About this topic
Summary Metaphysical necessity is typically considered to be stronger (or narrower) than physical necessity but weaker (or broader) than logical and conceptual necessity (there are exceptions, however). Traditional examples of metaphysical necessity involve theoretical identity statements such as "Water is H2O" and "Gold is the element with the atomic number 79"; both physically and metaphysically necessary, but not logically or conceptually necessary. It is sometimes thought that the various narrower notions of necessity could be defined by restriction of metaphysical necessity.
Key works Although Kripke 1980 will surely remain the classic on the topic of metaphysical necessity, more recent discussion is abundant. For a discussion of the relationship between different types of necessity and the idea that narrower notions of necessity could be defined by restriction of metaphysical necessity, see Fine 2002. Fine 1994 presents an influential case in favour of reducing metaphysical necessity to essence, different aspects of which have since been discussed, e.g., in Hale 1996, Shalkowski 1997, Lowe 1998, Zalta 2006, Cameron 2010, and Correia 2012. For discussion on Kripke's and Putnam's contributions to the literature, see for instance Edgington 2004Soames 2011, Ballarin 2013, and Tahko 2013.
Introductions Cameron 2010
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
138 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 138
  1. José Tomás Alvarado (2009). Una teoría causal de la modalidad. Ideas Y Valores 140:173-196.
    El trabajo presenta una concepción causal de la modalidad metafísica en la que un estado de cosas es metafísicamente posible si y sólo si podría ser causado (en el pasado, el presente o el futuro) por entidades actuales. La concepción es contrastada con lo que se llama la concepción "combinatoria" d..
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Erik Anderson (2005). How General is Generalized Scientific Essentialism? Synthese 144 (3):373 - 379.
    I look at a recent argument offered in defense of a doctrine which I will call generalized scientific essentialism. This is the doctrine according to which, not only are some facts about substance composition metaphysically necessary, but, in addition, some facts about substance behavior are metaphysically necessary. More specifically, so goes the argument, not only is water necessarily composed of H2O and salt is necessarily composed of NaCl, but, in addition, salt necessarily dissolves in water. If this argument is sound, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Neil E. Williams Andrea Borghini (2008). A Dispositional Theory of Possibility. Dialectica 62 (1):21-41.
    The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysically possible is determined by dispositions found in the actual world. We argue that there is just one world – this one – and that all genuine possibilities are grounded in the dispositions exemplified in it. This is the case whether or not those dispositions are manifested. As long as the possibility is one that would obtain were the relevant disposition manifested, it is a genuine possibility. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. John B. Bacon (1976). The Nature of Necessity. [REVIEW] Grazer Philosophische Studien 2:239-246.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Roberta Ballarin (2013). The Necessity of Origin: A Long and Winding Route. Erkenntnis 78 (2):353-370.
    In the last 30 years much philosophical discussion has been generated by Kripke’s proof of the necessity of origin for material objects presented in footnote 56 of ‘Naming and Necessity’. I consider the two most popular reconstructions of Kripke’s argument: one appealing to the necessary sufficiency of origin, and the other employing a strong independence principle allegedly derived from the necessary local nature of prevention. I argue that, to achieve a general result, both reconstructions presuppose an implicit Humean atomistic thesis (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jon Barton (2012). Peacocke's Epiphany: A Possible Problem for Semantic Approaches to Metaphysical Necessity. Philosophia Scientiae 16 (2):99-116.
    Dans son livre intitulé Being Known, C. Peacocke se propose de repondre à la question de savoir comment nous en venons a connaitre des nécessités métaphysiques. Il développe une conception sémantique reposant sur des principes comprenant, d’une part, ses Principes de Possibilité — qui fournissent les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes pour un nouveau concept, « l’admissibilité » — et d’autre part des caractérisations de la possibilité et de la nécessité a l’aide de ce nouveau concept. Je me concentre sur une (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. George Bealer (2006). A Definition of Necessity. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):17–39.
    In the history of philosophy, especially its recent history, a number of definitions of necessity have been ventured. Most people, however, find these definitions either circular or subject to counterexamples. I will show that, given a broadly Fregean conception of properties, necessity does indeed have a noncircular counterexample-free definition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Andrew Scott Beedle (1994). Necessity Naturalized: A Critique of Modal Realism. Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    I might have worn a sweater today. My mug might have been filled with tea and not coffee. In short, things might have been different than they are. ;When I say that things might have been different, it seems that I am committed to believing that, on some level at least, the character of the world is open to change, or admits of a certain flexibility. It seems that I am also committed to the idea that even though things might (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Andrea Bianchi (2010). Dicing with Saul Kripke. Erkenntnis 73 (2):237 - 249.
