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  1. Abhedānanda (1939). The Path of Realization. Calcutta, Ramakrishna Vedanta Math.
  2. Fred Ablondi (2008). François Lamy, Occasionalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 619-629.
    There is a long-standing view that Malebranche and his fellow occasionalists accepted occasionalism to solve the problem of interaction between immaterial souls and extended bodies. Recently, however, scholars have shown this story to be a myth. Malebranche, Geulincx, La Forge, and Cordemoy adopted occasionalism for a variety of reasons, but none did so because of a need to provide a solution to a perceived mind-body problem. Yet there is one Cartesian for whom the “traditional” reading is largely on the mark. (...)
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  3. Gustavo Fernández Acevedo (2003). ¿Puede un dualismo naturalista resolver el problema de la ineficacia causal de lo mental? Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 28 (2):285-303.
    In this article I defend two theses related to the ontology of the mind and the conception of explanatory levels supposed by evolutionary psychology. First, that the theory of mind adopted by this program can not remove all dualist remnant and present an acceptable picture of mind-body relationship. Second, that the difficulties presented by the ontological hypothesis, in addition to certain plausible theses on the explanatory compatibility, reduce in wide measure the attractiveness of pluralism of levels defended.
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  4. Frederick Adams (1991). Mind-Body Identity Theories. Teaching Philosophy 14 (4):433-436.
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  5. George P. Adams (1913). Mind as Form and as Activity. Philosophical Review 22 (3):265-283.
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  6. Mark Addis (2005). Entries on Goodstein, MacDonald, Masterman, and Pears. In Stuart Brown (ed.), The Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers. Thoemmes Press.
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  7. J. Aegwon Kim (1997). Supervenience, Emergence, and Realization in the Philosophy of Mind. In P. Machamer & M. Carrier (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press and Universtaetsverlag Konstanz. 271.
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  8. J. Agassi (1959). Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. Ii: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. Ed. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, G. Maxwell. [REVIEW] Mind 68:275.
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  9. Joseph Agassi (1991). Wittgenstein and Physicalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 41:67-97.
    In the light of a sketch of the history of modem Anti-Metaphysics up from Francis Bacon Wittgenstein's position - the refusal of the possibility of metaphysical assertions - is compared with the views of Mach, of Camap and Neurath and of Popper. Analysing the notions of 'nonsense', 'meaninglessness' and 'Scheinproblem', their interrelations and connections to physicalism three variants of Anti-Metaphysics are distinguished: the Enlightenment view, the positivistMachian view and the linguistic Wittgensteinian view. The present day actuality of these views is (...)
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  10. Varol Akman, Reading McDermott.
    The author is interested in computational approaches to consciousness. His reason for working in the field of AI is to solve the mind-body problem, that is, to understand how the brain can have experiences. This is an intricate project because it involves elucidation of the relationship between our mentality and its physical foundation. How can a biological/chemical system (the human body) have experiences, beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on? Physicists have good reasons to persuade us that ours is a material (...)
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  11. Virgil C. Aldrich (1988). The Body of a Person. University Press of America.
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  12. Daniel Algom, Lawrence E. Marks & David Wiesenfeld (1991). Tapping the Social Psychology of Psychophysical Experiments: Mode of Responding Does Not Alter Statistical Properties of Magnitude Estimates. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (2):226-228.
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  13. Colin Allen (2011). Methodological Questions Begged. Behavior and Philosophy 39 (40):83 - 87.
    I argue in opposition to Sam Rakover that the current lack of fully adequate theories of the subjective and qualitative aspects of mind does not justify the adoption of what he calls “methodological dualism” (Rakover, this issue). Scientific understanding of consciousness requires the continuation of attempts to explain it in terms of the neural mechanisms that support it. It would be premature to adopt a methodological stance that could foreclose on the possibility of more reductionistic approaches. The effects of such (...)
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  14. Keith Allen (forthcoming). Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument From Structure. Minds and Machines:1-20.
    Colours appear to instantiate a number of structural properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a fundamental distinction into unique and binary. Accounting for these structural properties is often taken to present a serious problem for physicalist theories of colour. This paper argues that a prominent attempt by Byrne and Hilbert to account for the structural properties of the colours, consistent with the claim that colours are types of surface spectral reflectance, is (...)
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  15. Mahrad Almotahari (2013). Flaws of Formal Relationism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):367-376.
