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  1. Gustavo Fernández Acevedo (2003). ¿Puede un dualismo naturalista resolver el problema de la ineficacia causal de lo mental? Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 28 (2):285-303.
    In this article I defend two theses related to the ontology of the mind and the conception of explanatory levels supposed by evolutionary psychology. First, that the theory of mind adopted by this program can not remove all dualist remnant and present an acceptable picture of mind-body relationship. Second, that the difficulties presented by the ontological hypothesis, in addition to certain plausible theses on the explanatory compatibility, reduce in wide measure the attractiveness of pluralism of levels defended.
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  2. Frederick Adams (1991). Mind-Body Identity Theories. Teaching Philosophy 14 (4):433-436.
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  3. Joseph Agassi (1991). Wittgenstein and Physicalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 41:67-97.
    In the light of a sketch of the history of modem Anti-Metaphysics up from Francis Bacon Wittgenstein's position - the refusal of the possibility of metaphysical assertions - is compared with the views of Mach, of Camap and Neurath and of Popper. Analysing the notions of 'nonsense', 'meaninglessness' and 'Scheinproblem', their interrelations and connections to physicalism three variants of Anti-Metaphysics are distinguished: the Enlightenment view, the positivistMachian view and the linguistic Wittgensteinian view. The present day actuality of these views is (...)
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  4. Varol Akman, Reading McDermott.
    The author is interested in computational approaches to consciousness. His reason for working in the field of AI is to solve the mind-body problem, that is, to understand how the brain can have experiences. This is an intricate project because it involves elucidation of the relationship between our mentality and its physical foundation. How can a biological/chemical system (the human body) have experiences, beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on? Physicists have good reasons to persuade us that ours is a material (...)
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  5. Colin Allen (2011). Methodological Questions Begged. Behavior and Philosophy 39 (40):83 - 87.
    I argue in opposition to Sam Rakover that the current lack of fully adequate theories of the subjective and qualitative aspects of mind does not justify the adoption of what he calls “methodological dualism” (Rakover, this issue). Scientific understanding of consciousness requires the continuation of attempts to explain it in terms of the neural mechanisms that support it. It would be premature to adopt a methodological stance that could foreclose on the possibility of more reductionistic approaches. The effects of such (...)
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  6. Keith Allen (forthcoming). Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument From Structure. Minds and Machines:1-20.
    Colours appear to instantiate a number of structural properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a fundamental distinction into unique and binary. Accounting for these structural properties is often taken to present a serious problem for physicalist theories of colour. This paper argues that a prominent attempt by Byrne and Hilbert to account for the structural properties of the colours, consistent with the claim that colours are types of surface spectral reflectance, is (...)
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  7. Mahrad Almotahari (2013). Flaws of Formal Relationism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):367-376.
    Formal relationism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that folk psychological states should be individuated, at least partially, in terms of the purely formal inference-licensing relations between underlying mental representations. It's supposed to provide a Russellian alternative to a Fregean theory of propositional attitudes. I argue that there's an inconsistency between the motivation for formal relationism and the use to which it's put in defense of Russellian propositions. Furthermore, I argue that formal relationism is committed to epiphenomenalism about (...)
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  8. Holly K. Andersen (2010). Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem. By Anthony Dardis. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):450-455.
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  9. Tyson Anderson (1974). Some Remarks on 'Physicalism and Immortality': Reply to David Mouton. Religious Studies 10 (1):81 - 84.
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  10. Leonard Angel (2010). The Importance of Physicalism in the Philosophy of Religion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):141 - 156.
    First, some say that core physicalism is not anti-religion. I argue that this seems to be incorrect. Physical completeness is a core element of contemporary physicalism; (the evidence for physical completeness is strong); and physical completeness both logically and not strictly logically rejects many central religious views. Consequently, there is a sense in which core physicalism is, in an important way, anti-religion. Second, physical completeness positively supports one significant religious view; and physical completeness permits one to hold two others. The (...)
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  11. G. E. M. Anscombe (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected Philosophical Papers Vol. Ii. Basil Blackwell.
