of substantive metaphysics. But Sider and others who employ metaphysical primitives face serious epistemological challenges. In the first section I develop a specific form of this <span class='Hi'>challenge</span> for Sider’s own proposed epistemology for structure; the second section develops a general <span class='Hi'>reliability</span> <span class='Hi'>challenge</span> for Sider’s theory; and the third and final section argues for the rejection of (...)
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  6. added 2016-02-08
    Jared Warren (2016). Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist? Metaphilosophy 47 (1):108-121.
    Some philosophers are metaphilosophical deflationists for metasemantic reasons. These theorists take standard philosophical assertions to be defective in some manner. There are various versions of metasemantic metaphilosophical deflationism, but a trap awaits any global version of it: metasemantics itself is a part of philosophy, so in deflating philosophy these theorists have thereby deflated the foundation of their deflationism. The present article discusses this issue and the prospects for an adequate response to the trap. Contrary to most historical responses, the article (...)
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  7. added 2016-02-08
    Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard (2016). Blame, Not Ability, Impacts Moral “Ought” Judgments for Impossible Actions: Toward an Empirical Refutation of “Ought” Implies “Can”. Cognition 150:20-25.
    Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...)
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  8. added 2016-02-07
    Shen-yi Liao, Louise McNally & Aaron Meskin (forthcoming). Aesthetic Adjectives Lack Uniform Behavior. Inquiry.
    The goal of this short paper is to show that aesthetic adjectives---exemplified by “beautiful” and “elegant”---do not pattern stably on a range of linguistic diagnostics that have been used to taxonomize the gradability properties of adjectives. We argue that a plausible explanation for this puzzling data involves distinguishing two properties of gradable adjectives that have been frequently conflated: whether an adjective’s applicability is sensitive to a comparison class, and whether an adjective’s applicability is context-dependent.
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  9. added 2016-02-07
    Shen-yi Liao, Louise McNally & Aaron Meskin (forthcoming). Aesthetic Adjectives Lack Uniform Behavior. Inquiry.
    The goal of this short paper is to show that aesthetic adjectives---exemplified by “beautiful” and “elegant”---do not pattern stably on a range of linguistic diagnostics that have been used to taxonomize the gradability properties of adjectives. We argue that a plausible explanation for this puzzling data involves distinguishing two properties of gradable adjectives that have been frequently conflated: whether an adjective’s applicability is sensitive to a comparison class, and whether an adjective’s applicability is context-dependent.
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  10. added 2016-02-07
    Shen-yi Liao, Louise McNally & Aaron Meskin (forthcoming). Aesthetic Adjectives Lack Uniform Behavior. Inquiry.
    The goal of this short paper is to show that aesthetic adjectives---exemplified by “beautiful” and “elegant”---do not pattern stably on a range of linguistic diagnostics that have been used to taxonomize the gradability properties of adjectives. We argue that a plausible explanation for this puzzling data involves distinguishing two properties of gradable adjectives that have been frequently conflated: whether an adjective’s applicability is sensitive to a comparison class, and whether an adjective’s applicability is context-dependent.
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  11. added 2016-02-07
    Shen-yi Liao, Louise McNally & Aaron Meskin (forthcoming). Aesthetic Adjectives Lack Uniform Behavior. Inquiry.
    The goal of this short paper is to show that aesthetic adjectives---exemplified by “beautiful” and “elegant”---do not pattern stably on a range of linguistic diagnostics that have been used to taxonomize the gradability properties of adjectives. We argue that a plausible explanation for this puzzling data involves distinguishing two properties of gradable adjectives that have been frequently conflated: whether an adjective’s applicability is sensitive to a comparison class, and whether an adjective’s applicability is context-dependent.
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  12. added 2016-02-07
    Shen-yi Liao, Louise McNally & Aaron Meskin (forthcoming). Aesthetic Adjectives Lack Uniform Behavior. Inquiry.
