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  1. Frederick Adams (1991). Mind-Body Identity Theories. Teaching Philosophy 14 (4):433-436.
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  2. Varol Akman, Reading McDermott.
    The author is interested in computational approaches to consciousness. His reason for working in the field of AI is to solve the mind-body problem, that is, to understand how the brain can have experiences. This is an intricate project because it involves elucidation of the relationship between our mentality and its physical foundation. How can a biological/chemical system (the human body) have experiences, beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on? Physicists have good reasons to persuade us that ours is a material (...)
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  3. Colin Allen (2011). Methodological Questions Begged. Behavior and Philosophy 39 (40):83 - 87.
    I argue in opposition to Sam Rakover that the current lack of fully adequate theories of the subjective and qualitative aspects of mind does not justify the adoption of what he calls “methodological dualism” (Rakover, this issue). Scientific understanding of consciousness requires the continuation of attempts to explain it in terms of the neural mechanisms that support it. It would be premature to adopt a methodological stance that could foreclose on the possibility of more reductionistic approaches. The effects of such (...)
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  4. Holly K. Andersen (2010). Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem. By Anthony Dardis. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):450-455.
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  5. G. E. M. Anscombe (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected Philosophical Papers Vol. Ii. Basil Blackwell.
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  6. Louise Antony (2010). Realization Theory and the Philosophy of Mind: Comments on Sydney Shoemaker's Physical Realization. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):89 - 99.
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  7. Alexander Bain (1873). Mind and Body: The Theories of Their Relation. London,H. S. King & Co., 1873] Farnborough, Eng., Gregg International.
  8. Marcello Barbieri (2006). Semantic Biology and the Mind?Body Problem: The Theory of the Conventional Mind. Biological Theory 1 (4):352-356.
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  9. George Bealer (2009). The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  10. William Bechtel, Molecules, Systems, and Behavior: Another View of Memory Consolidation.
    From its genesis in the 1960s, the focus of inquiry in neuroscience has been on the cellular and molecular processes underlying neural activity. In this pursuit neuroscience has been enormously successful. Like any successful scientific inquiry, initial successes have raised new questions that inspire ongoing research. While there is still much that is not known about the molecular processes in brains, a great deal of very important knowledge has been secured, especially in the last 50 years. It has also attracted (...)
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  11. Bertil Belfrage (2007). Berkeley's Four Concepts of the Soul (1707-1709). In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), Reexamining Berkeley's Philosophy.
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  12. Hagit Benbaji (2010). Token Monism, Event Dualism and Overdetermination. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 63-81.
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  13. David Boadella (1987). Lifestreams: An Introduction to Biosynthesis. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    CHAPTER EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION AND THE BODY The language of bio -energy It must be recognised at the outset that it is impossible for an individual not to ...
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  14. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) (2009). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Mit Press.
    A new program of philosophical analysis that reconciles a certain account of analysis with philosophical naturalism is applied to a range of philosophical ...
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  15. Myles Brand (1981). A Particularist Theory of Events. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:187-202.
    Events are unstructured particulars and their identity conditions are to be stated in terms of necessary spatiotemporal coincidence. In contrast, Davidson says that events are unstructured particulars, with their identity conditions to be given in terms of sameness of causes and effects; and Kim says that events are structured particulars, with their identity conditions to be given in terms of sameness of their constituents. The consequences of my view are then traced for mental events.
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  16. Manuel Bremer (2008). David Smith and Amie Thomasson, Editors, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Minds and Machines 18 (3):417-419.
  17. Mario Augusto Bunge (1980). The Mind-Body Problem: A Psychobiological Approach. Pergamon Press.
  18. Alex Byrne (1993). The Emergent Mind. Dissertation, Princeton University
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  19. Keith Campbell (2008). Review of Simone Gozzano, Francesco Orilia (Eds.), Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (8).
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  20. H. Wildon Carr (1920). Dr. Wildon Carr's Theory of the Relation of Mind and Body. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (21):579-580.
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  21. Richard L. Cartwright (1968). Propositions Again. Noûs 2 (3):229-246.
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  22. Chung-ying Cheng (ed.) (1975). Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem: [Proceedings]. University Press of Hawaii.
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  23. Noam Chomsky (1994). Naturalism and Dualism in the Study of Language and Mind. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2):181 – 209.
    (1994). Naturalism and dualism in the study of language and mind. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 181-209. doi: 10.1080/09672559408570790.
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  24. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2005). Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein Und Intersubjektivität. Studien Zur Phänomenologie von Brentano Bis Ingarden. Ontos.
    Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden Arkadiusz Chrudzimski. Husserl, Edmund 1908. Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre. Sommersemester I 908 (Husserliana XXVI, hrsg. von U. Panzer), Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster 1987 ...
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  25. Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction : brainbound versus extended -- From embodiment to cognitive extension -- The active body -- The negotiable body -- Material symbols -- World, Incorporated -- Boundary disputes -- Mind re-bound -- The cure for cognitive hiccups (HEMC, HEC, HEMC ...) -- Rediscovering the brain -- The limits of embodiment -- Painting, planning, and perceiving -- Disentangling embodiment -- Conclusions : mind-sized bites.
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  26. Brian Cooney (ed.) (2000). The Place of Mind. Wadsworth Thomson Learning.
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  27. Tim Crane, Introduction: The Mental and the Physical.
