Bookmark and Share

Metaphysics

Edited by Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
Most recently added entries found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 163
  1. added 2016-12-04
    L. A. Paul (forthcoming). First Personal Modes of Presentation and the Structure of Empathy. Inquiry.
    There are a host of fascinating philosophical issues that concern our understanding of the self, its relation to the first personal perspective, and its connection to the structure and content of conscious experience. These issues connect to work in the philosophy of language involving the nature of de se content and the role of perspective. They concern the role of indexicals in broader philosophical theories and the nature of the semantic content that indexicals contribute to our linguistic and conceptual representations. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. added 2016-12-04
    L. A. Paul (forthcoming). The Subjectively Enduring Self. In Ian Phillips (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge
    The self can be understood in objective metaphysical terms as a bundle of properties, as a substance, or as some other kind of entity on our metaphysical list of what there is. Such an approach explores the metaphysical nature of the self when regarded from a suitably impersonal, ontological perspective. It explores the nature and structure of the self in objective reality, that is, the nature and structure of the self from without. This is the objective self. I am taking (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. added 2016-12-04
    Martin Glazier (forthcoming). Essentialist Explanation. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in metaphysical explanation, and philosophers have fixed on the notion of ground as the conceptual tool with which such explanation should be investigated. I will argue that this focus on ground is myopic and that some metaphysical explanations that involve the essences of things cannot be understood in terms of ground. Such ‘essentialist’ explanation is of interest, not only for its ubiquity in philosophy, but for its being in a sense an ultimate (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. added 2016-12-04
    L. A. Paul (forthcoming). A One Category Ontology. In John A. Keller (ed.), Freedom, Metaphysics, and Method: Themes from van Inwagen. Oxford University Press
    I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular and property, replacing it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. added 2016-12-03
    Damiano Migliorini (2016). Lineamenti di cristeologia. «Fede critica» e umiltà epistemica: il rapporto ragione-fede al confine tra meta-teologia, metodologia e vita. TheoLogica. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 1:1-51.
    ENGLISH: The author investigates whether the model prevalent today of an “humble reason” - based on fallibilism and epistemic humility - is the most appropriate to express the theological truth, even in the light of the debate within the contemporary theism (rational theology). To answer this question it is necessary to examine the epistemological status of “human truth” and the “truth of faith”, in order to develop a common approach to sciences, philosophy and theology. Finally, the author shows how the (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. added 2016-12-03
    Mekhi Dhesi (2016). In Light of the Theory of Special Relativity is a Passage of Time and the Argument of the Presentist Untenable? Dissertation, University College London
    In light of the Special Theory of Relativity and the Minkowski creation of ‘spacetime’, the universe is taken to be a four-dimensional entity which postulates bodies as existing within a temporally extended reality. The Special Theory of Relativity’s implications liken the nature of the universe to a ‘block’ within which all events coexist equally in spacetime. Such a view strikes against the very essence of presentism, which holds that all that exists is the instantaneous state of objects in the present (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. added 2016-12-03
    Damiano Migliorini (2016). La soluzione di Boezio nel dibattito contemporaneo sull’onniscienza divina: un bilancio. Rassegna di Teologia 57:19-53.
    The author analyzes the interpretation of Boethius’ “timelessness solution” developed in contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Religion, and the main objections that have been moved to it, trying to draw some conclusions about its effectiveness (a) in solving the antinomy between omniscience and human freedom; (b) in weakening the argument of Open Theism. -/- La nuova prospettiva teoretica proposta dall’Open Theism impone un approfondimento e una rivalutazione delle soluzioni “classiche” all’antinomia tra onniscienza divina e libertà umana. Tra queste “soluzioni” vi è, (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. added 2016-12-02
    Robert J. Rovetto (2016 Sept). The Orbital Space Environment and Space Situational Awareness Domain Ontology – Towards an International Information System for Space Data. In Proceedings of The Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies (AMOS) Conference.
  9. added 2016-12-02
    Jared Warren (2016). Internal and External Questions Revisited. Journal of Philosophy 113 (4):177-209.
    Rudolf Carnap famously distinguished between the external meanings that existence questions have when asked by philosophers and the internal meanings they have when asked by non-philosophers. Carnap’s overall position involved various controversial commitments, but relatively uncontroversial interpretative principles also lead to a Carnap-style distinction between internal and external questions. In section 1 of this paper I offer arguments for such a distinction in several particular cases; in section 2 I defend my arguments from numerous objections and motivate them by using (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. added 2016-12-02
    Martin Lin (2014). Efficient Causation in Spinoza and Leibniz. In Tad Scmaltz (ed.), Efficient Causation: A History. 165-191.
