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  1. Ned Block & Susanna Siegel (2013). Attention and Perceptual Adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):205-206.
  2. William F. Brewer & Bruce L. Lambert (2001). The Theory-Ladenness of Observation and the Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scientific Process. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S176-S186.
    We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scientific process requires an examination (...)
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  3. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter critically assesses recent arguments that acquiring the ability to categorize an object as belonging to a certain high-level kind can cause the relevant kind property to be represented in visual phenomenal content. The first two arguments, developed respectively by Susanna Siegel (2010) and Tim Bayne (2009), employ an essentially phenomenological methodology. The third argument, developed by William Fish (2013), by contrast, is supported by an array of psychophysical and neuroscientific findings. I argue that while none of these arguments (...)
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  4. Jerome S. Bruner (1957). On Perceptual Readiness. Psychological Review 64:123-52.
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  5. Philip Cam (1990). Insularity and the Persistence of Perceptual Illusion. Analysis 50 (October):231-5.
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  6. Lelio Camilleri (1992). On Music Perception and Cognition: Modularity, Structure, and Processing. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 2 (4):365-377.
    The paper treats issues concerning the modular modelisation of musical mental processes. Some musical phenomena, like musical illusions, are explained in the framework of modularity and hypotheses are advanced in which the modular model seems very promising for the study of musical perception and cognition. In addition, arguments are proposed to distinguish between levels of abstraction and knowledge in musical cognitive processes.Moreover, some aspects about the theory of musical competence and the theory of musical processing are identified and the possibilities (...)
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  7. Ariel S. Cecchi (2014). Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity. Dialectica 68 (1):63-95.
    Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system (e.g., visual, auditory, haptic). The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system (defined as early vision) which I call ‘architectural’. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content of the perceptual experience. I scrutinize a study (...)
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  8. Patricia S. Churchland, V. S. Ramachandran & Terrence J. Sejnowski (1993). A Critique of Pure Vision. In Christof Koch & Joel L. David (eds.), Large-scale neuronal theories of the brain. MIT Press. 23.
    Anydomainofscientificresearchhasitssustainingorthodoxy. Thatis, research on a problem, whether in astronomy, physics, or biology, is con- ducted against a backdrop of broadly shared assumptions. It is these as- sumptionsthatguideinquiryandprovidethecanonofwhatisreasonable-- of what "makes sense." And it is these shared assumptions that constitute a framework for the interpretation of research results. Research on the problem of how we see is likewise sustained by broadly shared assump- tions, where the current orthodoxy embraces the very general idea that the business of the visual system is to (...)
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  9. Paul M. Churchland (1988). Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.
    The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: (1) to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; (2) to show that his views on impenetrability are (...)
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  10. Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    The present essay is addressed simultaneously to two distinct audiences.
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  11. Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception. Erkenntnis:1-12.
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of "being a wren." Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of "being a wren." I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have (...)
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  12. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Cognitive Penetration (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Two).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: Can perceptual experience be modified by reason?
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  13. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Report on the Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop.
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York on March 19th and 20th, 2012: 1. What is perceptual learning? 2. Can perceptual experience be modified by reason? 3. How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology? 4. How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception? 5. How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
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  14. William Cornwell (2004). Dr. In Marek, Johann Christian & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. niederosterreichkultur.
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  15. Parker Crutchfield (2011). Representing High-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):279 - 294.
    High-level theory is the view that high-level properties?the property of being a dog, being a tiger, being an apple, being a pair of lips, etc.?can be represented in perceptual experience. Low-level theory denies this and claims that high-level properties are only represented at the level of perceptual judgment and are products of cognitive interpretation of low-level sensory information (color, shape, illumination). This paper discusses previous attempts to establish high-level theory, their weaknesses, and an argument for high-level theory that does not (...)
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  16. Ophelia Deroy (2013). Object-Sensitivity Versus Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):87-107.
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  17. P. DesAutels (1995). Two Types of Theories: The Impact of Churchland's Perceptual Plasticity. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):25-33.
    In this paper I argue that because Churchland does not adequately address the distinction between high-level cognitive theories and low-level embodied theories, Churchland's claims for theory-laden perception lose their epistemological significance. I propose that Churchland and others debating the theory-ladenness of perception should distinguish carefully between two main ways in which perception is plastic: through modifying our high-level theories directly and through modifying our low-level theories using training experiences. This will require them to attend to two very different types of (...)
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  18. Zoe Drayson (2011). Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neuroscience Inform Philosophy? [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):242-249.
