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  1. Stefan Dragulinescu (2012). The Problem of Processes and Transitions: Are Diseases Phase Kinds? [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (1):79-89.
    In this paper I discuss a central objection against diseases being natural kinds—namely, that diseases are processes or transitions and hence they should not be conceptualized in the ‘substantish’ framework of natural kinds. I indicate that the objection hinges on conceiving disease kinds as phase kinds, in contrast to the non-phase, natural kinds of the exact sciences. I focus on somatic diseases and argue, via a representative comparison, that if disease kinds are phase kinds, then exact science kinds are phase (...)
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  2. Matthieu Fontaine & Shahid Rahman (2014). Towards a Semantics for the Artifactual Theory of Fiction and Beyond. Synthese 191 (3):499-516.
    In her book Fiction and Metaphysics (1999) Amie Thomasson, influenced by the work of Roman Ingarden, develops a phenomenological approach to fictional entities in order to explain how non-fictional entities can be referred to intrafictionally and transfictionally, for example in the context of literary interpretation. As our starting point we take Thomasson’s realist theory of literary fictional objects, according to which such objects actually exist, albeit as abstract and artifactual entities. Thomasson’s approach relies heavily on the notion of ontological dependence, (...)
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  3. Božidar Kante (2004). Artworks, Context and Ontology. Acta Analytica 19 (33):209-219.
    Horgan believes that the truth of the statement “Beethoven’s fifth symphony has four movements” does not require that there be some “dedicated object” answering to the term “Beethoven’s fifth simphony”. To the contrary, the relevant language/world correspondence relation is less direct than this. Especially appropriate is the behavior by Beethoven that we would call “composing his fifth symphony”. Our objections go along two directions: (1) is the process ontology (a) really a right kind of ontology for artworks (symphonies, novels) and, (...)
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  4. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Intensional Relative Clauses and the Semantics of Variable Objects. In Manfred Krifka & Schenner Mathias (eds.), Reconstruction Effects in Relative Clauses. Akademie Verlag.
    NPs with intensional relative clauses such as 'the book John needs to write' pose a significant challenge for semantic theory. Such NPs act like referential terms, yet they do not stand for a particular actual object. This paper will develop a semantic analysis of such NPs on the basis of the notion of a variable object. The analysis avoids a range of difficulties that a more standard analysis based on the notion of an individual concept would face. Most importantly, unlike (...)
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  5. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). States Versus Tropes. Comments on C. Anderson and M. Morzycki: 'Degrees as Kinds'. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory.
    In their paper ‘Degrees as Kinds’, Anderson and Morzycki, demonstrate how certain constructions in a range of languages treat kinds, manners, and degrees alike. Their proposal is to identify degrees with kinds of states and they consider states to be interchangeable with tropes. In these comments, I will raise some issues about the interchangeability of (concrete) states and tropes as well as the category of concrete states as well as Anderson and Morzycki's analysis of the comparative.
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  6. Donna Peuquet, Barry Smith & Berit O. Brogaard (eds.) (1998). The Ontology of Fields. National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis.
    In the specific case of geography, the real world consists on the one hand of physical geographic features (bona fide objects) and on the other hand of various fiat objects, for example legal and administrative objects, including parcels of real estate, areas of given soil types, census tracts, and so on. It contains in addition the beliefs and actions of human beings directed towards these objects (for example, the actions of those who work in land registries or in census bureaux), (...)
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  7. Paul Sheehy (2006). Sharing Space: The Synchronic Identity of Social Groups. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2):131-148.
    Taking ontological realism about social groups as the thesis that groups are composite material objects constituted by their members, this paper considers a challenge to the very possibility that groups be regarded as material entities. Ordinarily we believe that two groups can have synchronic co-extensive memberships—for example, the choir and the rugby team—while preserving their distinctive identity conditions. We also doubt that two objects of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time, which would appear (...)
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  8. Barry Smith & David Mark (2003). Do Mountains Exist? Towards an Ontology of Landforms. Environment and Planning B (Planning and Design) 30 (3):411–427.
