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  1. added 2014-08-29
    Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan (2014). Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP. Analysis 74 (3):363-370.
  2. added 2014-08-28
    Gabriel Gottlieb (forthcoming). “Know-How, Procedural Knowledge, and Choking Under Pressure”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and (...)
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  3. added 2014-08-28
    Ian Proops (forthcoming). Russellian Acquaintance Revisited. Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    In Bertrand Russell’s writings during the first two decades of the Twentieth Century there occur two rather different distinctions that involve his much-discussed, technical notion of acquaintance. The first is the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the second, the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This article examines the nature and philosophical purpose of these two distinctions, while also tracing the evolution of Russell’s notion of acquaintance. It argues that, when he first expressly (...)
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  4. added 2014-08-28
    Neil Van Leeuwen (forthcoming). Religious Credence is Not Factual Belief. Cognition.
    I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs (...)
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  5. added 2014-08-28
    Emanuele Ratti (2014). Levels of Abstraction, Emergentism and Artificial Life. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence:1-12.
    I diagnose the current debate between epistemological and ontological emergentism as a Kantian antinomy, which has reasonable but irreconcilable thesis and antithesis. Kantian antinomies have recently returned to contemporary philosophy in part through the work of Luciano Floridi, and the method of levels of abstraction. I use a thought experiment concerning a computer simulation to show how to resolve the epistemological/ontological antinomy about emergence. I also use emergentism and simulations in artificial life to illuminate both levels of abstraction and theoretical (...)
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  6. added 2014-08-28
    Anthony Cunningham (2005). Great Anger. The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  7. added 2014-08-27
    Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Shared Goals and Development. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a role in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are (...)
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  8. added 2014-08-27
    Brent Strickland, Matthew Fisher, Frank Keil & Joshua Knobe (2014). Syntax and Intentionality: An Automatic Link Between Language and Theory-of-Mind. Cognition 133 (1):249–261.
    Three studies provided evidence that syntax influences intentionality judgments. In Experiment 1, participants made either speeded or unspeeded intentionality judgments about ambiguously intentional subjects or objects. Participants were more likely to judge grammatical subjects as acting intentionally in the speeded relative to the reflective condition (thus showing an intentionality bias), but grammatical objects revealed the opposite pattern of results (thus showing an unintentionality bias). In Experiment 2, participants made an intentionality judgment about one of the two actors in a partially (...)
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  9. added 2014-08-27
    Anna Jenkins, David Dodell-Feder, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua Knobe (2014). The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents. PLoS ONE 9.
    In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 (...)
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  10. added 2014-08-27
    Martin F. Fricke (2004). Identifying, Discriminating or Picking Out an Object: Some Distinctions Neglected in the Strawsonian Tradition. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 12:106-107.
    In "Individuals", Peter Strawson talks about identifying, discriminating and picking out particular objects, regarding discriminating and picking out as ways of identifying. I object that, strictly speaking, identification means to say of two things that they are the same. In contrast, discriminating an object from all others can be done by just ascribing some predicate to it that does not apply to the others. Picking out an object does not even seem to require to distinguish it from all others. The (...)
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  11. added 2014-08-26
    Terence Rajivan Edward, Astrology, Fate and Causation.
    Some philosophers assert that astrology is a false theory. The simplest way to argue against all astrology is to identify a proposition that any kind of astrology must be committed to and then show that this proposition is false. In this paper I draw attention to some misconceptions regarding which propositions any kind of astrology is committed to.
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  12. added 2014-08-26
    Jennifer Wang (forthcoming). The Modal Limits of Dispositionalism. Noûs.
    Dispositionality is a modal notion of a certain sort. When an object is said to have a disposition, we typically understand this to mean that under certain circumstances, the object would behave in a certain way. For instance, a fragile object is disposed to break when dropped onto a concrete surface. It need not actually break - its being fragile has implications that, so to speak, point beyond the actual world. According to dispositionalism, all modal features of the world may (...)