    Everyone knows what David Lewis' possible worlds are, what role they play in his account of possibility and necessity, and Saul Kripke's criticisms. But what, instead, are Kripke's possible worlds, and what role do they play in his account of possibility and necessity? The answers are not so obvious. Recently, it has even been claimed that, contrary to what is standardly assumed, Kripke's approach to modality has not always been consistently metaphysical. In particular, an interpretation of the famous passage in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Stephen Biggs (2011). Abduction and Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.
    This paper introduces a modal epistemology that centers on inference to the best explanation (i.e. abduction). In introducing this abduction-centered modal epistemology, the paper has two main goals. First, it seeks to provide reasons for pursuing an abduction-centered modal epistemology by showing that this epistemology aids a popular stance on the mind-body problem and allows an appealing approach to modality. Second, the paper seeks to show that an abduction-centered modal epistemology can work by showing that abduction can establish claims about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Phillip Bricker (2001). Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality. In G. Preyer & F. Siebelt (eds.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman and Littlefield.
    It follows from Humean principles of plenitude, I argue, that island universes are possible: physical reality might have 'absolutely isolated' parts. This makes trouble for Lewis's modal realism; but the realist has a way out. First, accept absolute actuality, which is defensible, I argue, on independent grounds. Second, revise the standard analysis of modality: modal operators are 'plural', not 'individual', quantifiers over possible worlds. This solves the problem of island universes and confers three additional benefits: an 'unqualified' principle of compossibility (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. John P. Burgess (2013). On a Derivation of the Necessity of Identity. Synthese:1-19.
    The source, status, and significance of the derivation of the necessity of identity at the beginning of Kripke’s lecture “Identity and Necessity” is discussed from a logical, philosophical, and historical point of view.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. F. K. C. (1975). The Nature of Necessity. Review of Metaphysics 28 (4):762-763.
  14. Ross Cameron (2010). On the Source of Necessity. In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffman (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn posed a dilemma for any realist attempt to identify the source of necessity. Either the facts appealed to to ground modal truth are themselves necessary, or they are contingent. If necessary, we begin the process towards regress; but if contingent, we undermine the necessity whose source we wanted to explain. Bob Hale attempts to blunt both horns of this dilemma. In this paper I examine their respective positions and attempt to clear up some confusions on either side. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Ross Cameron (2009). What's Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):1 - 16.
    I begin by contrasting three approaches one can take to the distinction between the essential and accidental properties: an ontological, a deflationary, and a mind-dependent approach. I then go on to apply that distinction to the necessary a posteriori, and defend the deflationist view. Finally I apply the distinction to modal truth in general and argue that the deflationist position lets us avoid an otherwise pressing problem for the actualist: the problem of accounting for the source of modal truth.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Ross P. Cameron (2010). Necessity and Triviality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):401-415.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Ross P. Cameron (2010). The Grounds of Necessity. Philosophy Compass 5 (4):348-358.
    Some truths are necessary, others could have been false. Why? What is the source of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent? What's so special about the necessary truths that account for their necessity? In this article, we look at some of the most promising accounts of the grounds of necessity: David Lewis' reduction of necessity to truth at all possible worlds; Kit Fine's reduction of necessity to essence; and accounts of necessity that take the distinction between the necessary (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Ross P. Cameron (2007). The Contingency of Composition. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.
    There is widespread disagreement as to what the facts are concerning just when a collection of objects composes some further object; but there is widespread agreement that, whatever those facts are, they are necessary. I am unhappy to simply assume this, and in this paper I ask whether there is reason to think that the facts concerning composition hold necessarily. I consider various reasons to think so, but find fault with each of them. I examine the theory of composition as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Charles Chihara (2003). Review of Alvin Plantinga, Matthew Davidson (Ed.), Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (6).