    Do mountains exist? The answer to this question is surely: yes. In fact, ‘mountain’ is the example of a kind of geographic feature or thing most commonly cited by English speakers (Mark, et al., 1999; Smith and Mark 2001), and this result may hold across many languages and cultures. But whether they are considered as individuals (tokens) or as kinds (types), mountains do not exist in quite the same unequivocal sense as do such prototypical everyday objects as chairs or people.
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Holes
  1. Roberto Casati, Holes. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  2. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi, Holes. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A brief introduction to the main philosophical problems and theories about the nature of holes and such-like nothingnesses.
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  3. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2007). Foreword to ''Lesser Kinds''. The Monist 90 (3):331-332.
    This issue of The Monist is devoted to the metaphysics of lesser kinds, which is to say those kinds of entity that are not generally recognized as occupying a prominent position in the categorial structure of the world. Why bother? We offer two sorts of reason. The first is methodological. In mathematics, it is common practice to study certain functions (for instance) by considering limit cases: What if x = 0? What if x is larger than any assigned value? Physics, (...)
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  4. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2004). Counting the Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):23 – 27.
    Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
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  5. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2004). Counting the Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):23 – 27.
    Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
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  6. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2004). Counting the Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):23 – 27.
    Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
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  7. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2000). Topological Essentialism. Philosophical Studies 100 (3):217-236.
    Considering topology as an extension of mereology, this paper analyses topological variants of mereological essentialism (the thesis that an object could not have different parts than the ones it has). In particular, we examine de dicto and de re versions of two theses: (i) that an object cannot change its external connections (e.g., adjacent objects cannot be separated), and (ii) that an object cannot change its topological genus (e.g., a doughnut cannot turn into a sphere). Stronger forms of structural essentialism, (...)
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  8. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (1997). Perché i buchi sono importanti. Problemi di rappresentazione spaziale. Sapere 63 (2):38–43.
    The methodological anarchy that characterizes much recent research in artificial intelligence and other cognitive sciences has brought into existence (sometimes resumed) a large variety of entities from a correspondingly large variety of (sometimes dubious) ontological categories. Recent work in spatial representation and reasoning is particularly indicative of this trend. Our aim in this paper is to suggest some ways of reconciling such a luxurious proliferation of entities with the sheer sobriety of good philosophy.
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  9. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (1994). Holes and Other Superficialities. MIT Press.
    Holes are a good example of the sort of entity that down-to-earth philosophers would be inclined to expel from their ontological inventory. In this work we argue instead in favor of their existence and explore the consequences of this liberality—odd as they might appear. We examine the ontology of holes, their geometry, their part-whole relations, their identity and their causal role, the ways we perceive them. We distinguish three basic kinds of holes: blind hollows, perforating tunnels, and internal cavities, treating (...)
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  10. Cody Gilmore (2013). Slots in Universals. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:187-233.
    Slot theory is the view that (i) there exist such entities as argument places, or ‘slots’, in universals, and that (ii) a universal u is n-adic if and only if there are n slots in u. I argue that those who take properties and relations to be abundant, fine-grained, non-set-theoretical entities face pressure to be slot theorists. I note that slots permit a natural account of the notion of adicy. I then consider a series of ‘slot-free’ accounts of that notion (...)
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  11. David Lewis & Stephanie Lewis (1996). Review of Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi, o Les. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 105 (1):77-79.
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  12. David Lewis & Stephanie Lewis (1970). Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):206 – 212.
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  13. Phillip John Meadows (2013). What Angles Can Tell Us About What Holes Are Not. Erkenntnis 78 (2):319-331.
    In this paper I argue that holes are not objects, but should instead be construed as properties or relations. The argument proceeds by first establishing a claim about angles: that angles are not objects, but properties or relations. It is then argued that holes and angles belong to the same category, on the grounds that they share distinctive existence and identity conditions. This provides an argument in favour of categorizing holes as one categorizes angles. I then argue that a commitment (...)
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  14. Achille Varzi, Doughnuts.