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  13. added 2014-08-26
    Anders Nes (forthcoming). Review of T. Bayne and M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: OUP, 2011. [REVIEW] Mind.
  14. added 2014-08-26
    Jennifer Wang (2014). Review of Ulrich Meyer's The Nature of Time. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review 1:1.
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  15. added 2014-08-26
    Adam Morton (2014). Lockhart's Problem. The Philosophers' Magazine 25 (30).
    If we had more powerful minds would we be puzzled by less - because we could make better theories - or by more - because we could ask more difficult questions? This paper focuses on clarifying the question, with an emphasis on comparisons between actual and possible species of thinker.
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  16. added 2014-08-26
    Travis Timmerman (2013). The Persistent Problem of the Lottery Paradox: And Its Unwelcome Consequences for Contextualism. Logos and Episteme (I):85-100.
    This paper attempts to show that contextualism cannot adequately handle all versions of ‘The Lottery Paradox.” Although the application of contextualist rules is meant to vindicate the intuitive distinction between cases of knowledge and non-knowledge, it fails to do so when applied to certain versions of “The Lottery Paradox.” In making my argument, I first briefly explain why this issue should be of central importance for contextualism. I then review Lewis’ contextualism before offering my argument that the lottery paradox persists (...)
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  17. added 2014-08-26
    L. Doughney (2013). Folk, Theory, and Feeling: What Attention Is. Dissertation, La Trobe University
    In this thesis three independent answers to the question ‘what is attention?’ are provided. Each answer is a description of attention given through one of the perspectives that people have on the mental phenomenon. The first answer is the common-sense answer to the question, and is an account of the folk psychology of attention. The understanding of attention put forward here is of attention as a limited, divisible resource that is used in mental acts. The second answer is the empirical (...)
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  18. added 2014-08-26
    William F. Vallicella (2005). &Quot;does Existence Itself Exist? Transcendental Nihilism Meets the Paradigm Theory&Quot;. In Larry Lee Blackman (ed.), The Philosophy of Panayot Butchvarov: A Collegial Evaluation. The Edwin Mellen Press. 57-78.
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  19. added 2014-08-25
    Charles Hermes, Truthmakers and the Consequence Argument.
    Recent work in the truthmakers literature demonstrates that the logic of truthmaking is distinct from classical logic. Since free will is an ontological issue, and not merely a semantic issue, arguments about free will ought to be sensitive to these developments. In Truthmakers and the Direct Argument, Hermes argues that one of the main arguments for incompatibiilsm fails precisely where the truthmakers literature would predict. Here, I argue that similar problems make the Consequence Argument untenable.
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  20. added 2014-08-25
    Timothy Lane (2015). Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...)
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  21. added 2014-08-25
    Timothy Lane (2014). When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model. In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  22. added 2014-08-25
    Nada Gligorov (2014). Undermining Retributivism. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine 13 (2):7-12.
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  23. added 2014-08-24
    Martin F. Fricke (2014). Transparency or Opacity of Mind? Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 22:97-99.
    Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency (...)
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  24. added 2014-08-24
    Kim Davies (2014). Emergence From What? A Transcendental Understanding of the Place of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (5-6):10-32.
    This paper argues that the standard formulations of the question of how consciousness emerges, both synchronically and diachronically, from the physical world necessarily use a concept of the physical without either a clear grasp of the concept or an understanding of the necessary conditions of its possibility. This concept will be elucidated and some of the necessary conditions of its possibility explored, clarifying the place of the mental and the physical as abstractions from the totality of an agent engaged in (...)
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  25. added 2014-08-23
    Adam Feltz & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis. Consciousness and Cognition.
    Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a metaanalysis (...)
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  26. added 2014-08-23
    J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC (...)
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  27. added 2014-08-23
    Georg Theiner & John Sutton (2014). The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition: Commentary on Paul E. Smaldino, "The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits&Quot;. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):277-278.
    We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision-making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
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  28. added 2014-08-23
    Massimo Pigliucci (2014). 5 Questions on Science & Religion. In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), 5 Questions on Science & Religion. Automatic Press. 163-170.