    This book consists of an introduction by the editor, eleven of Plantinga’s previously published pieces, and an index. The previously published works are presented in the following chronological order: “De Re et De Dicto” (1969); “World and Essence” (1970); “Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?” (1973); Chapter VIII of The Nature of Necessity (1974); “Actualism and Possible Worlds” (1976); “The Boethian Compromise” (1978); “De Essentia” (1979); “On Existentialism” (1983); “Reply to John L. Pollock” (1985); “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. David Chua, Metaphysical Accounts of Modality: A Comparative Evaluation of Lewisian and Neo-Aristotelian Modal Metaphysics.
    In this essay I comparatively evaluate two realist metaphysical accounts of modality: David Lewis’ (1986) genuine modal realism (GMR), and neo-Aristotelian modal realism (AMR) as put forth by Alexander Pruss (2011). GMR offers a reductive analysis of modal claims of possibility and necessity in terms of claims quantifying over concrete worlds and counterparts, and is in this way committed the existence of a plurality of concrete worlds other than the actual world; AMR, on the other hand, offers an analysis of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Nicola Ciprotti & Luca Moretti (2009). Logical Pluralism is Compatible with Monism About Metaphysical Modality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):275-284.
    Beall and Restall 2000; 2001; 2006 advocate a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism, according to which there is not one true logic but many equally acceptable logical systems. They maintain that Logical Pluralism is compatible with monism about metaphysical modality, according to which there is just one correct logic of metaphysical modality. Wyatt 2004 contends that Logical Pluralism is incompatible with monism about metaphysical modality. We first suggest that if Wyatt were right, Logical Pluralism would (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Andrew Earl Coats (1999). Approaching the Mountain of Modalities: A View of Imaginability, Conceivability, and Possibility. Dissertation, University of California, Riverside
    Recently philosophers have raised doubts about the principle that imaginability implies possibility. Their doubts have been due largely to a number of examples involving the notions of identity and essence , in which certain impossibilities nonetheless seem to be imaginable. ;The dissertation responds to this line of argument. Its central thesis is that facts about identity and essence put constraints on what we can imagine, just as they put constraints on what is possible; hence, states of affairs that deny a (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Geraldine Coggins (2003). World and Object: Metaphysical Nihilism and Three Accounts of Worlds. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):353–360.
    The study of metaphysical possibility involves two central questions: (i) What are possible worlds? (ii) Is there an empty possible world? In looking at the first question we consider the different accounts of possible worlds-Lewisian realism, ersatzism, etc. In looking at the second question we consider the discussions of metaphysical nihilism, the modal ontological arguments, etc. In this paper I am drawing these two questions together in order to show how the position we hold on one of these issues affects (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Fabrice Correia (2012). On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):639-653.
    In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical necessity in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Vanessa de Harven (forthcoming). Necessity, Possibility and Determinism in Stoic Thought. In Max Cresswel, Edwin Mares & Adriane Rini (eds.), Logical Modalities from Aristotle to Carnap: The Story of Necessity. Cambridge.
    At the heart of the Stoic theory of modality is a strict commitment to bivalence, even for future contingents. A commitment to both future truth and contingency has often been thought paradoxical. This paper argues that the Stoic retreat from necessity is successful. it maintains that the Stoics recognized three distinct senses of necessity and possibility: logical, metaphysical and providential. Logical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a priori. Metaphysical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a posteriori, a (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Cian Dorr (2004). Non-Symmetric Relations. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:155-92.
    Presupposing that most predicates do not correspond directly to genuine relations, I argue that all genuine relations are symmetric. My main argument depends on the premise that there are no brute necessities, interpreted so as to require logical and metaphysical necessity to coincide for sentences composed entirely of logical vocabulary and primitive predicates. Given this premise, any set of purportedly primitive predicates by which one might hope to express the facts about non-symmetric relations order their relata will generate an objectionable (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Alice Drewery (2005). Essentialism and the Necessity of the Laws of Nature. Synthese 144 (3):381-396.
    In this paper I discuss and evaluate different arguments for the view that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I conclude that essentialist arguments from the nature of natural kinds fail to establish that essences are ontologically more basic than laws, and fail to offer an a priori argument for the necessity of all causal laws. Similar considerations carry across to the argument from the dispositionalist view of properties, which may end up placing unreasonable constraints on property identity across (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Erin Eaker (2014). Kripke's Sole Route to the Necessary a Posteriori. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):388-406.
    In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity . He argues that Kripke's second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in NN. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Dorothy Edgington (2004). Two Kinds of Possibility. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):1–22.