    Formal relationism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that folk psychological states should be individuated, at least partially, in terms of the purely formal inference-licensing relations between underlying mental representations. It's supposed to provide a Russellian alternative to a Fregean theory of propositional attitudes. I argue that there's an inconsistency between the motivation for formal relationism and the use to which it's put in defense of Russellian propositions. Furthermore, I argue that formal relationism is committed to epiphenomenalism about (...)
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  16. Maria Alvarez (2006). Book Review. Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith" Mind, Morality, and Explanation". [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 47 (4):362-366.
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  17. Holly K. Andersen (2010). Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem. By Anthony Dardis. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):450-455.
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  18. Tyson Anderson (1974). Some Remarks on 'Physicalism and Immortality': Reply to David Mouton. Religious Studies 10 (1):81 - 84.
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  19. Leonard Angel (2010). The Importance of Physicalism in the Philosophy of Religion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):141 - 156.
    First, some say that core physicalism is not anti-religion. I argue that this seems to be incorrect. Physical completeness is a core element of contemporary physicalism; (the evidence for physical completeness is strong); and physical completeness both logically and not strictly logically rejects many central religious views. Consequently, there is a sense in which core physicalism is, in an important way, anti-religion. Second, physical completeness positively supports one significant religious view; and physical completeness permits one to hold two others. The (...)
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  20. G. E. M. Anscombe (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected Philosophical Papers Vol. Ii. Basil Blackwell.
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  21. Lm Antony & J. Levine (1996). Reduction with Autonomy: Mental Causation, Reduction and Supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives 11:83-105.
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  22. Louise Antony (2010). Realization Theory and the Philosophy of Mind: Comments on Sydney Shoemaker's Physical Realization. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):89 - 99.
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  23. István Aranyosi (2002). Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer (Eds.), Physicalism and Its Discontents. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6:363-370.
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  24. István Aranyosi (2002). Physicalism and Its Discontents. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):363-370.
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  25. I. Kim’S. Exclusion Argument (2013). And Patterns of Variation. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 88.
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  26. D. M. Armstrong (1988). The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview, 1999); U. Place,'Thirty Years On: Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2).
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  27. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press.
    The emphasis is always on the arguments used, and the way one position develops from another. By the end of the book the reader is afforded both a grasp of the state of the controversy, and how we got there.
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  28. Gisa Aschersleben, Jorg Gehrke & Wolfgang Prinz (2004). A Psychophysical Approach to Action Timing. In Christian Kaernbach, Erich Schroger & Hermann Müller (eds.), Psychophysics Beyond Sensation: Laws and Invariants of Human Cognition. Psychology Press. 117--136.
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  29. James B. Ashbrook (1989). The Human Brain and Human Destiny: A Pattern for Old Brain Empathy with the Emergence of Mind. Zygon 24 (3):335-356.
    . The human brain combines empathy and imagination via the old brain which sets our destiny in the evolutionary scheme of things. This new understanding of cognition is an emergent phenomenon—basically an expressive ordering of reality as part of “a single natural system.” The holographic and subsymbolic paradigms suggest that we live in a contextual universe, one which we create and yet one in which we are required to adapt. The inadequacy of the new brain—specially the left hemisphere's rational view (...)
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  30. John Michael Atherton (2007). Philosophy Outdoors : First Person Physical. In M. J. McNamee (ed.), Philosophy, Risk, and Adventure Sports. London ;Routledge.
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  31. H. Atmanspacher (2005). Non-Physicalist Physical Approaches. Guest Editorial. Mind Matter 3:3-6.
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  32. Harald Atmanspacher, Mind and Matter as Asymptotically Disjoint, Inequivalent Representations with Broken.
    Many philosophical and scientific discussions of topics of mind-matter research make implicit assumptions, in various guises, about the distinction between mind and matter. Currently predominant positions are based on either reduction or emergence, providing either monistic or dualistic scenarios. A more-involved framework of thinking, which can be traced back to Spinoza and Leibniz, combines the two scenarios, dualistic (with mind and matter separated) and monistic (with mind and matter unseparated), in one single picture. Based on such a picture, the transition (...)
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  33. Paul Audi (2011). Primitive Causal Relations and the Pairing Problem. Ratio 24 (1):1-16.