    Are science and religion compatible when it comes to understanding cosmology (the origin of the universe), biology (the origin of life and of the human species), ethics, and the human mind (minds, brains, souls, and free will)? Do science and religion occupy non-overlapping magisteria? Is Intelligent Design a scientific theory? How do the various faith traditions view the relationship between science and religion? What, if any, are the limits of scientific explanation? What are the most important open questions, problems, or (...)
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  29. added 2014-08-22
    Hilary Greaves, Antiprioritarianism.
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  30. added 2014-08-22
    Selim Berker, The Unity of Grounding.
    I argue that there is only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation, and that it is indispensable for normative inquiry.
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  31. added 2014-08-22
    Paul Silva Jr (forthcoming). The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it's for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems for they fail to capture some intuitively compelling aspect of justification and other very plausible epistemic theses. After drawing attention to these problems a new view of justification is (...)
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  32. added 2014-08-22
    Isaac Choi (forthcoming). Is Petitionary Prayer Superfluous? Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
  33. added 2014-08-22
    Christoph Jedan (2010). Philosophy Superseded? The Doctrine of Free Will in the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions. In Jan N. Bremmer (ed.), The Pseudo-Clementines. Peeters. 200-216.
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  34. added 2014-08-22
    José Ortega Y. Gasset (2004). Consciousness, Object and Its Three Distances. In Dermot Moran & Lester E. Embree (eds.), Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy Volume 2. Routledge. 24-29.
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  35. added 2014-08-22
    Christoph Jedan (2000). Willensfreiheit bei Aristoteles? Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
    ein späteres Konstrukt. Dementsprechend sei es, wenn schon kein Willensbegriff bei Aristoteles vorliege, trivialerweise unmöglich, bei Aristoteles eine Willensfreiheit zu entdecken.2 Dieser Einwand könnte sich etwa, wie A. Dihle es getan hat, ...
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  36. added 2014-08-22
    David Brink (1993). The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory. In R. G. Frey & Christopher Morris (eds.), Value, Welfare, and Morality. Cambridge University Press. 252-289.
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  37. added 2014-08-21
    Robert Briscoe, Virtual Representation in Pictorial Space.
    Philosophical theories of depiction are typically structured by two assumptions: first, that depiction is a form of representation and, second, that the vehicle of a picture’s representational content is the design visible on its 2D surface. In this paper, I introduce a novel, empirically motivated resemblance theory of depiction that rejects both structuring assumptions. According to what I call the deep resemblance theory, pictures work by presenting virtual models of objects in phenomenally 3D, pictorial space. The first structuring assumption, according (...)
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  38. added 2014-08-21
    Martin Smith (forthcoming). Scepticism by a Thousand Cuts. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    Global sceptical arguments seek to undermine vast swathes of our putative knowledge by deploying hypotheses that posit massive deception or error. Local sceptical arguments seek to undermine just a small region of putative knowledge, using hypotheses that posit deception or error of a more mundane kind. Those epistemologists who have devised anti-sceptical strategies have tended to have global sceptical arguments firmly in their sights. I argue here that local sceptical arguments, while less dramatic, ultimately pose just as serious a challenge (...)
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  39. added 2014-08-21
    Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler (forthcoming). Conscious Vision in Action. Cognitive Science.
    Conscious visual experience is a source of fine-grained and highly accurate information about the spatial properties of nearby objects. It is thus natural to assume that the spatial information present in visual experience is often used for purposes of intentional, object-directed visuomotor control. Yet this assumption, which we here call the Control Thesis, has been criticized on empirical grounds by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH) [Clark 2007, 2009; Goodale & Milner 1992, 2004a, 2008; Milner & Goodale 1995/2006]. (...)
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  40. added 2014-08-21
    Richard Rowland (2014). Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue that the (...)
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  41. added 2014-08-21
    Christoph Jedan (2013). Metaphors of Closeness : Reflections on 'Homoiosis Theoi' in Ancient Philosophy and Beyond. Numen 60:54-70.