    In classical topology the only part of a doughnut that matters is the edible part. Here I review some good reasons for reversing the order and focusing on the hole instead. By studying the topology of the hole one can learn interesting things about the morphology of the doughnut (its shape), and by studying the morphology of the hole in turn one can learn a lot about the doughnut’s dynamic properties (its patterns of interaction with the environment). The price--of course--is (...)
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  15. Achille C. Varzi (forthcoming). The Magic of Holes. In Pina Marsico & Luca Tateo (eds.), Ordinary Things and Their Extraordinary Meanings. Information Age Publishing.
    There is no doughnut without a hole, the saying goes. And that’s true. If you think you can come up with an exception, it simply wouldn’t be a doughnut. Holeless doughnuts are like extensionless color, or durationless sound—nonsense. Does it follow, then, that when we buy a doughnut we really purchase two sorts of thing—the edible stuff plus the little chunk of void in the middle? Surely we cannot just take the doughnut and leave the hole at the grocery store, (...)
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  16. Achille C. Varzi (2003). Reasoning About Space: The Hole Story. Logic and Logical Philosophy 4:3-39.
    This is a revised and extended version of the formal theory of holes outlined in the Appendix to the book "Holes and Other Superficialities". The first part summarizes the basic framework (ontology, mereology, topology, morphology). The second part emphasizes its relevance to spatial reasoning and to the semantics of spatial prepositions in natural language. In particular, I discuss the semantics of ‘in’ and provide an account of such fallacious arguments as “There is a hole in the sheet. The sheet is (...)
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  17. Andrew Wake, Joshua Spencer & Gregory Fowler (2007). Holes as Regions of Spacetime. The Monist 90 (3):372-378.
    We discuss the view that a hole is identical to the region of spacetime at which it is located. This view is more parsimonious than the view that holes are sui generus entities located at those regions surrounded by their hosts and it is more plausible than the view that there are no holes. We defend the spacetime view from several objections.
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  18. Andrew Wake, Joshua Spencer & Gregory Fowler (2007). Holes as Regions of Spacetime. The Monist 90 (3):372-378.
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Reflections
  1. István Aranyosi, Through a Shadow, Darkly.
    The dictionary tells you that a shadow is a dark area or volume caused by an opaque object blocking some light. The definition is correct, but we need to clarify a couple of its elements: darkness and blocking. The clarification leads to the view that to see a shadow is a degree of failing to see a surface. I will also argue that seeing a silhouette (i.e. a backlit object) is a particular way of failing to see an object. Thus (...)
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  2. David M. Armstrong (1959). Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.
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  3. M. Arthadeva (1960). "Mirror Images" Are Physical Objects: A Reply to Mr. Armstrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):160 – 162.
    The author thinks d m armstrong has correctly explicated his own earlier analysis but that his criticisms are unfounded. The position armstrong takes is actually analogous to the author's in terms of right-Left distortion in mirrors. The author concludes that armstrong should say what "people are doing if they are not perceiving" which would take him into the "quagmire of sense-Data theories." (staff).
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  4. M. Arthadeva (1957). Naive Realism and Illusions of Reflection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):155 – 169.
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  5. J. L. Austin (1964). Sense And Sensibilia; Reconstructed From The Manuscript Notes By G J Warnock. Oxford University Press.
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  6. N. J. Block (1974). Why Do Mirrors Reverse Right/Left but Not Up/Down. Journal of Philosophy 71 (9):259-277.
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  7. Damjan Bojadžiev (2004). Arithmetical and Specular Self-Reference. Acta Analytica 19 (33):55-63.
    Arithmetical self-reference through diagonalization is compared with self-recognition in a mirror, in a series of diagrams that show the structure and main stages of construction of self-referential sentences. A Gödel code is compared with a mirror, Gödel numbers with mirror images, numerical reference to arithmetical formulas with using a mirror to see things indirectly, self-reference with looking at one’s own image, and arithmetical provability of self-reference with recognition of the mirror image. The comparison turns arithmetical self-reference into an idealized model (...)
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  8. Roberto Casati (2012). Towards a Synchretist Theory of Depiction (How to Account for the Illusionistic Aspect of Pictorial Mirrors, Illusions and Epistemic Innocence). In Clotilde Calabi (ed.), Perceptual Illusions: Philosophical and Psychological Essays.