  11. added 2016-12-01
    David Shoemaker (2016). The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism. In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism. Oxford University Press 303-328.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. added 2016-12-01
    Christopher M. P. Tomaszewski (2016). Formal Proper Parts Through Strong Supplementation: A Reply to Bennett. Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):521-526.
    Kathrin Koslicki argues that ordinary material objects like tables and motorcycles have formal proper parts that structure the material proper parts. Karen Bennett rejects a key premise in Koslicki's argument according to which the material ingredient out of which a complex material object is made is a proper part of that object. Koslicki defends this premise with a principle motivated by its power to explain three important phenomena of material composition. But these phenomena can be equally well explained by a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. added 2016-11-30
    Matt Farr (2016). Causation and Time Reversal. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    What would it be for a process to happen backwards in time? Would such a process involve different causal relations? It is common to understand the time reversal invariance of a physical theory in causal terms, such that whatever can happen forwards in time (according to the theory) can also happen backwards in time. This has led many to hold that time reversal symmetry is incompatible with the asymmetry of cause and effect. This paper critiques the causal reading of time (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. added 2016-11-29
    Nina Strohminger, Joshua Knobe & George Newman (forthcoming). The True Self: A Psychological Concept Distinct From the Self. Perspectives on Psychological Science.
    A long tradition of psychological research has explored the distinction between characteristics that are part of the self and those that lie outside of it. Recently, a surge of research has begun examining a further distinction. Even among characteristics that are internal to the self, people pick out a subset as belonging to the true self. These factors are judged as making people who they really are, deep down. In this paper, we introduce the concept of the true self and (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. added 2016-11-28
    Tuomas E. Tahko (forthcoming). Disentangling Nature's Joints. In William Simpson, Robert Koons & Nicholas Teh (eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Modern Science. Routledge
    Can the neo-Aristotelian uphold a pluralist substance ontology while taking seriously the recent arguments in favour of monism based on quantum holism and other arguments from quantum mechanics? In this article, Jonathan Schaffer’s priority monism will be the main target. It will be argued that the case from quantum mechanics in favour of priority monism does face some challenges. Moreover, if the neo-Aristotelian is willing to consider alternative ways to understand ‘substance’, there may yet be hope for a pluralist substance (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. added 2016-11-28
    Nicolai Hartmann, Frédéric Tremblay & Keith R. Peterson (forthcoming). The Megarian and the Aristotelian Concept of Possibility: A Contribution to the History of the Ontological Problem of Modality. Axiomathes:1-15.
    This is a translation of Nicolai Hartmann’s article “Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ontologischen Modalitätsproblems,” first published in 1937. In this article, Hartmann defends an interpretation of the Megarian conception of possibility, which found its clearest form in Diodorus Cronus’ expression of it and according to which “only what is actual is possible” or “something is possible only if it is actual.” Hartmann defends this interpretation against the then dominant Aristotelian conception of possibility, based (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. added 2016-11-28
    Willem deVries (2016). Hegelian Spirits in Sellarsian Bottles. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    Though Wilfrid Sellars portrayed himself as a latter-day Kantian, I argue here that he was at least as much a Hegelian. Several themes Sellars shares with Hegel are investigated: the sociality and normativity of the intentional, categorial change, the rejection of the given, and especially their denial of an unknowable thing-in-itself. They are also united by an emphasis on the unity of things—the belief that things do ‘‘hang together.’’ Hegel’s unity is idealist; Sellars’ is physicalist; the differences are substantial, but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. added 2016-11-28
    John MacFarlane & Colin McGinn (2002). Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Philosophical Review 111 (3):462.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. added 2016-11-25
    Saurav Karki, The Consciousness of the Literates.
    This essay intends to focus on the so-called 'Literates' people of our society.It labels them as a stigma.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. added 2016-11-25
    Christian Miller (forthcoming). How Contemporary Psychology Supports Central Elements of Simḥah Zissel’s Picture of Character. Journal of Jewish Ethics.
    This is my contribution to a book symposium on Professor Geoffrey Claussen’s book, Sharing the Burden: Rabbi Simḥah Zissel Ziv and the Path of Musar. I focus on just two topics that figure prominently in Professor Claussen’s book: human nature and the virtue of love.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. added 2016-11-23
    Jacek Brzozowski (forthcoming). Monism and Gunk. In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. Oxford University Press
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. added 2016-11-23
    Kerry McKenzie (2016). Looking Forward, Not Back: Supporting Structuralism in the Present. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:87-95.
