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  1. Anna Alexandrova & Robert Northcott (2013). It's Just a Feeling: Why Economic Models Do Not Explain. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (3):262 - 267.
    Julian Reiss correctly identified a trilemma about economic models: we cannot maintain that they are false, but nevertheless explain and that only true accounts explain. In this reply we give reasons to reject the second premise ? that economic models explain. Intuitions to the contrary should be distrusted.
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  2. N. Emrah Aydinonat (2007). Models, Conjectures and Exploration: An Analysis of Schelling's Checkerboard Model of Residential Segregation. Journal of Economic Methodology 14 (4):429-454.
    This paper analyses and explicates the explanatory characteristics of Schelling's checkerboard model of segregation. It argues that the explanation of emergence of segregation which is based on the checkerboard model is a partial potential (theoretical) explanation. Yet it is also argued that despite its partiality, the checkerboard model is valuable because it improves our chances to provide better explanations of particular exemplifications of residential segregation. The paper establishes this argument by way of examining the several ways in which the checkerboard (...)
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  3. Roger E. Backhouse (2009). An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets , Donald MacKenzie. Mit Press, 2006, X + 377 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):99-106.
  4. Roger E. Backhouse (2004). History and Equilibrium: A Partial Defense of Equilibrium Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 11 (3):291-305.
    This paper responds to the argument, made by many heterodox economists, that equilibrium theory should be abandoned in favor of theories that pay more attention to history. It considers some of the main ways in which the concept of equilibrium has been understood in economics, and the reasons why there has been confusion in discussions of equilibrium. The conclusion is drawn that the focus should be less on equilibrium as a concept than on equilibrium analysis as a method, and limited (...)
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  5. Roger E. Backhouse (1993). Lakatosian Perspectives on General Equilibrium Analysis. Economics and Philosophy 9 (02):271-.
  6. Justin Bledin & Sharon Shewmake (2004). Research Programs, Model-Building and Actor-Network-Theory: Reassessing the Case of the Leontief Paradox. Journal of Economic Methodology 11 (4):455-476.
    Methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP), model-building and actor-network-theory (ANT) are woven together to provide a layered study of the Leontief paradox. Neil De Marchi's Lakatosian account examined the paradox within an Ohlin-Samuelson research program. A model-building approach rather highlights the ability of Leontief's input-output model to mediate between international trade theory and the world by facilitating an empirical application of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. The epistemological implications of this model-building approach provide an alternative explanation of why Samuelson and other prominent (...)
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  7. Peter J. Boettke (1997). What Went Wrong with Economics? Equilibrium as a Flight From Reality. Critical Review 11 (1):11-64.
    F. A. Hayek's realistic economic theory has been replaced by the formalistic use of equlibrium models that bear little resemblance to reality. These models are as serviceable to the right as to the left: they allow the economist either to condemn capitalism for failing to measure up to the model of perfect competition, or to praise capitalism as a utopia of perfect knowledge and rational expectations. Hayek, by contrast, used equilibrium to show that while capitalism is not perfect, it contains (...)
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  8. M. Boumans (2002). Pragmatic View on Empirical Modeling A Review of Clive WJ Granger's Empirical Modeling in Economics, Specification and Evaluation. Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (1):103-106.
  9. Marcel Boumans (2012). Measurement in Economics. In Uskali Mäki, Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard & John Woods (eds.), Philosophy of Economics. North Holland. 395.
  10. Marcel Boumans (2004). Models in Economics. In John Bryan Davis & Alain Marciano (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy. Edward Elgar Pub.. 260--282.
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  11. Marcel Boumans (1999). Representation and Stability in Testing and Measuring Rational Expectations. Journal of Economic Methodology 6 (3):381-402.
    There are at least two elements of theory completion necessary for measurement: (1) a measurement formula and (2) standardization of that representation. Standardization is based on the search for stability. The more stable the correlation which the measurement formula represents is, the less influence other circumstances have. Then, the interconnection between testing, mathematical representation and standardization is of a hierarchical order. By testing a model one tries to find out to what extent the model covers the data of the phenomenon, (...)
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  12. Marcel J. Boumans, Calibration of Models in Experiments.
    The assessment of models in an experiment depends on their material nature and their function in the experiment. Models that are used to make the phenomenon under investigation visible - sensors - are assessed by calibration. However, calibration strategies assume material intervention. The experiment discssed in this paper is an experiment in economics to measure the influence of technology shocks on business cycles. It uses immaterial, mathematical instruments. It appears that calibration did not work for these kinds of models, it (...)
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  13. Marcel J. Boumans, Grey-Box Understanding in Economics.