    The theme of these is essays is what might be called, rather ambitiously, the nature of the human mind. Psychologists and philosophers both investigate the nature of the mind, but from rather different angles. Psychologists and neuroscientists investigate the actual mechanisms in the brain, the body and the world which underpin mental events and processes. Philosophers, by contrast, ask more abstract questions: for example, about what makes any process mental at all, or how mental reality fits into the rest of (...)
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  28. Sean Crawford (ed.) (2010). Philosophy of Mind: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Routledge.
    v. 1. Foundations -- v. 2. The mind-body problem -- v. 3. Intentionality -- v. 4. Consciousness.
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  29. José-Luis Diaz (2000). Mind-Body Unity, Dual Aspect, and the Emergence of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):393 – 403.
    Dual aspect theory has conceptual advantages over alternative mind-body notions, but difficulties of its own. The nature of the underlying psychophysical ground, for one, remains problematic either in terms of the principle of complementarity or if mind and matter are taken to be aspects of something like energy, movement, or information. Moreover, for a dual aspect theory to be plausible it should avoid the four perils of all mind-body theories: epiphenomenalism, reductionism, gross panpsychism, and the problems of emergence. An alternative (...)
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  30. Frank Dickinson (1929). Dualism and Functionalism.
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  31. Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann (2010). Who's Afraid of Nagelian Reduction? Erkenntnis 73 (3):393-412.
    We reconsider the Nagelian theory of reduction and argue that, contrary to a widely held view, it is the right analysis of intertheoretic reduction, since the alleged difficulties of the theory either vanish upon closer inspection or turn out to be substantive philosophical questions rather than knock-down arguments.
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  32. Tyler Doggett & Daniel Stoljar (2010). Does Nagel's Footnote Eleven Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Philosophical Issues 20 (1):125-143.
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  33. Durant Drake (1923). The Mind-Body Impasse. Philosophical Review 32 (2):221-228.
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  34. Hans Driesch (1927). Mind and Body. London, Methuen.
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  35. Homer H. Dubs (1929). The Psychophysical Problem-A Neglected Solution. The Monist 39 (1):121-125.
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  36. Antony Eagle, Mind and Body.
    Characteristic mental states including thinking about going on holiday, desiring to eat a peach, feeling sad, and believing that that Australia will win the world cup. Mental states are intentional (about other things) and we have privileged access to them.
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  37. Frances Egan (1994). Aworld Withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “Naturalism and Intentionality”. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):327 - 338.
  38. Ralph D. Ellis (2010). How the Mind Uses the Brain: To Move the Body and Image the Universe. Open Court.
    Introduction: Searching for the covert agent of consciousness -- The devil's pact (or, why the hard problem is now so hard) -- Action at the macro level : an agent-based theory of intentionality -- Action imagery and representation of the external world -- Do we need an emergency metaphysician? : action versus reaction at the micro level -- Herding neurons : the causal structure of self-organizing systems -- The paradoxes of phenomenal consciousness -- The self-organizing imagination : addressing the mind-body (...)
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  39. H. Tristram Engelhardt (1973). Mind-Body: A Categorial Relation. The Hague,Martinus Nijhoff.
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  40. Robert Evans (2004). Book Review: Why the Mind-Body Problem Cannot Be Solved. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 14 (3):403-407.
  41. Marvin Farber (1944). Types of Unity and the Problem of Monism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1):37-59.
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  42. Peter Fazekas (2011). Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophia 39 (1):21-29.
    The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal roles (...)
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  43. Damien Fennell (2010). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism – Andrew Melnyk. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):194-195.
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  44. William Fish (2009). Book Notes: Adams, Frederick and Kenneth Aizawa,The Bounds of Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008, Pp. Xiii + 197, AU$120.00 / NZ$130.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):355-356.
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  45. Owen Flanagan (1997). Conscious Inessentialism and the Epiphenomenalist Suspicion. In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. The Mit Press.
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  46. Jason Ford (2010). Robert Kirk: Zombies and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):321-324.
  47. G. Franck & H. Atmanspacher, A Proposed Relation Between Intensity of Presence and Duration of Nowness.
    Summary. It is proposed to translate the mind-matter distinction into terms of mental and physical time. In the spirit of this idea, we hypothesize a relation between the intensity of mental presence and a crucial time scale (some seconds) often referred to as a measure for the duration of nowness. This duration is experimentally accessible and might, thus, offer a suitable way to characterize the intensity of mental presence. Interesting consequences with respect to the idea of a generalized notion of (...)
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  48. Brian Garrett, Causal Relevance and the Mental : Towards a Non-Reductive Metaphysics.
    My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior (such as the waving of my hand) is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states (event dualism), then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. (...)
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  49. Georg Gasser (ed.) (2007). How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.
    The aim of the present volume is to draw the balance of naturalism's success so far.
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  50. Brie Gertler (2009). The Role of Ignorance in the Problem of Consciousness: Critical Review of Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, 2006). Noûs 43 (2):378-393.
    The plain man thinks that material objects must certainly exist, since they are evident to the senses. Whatever else may be doubted, it is certain that anything you can bump into must be real; this is the plain man’s metaphysic. This is all very well, but the physicist comes along and shows that you never bump into anything: even when you run your hand along a stone wall, you do not really touch it. When you think you touch a thing, (...)
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