    The view that the fundamental kind properties are intrinsic properties enjoys reflexive endorsement by most metaphysicians of science. But ontic structural realists deny that there are any fundamental intrinsic properties at all. Given that structuralists distrust intuition as a guide to truth, and given that we currently lack a fundamental physical theory that we could consult instead to order settle the issue, it might seem as if there is simply nowhere for this debate to go at present. However, I will (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. added 2016-11-22
    Ulrich de Balbian (forthcoming). Meta-Philosophy (Critique of Metaphysics, Ontology, Epistemology). Academic Publishers.
    Meta-philosophy (Critique of philosophy=metaphysics, ontology, epistemology).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. added 2016-11-21
    Martin A. Lipman (2016). Against Fundamentality‐Based Metaphysics. Noûs 50 (4).
    Metaphysical views typically draw some distinction between reality and appearance, endorsing realism about some subject matters and antirealism about others. There are different conceptions of how best to construe antirealist theories. A simple view has it that we are antirealists about a subject matter when we believe that this subject matter fails to obtain. This paper discusses an alternative view, which I will call the fundamentality-based conception of antirealism. We are antirealists in this sense when we think that the relevant (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. added 2016-11-19
    Douglas I. Campbell, Jack Copeland & Zhuo-Ran Deng (forthcoming). The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Famous examples of conceivability arguments include (i) Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism, (ii) Kripke's ‘modal argument’ against psychophysical identity theory, (iii) Chalmers’ ‘zombie argument’ against materialism, and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper, we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding ‘mirror argument’, M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C's conclusion. Hence, a proponent of C—henceforth, a ‘conceivabilist’—can be warranted in holding that C's premises (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. added 2016-11-18
    Kathy Behrendt (forthcoming). Narrative Aversions: Challenges for the Illness Narrative Advocate. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    Engaging in self-narrative is often touted as a powerful antidote to the bad effects of illness. But there are various, sometimes familiar, examples of what may broadly be termed “aversions” to illness narrative. I group these into three kinds: aversion to certain types of illness narrative; aversion to illness narrative as a whole; and aversion to illness narrative as an essentially therapeutic endeavour. These aversions can throw into doubt the advantages claimed for illness narrative, including the key benefits of repair (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. added 2016-11-18
    Christopher J. Austin (forthcoming). Evo-Devo: A Science of Dispositions. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-17.
    Evolutionary developmental biology represents a paradigm shift in the understanding of the ontogenesis and evolutionary progression of the denizens of the natural world. Given the empirical successes of the evo-devo framework, and its now widespread acceptance, a timely and important task for the philosophy of biology is to critically discern the ontological commitments of that framework and assess whether and to what extent our current metaphysical models are able to accommodate them. In this paper, I argue that one particular model (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. added 2016-11-17
    Nevin Climenhaga (forthcoming). Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value-bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value-bearers he has already created. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. added 2016-11-15
    David Yates (forthcoming). Demystifying Emergence. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. added 2016-11-15
    Bob Fischer (forthcoming). C. I. Lewis and the Benacerraf Problem. Episteme.
    Realists about modality offer an attractive semantics for modal discourse in terms of possible worlds, but standard accounts of the worlds—as properties, propositions, or causally-isolated concreta—invoke entities with which we can’t interact. If realism is true, how can we know anything about modal matters? Let's call this "the Benacerraf Problem." I suggest that C. I. Lewis has an intriguing answer to it. Given that we’re willing to disentangle some of Lewis’s insights from his phenomenalism, we can take the following line. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. added 2016-11-15
    Mark Jago (forthcoming). Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions. Argumenta.
    Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. added 2016-11-14
    David Torrijos-Castrillejo (2016). La providence chez Saint-Thomas d’Aquin comme compréhension de la totalité. In Claude Brunier-Coulin (ed.), Institutions et destitutions de la Totalité. Explorations de l’œuvre de Christian Godin. Actes du colloque des 24-25-26 septembre 2015. Orizons 293-318.
