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  1. Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2010). What Descartes Did Not Know. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):297-311.
    Descartes’ epistemologies of meditation and sense imply that we cannot know anything about the mind-body union, either in the Cartesian sense of having scientia or, more interestingly, in terms of any other concept of knowledge available to Descartes. After considering the implications of this conclusion for what we may know about mind-body interaction, it becomes clear that, on Descartes’ view, we at best can be said to know that mind-body interaction, if it does in fact take place, does not violate (...)
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  2. Emmanuel Alloa & Natalie Depraz (2012). Der Leib, ein 'merkwürdig unvollkommen konstituiertes Ding'. In Emmanuel Alloa, Thomas Bedorf, Tobias Nikolaus Klass & Christian Grüny (eds.), Leiblichkeit. Geschichte und Aktualität eines Begriffs. Mohr-Siebeck / UTB
  3. Emmanuel Alloa & Miriam Fischer (eds.) (2013). Leib und Sprache. Zur Reflexivität verkörperter Ausdrucksformen. Velbrück.
    Die elf Beiträge dieses Bandes gehen aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln dem Problem der Verkörperung von Sinn nach: phänomenologische, psychoanalytische und sprachwissenschaftliche Ansätze bilden dabei den Schwerpunkt; sie werden aber durch Studien aus der Literaturtheorie, der politischen Theorie und der Filmwissenschaft ergänzt. Was heißt es – das ist die zentrale Frage –, den Körper als leibliches Medium aufzufassen, welches Sinn nicht nur verkörpert, sondern überhaupt erst entstehen lässt? Gibt es bereits eine Sprache des Leibes diesseits der Ebene ausdrücklicher Rede?
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  4. Emmanuel Alloa & Miriam Fischer (eds.) (2013). Leib und Sprache. Zur Reflexivität verkörperter Ausdrucksformen. Velbrück.
    Die elf Beiträge dieses Bandes gehen aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln dem Problem der Verkörperung von Sinn nach: phänomenologische, psychoanalytische und sprachwissenschaftliche Ansätze bilden dabei den Schwerpunkt; sie werden aber durch Studien aus der Literaturtheorie, der politischen Theorie und der Filmwissenschaft ergänzt. Was heißt es – das ist die zentrale Frage –, den Körper als leibliches Medium aufzufassen, welches Sinn nicht nur verkörpert, sondern überhaupt erst entstehen lässt? Gibt es bereits eine Sprache des Leibes diesseits der Ebene ausdrücklicher Rede?
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  5. Torin Alter & Robert J. Howell (2011). Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader. OUP Usa.
    Ideal for courses in consciousness and the philosophy of mind, Consciousness and The Mind-Body Problem: A Reader presents thirty-three classic and contemporary readings, organized into five sections that cover the major issues in this debate: the challenge for physicalism, physicalist responses, alternative responses, the significance of ignorance, and mental causation. Edited by Torin Alter and Robert J. Howell, the volume features work from such leading figures as Karen Bennett, Ned Block, David J. Chalmers, Frank Jackson, Colin McGinn, David Papineau, and (...)
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  6. István Aranyosi (2010). Powers and the Mind–Body Problem. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):57 – 72.
    This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality.
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  7. P. Århem & B. I. B. Lindahl (1993). Neuroscience and the Problem of Consciousness: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches. An Introduction. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):77-88.
  8. David M. Armstrong (1983). Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff.
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  9. David M. Armstrong (1983). Recent Work on the Relation of Mind and Brain. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff
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  10. Alexander Bain (1883). Mind and Body. Mind 8 (31):402-412.
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  11. Lynne Rudder Baker, Our Place in Nature: Material Persons and Theism.
    One of the deepest assumptions of Judaism and its offspring, Christianity, is that there is an important difference between human persons and everything else that exists in Creation. We alone are made in God’s image. We alone are the stewards of the earth. It is said in Genesis that we have “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps (...)
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  12. Gerald Balfour (1909). Psychical Research and Current Doctrines of Mind and Body. Hibbert Journal 8:543.
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  13. Katalin Balog (2012). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press 16.
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
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  14. Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique (...)
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  15. Katalin Balog (2008). Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter , Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
    The book under review is a collection of thirteen essays on the nature phenomenal concepts and the ways in which phenomenal concepts figure in debates over physicalism. Phenomenal concepts are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. There are recent arguments, originating in Descartes’ famous conceivability argument, that purport to show that phenomenal experience is irreducibly non-physical. Second, phenomenal concepts are (...)