    I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. B. D. Ellis (2002). The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism. Acumen.
    In "The Philosophy of Nature," Brian Ellis provides a clear and forthright general summation of, and introduction to, the new essentialist position. Although the theory that the laws of nature are immanent in things, rather than imposed on them from without, is an ancient one, much recent work has been done to revive interest in essentialism and "The Philosophy of Nature" is a distinctive contribution to this lively current debate. Brian Ellis exposes the philosophical and scientific credentials of the prevailing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Delia Graff Fara (2012). Possibility Relative to a Sortal. In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 7. Oxford University Press.
    This paper is an informal presentation of the ideas presented formally in (”Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory”. Relative-sameness relations -- such as being the same person as -- are like David Lewis’s “counterpart” relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold over time or across worlds between objects that aren’t cross-time or cross-world identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different contexts. They differ from his counterpart relations, however, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Robert Farrell (1983). Metaphysical Necessity and Epistemic Location. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):283 – 294.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Robert Farrell (1981). Metaphysical Necessity is Not Logical Necessity. Philosophical Studies 39 (2):141 - 153.
    Kripke and putnam have argued that metaphysical necessity is truth in all possible worlds, Hence is a kind of logica necessity; it is this claim I argue against. My argument proceeds by way of my considering and elaborating an example to show that although 'gold has atomic number 79' be counted a metaphysically necessary truth, There is a possible world in which it is false; it turns out to be for all I show here at most a physical necessity, True (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Kit Fine (2002). Varieties of Necessity. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford Up. 253-281.
    It is argued that there are three main forms of necessity--the metaphysical, the natural and the normative--and that none of them is reducible to the others or to any other form of necessity. In arguing for a distinctive form of natural necessity, it is necessary to refute a version of the doctrine of scientific essentialism; and in arguing for a distinctive form of normative necessity, it is necessary to refute certain traditional and contemporary versions of ethical naturalism.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
    It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Bruce L. Gordon (2002). Maxwell–Boltzmann Statistics and the Metaphysics of Modality. Synthese 133 (3):393 - 417.
    Two arguments have recently been advanced that Maxwell-Boltzmann particles areindistinguishable just like Bose–Einstein and Fermi–Dirac particles. Bringing modalmetaphysics to bear on these arguments shows that ontological indistinguishabilityfor classical (MB) particles does not follow. The first argument, resting on symmetryin the occupation representation for all three cases, fails since peculiar correlationsexist in the quantum (BE and FD) context as harbingers of ontic indistinguishability,while the indistinguishability of classical particles remains purely epistemic. The secondargument, deriving from the classical limits of quantum statistical partition (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Ian Hacking (2010). Putnam's Theory of Natural Kinds and Their Names is Not the Same as Kripke's. Principia 11 (1):1-24.
    Philosophers have been referring to the “Kripke–Putnam” theory of naturalkind terms for over 30 years. Although there is one common starting point, the two philosophers began with different motivations and presuppositions, and developed in different ways. Putnam’s publications on the topic evolved over the decades, certainly clarifying and probably modifying his analysis, while Kripke published nothing after 1980. The result is two very different theories about natural kinds and their names. Both accept that the meaning of a naturalkind term is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. V. Halbach & P. Welch (2009). Necessities and Necessary Truths: A Prolegomenon to the Use of Modal Logic in the Analysis of Intensional Notions. Mind 118 (469):71-100.
    In philosophical logic necessity is usually conceived as a sentential operator rather than as a predicate. An intensional sentential operator does not allow one to express quantified statements such as 'There are necessary a posteriori propositions' or 'All laws of physics are necessary' in first-order logic in a straightforward way, while they are readily formalized if necessity is formalized by a predicate. Replacing the operator conception of necessity by the predicate conception, however, causes various problems and forces one to reject (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Bob Hale (2004). Putnam's Retreat: Some Reflections on Hilary Putnam's Changing Views About Metaphysical Necessity. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):351–378.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.) (2010). Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    The philosophy of modality investigates necessity and possibility, and related notions--are they objective features of mind-independent reality? If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be explained in other terms? This volume presents new work on modality by established leaders in the field and by up-and-coming philosophers. Between them, the papers address fundamental questions concerning realism and anti-realism about modality, the nature and basis of facts about what is possible and what is necessary, the nature of modal knowledge, modal (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. By Toby Handfield (2004). Counterlegals and Necessary Laws. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):402–419.