    This article deals with the doctrine of providence in Thomas Aquinas based on the thinking of the French philosopher Christian Godin: divine providence would provide an understanding of the “totality” (totalité) that concerns not only the entire universe but also each individual. Aquinas gives an Aristotelian explanation of chance, luck and contingency from the divine perspective. Omniscience, omnipotence and divine providence, however, do not contradict the existence of either true contingency in the natural world or freedom but, on the contrary, (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. added 2016-11-12
    Jennifer McWeeny (2016). Varieties of Consciousness Under Oppression: False Consciousness, Bad Faith, Double Consciousness, and Se Faire Objet. In S. West Gurley & Geoff Pfeifer (eds.), Phenomenology and the Political. Palgrave MacMillan 149-63.
    What it would mean for phenomenology to move in an ontological direction that would render its relevance to contemporary political movement less ambiguous while at the same time retaining those aspects of its method that are epistemologically and politically advantageous? The present study crafts the beginnings of a response to this question by examining four configurations of consciousness that seem to be respectively tied to certain oppressive contexts and certain kinds of oppressed bodies: 1. false consciousness, 2. bad faith, 3. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. added 2016-11-12
    Daniel J. McKaughan (2015). Character Traits and the Neuroscience of Social Behavior. In Christian R. Miller, Michael Furr, Angela Knobel & William Fleeson (eds.), Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Oxford University Press
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. added 2016-11-11
    Jessica M. Wilson (forthcoming). Grounding-Based Formulations of Physicalism. Topoi:1-18.
    I problematize Grounding-based formulations of physicalism. More specifically, I argue, first, that motivations for adopting a Grounding-based formulation of physicalism are unsound; second, that a Grounding-based formulation lacks illuminating content, and that attempts to imbue Grounding with content by taking it to be a strict partial order are unuseful and problematic ; third, that conceptions of Grounding as constitutively connected to metaphysical explanation conflate metaphysics and epistemology, are ultimately either circular or self-undermining, and controversially assume that physical dependence is incompatible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. added 2016-11-09
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Transcendental Arguments, Conceivability, and Global Vs. Local Skepticism. Philosophia.
    In this paper, I argue that, if transcendental arguments are to proceed from premises that are acceptable to the skeptic, the Transcendental Premise, according to which “X is a metaphysically necessary condition for the possibility of Y,” must be grounded in considerations of conceivability and possibility. More explicitly, the Transcendental Premise is based on what Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, p. 2) call the “conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move.” This “inconceivability-impossibility” move, however, is a problematic argumentative move when advancing transcendental arguments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. added 2016-11-08
    Lee Walters (forthcoming). Are the Statue and the Clay Mutual Parts? Noûs.
    Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments against the view concluding that there are both pre-theoretical and theoretical considerations for denying that the statue and the clay are mutual parts.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. added 2016-11-08
    Michele Paolini Paoletti (2016). From Falsemakers to Negative Properties. Theoria 82.
    I shall argue in this article that, if we need to admit of negative facts in our ontology as falsemakers of false propositions, then it is plausible to accept that there are also negative properties conceived of as modes. After having briefly recalled the falsemaker argument, I shall explore five different alternative interpretations of negative facts and I shall demonstrate that each alternative – except for the one involving negative properties – is affected by some problems. Later on, I shall (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. added 2016-11-08
    Hasen Khudairi (2016). Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese:1-8.
    This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceivability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths in light of a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability—i.e., the epistemic possibility—thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. added 2016-11-07
    Mihai Rusu (2016). Modal Rationalism and the Objection From the Insolvability of Modal Disagreement. Logos and Episteme 7:171-183.
    The objection from the insolvability of principle-based modal disagreements appears to support the claim that there are no objective modal facts, or at the very least modal facts cannot be accounted for by modal rationalist theories. An idea that resurfaced fairly recently in the literature is that the use of ordinary empirical statements presupposes some prior grasp of modal notions. If this is correct, then the idea that we may have a total agreement concerning empirical facts and disagree on modal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. added 2016-11-06
    Oren Magid (2016). Heidegger on Human Finitude: Beginning at the End. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2).
  42. added 2016-11-06
    Mark Jago & Harold Noonan (2016). Modal Realism, Still At Your Convenience. Analysis.
    Divers (2014) presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. added 2016-11-06
    Timothy Williamson (2016). Modal Science. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):453-492.
    This paper explains and defends the idea that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of objective necessity. Plausible closure conditions on the family of objective modalities are shown to entail that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Evidence is provided that some objective modalities are studied in the natural sciences. In particular, the modal assumptions implicit in physical applications of dynamical systems theory are made explicit by using such systems to define models of a modal temporal logic. Those assumptions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. added 2016-11-05
    César Schirmer dos Santos (2011). Presentismo, referência ao passado e proposições. Investigação Filosófica 2 (2):1-8.