    The goal of this short paper is to show that aesthetic adjectives---exemplified by “beautiful” and “elegant”---do not pattern stably on a range of linguistic diagnostics that have been used to taxonomize the gradability properties of adjectives. We argue that a plausible explanation for this puzzling data involves distinguishing two properties of gradable adjectives that have been frequently conflated: whether an adjective’s applicability is sensitive to a comparison class, and whether an adjective’s applicability is context-dependent.
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  13. added 2016-02-07
    Shen-yi Liao, Louise McNally & Aaron Meskin (forthcoming). Aesthetic Adjectives Lack Uniform Behavior. Inquiry.
    The goal of this short paper is to show that aesthetic adjectives---exemplified by “beautiful” and “elegant”---do not pattern stably on a range of linguistic diagnostics that have been used to taxonomize the gradability properties of adjectives. We argue that a plausible explanation for this puzzling data involves distinguishing two properties of gradable adjectives that have been frequently conflated: whether an adjective’s applicability is sensitive to a comparison class, and whether an adjective’s applicability is context-dependent.
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  14. added 2016-02-07
    Mark Alfano & Don Loeb (2014). Experimental Moral Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  15. added 2016-02-06
    Andreas Ditter (forthcoming). Why Intellectualism Still Fails. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv115.
    Intellectualism about knowledge-how is the view that knowing how to do something amounts to knowing a fact. The version of intellectualism defended by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson holds that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-wh, i.e., knowledge-where, -when, -who, etc. It draws its major motivation from the uniformity between ascriptions of knowledge-how and ascriptions of knowledge-wh in English, being all infinitival embedded question constructions. My aim in this paper is to challenge intellectualism of this sort. I argue that the (...)
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  16. added 2016-02-06
    Fabrizio Cariani & Lance J. Rips (2016). Conditionals, Context, and the Suppression Effect. Cognitive Science 40 (1).
    Modus ponens is the argument from premises of the form If A, then B and A to the conclusion B. Nearly all participants agree that the modus ponens conclusion logically follows when the argument appears in this Basic form. However, adding a further premise can lower participants’ rate of agreement—an effect called suppression. We propose a theory of suppression that draws on contemporary ideas about conditional sentences in linguistics and philosophy. Semantically, the theory assumes that people interpret an indicative conditional (...)
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  17. added 2016-02-04
    Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault (forthcoming). On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination. Synthese:1-21.
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
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  18. added 2016-02-04
    Tomasz Wysocki (forthcoming). Arguments Over Intuitions? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    Deutsch 2010 claims that hypothetical scenarios are evaluated using arguments, not intuitions, and therefore experiments on intuitions are philosophically inconsequential. Using the Gettier case as an example, he identifies three arguments that are supposed to point to the right response to the case. In the paper, I present the results of studies ran on Polish, Indian, Spanish, and American participants that suggest that there’s no deep difference between evaluating the Gettier case with intuitions and evaluating it with Deutsch’s arguments. Specifically, (...)
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  19. added 2016-02-02
    Mathias Girel (2015). Perfectionism in Practice: Shusterman’s Place in Recent Pragmatism. Contemporary Pragmatism 12 (1):156-179.
    Building on recent texts, I give a characterization of Richard Shusterman’s specific variant of pragmatism, understood as a melioristic or perfectionist pragmatism, where ethical and political dimensions are deeply intertwined with the epistemological one. To do so, I focus on what seems to be Shusterman’s latest contribution to his inter- rupted dialogue with Richard Rorty in Thinking through the Body.
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  20. added 2016-02-01
    Contzen Pereira & Jumpal Shashi Kiran Reddy (2016). Imaginings and Imaginations of the Soul. Journal of Metaphysics and Connected Consciousness.
    The soul is agile and transparent; it does not make the body weighty. It streams limitless within the patterns of regimented matter, gratifies the body until it can fill it no more, but remains as a swirling ball of energy with it. We do not see it, but can imagine it; like the wind; an energy, we do not see but can feel and there is no kerb to imagine its likeness. The soul so translucent lies beneath the scabbard of (...)
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  21. added 2016-01-28
    Brendan Hogan (forthcoming). Power, Pragmatism and the Situation of Democracy. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 30 (1).
  22. added 2016-01-27
    Ludovico Geymonat (1987). La ragione e la politica. Bertani.