    Necessitarian accounts of the laws of nature have an apparent difficulty in accounting for counterlegal conditionals because, despite appearing to be substantive, on the necessitarian thesis they are vacuous. I argue that the necessitarian may explain the apparently substantive content of such conditionals by pointing out the presuppositions of counterlegal discourse. The typical presupposition is that a certain conceptual possibility has been realized; namely, that necessitarianism is false. (The idea of conceptual possibility is explicated in terms of recent work in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Reina Hayaki (2005). The Transience of Possibility. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (2):25-36.
    The standard view of metaphysical necessity is that it is truth in all possible worlds, and therefore that the correct modal logic for metaphysical necessity is S5, in models of which all worlds are accessible from each other. I argue that S5 cannot be the correct logic for metaphysical necessity because accessibility is not symmetric: there are possible worlds that are accessible from ours but from which our world is not accessible. There are (or could be) some individuals who, if (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Eli Hirsch (1986). Metaphysical Necessity and Conceptual Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):243-256.
  44. Christopher Hughes (2004). Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Saul Kripke, in a series of classic writings of the 1960s and 1970s, changed the face of metaphysics and philosophy of language. Christopher Hughes offers a careful exposition and critical analysis of Kripke's central ideas about names, necessity, and identity. He clears up some common misunderstandings of Kripke's views on rigid designation, causality and reference, and the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori. Through his engagement with Kripke's ideas Hughes makes a significant contribution to ongoing debates on, inter alia, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Andrea Iacona (2013). Timeless Truth. In Fabrice Correia & Andrea Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree. Springer.
    A fairly simple theory of the semantics of tense is obtained by combining three claims: (i) for any time t, a present-tense sentence `p' is either true or false at t; (ii) for any time t0 earlier than t, the future-tense sentence `It will be the case that p at t' is true at t0 if `p' is true at t, false otherwise; (iii) for any time t0 later than t, the past-tense sentence `It was the case that p at (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Bjørn Jespersen & Pavel Materna (2002). Are Wooden Tables Necessarily Wooden? Acta Analytica 17 (1):115-150.
    This paper defendsintensional essentialism: a property (intensional entity) is not essential relative to an individual (extensional entity), but relative to other properties (or intensional entities). Consequently, an individual can have a property only accidentally, but in virtue of having that property the individual has of necessity other properties. Intensional essentialism is opposed to various aspects of the Kripkean notion of metaphysical modality, eg, varying domains, existence as a property of individuals, and its category of properties which are both empirical and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Janine Jones (2002). Possibly Turning Out and Metaphysical Possibility. Philosophia 29 (1-4):261-276.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Michael Jubien (2009). Possibility. Oxford University Press.
    Possibility offers a new analysis of the metaphysical concepts of possibility and necessity, one that does not rely on any sort of "possible worlds." The analysis proceeds from an account of the notion of a physical object and from the positing of properties and relations. It is motivated by considerations about how we actually speak of and think of objects. Michael Jubien discusses several closely related topics, including different purported varieties of possible worlds, the doctrine of "essentialism," natural kind terms (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities. Synthese 151 (2):273-295.
    David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism relies on the entailment from a priori conceivability to metaphysical possibility. The a posteriori physicalist rejects this premise, but is consequently committed to psychophysical strong necessities. These don't fit into the Kripkean model of the necessary a posteriori, and they are therefore, according to Chalmers, problematic. But given semantic assumptions that are essential to the conceivability argument, there is reason to believe in microphysical strong necessities. This means that some of Chalmers' criticism is unwarranted, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Joel Katzav (2005). Ellis on the Limitations of Dispositionalism. Analysis 65 (285):92–94.
    FIRST PARAGRAPH I have argued that dispositionalism is incompatible with the Principle of Least Action (PLA) (Katzav 2004). In ‘Katzav on the Limitations of Dispositionalism,’ Brian Ellis responds, arguing that while naïve dispositionalism is incompatible with the PLA, sophisticated dispositionalism is not. Naive dispositionalism, according to Ellis, is the view that the world is ultimately something like a conglomerate of objects and their dispositions, and that, therefore, dispositions are the ultimate ontological units that explain events. Sophisticated dispositionalism, according to Ellis, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 138