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  1. Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2010). What Descartes Did Not Know. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):297-311.
    Descartes’ epistemologies of meditation and sense imply that we cannot know anything about the mind-body union, either in the Cartesian sense of having scientia or, more interestingly, in terms of any other concept of knowledge available to Descartes. After considering the implications of this conclusion for what we may know about mind-body interaction, it becomes clear that, on Descartes’ view, we at best can be said to know that mind-body interaction, if it does in fact take place, does not violate (...)
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  2. Torin Alter & Robert J. Howell (2011). Consciousness and The Mind-Body Problem: A Reader. OUP USA.
    Over the past three decades, the challenge that conscious experience poses to physicalism--the widely held view that the universe is a completely physical system--has provoked a growing debate in philosophy of mind studies and given rise to a great deal of literature on the subject. Ideal for courses in consciousness and the philosophy of mind, Consciousness and The Mind-Body Problem: A Reader presents thirty-three classic and contemporary readings, organized into five sections that cover the major issues in this debate: the (...)
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  3. István Aranyosi (2010). Powers and the Mind–Body Problem. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):57 – 72.
    This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical (understood as broadly logical) possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic (...)
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  4. P. Århem & B. I. B. Lindahl (1993). Neuroscience and the Problem of Consciousness: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches. An Introduction. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):77-88.
  5. David M. Armstrong (1983). Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff.
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  6. David M. Armstrong (1983). Recent Work on the Relation of Mind and Brain. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff.
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  7. Alexander Bain (1883). Mind and Body. Mind 8 (31):402-412.
  8. Lynne Rudder Baker, Our Place in Nature: Material Persons and Theism.
    One of the deepest assumptions of Judaism and its offspring, Christianity, is that there is an important difference between human persons and everything else that exists in Creation. We alone are made in God’s image. We alone are the stewards of the earth. It is said in Genesis that we have “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps (...)
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  9. Katalin Balog (2012). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 16.
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
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  10. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2009). Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
  11. Lewis White Beck (1940). The Psychophysical as a Pseudo-Problem. Journal of Philosophy 37 (October):561-71.
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  12. Jonathan Bennett (1994). 4 Locke's Philosophy of Mind. In V. C. Chappell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge University Press. 89.
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  13. George Berger (1982). The Mind-Body Problem, a Psychological Approach. Erkenntnis 17 (3):399-403.
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  14. Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez (2013). Pourquoi la conscience phénoménale doit avoir une nature physique. In Marc Silverstein (ed.), Matériaux scientifiques et philosophiques pour un matérialisme contemporain. Éditions Matériologiques. 755-800.
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  15. Rudolf Bernet (2013). The Body as a 'Legitimate Naturalization of Consciousness'. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:43-65.
    Husserl's phenomenology of the body constantly faces issues of demarcation: between phenomenology and ontology, soul and spirit, consciousness and brain, conditionality and causality. It also shows that Husserl was eager to cross the borders of transcendental phenomenology when the phenomena under investigation made it necessary. Considering the details of his description of bodily sensations and bodily behaviour from a Merleau-Pontian perspective allows one also to realise how Husserl (unlike Heidegger) fruitfully explores a phenomenological field located between a science of pure (...)
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  16. Jason A. Beyer (2002). Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Second Edition. Teaching Philosophy 25 (3):258-261.
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  17. Dennis D. Bielfeldt (2006). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. [REVIEW] Zygon 41 (2):487-490.
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  18. D. Birnbacher (2010). The Mind-Body Issue. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press.
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  19. James Bissett Pratt (1936). The Present Status of the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 45 (2):144-166.
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  20. Ned Block (forthcoming). Consciousness, Big Science and Conceptual Clarity. In Gary Marcus & Jeremy Freeman (eds.), in The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World’s Leading Neuroscientists. Princeton University Press.
  21. Ned Block (forthcoming). The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground. In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  22. Paul Richard Blum (2012). The Epistemology of Immortality: Searle, Pomponazzi, and Ficino. Studia Neoaristotelica 9 (1):85-102.
    The relationship between body and mind was traditionally discussed in terms of immortality of the intellect, because immateriality was one necessary condition for the mind to be immortal. This appeared to be an issue of metaphysics and religion. But to the medieval and Renaissance thinkers, the essence of mind is thinking activity and hence an epistemological feature. Starting with John Searle’s worries about the existence of consciousness, I try to show some parallels with the Aristotelian Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), and eventually (...)
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  23. Paul Richard Blum, Epistemology and Cosmology in Neoplatonism: Is Cognition a Mind-Body-Problem? Paper at Cosmos, Nature, Culture - A Transdisciplinary Conference Metanexus Conference July 18-21, 2009, Phoenix, Arizona. [REVIEW] http://www.metanexus.net/conference2009/articles/Default.aspx?id=10790.
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  24. Jerzy Bobryk (2004). Jakie zagadnienia składają się na problem psychofizyczny. Filozofia Nauki 3.