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  16. Katalin Balog (2004). Review: Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):774-778.
    Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
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  17. Katalin Balog (2001). Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):645–652.
    Symposium contribution on Frank Jackson’s a priori entailment thesis – which he employs to connect metaphysics and conceptual analysis. In the book he develops this thesis within the two-dimensional framework and also proposes a formal argument for it. I argue that the two-dimensional framework doesn’t provide independent support for the a priori entailment thesis since one has to build into the framework assumptions as strong as the thesis itself.
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  18. Katalin Balog (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...)
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  19. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2009). Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
  20. Lewis White Beck (1940). The Psychophysical as a Pseudo-Problem. Journal of Philosophy 37 (October):561-71.
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  21. Ermanno Bencivenga (1984). Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie. Review of Metaphysics 38 (2):395-396.
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  22. Jonathan Bennett (1994). 4 Locke's Philosophy of Mind. In V. C. Chappell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke. Cambridge University Press 89.
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  23. George Berger (1982). The Mind-Body Problem, a Psychological Approach. Erkenntnis 17 (3):399-403.
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  24. Reinaldo J. Bernal (2013). Pourquoi la conscience phénoménale doit avoir une nature physique. In Marc Silverstein (ed.), Matériaux scientifiques et philosophiques pour un matérialisme contemporain. Éditions Matériologiques 755-800.
    Une entité est phénoménalement consciente si et seulement s’il existe quelque chose comme l’effet-que-ça-fait d’être cette entité. À partir de cette définition, aucun test empirique ne peut être fourni pour établir si une entité S est consciente ou pas. S peut croire qu’elle est consciente parce qu’en effet elle l’est, mais pour qu’un sujet W puisse attribuer la conscience à S, une théorie est nécessaire. Cette théorie doit fournir des critères intersubjectifs, basés sur l’observation du comportement, les propriétés physiques ou (...)
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  25. Rudolf Bernet (2013). The Body as a 'Legitimate Naturalization of Consciousness'. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:43-65.
    Husserl's phenomenology of the body constantly faces issues of demarcation: between phenomenology and ontology, soul and spirit, consciousness and brain, conditionality and causality. It also shows that Husserl was eager to cross the borders of transcendental phenomenology when the phenomena under investigation made it necessary. Considering the details of his description of bodily sensations and bodily behaviour from a Merleau-Pontian perspective allows one also to realise how Husserl (unlike Heidegger) fruitfully explores a phenomenological field located between a science of pure (...)
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  26. Martin A. Bertman (1983). The Body-Mind Pseudo-Problem. Philosophical Inquiry 5 (1):43-47.
  27. Jason A. Beyer (2002). Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Second Edition. Teaching Philosophy 25 (3):258-261.
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  28. Dennis D. Bielfeldt (2006). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. [REVIEW] Zygon 41 (2):487-490.
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  29. D. Birnbacher (2010). The Mind-Body Issue. In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press
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  30. Elize Bisanz (2008). The Logic of Interdisciplinarity Semiotics as the Science of Mind and Body. Semiotics:163-171.
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  31. James Bissett Pratt (1936). The Present Status of the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 45 (2):144-166.
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  32. Ned Block (2015). The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground. In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press 105-133.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  33. Ned Block (2014). Consciousness, Big Science and Conceptual Clarity. In Gary Marcus & Jeremy Freeman (eds.), in The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World’s Leading Neuroscientists. Princeton University Press 161-176.
  34. Paul Richard Blum (2012). The Epistemology of Immortality: Searle, Pomponazzi, and Ficino. Studia Neoaristotelica 9 (1):85-102.
    The relationship between body and mind was traditionally discussed in terms of immortality of the intellect, because immateriality was one necessary condition for the mind to be immortal. This appeared to be an issue of metaphysics and religion. But to the medieval and Renaissance thinkers, the essence of mind is thinking activity and hence an epistemological feature. Starting with John Searle’s worries about the existence of consciousness, I try to show some parallels with the Aristotelian Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), and eventually (...)