    There is no doubt that spatial relations aid us in pairing up causes and effects. But when we consider the possibility of qualitatively indiscernible things, it might seem that spatial relations are more than a mere aid – they might seem positively required. The belief that spatial relations are required for causal relations is behind an important objection to Cartesian Dualism, the pairing problem. I argue that the Cartesian can answer this objection by appeal to the possibility of primitive causal (...)
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  34. Sunny Auyang, Who Am I? What is It? The Subject-Object Relation.
    Mind is not some mysterious mind stuff; no such stuff exists and the universe comprises only physical matter. It is an emergent property of certain complex material entities, not brains alone but whole human beings living and coping in the physical and social world. This thesis involves three ideas: materialism, emergent properties, and intentionality. The first two belong to the mind-body problem and the status of mental properties in the material universe. The third refers to the mind-world relation, the symbiotic (...)
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  35. Anita Avramides (1989). Lynn Rudder Baker, "Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism". [REVIEW] Dialogue 28 (4):693.
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  36. Anita Avramides (1989). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism Lynne Rudder Baker Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. 190. $19.95 (U.S.), $9.95 (U.S.) Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 28 (04):693-.
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  37. R. J. B. (1969). The "Mental" and the "Physical.". Review of Metaphysics 22 (4):752-752.
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  38. R. J. B. (1967). Philosophy and the Science of Behavior. Review of Metaphysics 21 (2):380-380.
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  39. Jesús Baceta (2012). Una reivindicación del funcionalismo y su neutralidad ontológica. Apuntes Filosóficos 20 (38):13-25.
    Resumen Se expone la teoría de los estados funcionales de Putnam y se muestra en qué consiste su neutralidad ontológica. Se consideran las críticas del propio Putnam al funcionalismo y su falta de adecuación empírica para una explicación satisfactoria de la relación entre mente y cuerpo. Luego, se argumenta a favor del funcionalismo gracias a algunas pistas que proporciona el propio Putnam, indicios que retrotraen al monismo ontológico de Davidson. Palabras clave: funcionalismo;neutralidad ontológica; mente cuerpo;monismo ontológico. A Vindication of Functionalism (...)
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  40. A. Bailey (1997). Rocco J. Gennaro, Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:276-276.
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  41. Andrew R. Bailey (1998). Supervenience and Physicalism. Synthese 117 (1):53-73.
    Discussion of the supervenience relation in the philosophical literature of recent years has become Byzantine in its intricacy and diversity. Subtle modulations of the basic concept have been tooled and retooled with increasing frequency, until supervenience has lost nearly all its original lustre as a simple and powerful tool for cracking open refractory philosophical problems. I present a conceptual model of the supervenience relation that captures all the important extant concepts (and suggests a few new ones) without ignoring the complexities (...)
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  42. Alexander Bain (1873). Mind and Body: The Theories of Their Relation. London,H. S. King & Co., 1873] Farnborough, Eng., Gregg International.
  43. David Bain (2005). Daniel Dennett. Reconciling Science and Our Self-Conception. By Matthew. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):369-371.
    Review of Matthew's Elton's book, *Daniel Dennett: Reconciling Science and Our Self-Conception*.
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  44. Marina Bakalova (2011). VIII. Ontology of Ability: A Defense of the Counterfactual Analysis of Ability. In Petrov V. (ed.), Ontological Landscapes: Recent Thought on Conceptual Interfaces Between Science and Philosophy. Ontos. 169.
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  45. Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). Book Review:Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind John Haugeland (Harvard). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 66 (3):494-.
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  46. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). The Nature of True Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):475-478.
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  47. Lynne Rudder Baker (1991). [Book Review] Saving Belief, a Critique of Physicalism. [REVIEW] Criminal Justice Ethics 10 (4):27-40.
  48. Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo (forthcoming). Ahistorical Homology and Multiple Realizability. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    The Mind-Brain Identity Theory lived a short life as a respectable philosophical position in the late 1950s, until Hilary Putnam developed his famous argument on the multiple realizability of mental states. The argument was, and still is, taken as the definitive demonstration of the falsity of Identity Theory and the foundation on which contemporary functionalist computational cognitive science was to be grounded. In this paper, in the wake of some contemporary philosophers, we reopen the case for Identity Theory and offer (...)
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  49. Derek Ball (2014). Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, by Derk Pereboom. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):118-129.
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  50. Victor Balowitz (1975). More on Persons and Their Bodies. Philosophical Studies 27 (1):63 - 64.
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