    Os presentistas nos dizem que os únicos objetos percorridos pelos quantificadoresde escopo mais amplo são aqueles que existem no presente, o que leva seus críticos aperguntarem o que torna verdadeiros os enunciados sobre o passado, como “Sócrates foi umfilósofo”. Em defesa do presentismo, e seguindo a proposta de Fiocco (2007), argumentamosque o que torna verdadeiro um enunciado sobre o passado é uma proposição, que proposiçõesnão existem no tempo, e que nada na teoria presentista compromete seus defensores com atese de que (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. added 2016-11-05
    César Schirmer dos Santos (2011). Presentismo, referência ao passado e proposições. Investigação Filosófica 2 (2):1-8.
    Os presentistas nos dizem que os únicos objetos percorridos pelos quantificadoresde escopo mais amplo são aqueles que existem no presente, o que leva seus críticos aperguntarem o que torna verdadeiros os enunciados sobre o passado, como “Sócrates foi umfilósofo”. Em defesa do presentismo, e seguindo a proposta de Fiocco (2007), argumentamosque o que torna verdadeiro um enunciado sobre o passado é uma proposição, que proposiçõesnão existem no tempo, e que nada na teoria presentista compromete seus defensores com atese de que (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. added 2016-11-05
    César Schirmer dos Santos (2011). Presentismo, referência ao passado e proposições. Investigação Filosófica 2 (2):1-8.
    Os presentistas nos dizem que os únicos objetos percorridos pelos quantificadoresde escopo mais amplo são aqueles que existem no presente, o que leva seus críticos aperguntarem o que torna verdadeiros os enunciados sobre o passado, como “Sócrates foi umfilósofo”. Em defesa do presentismo, e seguindo a proposta de Fiocco (2007), argumentamosque o que torna verdadeiro um enunciado sobre o passado é uma proposição, que proposiçõesnão existem no tempo, e que nada na teoria presentista compromete seus defensores com atese de que (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. added 2016-11-05
    César Schirmer dos Santos (2011). Presentismo, referência ao passado e proposições. Investigação Filosófica 2 (2):1-8.
    Os presentistas nos dizem que os únicos objetos percorridos pelos quantificadoresde escopo mais amplo são aqueles que existem no presente, o que leva seus críticos aperguntarem o que torna verdadeiros os enunciados sobre o passado, como “Sócrates foi umfilósofo”. Em defesa do presentismo, e seguindo a proposta de Fiocco (2007), argumentamosque o que torna verdadeiro um enunciado sobre o passado é uma proposição, que proposiçõesnão existem no tempo, e que nada na teoria presentista compromete seus defensores com atese de que (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. added 2016-11-05
    César Schirmer dos Santos (2011). Presentismo, referência ao passado e proposições. Investigação Filosófica 2 (2):1-8.
    Os presentistas nos dizem que os únicos objetos percorridos pelos quantificadores de escopo mais amplo são aqueles que existem no presente, o que leva seus críticos a perguntarem o que torna verdadeiros os enunciados sobre o passado, como “Sócrates foi um filósofo”. Em defesa do presentismo, e seguindo a proposta de Fiocco (2007), argumentamos que o que torna verdadeiro um enunciado sobre o passado é uma proposição, que proposições não existem no tempo, e que nada na teoria presentista compromete seus (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. added 2016-11-04
    Andrew Bacon (forthcoming). Tense and Relativity. Noûs.
    Those inclined to positions in the philosophy of time that take tense seriously have typically assumed that not all regions of space-time are equal: one special region of space-time corresponds to what is presently happening. When combined with assumptions from modern physics this has the unsettling consequence that the shape of this favored region distinguishes people in certain places or people traveling at certain velocities. In this paper I shall attempt to avoid this result by developing a tensed picture of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. added 2016-11-04
    Kevin Morris (2016). Russellian Physicalism, Bare Structure, and Swapped Inscrutables. Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):180-198.
    This paper discusses and evaluates a recent argument for the conclusion that an attractive variety of Russellian monism ought to be regarded as a form of physicalism. According to this line of thought, if the Russellian’s “inscrutable” properties are held to ground not only experience, but also the physical structure of the world—and in this sense are not “experience-specific”—they thereby have an unproblematic place in physicalist metaphysics. I argue, in contrast, that there can be a sense in which the Russellian’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 163