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Metaphilosophy

Edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)
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  1. added 2016-09-24
    Timothy Williamson (2016). Abductive Philosophy. Philosophical Forum 47 (3-4):263-280.
  2. added 2016-09-23
    Victor Counted (2016). Making Sense of Place Attachment: Towards a Holistic Understanding of People-Place Relationships and Experiences. Environment, Space, Place 8 (1):7-32.
    The article is an attempt to make sense of the different interdisciplinary perspectives associated with people’s attachment to places with a view to construct a holistic template for understanding people-place relationships and experiences. The author took note of the theoretical contributions of Jorgensen & Stedman, Scannell & Gifford, and Seamon to construct an integrative framework for understanding emotional links to places and people’s perception and experience of places. This was done with the intention of illuminating the meaning of place and (...)
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  3. added 2016-09-16
    Shelley Tremain (forthcoming). Knowing Disability, Differently. In Ian James Kidd, Jose Medina & Pohlhaus Jr (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. Routledge
  4. added 2016-09-12
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Empiricism and Rationalism. Amazon Digital Services LLC.
    Empiricism is the doctrine that all knowledge has a strictly observational basis. Rationalism is the doctrine that least some knowledge has non-observational, purely conceptual basis. In the present work, empiricism is carefully considered and found to have four dire shortcomings: -/- (1) Empiricism cannot account for our knowledge of what doesn't exist, let alone what cannot exist. -/- (2) Empiricism cannot account for our knowledge of dependence-relations, given (1), coupled with the fact that 'P depends on Q' is equivalent with (...)
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  5. added 2016-09-09
    Marc Champagne, We, the Professional Sages: Analytic Philosophy’s Arrogation of Argument.
    One claim reiterated with increasing boldness by the “analytic” tradition in philosophy is that what sets it apart from long-time rivals is a shared adherence to proper norms of argumentation. Gradated deviancy from this canon by English-speaking practitioners has therefore raised important questions about who can repair under the banner “professional philosopher.” We will portray as deeply worrisome the idea that argumentation should secure not just conclusions, but disciplinary membership as well.
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  6. added 2016-09-06
    Florian Cova (forthcoming). Intentional Action and the Frame-of-Mind Argument: New Experimental Challenges to Hindriks. Philosophical Explorations.
    Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgments about intentional action, Knobe (2003) has claimed that these judgments are shaped by our moral judgments and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the ‘frame-of-mind condition’, according to which judgments about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition, Hindriks (2008, 2014) has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According (...)
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  7. added 2016-09-02
    Gila Sher (forthcoming). Substantivism About Truth. Philosophy Compass.
    Substantivism is a general philosophical methodology advocating a substantive approach to philosophical theorizing. In this article I present an overview of this methodology with a special emphasis on the field of truth. I begin with a framework for understanding what is at stake in the substantivist-deflationist debate and describe the substantivist critique of deflationism. I then proceed to discuss contemporary substantivism as a positive methodology, present examples of recent substantivist theories of truth, delineate several principles of philosophical substantivism, and connect (...)
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  8. added 2016-08-29
    Manuel R. Vargas (forthcoming). Contested Terms and Philosophical Debates. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    There are two standard theoretical responses to putative errors in ordinary thinking about some given target property: eliminativism or revisionism. Roughly, eliminativism is the denial that the target property exists, and revisionism is the view that the property exists, but that people tend to have false beliefs about it. Recently, Shaun Nichols has proposed a third option: discretionism. Discretionism is the idea that some terms have multiple reference conventions, so that it may be true to say with eliminativists that the (...)
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  9. added 2016-08-29
    Peter Olen (2016). From Formalism to Psychology: Metaphilosophical Studies in Wilfrid Sellars's Early Works. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1):24-63.
    When discussing Wilfrid Sellars’s philosophy, very little work has been done to offer a developmental account of his systematic views. More often than not, Sellars’s complex views are presented in a systematic and holistic fashion that ignores any periodization of his work. I argue that there is a metaphilosophical shift in Sellars’s early philosophy that results in substantive changes to his conception of language, linguistic rules, and normativity. Specifically, I claim that Sellars’s shift from a formalist metaphilosophy to one more (...)
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  10. added 2016-08-22
    Christopher A. Vogel (2016). Lexical Flexibility, Natural Language and Ontology. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (1).
    The Realist that investigates questions of ontology by appeal to the quantificational structure of language assumes that the semantics for the privileged language of ontology is externalist. I argue that such a language cannot be (some variant of) a natural language, as some Realists propose. The flexibility exhibited by natural language expressions noted by Chomsky and others cannot obviously be characterized by the rigid models available to the externalist. If natural languages are hostile to externalist treatments, then the meanings of (...)
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  11. added 2016-08-19
    Dominic Gregory (forthcoming). Counterfactual Reasoning and Knowledge of Possibilities. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Williamson has argued against scepticism concerning our metaphysically modal knowledge, by arguing that standard patterns of suppositional reasoning to counterfactual conclusions provide reliable sources of correct ascriptions of possibility and necessity. The paper argues that, while Williamson’s claims relating to necessity may well be right, he has not provided adequate reasons for thinking that the familiar modes of counterfactual reasoning to which he points generalise to provide a decent route to ascriptions of possibility. The paper also explores another path to (...)