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  12. Lm Antony & J. Levine (1996). Reduction with Autonomy: Mental Causation, Reduction and Supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives 11:83-105.
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  13. Louise Antony (2010). Realization Theory and the Philosophy of Mind: Comments on Sydney Shoemaker's Physical Realization. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):89 - 99.
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  14. István Aranyosi (2002). Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer (Eds.), Physicalism and Its Discontents. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6:363-370.
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  15. István Aranyosi (2002). Physicalism and Its Discontents. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):363-370.
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  16. I. Kim’S. Exclusion Argument (2013). And Patterns of Variation. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 88.
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  17. H. Atmanspacher (2005). Non-Physicalist Physical Approaches. Guest Editorial. Mind Matter 3:3-6.
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  18. Paul Audi (2011). Primitive Causal Relations and the Pairing Problem. Ratio 24 (1):1-16.
    There is no doubt that spatial relations aid us in pairing up causes and effects. But when we consider the possibility of qualitatively indiscernible things, it might seem that spatial relations are more than a mere aid – they might seem positively required. The belief that spatial relations are required for causal relations is behind an important objection to Cartesian Dualism, the pairing problem. I argue that the Cartesian can answer this objection by appeal to the possibility of primitive causal (...)
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  19. Anita Avramides (1989). Lynn Rudder Baker, "Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism". [REVIEW] Dialogue 28 (4):693.
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  20. Anita Avramides (1989). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism Lynne Rudder Baker Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. 190. $19.95 (U.S.), $9.95 (U.S.) Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 28 (04):693-.
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  21. R. J. B. (1969). The "Mental" and the "Physical.". Review of Metaphysics 22 (4):752-752.
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  22. A. Bailey (1997). Rocco J. Gennaro, Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:276-276.
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  23. Andrew R. Bailey (1998). Supervenience and Physicalism. Synthese 117 (1):53-73.
    Discussion of the supervenience relation in the philosophical literature of recent years has become Byzantine in its intricacy and diversity. Subtle modulations of the basic concept have been tooled and retooled with increasing frequency, until supervenience has lost nearly all its original lustre as a simple and powerful tool for cracking open refractory philosophical problems. I present a conceptual model of the supervenience relation that captures all the important extant concepts (and suggests a few new ones) without ignoring the complexities (...)
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  24. Alexander Bain (1873). Mind and Body: The Theories of Their Relation. London,H. S. King & Co., 1873] Farnborough, Eng., Gregg International.
  25. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). The Nature of True Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):475-478.
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  26. Lynne Rudder Baker (1991). [Book Review] Saving Belief, a Critique of Physicalism. [REVIEW] Criminal Justice Ethics 10 (4):27-40.
  27. Derek Ball (2014). Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, by Derk Pereboom. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):118-129.
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  28. Marcello Barbieri (2006). Semantic Biology and the Mind?Body Problem: The Theory of the Conventional Mind. Biological Theory 1 (4):352-356.
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  29. J. Barresi (1999). Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:92-93.
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  30. J. Barresi (1996). Daniel Dennett, Kinds of Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:532-534.
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  31. George Bealer (2009). The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  32. William Bechtel, Molecules, Systems, and Behavior: Another View of Memory Consolidation.
    From its genesis in the 1960s, the focus of inquiry in neuroscience has been on the cellular and molecular processes underlying neural activity. In this pursuit neuroscience has been enormously successful. Like any successful scientific inquiry, initial successes have raised new questions that inspire ongoing research. While there is still much that is not known about the molecular processes in brains, a great deal of very important knowledge has been secured, especially in the last 50 years. It has also attracted (...)
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  33. Ansgar Beckermann (2009). What Is Property Physicalism? In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  34. D. Beilfeldt (1999). Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism. Zygon 34 (4):619-628.
    This essay examines Nancey Murphy’s commitment to downward causation and develops a critique of that notion based upon the distinction between the causal relevance of a higher-level event and its causal efficacy. I suggest the following: (1) nonreductive physicalism lacks adequate resources upon which to base an assertion of real causal power at the emergent, supervenient level; (2) supervenience’s nonreductive nature ought not obscure the fact that it affirms an ontological determination of higher-level properties by those at the lower level; (...)