  23. added 2016-01-26
    Shen-yi Liao (forthcoming). Are Philosophers Good Intuition Predictors? Philosophical Psychology.
    Some philosophers have criticized experimental philosophy for being superfluous. Jackson (1998) implies that experimental philosophy studies are unnecessary. More recently, Dunaway and colleagues (2013) empirically demonstrates that experimental studies do not deliver surprising results, which is a pro tanto reason for foregoing conducting such studies. -/- This paper gives theoretical and empirical considerations against the superfluity criticism. The questions concerning the surprisingness of experimental philosophy studies have not been properly disambiguated, and their metaphilosophical significance have not been properly assessed. Once (...)
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  24. added 2016-01-24
    Alberto Pasquinelli (ed.) (1970). Carl G. Hempel. La formazione dei concetti e delle teorie nella scienza empirica. Feltrinelli.
  25. added 2016-01-24
    Josepho Wu Chang-teh (1970). Dal neopositivismo allo storicismo scientifico. L'evoluzione filosofica di Ludovico Geymonat. Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana.
  26. added 2016-01-21
    Shriniwas Hemade (2016). 'समकालीन' तेची संकल्पना : भारतीय संदर्भात तात्त्विक पुनरावलोकनाची गरज. आकलन Aakalan:01-12.
    'समकालीन' ही संकल्पना आपण इंग्रजीतील 'कॉंटेम्पररी' (Contemporary) या अर्थाने वापरतो. समकालीन असण्याचा मुद्दा बहुतेक सर्व मराठी साहित्यिक, लेखक, नाटककार, कवी, टीकाकार, समीक्षक, साक्षेपी संपादक आणि साक्षेपी प्रकाशक यांनी चर्चेच्या अग्रक्रमी ठेवला आहे. या साऱ्यांनी विशेषतः लेखक मंडळीनी आधुनिकतावाद, आधुनिकोत्तरतावाद, देशीवाद, नवनैतिकता, वास्तववाद इत्यादी संकल्पना मांडल्या. समकालीन किंवा समकालीनता हा 'आजचा समकालीन' मुद्दा आहे !? या साऱ्यांची बरीच चर्चा झाली आहे आणि होही आहे. या संदर्भात 'समकालीन' ही संकल्पना तपासली पाहिजे. प्रथम हे लक्षात घेतले पाहिजे की 'समकालीन' ही जाणिव भारतीय नाही, (...)
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  27. added 2016-01-19
    Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (forthcoming). Perceived Weaknesses of Philosophical Inquiry: A Comparison to Psychology. Philosophia:1-20.
    We report two experiments exploring the perception of how contemporary philosophy is often conducted. We find that (1) participants associate philosophy with the practice of conducting thought experiments and collating intuitions about them, and (2) that this form of inquiry is viewed much less favourably than the typical form of inquiry in psychology: research conducted by teams using controlled experiments and observation. We also found (3) an effect whereby relying on intuition is viewed more favorably in the context of team (...)
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  28. added 2016-01-14
    Jack Reynolds (forthcoming). Philosophy's Shame: Reflections on an Ambivalent/Ambiviolent Relationship with Science. Sophia.
    In this paper, I take inspiration from some themes in Ann Murphy’s recent book, Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary, especially her argument that philosophy’s identity and relation to itself depends on an intimate relationship with that which is designated as not itself (e.g. other academic disciplines and non-philosophy in general), the latter of which is a potential source of shame that calls for some form of response. I argue that this shame is particularly acute in regard to the natural sciences, (...)
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  29. added 2016-01-14
    Jack Reynolds & Patrick Stokes (forthcoming). Writing the First Person: Existentialist Methodology and Perspective. In Soren Overgaard & Giuseppina D'Oro (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology. Cambridge UP
    Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim to articulate and minimally defend certain core existentialist insights concerning the first-person perspective, the relationship between theory and practice, and the mode of philosophical presentation conducive to best making those points. We will do this by considering some of the central methodological objections that have been posed around the role of the first-person perspective and “lived experience” in the contemporary literature, before providing some neo-existentialist (...)