    It is often assumed that a single, diachronically persistent motif of imitating god can be identifijied in Ancient philosophy and early Christianity. The present article takes issue with this assumption and seeks to establish the conceptual framework for a more sophisticated discussion of homoiôsis. The article identifijies eight crucial junctures at which homoiôsis stories can diverge. For all the variance of homoiôsis narratives, the category of imitation of the divine remains a useful analytical tool. The article supports this claim by (...)
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  42. added 2014-08-20
    S. Orestis Palermos (2014). Loops, Constitution and Cognitive Extension. Cognitive Systems Research 27:25-41.
    The ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and the persisting theoretical confusion about the fundamental difference between the hypotheses of embedded (HEMC) and extended (HEC) cognition are three interrelated worries, whose common point—and the problem they accentuate—is the lack of a principled criterion of constitution. Attempting to address the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, mathematically oriented philosophers of mind have previously suggested that the presence of non-linear relations between the inner and the outer contributions is sufficient for cognitive extension. The abstract idea of (...)
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  43. added 2014-08-20
    John Schwenkler (2014). The First Sense, by Matthew Fulkerson. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.
  44. added 2014-08-20
    Sara Bernstein (2014). What Causally Insensitive Events Tell Us About Overdetermination. Philosophia 1:1-18.
    Suppose that Billy and Suzy each throw a rock at window, and either rock is sufficient to shatter the window. While some consider this a paradigmatic case of causal overdetermination, in which multiple cases are sufficient for an outcome, others consider it a case of joint causation, in which multiple causes are necessary to bring about an effect. Some hold that every case of overdetermination is a case of joint causation underdescribed: at a maximal level of description, every cause is (...)
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  45. added 2014-08-20
    Daniel Nica (2013). Narrative and Justification in Moral Particularism. Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy (2):22-32.
    In this paper I will discuss the problem of justification in moral particularism. The first part is concerned with Jonathan Dancy’s account of justification, which is a narrative one. To justify one’s choice is to present a persuasive description of the context in a narrative fashion, not to subordinate singular cases to universal rules. Since it dismisses arguments and employs persuasiveness, this view seems irrational, so the second part of my paper will consist of a personal reconstruction and reformulation of (...)
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  46. added 2014-08-20
    Catherine Rowett (2013). Plato, Wittgenstein and the Definition of Games. In Luigi Perissinotto & Begoña Ramón Cámara (eds.), Wittgenstein and Plato: connections, comparisons and contrasts. Palgrave. 196-219.
    In this paper I argue, controversially, that Plato's Meno anticipates Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism. Plato is usually read as an essentialist of the very kind that Wittgenstein was challenging, and the Meno in particular is usually taken as evidence that Plato thought that to know something you must be able to define it, and that if you can't define it you can't investigate any other questions on the topic. I suggest instead that Plato shows Socrates proposing such a position (much (...)
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  47. added 2014-08-20
    Spyrion Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (2013). Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (8):105-120.
    The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and (...)
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  48. added 2014-08-20
    Daniel Nica (2011). Originile Disputei Etice Dintre Particularism Şi Generalism: Platon Şi Aristotel. Annals of Philosophy. University of Bucharest:51-63.
    This paper is a critical investigation about the historical origins of two contemporary approaches in ethics: moral particularism and moral generalism. Moral particularism states that there are no defensible moral principles and that moral thought doesn’t consist in the application of moral principles to cases, but in understanding the morally relevant features of an action, which vary from case to case. In opposition, moral generalism is the traditional claim that moral decisions are made by applying general rules to particular actions. (...)
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  49. added 2014-08-19
    Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized -- Part One: General Agendas.
    How can different individuals' probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events -- the agenda -- is a sigma-algebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection). We drop this demanding assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. One might be interested in the probability of rain and that of an interest-rate increase, but not in the probability of rain or (...)
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  50. added 2014-08-19
    Franz Dietrich, Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalised -- Part Two: The Premise-Based Approach.
    How can different individuals' probability functions on a given sigma-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize (...)
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