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  12. added 2016-08-18
    Yrsa Neuman (2015). Standing Before a Sentence: Moore's Paradox and a Perspective From Within Language. Dissertation, Åbo Akademi University
    Ludwig Wittgenstein once wrote to G.E. Moore that he had stirred up a philosophical wasps’ nest with his paradox, associated with the sentence “I believe it’s raining and it’s not raining”. The problem is that it would be odd for a speaker to assert this thought about herself, although it could be true about her, and although the sentence is well-formed and not contradictory. -/- Making use of the notion of a sentence having sense in a context of significant use (...)
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  13. added 2016-08-17
    David Rose (forthcoming). Folk Intuitions of Actual Causation: A Two-Pronged Debunking Explanation. Philosophical Studies:1-39.
    How do we determine whether some candidate causal factor is an actual cause of some particular outcome? Many philosophers have wanted a view of actual causation which fits with folk intuitions of actual causation and those who wish to depart from folk intuitions of actual causation are often charged with the task of providing a plausible account of just how and where the folk have gone wrong. In this paper, I provide a range of empirical evidence aimed at showing just (...)
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  14. added 2016-08-17
    Neri Marsili (2016). Lying by Promising. International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):271-313.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a (...)
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  15. added 2016-08-17
    Yuri Cath (2016). Reflective Equilibrium. In H. Cappelen, T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford University Press 213-230.
    This article examines the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) and its role in philosophical inquiry. It begins with an overview of RE before discussing some of the subtleties involved in its interpretation, including challenges to the standard assumption that RE is a form of coherentism. It then evaluates some of the main objections to RE, in particular, the criticism that this method generates unreasonable beliefs. It concludes by considering how RE relates to recent debates about the role of intuitions in (...)
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  16. added 2016-08-16
    Nolan Daniel, Canberra Plan. A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand.
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  17. added 2016-08-14
    Kevin Lynch (forthcoming). The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method, by Max Deutsch (MIT Press, 2015). [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
  18. added 2016-08-11
    Tuomas E. Tahko (2016). The Scientific Inquisition. The Philosophers' Magazine 74:86-89.
    Nobody expects the Scientific Inquisition!
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  19. added 2016-08-10
    Michael R. Starks, The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle.
    I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic (...)
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  20. added 2016-08-04
    Chris Ranalli, Metaepistemological Skepticism. Oxford Bibliographies.
  21. added 2016-08-03
    Nevin Climenhaga (forthcoming). Intuitions Are Used as Evidence in Philosophy. Mind.
    In recent years a growing number of philosophers writing about the methodology of philosophy have defended the surprising claim that philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence. In this paper I defend the contrary view that philosophers do use intuitions as evidence. I argue that this thesis is the best explanation of several salient facts about philosophical practice. First, philosophers tend to believe propositions which they find intuitive. Second, philosophers offer error theories for intuitions that conflict with their theories. Finally, (...)
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  22. added 2016-08-03
    Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols (2015). Neurodegeneration and Identity. Psychological Science 26 (9):1469– 1479.
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  23. added 2016-07-26
    Frederique Janssen-Lauret (forthcoming). Susan Stebbing, Incomplete Symbols, and Foundherentist Meta-Ontology. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy.
    Susan Stebbing's work on incomplete symbols and analysis was instrumental in clarifying, sharpening, and improving the project of logical constructions which was pivotal to early analytic philosophy. She dispelled use-mention confusions by restricting the term `incomplete symbol' to expressions eliminable through analysis, rather than those expressions' purported referents, and distinguished linguistic analysis from directional analysis of facts. In this paper I explore Stebbing's role in analytic philosophy's development from anti-holism, presupposing that analysis terminates in simples, to the more holist or (...)
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  24. added 2016-07-26
    Héctor Arévalo Benito (2015). "Estudio sobre el pensamiento hispanoamericano en José Gaos". UT.
    En este estudio se plantea con cierto detalle el planteamiento de José Gaos acerca de qué alcance, sentido e implicaciones posee el "pensamiento hispanoamericano" para el autor asturiano, visto desde su obra publicada en México a mediados de los años 40.
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  25. added 2016-07-23
    Fabio Sterpetti (2016). Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism. In L. Magnani & C. Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues. Springer 639-661.
    Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver-age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An interesting (...)
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  26. added 2016-07-19
    Christian Quast (2016). Expertise: A Practical Explication. Topoi:1-17.
    In this paper I will introduce a practical explication for the notion of expertise. At first, I motivate this attempt by taking a look on recent debates which display great disagreement about whether and how to define expertise in the first place. After that I will introduce the methodology of practical explications in the spirit of Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the state of nature along with some conditions of adequacy taken from ordinary and scientific language. This eventually culminates in the (...)