    The present paper focuses on the mind-body problem. According to the author, the mind-body problem is, as a matter of fact, a bundle of several problems; they are of a different nature and may be solved in the area of interdisciplinary cooperation. The paper concentrates on two aspects of the mind-body problems: the apparent causal interactions of the consciousness and the body, and the unique nature and genesis self-consciousness.
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  25. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  26. Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) (2000). New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press.
    A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
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  27. Herbert G. Bohnert (1974). The Logico-Linguistic Mind-Brain Problem and a Proposed Step Towards its Solution. Philosophy of Science 41 (March):1-14.
    This paper argues that if a person's beliefs are idealized as a set of sentences (theoretical, observational, and mixed) then the device of Ramsey sentences provides a treatment, of the mind-brain problem, that has at least four noteworthy characteristics. First, sentences asserting correlations between one's own brain state and one's own "private" experiences are, on such treatment, reconstrued as neither causal, coreferential, nor as meaning postulates, but as clauses in an overall hypothesis (Ramsey sentence) whose only nonlogical constants have "private" (...)
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  28. Henry Bradford Smith (1922). Mind in the Mechanical Order. Journal of Philosophy 19 (18):489-493.
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  29. C. D. Broad (1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    Bew. van de Tarner lectures, gegeven aan het Trinity College te Cambridge in 1923.
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  30. William H. Bruening (1978). No Matter--Never Mind. Philosophical Investigations 1 (2):43-53.
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  31. Dan Bruiger, The Rise and Fall of Reality.
    The Mind-Body Problem is a by-product of subjective consciousness, i.e. of the self-reference of an awareness system. Given the possibility of a subjective frame placed around the contents of consciousness, and given also the reifying tendency of mind, the rift between subject and object is an inevitable artifact of human consciousness. The closest we can come to a solution is an understanding of the exact nature and situation of the embodied subject. Ontological solutions, such as materialism and idealism, are excluded (...)
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  32. Clark W. Butler (1972). The Mind-Body Problem: A Nonmaterialistic Identity Thesis. Idealistic Studies 2 (September):229-48.
    A defense of panpyschism based on Ockham's Razor, arguing against the materialistic identity thesis, e.g., J J C Smart.
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  33. Karlyn K. Campbell (1970). Body and Mind. Doubleday.
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  34. Keith Campbell (1980). Body And Mind, Reprint. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
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  35. Whately Carington (1949). Matter, Mind And Meaning. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    Carington kindly placed at my disposal, because they seem to me to illustrate some of the main themes of this book.
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  36. Martin Carrier & J. Mittelstrass (1991). Mind, Brain, Behavior: The Mind-Body Problem and the Philosophy of Psychology. De Gruyter.
    Translation of: Geist, Gehirn, Verhalten.
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  37. David J. Chalmers, The First Person and Third Person Views (Part I).
    Intro to what "first person" and "third person" mean. (outline the probs of the first person) (convenience of third person vs absoluteness of first person) (explain terminology) Dominance of third person, reasons. (embarassment with first person) (division of reactions) (natural selection - those who can make the most noise) (analogy with behaviourism) Reductionism, hard line and soft line Appropriation of first person terms by reductionists.
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  38. Harold Chapman Brown (1933). Mind--An Event in Physical Nature. Philosophical Review 42 (2):130-155.
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  39. Charles L. Y. Cheng (ed.) (1975). Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press.
  40. Roderick M. Chisholm (1978). Is There a Mind-Body Problem? Philosophic Exchange 2:25-34.
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  41. Guy Claxton (2003). The Mind-Body Problem--Who Cares? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):35-37.
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  42. Eli Cohen (1986). Has the Mind-Body Problem Much of a Past? Philosophia 16 (1):61-64.
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  43. W. E. Cooper (1977). Beyond Materialism and Back Again. Dialogue 16 (June-July):191-206.
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  44. Richard Corry (2013). Emerging From the Causal Drain. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.
    For over 20 years, Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument has stood as the major hurdle for non-reductive physicalism. If successful, Kim’s argument would show that the high-level properties posited by non-reductive physicalists must either be identical with lower-level physical properties, or else must be causally inert. The most prominent objection to the Causal Exclusion Argument—the so-called Overdetermination Objection—points out that there are some notions of causation that are left untouched by the argument. If causation is simply counterfactual dependence, for example, (...)
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  45. Tim Crane (2000). Dualism, Monism, Physicalism. Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.
    Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism, but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena (ontological reduction) or it must give an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms (explanatory or (...)
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  46. Tim Crane (1999). The Mind-Body Problem. In Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. MIT Press.
    The mind-body problem is the problem of explaining how our mental states, events and processes—like beliefs, actions and thinking—are related to the physical states, events and processes in our bodies. A question of the form, ‘how is A related to B?’ does not by itself pose a philosophical problem. To pose such a problem, there has to be something about A and B which makes the relation between them seem problematic. Many features of mind and body have been cited as (...)
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  47. Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.) (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.
    This collection of new essays put the debates on the mind-body problem into historical context.
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  48. Erhan Demircioglu (2013). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...)
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  49. Durant Drake (1929). Beyond Monism and Dualism. Journal of Philosophy 26 (15):402-407.
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  50. Fred Dretske (1994). Mind and Brain. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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