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Metaphilosophy

Edited by Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)
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  1. added 2014-12-09
    Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Philosophers Are Doing Something Different Now: Quantitative Data. Cognition.
    The philosophical study of mind in the twentieth century was dominated by a research program that used a priori methods to address foundational questions. Since that time, however, the philosophical study of mind has undergone a dramatic shift. To provide a more accurate picture of contemporary philosophical work, I compared a sample of highly cited philosophy papers from the past five years with a sample of highly cited philosophy papers from the twentieth century. In the twentieth century sample, the majority (...)
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  2. added 2014-12-08
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental Study. Methode.
    In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental (...)
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  3. added 2014-12-05
    Chris Daly & David Liggins (2014). In Defence of Existence Questions. Monist 97 (7):460–478.
    Do numbers exist? Do properties? Do possible worlds? Do fictional characters? Many metaphysicians spend time and effort trying to answer these and other questions about the existence of various entities. These inquiries have recently encountered opposition: a group of philosophers, drawing inspiration from Aristotle, have argued that many or all of the existence questions debated by metaphysicians can be answered trivially, and so are not worth debating. Our task is to defend existence questions from the neo-Aristotelians' attacks.
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  4. added 2014-11-23
    Steven A. Miller (2014). John Dewey is a Tool: Lessons From Rorty and Brandom on the History of Pragmatism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (2):246-264.
    Richard Rorty’s writings have long frustrated scholars of classical American philosophy. Robert Brandom’s recent engagements with the history of pragmatism have been met with similar disdain. This essay draws on Larry A. Hickman’s theory of technology and tool-use to find a productive framework for thinking through these interpretations. Foregrounding the purposes that guide their readings, we may find value where many readers have seen only ignorance. This strategy does not embrace interpretive relativism, nor does it preclude all scholarly criticism, but (...)
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  5. added 2014-11-23
    Barbara Herrnstein Smith (2002). Reply to an Analytic Philosopher. South Atlantic Quarterly 101 (1):229-242.
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  6. added 2014-11-19
    Renatas Berniunas & Vilius Dranseika (forthcoming). Folk Concepts of Person and Identity: A Response to Nichols and Bruno. Philosophical Psychology.
    In a paper in Philosophical Psychology, Nichols & Bruno (2010) claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article we attempt to evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity but rely on different concepts of a person and of identity of an individual. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no (...)
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  7. added 2014-11-19
    Regina A. Rini (forthcoming). How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise. Synthese:1-22.
    Recent empirical work appears to suggest that the moral intuitions of professional philosophers are just as vulnerable to distorting psychological factors as are those of ordinary people. This paper assesses these recent tests of the ‘expertise defense’ of philosophical intuition. I argue that the use of familiar cases and principles constitutes a methodological problem. Since these items are familiar to philosophers, but not ordinary people, the two subject groups do not confront identical cognitive tasks. Reflection on this point shows that (...)
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  8. added 2014-11-18
    Kevin Reuter, Lara Kirfel, Raphael Van Riel & Luca Barlassina (2014). The Good, the Bad, and the Timely: How Temporal Order and Moral Judgment Influence Causal Selection. Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-10.
    Causal selection is the cognitive process through which one or more elements in a complex causal structure are singled out as actual causes of a certain effect. In this paper, we report on an experiment in which we investigated the role of moral and temporal factors in causal selection. Our results are as follows. First, when presented with a temporal chain in which two human agents perform the same action one after the other, subjects tend to judge the later agent (...)
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  9. added 2014-11-18
    Pedro Karczmarczyk (2012). Los argumentos del lenguaje privado. Notas para la reconstrucción de una controversia. Dialogos 92:73-124.
    Intentaremos reconstruir la controversia acerca de la posibilidad de un lenguaje privado. Analizamos primero las posiciones “epistemológicas” (Malcolm y Fogelin), mostrando sus fallos. Luego analizamos la versión “semántica” (Kenny y Tugendhat) encontrándolas igualmente fallidas. La crítica de Barry Stroud a los argumentos trascendentales como argumentos antiescépticos nos permite discernir el presupuesto común que debilita las posiciones anteriores. Asimismo, la reconstrucción permite apreciar mejor la manera en la que la versión de Kripke evita comprometerse con este presupueto. Argumentamos que esta versión (...)
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  10. added 2014-11-18
    Geert Keil (2001). Rorty und der Eliminative Materialismus – eine Mesalliance? In Thomas Schäfer Udo Tietz (ed.), Hinter den Spiegeln. Beiträge zur Philosophie Richard Rortys. 56-72.