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  9. Xiang Chen (2000). To See or Not to See: The Uses of Photometers and Measurements of Reflective Power. Perspectives on Science 8 (1):1-28.
    : Armed with a photometer originally designed for evaluating telescopes, Richard Potter in the early 1830s measured the re(integral)ective power of metallic and glass mirrors. Because he found significant discrepancies between his measurements and Fresnel's predictions, Potter developed doubts concerning the wave theory. However, Potter's measurements were colored by a peculiar procedure. In order to protect the sensitivity of the eye, Potter made certain approximations in the measuring process, which exaggerated the discrepancies between the theory and the data. Potter's measurements (...)
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  10. Arthur Child (1958). Reflection: Its Nature and its Philosophic Import. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (1):1-15.
    Interpretation strives, for one thing, toward unification. One means of unifying is the category I call "repetition"; and reflection is one of its types. In order to identify the concept of reflection, I shall outline the various types of repetition and add some comments on this type in particular. I shall then consider several of the philosophical problems raised by the supposition that the reflective relationships do exist in the materials interpreted.
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  11. Rafael De Clercq (2007). A Note on the Aesthetics of Mirror Reversal. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):553 - 563.
    According to Roy Sorensen [Philosophical Studies 100 (2000) 175-191] an object cannot differ aesthetically from its mirror image. On his view, mirror-reversing an object — changing its left/right orientation — cannot bring about any aesthetic change. However, in arguing for this thesis Sorensen assumes that aesthetic properties supervene on intrinsic properties alone. This is a highly controversial assumption and nothing is offered in its support. Moreover, a plausible weakening of the assumption does not improve the argument. Finally, Sorensen's second argument (...)
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  12. Clare Mac Cumhaill (2011). Specular Space. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):487-495.
    I argue that when empty space is seen in mirrors—that is, when perceptual specular experience is veridical—specular empty space is, like pictorial empty space, seen-in. I explain how the phenomenal expansiveness of specular reflections can nonetheless be reconciled with the see-through look of specular space.
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  13. Nicholas Denyer (1994). Why Do Mirrors Reverse Left/Right and Not Up/Down? Philosophy 69 (268):205 - 210.
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  14. Marvin Farber (1948). Modes of Reflection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (4):589-600.
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  15. Joshua Gert (2006). The Color of Mirrors. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):369 - 377.
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  16. Alvin I. Goldman, Mirroring, Mindreading, and Simulation.
    What is the connection between mirror processes and mindreading? The paper begins with definitions of mindreading and of mirroring processes. It then advances four theses: (T1) mirroring processes in themselves do not constitute mindreading; (T2) some types of mindreading (“low-level” mindreading) are based on mirroring processes; (T3) not all types of mindreading are based on mirroring (“high-level” mindreading); and (T4) simulation-based mindreading includes but is broader than mirroring-based mindreading. Evidence for the causal role of mirroring in mindreading is drawn from (...)
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  17. C. L. Hardin (2003). A Spectral Reflectance Doth Not a Color Make. Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):191-202.
  18. Sarah Kofman (1999). Mirror and Oneiric Mirages. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 7 (1):4-14.
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  19. G. Lee (2006). The Experience of Left and Right. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
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  20. Geoffrey Lee (2006). The Experience of Left and Right. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
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  21. Michael Madary (2008). Specular Highlights as a Guide to Perceptual Content. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):629 – 639.
    This article is a contribution to a recent debate in the philosophy of perception between Alva Noë and Sean Kelly. Noë (2004) has argued that the perspectival part of perception is simultaneously represented along with the non-perspectival part of perception. Kelly (2004) argues that the two parts of perception are not always simultaneously experienced. Here I focus on specular highlights as an example of the perspectival part of perception. First I give a priori motivation to think that specular highlights are (...)
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  22. R. A. Mall (1974). On Reflection and Negation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (1):79-92.
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  23. R. M. P. Malpas (1973). Left and Right in the Mirror. Mind 82 (327):421-425.
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  24. Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
    The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object reflected in (...)
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