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  27. added 2016-07-12
    Marko Jurjako (forthcoming). Do Philosophical Intuitions Need Calibration? Anthropology and Philosophy.
    In his seminal paper ‘Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium’ Robert Cummins argued that if intuitions are to serve as reliable guides to philosophical truths then we should be able to check their reliability in particular cases. However, if we can check the reliability of intuitions then that means that we have an independent non-intuitive access to the domain that intuitions are supposed to disclose, which in effect makes intuitions obsolete. Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood in their book ‘An Introduction to Metaphilosophy’ respond (...)
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  28. added 2016-07-12
    Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti (forthcoming). Metaphilosophy in Practice: The Responsibility of Psychopathic Offenders as a Case Study. Anthropology and Philosophy.
    We argue that philosophy has an important role to play in bridging certain social practices with certain scientific advancements. Specifically, we describe such a role by focusing on the issue of how and whether neuropsychological data concerning psychopathic offenders reflect on their criminal culpability. We offer some methodological requirements for this type of philosophical application. In addition, we show how it might help in addressing the problem of determining the criminal responsibility of psychopathic offenders.
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  29. added 2016-07-11
    Arber Tasimi, Susan Gelman, Andrei Cimpian & Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Differences in the Evaluation of Generic Statements About Human and Non-Human Categories. Cognitive Science.
    Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. Current theories suggest that people should be especially inclined to accept generics that involve threatening information. However, previous tests of this claim have focused on generics about non-human categories, which raises the question of whether this effect applies as readily to human categories. In Experiment 1, adults were more likely to accept generics involving a threatening (vs. a non-threatening) property for artifacts, but this negativity bias did not also apply to (...)
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  30. added 2016-07-09
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Outline of a Theory of Knowledge. JOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI.
    It is made clear what discursive knowledge is and how we acquire it, and some age-old skeptical views are shown to be incoherent. It is shown that all knowledge is to some degree inferential. At the same time, it is shown that there are three quite distinct senses in which empirical knowledge can be inferential. It is proved that we have a priori knowledge, and also that knowledge of non-empirical truths is needed to acquire empirical knowledge. Finally, it is clearly (...)
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  31. added 2016-07-08
    Insa Lawler (2016). Dirk Koppelberg and Stefan Tolksdorf (Eds) : Erkenntnistheorie - Wie Und Wozu? [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):411-415.
    To what end should or do we pursue philosophy and how? Meta-philosophical questions along these lines have gained more and more interest recently. The collected volume "Erkenntnistheorie — Wie und wozu?" (Engl.: "Epistemology — How and to what end?") aspires to raise and tackle issues addressing the meta-epistemological questions "How is epistemology practiced and to what end?". Although this aim sounds like a descriptive meta-epistemological endeavor, it is not surprising that many authors rather argue for normative claims surrounding the questions (...)
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  32. added 2016-07-07
    Ray Scott Percival (1999). Review of Unweaving The Rainbow (by Richard Dawkins). [REVIEW] Science Spectra.
  33. added 2016-07-05
    Kiyoung Kim (ed.) (2015). AN ATTEMPT ON THE METHODOLOGICAL COMPOSURE: BETWEEN THE NUMBER AND UNDERSTANDING, NATURE AND CONSTRUCTION. ResearchGate.
    Once I had explored the research issue of North and South unification with a focus on the legal integration for uniform constitution and various statutes. It pushed me to deal with a big question, and looked like a semi-textbook with an inchoate idea and baby theory upon the completion of research project. The literature review thankfully had allowed the space of creativity and originality of my work product, and can also be a typical way of foreign graduate legal researchers in (...)
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  34. added 2016-06-29
    Nahuel Sznajderhaus (forthcoming). On the Received Realist View of Quantum Mechanics. Cadernos de História E Filosofia da Ciência.
    In this article I defend that an underlying framework exists among those interpretations of quantum mechanics which crucially consider the measurement problem as a central obstacle. I characterise that framework as the Received View on the realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particular, I analyse the extent to which two of the most relevant attempts at quantum mechanics, namely, many worlds interpretations and Bohmian mechanics, belong within the Received View. However, I claim that scientific realism in itself does not entail (...)
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  35. added 2016-06-29
    Nikil Mukerji (forthcoming). Einführung in die experimentelle Philosophie. Wilhelm Fink.
    Wie kann ein Experiment zur Beantwortung philosophischer Fragestellungen beitragen? Etwa: Was ist Wissen? Was bedeuten sprachliche Ausdrücke? Haben wir einen freien Willen? Kann man etwas absichtlich tun, ohne es zu beabsichtigen? Vertreter einer jungen philosophischen Bewegung wollen den Fragen ihres Fachs mithilfe empirisch-psychologischer Methoden auf den Grund gehen. Anstatt den Lehnstuhl (»armchair«) aufzusuchen, um sich philosophischen Problemen zu widmen, begeben sich experimentelle Philosophen ins Labor, um mithilfe empirischer Informationen aus Psychologie, Neurowissenschaft und Kognitionswissenschaft philosophische Schlussfolgerungen zu stützen. Die Einführung gibt (...)
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