    In economics, models are built to answer specific questions. Each type of question requires its own type of models; in other words, it defines the requirements that a model should meet and thereby instructs how the models should be built. An explanation is an answer to a ‘why’-question. In economics, this answer is provided by a white-box model. To answer a ‘how much’-question, which is asking for a measurement, economists can make use of black-box models. Economic phenomena are often (...)
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  14. Marcel J. Boumans, Built-in Justification.
    In several accounts of what models are and how they function a specific view dominates. This view contains the following characteristics. First, there is a clear-cut distinction between theories, models and data and secondly, empirical assessment takes place after the model is built. This view in which discovery and justification are disconnected is not in accordance with several practices of mathematical business-cycle model building. What these practices show is that models have to meet implicit criteria of adequacy, such as satisfying (...)
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  15. Marcel Boumans & Mary S. Morgan (2001). Ceteris Paribus Conditions: Materiality and the Application of Economic Theories. Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (1):11-26.
  16. Richard Bradley (2000). Review. Steven Rappaport 'Models and Reality in Economics' [Book Review]. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):159-163.
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  17. Krzysztof Brzechczyn (ed.) (2009). Idealization Xiii: Modeling in History. Rodopi.
    The book reveals different dimensions of modeling in the historical sciences. Papers collected in the first part (Ontology of the Historical Process) consider different models of historical reality and discuss their status. The second part (Modeling in the Methodology of History) presents various forms of idealization in historiographic research. The papers in the third part (Modeling in the Research Practice) present various models of past reality (e.g. of Poland, Central Europe and the general history of the feudal system) put forward (...)
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  18. James M. Buchanan (2001). Game Theory, Mathematics, and Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (1):27-32.
  19. Nevin Cavusoglu & Edinaldo Tebaldi (2006). Evaluating Growth Theories and Their Empirical Support: An Assessment of the Convergence Hypothesis. Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (1):49-75.
    Understanding the factors determining economic growth has been a major concern for economists and governing bodies for many years. The Solow growth model and the endogenous growth models are the main theories tested and used in the growth literature. This paper discusses the main contributions to economic methodology and uses Lakatos's scientific research program framework to evaluate the main theoretical contributions to growth theory. Based on Lakatos's ideas, Solovian models are both empirically and theoretically progressive. Endogenous growth models, on the (...)
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  20. Szu-Ting Chen (2011). Imagining the Imaginable: A Reinterpretation of the Function of Economists' Concern About Structural Isomorphism in Economic Theorizing. Journal of Economic Methodology 18 (01):53-78.
    By using a metatheoretical interpretation of the development of international trade theory as an example, I illustrate that, as is manifested in the practices of economic theorization, a theoretical representation can be decomposed into two component representations: a formal representation and a causal narrative representation. I further maintain that, with respect to both component representations, the concern of isomorphism is important in that it is the guiding idea that underlies economists' practice of identifying both an adequate formal model and a (...)
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  21. David Colander (1994). Vision, Judgment, and Disagreement Among Economists. Journal of Economic Methodology 1 (1):43-56.
  22. Steven Cook (2005). On the Semantic Approach to Econometric Methodology. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (1):117-123.
    In recent research, Davis (2005) has introduced the semantic conception of theories as a means of studying the differing practices of the Textbook and LSE approaches to econometric modelling. In this paper, Davis' (2005) use of the semantic view is examined, with close attention paid to the stated roles of the semantic notions of ?model dimensions? and ?bridging assumptions?. While comments concerning the latter are of a supportive nature, some concerns are raised in relation to Davis' use of model dimensions.
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  23. Rod Cross, Harold Hutchinson, Harbir Lamba & Doug Strachan (2014). Reflections on Soros: Mach, Quine, Arthur and Far-From-Equilibrium Dynamics. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (4):357-367.
    We argue that the Soros account of reflexivity does not provide a clear-cut distinction between a social science such as economics and the physical sciences. It is pointed out that the participants who attempt to learn from refutations of conjectures in the Soros world are likely to be haunted by the Duhem–Quine problem of conjointness of hypotheses and unfocused refutation. On a more constructive note, we argue that models of inductive learning, in which participants form conjectures on the basis of (...)
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  24. Robin Cubitt (2005). Experiments and the Domain of Economic Theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (2):197-210.
    This paper distinguishes the base domain of an economic theory (in which predictions are relatively unambiguous) from, respectively, the domains of intended application and of legitimate testing; it argues that the domain of legitimate testing is not generally restricted to that of intended application; and discusses the obligations on researchers imposed by a position that presumes experimental environments in the base domain of a theory to provide legitimate test, unless there is compelling reason to expect behaviour in the domain of (...)
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  25. Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme in game theory was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme (Interactive Epistemology). The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the 20th century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate game theoretic solution concept for any normal form and extensive (...)
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  26. Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). On the Narrow Epistemology of Game Theoretic Agents. In Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Tero Tulenheimo (eds.), Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy. Springer.