    Im Beitrag von Geert Keil geht es um das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern Rortys frühes Eintreten für den Eliminativen Materialismus mit seinen entspannten Auffassungen zum Status der Wissenschaften vereinbar ist. Allgemein sieht Rorty die Wissenschaften als eine Reihe etablierter sozialer Praktiken an, als Werkzeuge, mit bestimmten Teilen der Welt zurechtzukommen. Dieses pragmatistisch-instrumentalistische Wissenschaftsverständnis steht in auffallendem Kontrast zu der Rolle, die den Naturwissenschaften im Rahmen des Eliminativen Materialismus zufallen soll. Dieser Lösungsvorschlag für (...)
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  11. added 2014-11-17
    Robin McKenna (forthcoming). Knowledge Ascriptions, Edited by Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
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  12. added 2014-11-17
    Nicolas Delon (2013). Pour une éthique animale descriptive. Klesis 27:118-154.
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  13. added 2014-11-14
    Alessia Marabini (2014). La concezione epistemica dell'analiticità. Aracne editrice.
    La rinascita negli ultimi decenni di un nutrito dibattito intorno alla nozione di analiticità dopo le critiche a suo tempo mosse da Quine alla batteria di nozioni utilizzate da Rudolf Carnap (ad esempio, postulati di significato, regole semantiche, definizioni implicite, convenzioni e stipulazioni esplicite) prende le mosse da una riflessione critica sulle argomentazioni di Quine e tenta, da un lato, di approfondire meglio il legame fra analiticità e conoscenza a priori, e, dall’altro, di capire meglio il ruolo che la definizione (...)
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  14. added 2014-11-14
    Peter Seipel (2014). Philosophy, Famine Relief, and the Skeptical Challenge From Disagreement. Ratio 27 (4).
    Disagreement has been grist to the mills of sceptics throughout the history of philosophy. Recently, though, some philosophers have argued that widespread philosophical disagreement supports a broad scepticism about philosophy itself. In this paper, I argue that the task for sceptics of philosophy is considerably more complex than commonly thought. The mere fact that philosophical methods fail to generate true majority views is not enough to support the sceptical challenge from disagreement. To avoid demanding something that human reasoning cannot supply, (...)
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  15. added 2014-11-12
    Nicholas Laskowski (2014). How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit Out of an End-Relational Semantic Hat. Res Philosophica 91 (4):589-607.
    Analytic reductivism in metaethics has long been out of philosophical vogue. In Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normativity (2014), Stephen Finlay tries to resuscitate it by developing an analytic metaethical reductive naturalistic semantics for ‘good.’ He argues that an end-relational semantics is the simplest account that can explain all of the data concerning the term, and hence the most plausible theory of it. I argue that there are several assumptions that a reductive naturalist would need to make about contextual (...)
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  16. added 2014-11-12
    Kaija Mortensen (2014). A Review of "Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind&Quot;. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  17. added 2014-11-11
    Pedro Karczmarczyk, Gassmann Carlos, Acosta Jazmín Anahí, Rivera Silvia, Cuervo Sola Manuel, Torrano Andrea & Abeijón Matías (2013). Aproximaciones a la epistemología francesa. In Karczmarczyk Pedro (ed.), Estudios de epistemología, X. Instituto de epistemología, Universidad Nacional de Tucumán. 1-164.
    Aproximaciones a la escuela francesa de epistemología Los problemas que dominan a la epistemología pueden contextualizarse históricamente como una forma de racionalidad filosófica. La filosofía se ha presentado a lo largo de la historia como un discurso en el que sus diversos componentes (metafísica, ontología, gnoseología, ética, lógica, etc.) se mostraron unidos en el molde de la ?unidad del saber?. En este marco unitario alguna de las formas del saber filosófico detenta usualmente una posición dominante. El énfasis colocado en la (...)
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  18. added 2014-11-09
    Pedro Karczmarczyk (2013). Wittgenstein, Winch, Kripkenstein y la posibilidad de la crítica. Cuadernos de Filosofía 30:07-37.
    The present paper deals with the consequences Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s private language argument has for political and social thought. We will show this is particularly important because it challenges the framework where ordinarily is located the discussion of the political and social relevance of Wittgenstein’s thought. Classical discussion has been concerned mainly with the role of communitary agreement, its relativistic or conservative consequences, the room for criticism and disagreement that it leaves, etc. We discern in classical reading a commitment (...)
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  19. added 2014-11-09
    Geert Keil (2010). Naturalismuskritik und Metaphorologie. In Michael Bölker Mathias Gutmann & Wolfgang Hesse (eds.), Information und Menschenbild. 155-171.