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  35. Paul Richard Blum, Epistemology and Cosmology in Neoplatonism: Is Cognition a Mind-Body-Problem? Paper at Cosmos, Nature, Culture - A Transdisciplinary Conference Metanexus Conference July 18-21, 2009, Phoenix, Arizona. [REVIEW] http://www.metanexus.net/conference2009/articles/Default.aspx?id=10790.
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  36. Jerzy Bobryk (2004). Jakie zagadnienia składają się na problem psychofizyczny. Filozofia Nauki 3.
    The present paper focuses on the mind-body problem. According to the author, the mind-body problem is, as a matter of fact, a bundle of several problems; they are of a different nature and may be solved in the area of interdisciplinary cooperation. The paper concentrates on two aspects of the mind-body problems: the apparent causal interactions of the consciousness and the body, and the unique nature and genesis self-consciousness.
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  37. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  38. Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) (2000). New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press.
    A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
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  39. Herbert G. Bohnert (1974). The Logico-Linguistic Mind-Brain Problem and a Proposed Step Towards its Solution. Philosophy of Science 41 (March):1-14.
    This paper argues that if a person's beliefs are idealized as a set of sentences then the device of Ramsey sentences provides a treatment, of the mind-brain problem, that has at least four noteworthy characteristics. First, sentences asserting correlations between one's own brain state and one's own "private" experiences are, on such treatment, reconstrued as neither causal, coreferential, nor as meaning postulates, but as clauses in an overall hypothesis whose only nonlogical constants have "private" meanings. Second, sentences asserting psycho-physical correlations (...)
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  40. Andrew Botterell (1998). Analysis in Mind. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    From the time of Descartes to about the 1960s, a certain epistemological idea dominated the philosophy of mind, namely the idea that theses about the relation between mind and body are, if true, a priori truths. Much of recent philosophy of mind is devoted to the question whether that idea is right. My research is largely an attempt to argue that some recent defenses of it are unsuccessful. ;For example, Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that every actual psychological event, property, (...)
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  41. Henry Bradford Smith (1922). Mind in the Mechanical Order. Journal of Philosophy 19 (18):489-493.
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  42. C. D. Broad (1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    Bew. van de Tarner lectures, gegeven aan het Trinity College te Cambridge in 1923.
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  43. William H. Bruening (1978). No Matter--Never Mind. Philosophical Investigations 1 (2):43-53.
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  44. Dan Bruiger, The Rise and Fall of Reality.
    The Mind-Body Problem is a by-product of subjective consciousness, i.e. of the self-reference of an awareness system. Given the possibility of a subjective frame placed around the contents of consciousness, and given also the reifying tendency of mind, the rift between subject and object is an inevitable artifact of human consciousness. The closest we can come to a solution is an understanding of the exact nature and situation of the embodied subject. Ontological solutions, such as materialism and idealism, are excluded (...)
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  45. Godehard Brüntrup (2011). Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen. Die Renaissance des Panpsychismus in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie des Geistes. In Tobias Müller & Heinrich Watzka (eds.), Ein Universum voller "Geiststaub"? Der Panpsychismus in der aktuellen Geist-Gehirn-Debatte. Mentis 23-59.
    Paper on the renaissance of panpsychism in the contemporary philosophy of mind.
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  46. Godehard Brüntrup (2004). Gibt es einen genuin philosophischen Kern des Leib-Seele-Problems? In Imre Koncsik & Günter Wilhelms (eds.), Jenseits, Evolution, Geist: Schnittstellen zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaften. Peter Lang 227-248.
    Article on the question whether the mind-body problem is partially non-empirical, and irreducibly conceptual or philosophical.
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  47. Marc Burock, Not Communication.
    Informational ontologies more and more envelop the natural sciences. The growth of communication technologies and social networking characterize our age. Instead of seeing our world solely as matter in motion, as did Democritus, we now imagine living in a world composed of flowing information. Bits of information have since replaced atoms of matter, and the space-time movement of bits is now called communication. This work is partly a criticism of the materialism and idealism that gave birth to today’s worldview, and (...)
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  48. Clark W. Butler (1972). The Mind-Body Problem: A Nonmaterialistic Identity Thesis. Idealistic Studies 2 (September):229-48.
    A defense of panpyschism based on Ockham's Razor, arguing against the materialistic identity thesis, e.g., J J C Smart.
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  49. Karlyn K. Campbell (1970). Body and Mind. Doubleday.
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  50. Keith Campbell (1980). Body and Mind, Reprint. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
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