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  35. Jules Belford (1970). A Physicalistic Approach to the Problem of Other Minds. Dissertation, University of Miami
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  36. Bertil Belfrage (2007). Berkeley's Four Concepts of the Soul (1707-1709). In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), Reexamining Berkeley's Philosophy.
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  37. Hagit Benbaji (2010). Token Monism, Event Dualism and Overdetermination. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 63-81.
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  38. Agustín Vicente Benito (2001). Realization, Determination and Mental Causation. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (40):77-94.
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  39. José Luis Bermúdez (2004). Vagueness, Phenomenal Concepts and Mind-Brain Identity. Analysis 64 (2):134 - 139.
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  40. Paul Bernier (2000). Fonctionnalisme et similarité phénoménale. Philosophiques 27 (1):99-114.
    Dans la foulée de divers arguments antiphysicalistes visant à montrer que les qualia ne sont pas fonctionnalisables, Ned Block a proposé un autre argument de ce type, qui repose sur son expérience de pensée de la Terre inversée. L’argument de Block montrerait qu’un sujet peut avoir deux expériences de couleur du même type « phénoménal » qui seraient de deux types fonctionnels distincts puisque, selon lui, elles auraient des contenus intentionnels distincts. Il existerait donc une différence fondamentale entre le contenu (...)
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  41. John Bickle (2007). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):262–264.
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  42. D. J. Bierman (1996). Mind, Machines and Paranormal Phenomena: A Rejoinder to Beloffs Radical Dualist Perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):5-6.
    In the very first issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, dualist John Beloff discusses the problem of how interactions may occur between the supposedly different realms of mind and matter. It is indeed the case that meta-analyses covering many years of research give very strong support to the reality of psi phenomena . Historical analysis has shown, however, that the results of some of the stronger paradigms are subject to a decline effect after an initial successful period of ten (...)
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  43. Fernando Birman (2009). Quantum Mechanics and the Plight of Physicalism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):207-225.
    The literature on physicalism often fails to elucidate, I think, what the word physical in physical ism precisely means. Philosophers speak at times of an ideal set of fundamental physical facts, or they stipulate that physical means non-mental , such that all fundamental physical facts are fundamental facts pertaining to the non-mental. In this article, I will probe physicalism in the very much tangible framework of quantum mechanics. Although this theory, unlike “ideal physics” or some “final theory of non-mentality”, is (...)
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  44. J. I. Biro & Robert W. Shahan (1982). Mind, Brain, and Function Essays in the Philosophy of Mind.
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  45. Robert Bishop (2013). Review of" After Physicalism". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):8.
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  46. Robert Bishop (2010). The Via Negativa: Not the Way to Physicalism. Mind and Matter 8 (2):203-214.
    A recent defense of the causal argument for physicalism is to defune the physical in terms of the non-mental. This move is designed to defuse Hempel's dilemma, one version of which is taken to the problem that the physical cannot be successfully defined in terms of either present-day or a future completed physics. I argue that the inductive support offered for this non-mental move simply begs the question for physicalism.
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  47. R. Bissell (1997). Fred Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:274-275.
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  48. James Blachowicz (2013). The Constraint Interpretation of Physical Emergence. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 44 (1):21-40.
    I develop a variant of the constraint interpretation of the emergence of purely physical (non-biological) entities, focusing on the principle of the non-derivability of actual physical states from possible physical states (physical laws) alone. While this is a necessary condition for any account of emergence, it is not sufficient, for it becomes trivial if not extended to types of constraint that specifically constitute physical entities, namely, those that individuate and differentiate them. Because physical organizations with these features are in fact (...)
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  49. N. Block (1996). Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back: Mental Causation, Reduction and Supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives 11:107-132.
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  50. Ned Block (1992). Le fonctionnalisme face au problème Des qualia. Les Etudes Philosophiques (3):337-369.
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