    In natürlicher Sprache formulierte Theorien über welchen Gegenstandsbereich auch immer zeichnen sich wesentlich durch ihre zentralen Begriffe aus. In der Begrifflichkeit einer Theorie spiegeln sich ihre Klassifikationen und gegebenenfalls die angenommenen natürlichen Arten wider. Da von den natürlichen Arten unter anderem abhängt, welche induktiven Schlüsse möglich sind, kann man ohne Übertreibung sagen, dass die zentralen Begriffe einer Theorie einen Teil ihrer Erklärungslast tragen. Eine naturalistische Theorie beansprucht, die von ihr behandelten Phänomene als Teile der natürlichen Welt verständlich zu machen, und (...)
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  20. added 2014-11-06
    Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Experimental Philosophy is Cognitive Science. In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell.
  21. added 2014-11-02
    Lilian O'Brien (forthcoming). Side Effects and Asymmetry in Act-Type Attribution. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    Joshua Knobe's work has marshaled considerable support for the hypothesis that everyday judgments of whether an action is intentional are systematically influenced by evaluations of the action or agent. The main source of evidence for this hypothesis is a series of surveys that involve an agent either helping or harming something as a side effect. Respondents are much more likely to judge the side effect intentional if harm is involved. It is a remarkable feature of the discussion so far that (...)
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  22. added 2014-10-28
    Francois-Igor Pris (2014). О Новом Философском Методе И Новой Реалистической Философии Жослина Бенуаста. Philosophy and Social Sciences (in Russian) 1:32-36.
  23. added 2014-10-21
    Frank J. Hoffman (2000). “Buddhology”. In William M. Johnston (ed.), Encyclopedia of Monasticism. Fitzroy Dearborn.
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  24. added 2014-10-21
    Frank J. Hoffman (1998). “Satisfactions and Obstacles in Philosophizing Across Cultures”. In D. P. Chattopadaya and C. Gupta (ed.), Cultural Otherness and Beyond. E.J. Brill.
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  25. added 2014-10-19
    Nathan Hanna (forthcoming). Philosophical Success. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    Peter van Inwagen proposes a criterion of philosophical success. He takes it to support an extremely pessimistic view about philosophy. He thinks that all philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions fail, including the argument from evil. I’m more optimistic on both counts. I’ll identify problems with van Inwagen’s criterion and propose an alternative. I’ll then explore the differing implications of our criteria. On my view, philosophical arguments can succeed and the argument from evil isn’t obviously a failure.
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  26. added 2014-10-14
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense. Metaphilosophy.
    Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of non-philosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of non-philosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. In this paper, I sketch three arguments (...)
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  27. added 2014-10-14
    Carrie Figdor & Matt L. Drabek (forthcoming). Experimental Philosophy and the Underrepresentation of Women. In W. Buckwalter & J. Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell.
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  28. added 2014-10-13
    Carrie Figdor & Mark Phelan (forthcoming). Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility?: A Case for Rethinking Their Relationship and the Design of Experimental Studies in Moral Psychology. Mind and Language.
    Philosophical tradition has long held that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. We report experimental results that show that the folk do not think free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Our results also suggest that experimental investigation of the relationship is ill-served by a focus on incompatibilism vs. compatibilism. We propose an alternative framework for empirical moral psychology in which judgments of free will and moral responsibility can vary independently in response to many factors (including beliefs about determinism). (...)
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  29. added 2014-10-11
    Helen De Cruz (2014). Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Intuitions play a central role in analytic philosophy, but their psychological basis is little understood. This paper provides an empirically-informed, psychological char- acterization of philosophical intuitions. Drawing on McCauley’s distinction between maturational and practiced naturalness, I argue that philosophical intuitions originate from several early-developed, specialized domains of core knowledge (maturational naturalness). Eliciting and deploying such intuitions in argumentative contexts is the domain of philosophical expertise, thus philosophical intuitions are also practiced nat- ural. This characterization has implications for the evidential value (...)
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  30. added 2014-10-09
    Steven D. Hales & Jennifer Adrienne Johnson (2014). Luck Attributions and Cognitive Bias. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):509-528.
    Philosophers have developed three theories of luck: the probability theory, the modal theory, and the control theory. To help assess these theories, we conducted an empirical investigation of luck attributions. We created eight putative luck scenarios and framed each in either a positive or a negative light. Furthermore, we placed the critical luck event at the beginning, middle, or end of the scenario to see if the location of the event influenced luck attributions. We found that attributions of luckiness were (...)
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  31. added 2014-09-28
    Timothy Perrine (2015). Undermining Truthmaker Theory. Synthese 192 (1):185-200.
    Truthmaker theorists hold that there is a metaphysically explanatory relation that holds between true claims and what exists. While some critics try to provide counterexamples to truthmaker theory, that response quickly leads to a dialectical standoff. The aim of this paper is to move beyond that standoff by attempting to undermine some standard arguments for truthmaker theory. Using realism about truth and a more pragmatic account of explanation, I show how some of those arguments can be undermined.
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