Edited by Noel Saenz (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
|Summary||Supposing that holes, reflections, shadows, absences and omissions (minor entities) exist, what is their nature? Are they concrete? If so, are they material or immaterial. Take holes. If they exist, they exist in space and time. After all, the hole in my doughnut persists and is certainly located. But it does not appear to be concrete since it is, it would seem, merely the absence of the doughnut material surrounding it. But do holes, reflections, shadows, etc. even exist? Everyday speak would seem to have it so. After all, we say things like 'There is a hole in my shirt' and 'in a fit of rage, so-and-so punched a hole in the wall'. We also attribute to things like wholes, shadows and reflection causal powers: my shirt is unwearable because it has too many holes; my shadow startled me in the middle of the night; my reflection in a funny mirror made me laugh. Should we take such talk literally?|
|Key works||For some key works on the nature and existence of minor entities, see Lewis & Lewis 1970, Casati & Varzi 1994 and Sorensen 2008.|
|Introductions||For a nice introduction on holes, see Casati & Varzi 2014. For a nice introduction on omissions, see Bernstein 2015. For a nice introduction on nothingness that touches on issues related to minor entities, see Sorensen 2008.|
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