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  30. added 2016-01-08
    James Andow (forthcoming). Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
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  31. added 2016-01-05
    Julian De Freitas, Kevin Tobia, George Newman & Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Normative Judgments and Individual Essence. Cognitive Science.
    A growing body of research has examined how people judge the persistence of identity over time — that is, how they decide that a particular individual is the same entity from one time to the next. While a great deal of progress has been made in understanding the types of features that people typically consider when making such judgments, to date, existing work has not explored how these judgments may be shaped by normative considerations. The present studies demonstrate that normative (...)
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  32. added 2016-01-03
    Diego E. Machuca (forthcoming). A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing About Disagreement Argument. Synthese:1-18.
    An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting. The proponent of that view claims that equal weight should be given to all the parties to a peer dispute. Hence, if one of his epistemic peers defends the opposite view, he is required to give equal weight to the two rival views, thereby undermining his confidence in the correctness (...)
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  33. added 2016-01-01
    Jörg Volbers (2015). Freiheit als Praxisform. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 63 (6).
    Dewey’s pragmatism and John McDowell’s philosophy of language share central concerns. They defend a naturalistic vision of the mind (“second nature”) and rely on the concept of experience in order to articulate the contact between mind and world. They differ, though, in their understanding of how the human mind can relate spontaneously to itself and to the world. McDowell links this freedom exclusively to language with the consequence of detaching it from any reflexive determination, turning it into an abstract given. (...)
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  34. added 2015-12-26
    Thomas Pölzler (forthcoming). Revisiting Folk Moral Realism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict this claim, four prominent earlier studies (...)
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  35. added 2015-12-24
    Masaki Ichinose (2005). Does Probability Collapse or Retroact? Philosophical Studies 23.
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  36. added 2015-12-17
    James Andow (forthcoming). Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics. Philosophia:1-10.
    Complete information dispositional metasemantics says that our expressions get their meaning in virtue of what our dispositions to apply those terms would be given complete information. The view has recently been advanced and argued to have a number of attractive features. I argue that that it threatens to make the meanings of our words indeterminate and doesn't do what it was that made a dispositional view attractive in the first place.
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  37. added 2015-12-17
    Chris Ranalli (2015). Meta-Epistemological Scepticism: Criticisms and a Defence. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    The epistemological problem of the external world asks: (1) “How is knowledge of the world possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible?” This is a “how-possible?” question: it asks how something is possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible (cf. Cassam 2007; Nozick 1981; Stroud 1984). Now consider the following question, which asks: (2) “How is a philosophically satisfying answer to (1) possible?” Scepticism is the thesis that knowledge of the world is impossible. It therefore represents (...)
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  38. added 2015-12-17
    Gary Hatfield (2002). Transl of Immanuel Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science. In Henry Allison & Peter Heath (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Cambridge University Press 29-169, 465-484.
    This edition of the Prolegomena presents Kant's thought clearly by paying careful attention to his original language. An extensive translator's introduction considers the origin and purpose of the Prolegomena, examines Kant's use of the analytic method, compares the structure of the Prolegomena to that of the Critique of Pure Reason, examines Kant's relation to Hume as expressed in this work, briefly surveys the work's reception, and offers a note on texts and translation. Detailed scholarly notes accompany the translation itself.
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  39. added 2015-12-16
    Gustavo Fernández Díez (2010). The Demarcation Between Philosophy and Science. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (29):131-146.
    This paper is based on a criterion recently proposed by Richard Fumerton for demarcating philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I suggest to extend it to a demarcation criterion between philosophy and science in general, and put it in the context of the historical changes of boundaries between the philosophical and the scientifi c fi eld. I point to a number of philosophical claims and approaches that have been made utterly obsolete by the advancement of science, and conjecture that a (...)
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  40. added 2015-12-15
    Georg Brun (forthcoming). Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-Engineering. Erkenntnis:1-31.
    Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...)
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  41. added 2015-12-15
    Francois-Igor Pris (2015). Quelques applications de la seconde philosophie de Wittgenstein (ISBN 978-3-639-48126-6). Editions Universitaires Europeennes.