    I argue that game theoretic explanations of human actions make implausible epistemological assumptions. A logical analysis of game theoretic explanations shows that they do not conform to the belief-desire framework of action explanation. Epistemic characterization theorems (specifying sufficient conditions for game theoretic solution concepts to obtain) are argued to be the canonical way to make game theory conform to that framework. The belief formation practices implicit in epistemic characterization theorems, however, disregard all information about players except what can be found (...)
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  27. Neil de Marchi (1992). More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature's Economics, Philip Mirowski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, Xii + 450 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 8 (01):163-.
  28. Ken Dennis (1995). A Logical Critique of Mathematical Formalism in Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 2 (2):181-200.
    Mathematical economic theory is lacking in logical rigour. Even if the mathematics used in constructing formal economic theory is rigorous as pure mathematics, economic theory possesses both mathematical and non-mathematical components. But mathematical reductionism fails to formalize the non-mathematical components of economic theory, and the method of numerics (outlined in this paper) shows how, in simple cases, the two components of economic theory can be formally identified, distinguished, and integrated. However, the real challenge to formalizing economic theory points not to (...)
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  29. Thomas J. Dohmen (2002). Building and Using Economic Models: A Case Study Analysis of the IS-LL Model. Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (2):191-212.
    This paper critically assesses several model accounts written in the 1990s by epistemologists and philosophers of science by relating them to a specific but crucial example of model building, namely Hicks's (1937) construction of the first version of the IS-LM model, and examining in how far these accounts apply to this case. Thereby the paper contributes to answering why and how economists build models. The view crystallizes that economists build models not only to facilitate the conceptual exploration of theory, but (...)
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  30. Stan du Plessis (2010). Implications for Models in Monetary Policy. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (4):429-444.
    Monetary authorities have been implicated in the financial crisis of 2007?2008. John Muellbauer, for example, has blamed what he thought was initially inadequate policy responses by central banks to the crisis on their models, which are, in his words, ?overdue for the scrap heap?. This paper investigates the role of monetary policy models in the crisis and finds that (i) it is likely that monetary policy contributed to the financial crisis; and (ii) that an inappropriately narrow suite of models made (...)
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  31. Brian Epstein (2008). When Local Models Fail. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):3-24.
    Models treating the simple properties of social groups have a common shortcoming. Typically, they focus on the local properties of group members and the features of the world with which group members interact. I consider economic models of bureaucratic corruption, to show that (a) simple properties of groups are often constituted by the properties of the wider population, and (b) even sophisticated models are commonly inadequate to account for many simple social properties. Adequate models and social policies must treat certain (...)
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  32. Daniel Farhat (2011). Virtually Science: An Agent-Based Model of the Rise and Fall of Scientific Research Programs. Journal of Economic Methodology 18 (4):363-385.
    Is there more to ?good science? than explaining novel facts? Social interaction within scientific communities plays a pivotal role in defining acceptable research practices. This article explores the connection between research outcomes and the socio-cultural environment they are constructed in by developing an agent-based computational model of scientific communities. Agent-to-agent interaction is added to a system of knowledge production inspired by the work of Lakatos (1969, 1970) on scientific research programs as an important factor guiding the actions of (...)
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  33. Adam Fforde (2005). Persuasion: Reflections on Economics, Data, and the 'Homogeneity Assumption'. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (1):63-91.
    This paper discusses issues to do with the empirical basis of modern economics and points towards the need to look more closely at the ?homogeneity assumption? that underpins much economic theory. It argues that severe problems currently prevent economics from becoming more persuasive to both students of economics and those outside the discipline. The issue involves the management of disciplinary boundaries, and excessive use of the ?homogeneity assumption.? Three areas of concern are explored. First is the literature on causes of (...)
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  34. Franklin M. Fisher (2002). Symposium on Marshall's Tendencies: 2 Well-Grounded Theory, and Aggregation. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):17-20.
    In Marshall's Tendencies (Sutton, 2000), John Sutton poses some fairly deep questions for economists, especially for empirical work. In particular, when (if ever) is it safe to behave as though the applies? In that paradigm, we are attempting to extract and estimate the model from the data and are only kept from doing so because, while economic analysis captures the main , there are many small influences that we cannot exactly take into account. That paradigm, which Sutton traces to an (...)
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  35. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss (2000). Theoretical Isolation in Contract Theory: Suppressing Margins and Entrepreneurship. Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (3):313-339.
    We discuss contract theory from a combined Austrian/new institutional view. In the latter view, the world is seen as shot through with ignorance and transaction costs, but, as a tendency, entrepreneurial activity responds to the problems caused by these. All modelling must critically reflect this. This ontological commitment is contrasted to various isolations characteristic of contract theory, specifically the modelling strategy of introducing often ad hoc and unexplained constraints that suppress margins and possibilities of entrepreneurial actions that would be open (...)