  42. added 2015-12-14
    Christian Beenfeldt (2013). The Philospohical Background and Scientific Legacy of E. B. Titchener's Psychology: Understanding Introspectionism. Springer.
    ​This volume offers a new understanding of Titchener’s influential system of psychology popularly known as introspectionism, structuralism and as classical introspective psychology. Adopting a new perspective on introspectionism and seeking to assess the reasons behind its famous implosion, this book reopens and rewrites the chapter in the history of early scientific psychology pertaining to the nature of E. B. Titchener’s psychological system. -/- Arguing against the view that Titchener’s system was undone by an overreliance on introspection, the author explains how (...)
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  43. added 2015-12-12
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Why Be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher? Axiomathes:1-14.
    In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in (...)
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  44. added 2015-12-08
    Florian Cova, Amanda Garcia & Shen-yi Liao (2015). Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):927-939.
    In the past decade, experimental philosophy---the attempt at making progress on philosophical problems using empirical methods---has thrived in a wide range of domains. However, only in recent years has aesthetics succeeded in drawing the attention of experimental philosophers. The present paper constitutes the first survey of these works and of the nascent field of 'experimental philosophy of aesthetics'. We present both recent experimental works by philosophers on topics such as the ontology of aesthetics, aesthetic epistemology, aesthetic concepts, and (...)
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  45. added 2015-12-03
    Thomas Pölzler (forthcoming). Further Problems with Projectivism. South African Journal of Philosophy.
    From David Hume onwards, many philosophers have argued that moral thinking is characterized by a tendency to “project” our own mental states onto the world. This metaphor of projection may be understood as involving two empirical claims: the claim that humans experience morality as a realm of objective facts (the experiential hypothesis), and the claim that this moral experience is immediately caused by affective attitudes (the causal hypothesis). Elsewhere I argued in detail against one form of the experiential hypothesis. My (...)
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  46. added 2015-11-30
    Moti Mizrahi (2015). Ought, Can, and Presupposition: A Reply to Kurthy and Lawford-Smith. Methode 4 (6):250-256.
    I report the results of a follow-up study, designed to address concerns raised by Kurthy and Lawford-Smith in response to my original study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Like the results of the original study, the results of the follow-up study do not support the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive. The results of both studies suggest that OIC is probably not a principle of ordinary moral cognition. As I have argued in my paper, I take this (...)
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  47. added 2015-11-30
    Miklos Kurthy & Holly Lawford-Smith (2015). [Comment] A Brief Note on the Ambiguity of ‘Ought’. Reply to Moti Mizrahi’s ‘Ought, Can and Presupposition: An Experimental Study’. Methode: Analytic Perspectives 4 (6):244-249.
    Moti Mizrahi provides experimental evidence according to which subjects judge that a person ought to ? even when she cannot ?. He takes his results to constitute a falsification of the alleged intuitiveness of the ‘Ought Implies Can’ principle. We point out that in the light of the fact that (a) ‘ought’ is multiply ambiguous, that (b) only a restricted set of readings of ‘ought’ will be relevant to the principle, and that (c) he did not instruct his subjects appropriately (...)
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  48. added 2015-11-26
    Marek Picha (2014). Apriorism, Psychologism, and Conceptualism About Thought Experiments. Dokos 2014 (1):27-47.
    Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not fully clear conception about (...)
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  49. added 2015-11-25
    Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz (2015). The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):58-77.
    Speculative fiction, such as science fiction and fantasy, has a unique epistemic value. We examine similarities and differences between speculative fiction and philosophical thought experiments in terms of how they are cognitively processed. They are similar in their reliance on mental prospection, but dissimilar in that fiction is better able to draw in readers (transportation) and elicit emotional responses. By its use of longer, emotionally poignant narratives and seemingly irrelevant details, speculative fiction allows for a better appraisal of the consequences (...)
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  50. added 2015-11-23
    Boris Rähme (2015). Transcendental Arguments, Epistemically Constrained Truth, and Moral Discourse. In Gabriele Gava & Robert Stern (eds.), Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Routledge 259-285.
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