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  36. R. N. Giere (2001). Mediating Models A Review of Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Sciences, MS Morgan and M. Morrison (Eds). Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (1):139-144.
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  37. Robert S. Goldfarb & Jonathan Ratner (2009). Exploring Different Visions of the Model–Empirics Nexus: Solow Versus Lipsey. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (2):159-174.
    Does empirical work in economics both provoke and test theoretical models, or does model development proceed according to a theory-oriented research program, with little interaction with empirics? Robert Solow and Richard Lipsey have articulated different visions of this relationship. This paper: (i) describes these competing Solow versus Lipsey views; (ii) presents examples illustrating each view; and (iii) draws inferences about factors promoting a close relation between empirics and modeling. Three examples are examined in detail: the ?nursing shortage? literature; Lind's analysis (...)
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  38. William B. Griffith (1991). The Methodology of Economic Model Building: Methodology After Samuelson, Lawrence A. Boland. London: Routledge, 1989, V + 194 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 7 (01):119-122.
  39. Till Grüne-Yanoff (2013). Genuineness Resolved: A Reply to Reiss' Purported Paradox. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (3):255 - 261.
    This response to Reiss ?explanatory paradox? argues that some economic models might be true, and that many economic models are not intended for providing how-actually explanations, but rather how-possibly explanations. Therefore, two assumptions of Reiss? paradox are not true, and the paradox disappears.
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  40. Till Grüne‐Yanoff & Paul Schweinzer (2008). The Roles of Stories in Applying Game Theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (2):131-146.
    Game?theoretic models consist of a formal game structure and an informal model narrative or story. When game theory is employed to model economic situations, the stories play a central role in interpreting, constructing and solving game structures. We analyse the architecture of game theory and distinguish between game models and the theory proper. We present the different functions of the model narrative in the application of game models to economic situations. In particular, we show how model narratives support the choice (...)
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  41. Francesco Guala (2004). Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction, Edited by Uskali MÄKI. Cambridge University Press, 2002, VII + 384 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):217-223.
  42. Francesco Guala & Luigi Mittone (2005). Experiments in Economics: External Validity and the Robustness of Phenomena. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (4):495-515.
    External validity is the problem of generalizing results from laboratory to non?laboratory conditions. In this paper we review various ways in which the problem can be tackled, depending on the kind of experiment one is doing. Using a concrete example, we highlight in particular the distinction between external validity and robustness, and point out that many experiments are not aimed at a well?specified real?world target but rather contribute to a ?library of robust phenomena?, a body of experimental knowledge to be (...)
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  43. Francesco Guala & Stathis Psillos (2001). Models as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison (Eds.). Cambridge University Press, 1999, XI + 401 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):275-294.
  44. Frank Hahn (1996). Rerum Cognoscere Causas. Economics and Philosophy 12 (02):183-.
  45. David L. Hammes & Lawrence A. Boland (1984). Neoclassical Vs. Classical Economic Models. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (1):107-113.
  46. D. Wade Hands (2013). Introduction to Symposium on the Explanation Paradox. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (3):235 - 236.
  47. D. Wade Hands (2007). William Stanley Jevons and the Making of Modern Economics, by Harro Maas. Cambridge University Press, 2005, XXII+330 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):252-256.
  48. Daniel M. Hausman (2013). Paradox Postponed. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (3):250 - 254.
    This comment argues that there is an explanation paradox in economics, as Julian Reiss maintains, only if models in economics succeed in explaining even though they are not approximately true, fail to identify the causes of what they purport to explain, and misdescribe the mechanism by which the causes lead to the effects to be explained. Reiss provides no reason to believe that models that do not describe the causes and mechanisms at work are nevertheless explanatory.
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  49. Daniel M. Hausman (1998). The Faults of Formalism and the Magic of Markets. Critical Review 12 (1-2):127-138.
    Abstract Contrary to Peter J. Boettke's essay, ?What Went Wrong with Economics??, there is no connection between ?formalism? and the alleged inability of mainstream economists to regard theoretical models as anything other than either depictions of real market economies or bases for criticizing market economies and justifying government intervention. Although Boettke's criticisms of the excesses of formalism are justified, Austrian economists such as Boettke need to justify their view that government interventions into economic affairs are inevitably harmful.
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  50. Daniel M. Hausman (1997). Theory Appraisal in Neoclassical Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (2):289-296.
    After answering relatively minor criticisms of The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics by Geert Reuten and Uskali Mäki, this essay grants their main charge that I could not sensibly defend the way economists assess theories while at the same time criticizing their insistence that economic theories be unified and of maximal scope. I should have said that economists are mistaken in their methods of assessment because they focus on the wrong data and because they unjustifiably insist that only unified (...)
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