  19. Terence Rajivan Edward (2011). Theory-Laden Experience and Illusions. Ethos 4 (2):58-67.
    The persistence of certain illusions has been used to argue that some theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. Learning that one of these illusions is an illusion involves accepting theories. Nevertheless, the illusion does not go away. It seems then that these theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. This paper contests an assumption of this argument: that the only way in which our perceptions can be affected by holding these theories is by the illusion going away.
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  20. Matthew H. Erdelyi (1974). A New Look at the New Look: Perceptual Defense and Vigilance. Psychological Review 81:1-25.
  21. Anna Estany (2001). The Thesis of Theory-Laden Observation in the Light of Cognitive Psychology. Philosophy of Science 68 (2):203-217.
    The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theory-ladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and Paul (...)
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  22. Jerry A. Fodor (1988). A Reply to Churchland's `Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality'. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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  23. Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
    Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
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  24. Jerry A. Fodor (1983). The Modularity of Mind. MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
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  25. Ellen Fridland (2010). Perception and Skill: Theoretical Foundations for a Science of Perception. Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
  26. Richard Fumerton (2013). Siegel on the Epistemic Impact of “Checkered” Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):733-739.
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  27. Angus Gellatly (1999). Perception and Information Processing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):377-378.
    Perception and cognition can be understood either as conscious experience, thought, and behaviour or as bodily functions executed at the level of information processing. Whether or not they are cognitively penetrable depends on the level referred to. Selective attention is the mechanism by which cognition affects perception, theory influences observation and observational reports, culture biases experience, and current knowledge determines what inferences are made. Seeing must be distinguished from seeing as.
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  28. P. Gerrans & J. Kennett, Is Cognitive Penetrability the Mark of the Moral?
    The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Garrett Cullity on moral psychology and another by Richard Joyce on moral judgements.
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  29. Daniel J. Gilman (1991). The Neurobiology of Observation. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):496-502.
    Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue that his neurological evidence is inadequate to his philosophical goals, both by itself (...)
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  30. I. J. Good (1968). Creativity and Duality in Perception and Recall. In Proceedings of the Iee/Npl Conference on Pattern Recognition No. 42. Inst Elec Eng Npl.
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  31. Richard Gray (2001). Cognitive Modules, Synaesthesia and the Constitution of Psychological Natural Kinds. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):65-82.
    Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of modularity, and (...)
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  32. John D. Greenwood (1999). Simulation, Theory-Theory and Cognitive Penetration: No 'Instance of the Fingerpost'. Mind and Language 14 (1):32-56.
  33. Alexander Grunewald (1999). Neurophysiology Indicates Cognitive Penetration of the Visual System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):379-380.
    Short-term memory, nonattentional task effects and nonspatial extraretinal representations in the visual system are signs of cognitive penetration. All of these have been found physiologically, arguing against the cognitive impenetrability of vision as a whole. Instead, parallel subcircuits in the brain, each subserving a different competency including sensory and cognitive (and in some cases motor) aspects, may have cognitively impenetrable components.
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  34. Jane Heal (1996). Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability. Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.
  35. Michael Huemer (2013). Epistemological Asymmetries Between Belief and Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):741-748.
  36. Michael Jacovides (2012). Locke and the Visual Array. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):69-91.
    A.D. Smith opens his excellent paper, “Space and Sight,” by remarking, One of the most notable features of both philosophy and psychology throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is the almost universal denial that we are immediately aware through sight of objects arrayed in three-dimensional space. This was not merely a denial of Direct Realism, but a denial that truly visual objects are even phenomenally presented in depth (481). Times have changed. As Smith writes, “It is hard to think of (...)
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  37. Lester E. Krueger (1999). An Even Stronger Case for the Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):382-383.
    Pylyshyn could have strengthened his case by avoiding side issues and by taking a sterner, firmer line on the unresolved (and perhaps unresolvable) problems plaguing the sensitivity (d') measure of top-down, cognitive effects, as well as the general (nearly utter!) lack of convincing evidence provided by proponents of the cognitive penetrability of visual perception.
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  38. Robert S. Lockhart (2000). Modularity, Cognitive Penetrability and the Turing Test. Psycoloquy.
    The Turing Test blurs the distinction between a model and irrelevant) instantiation details. Modeling only functional modules is problematic if these are interconnected and cognitively penetrable.
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  39. Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
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  40. Neil A. Macmillan (1999). Better Ways to Study Penetrability with Detection Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):384-384.
    Signal detection theory (SDT) is best known as a method for separating sensitivity from bias. If sensitivity reflects early sensory processing and bias later cognition, then SDT can be use to study penetrability by asking whether cognitive manipulations affect sensitivity. This assumption is too simple, but SDT can nonetheless be helpful in developing specific methods of how sensory and cognitive information combine. Two such approaches are described.
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  41. Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies (...)
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  42. Eric Mandelbaum, Ballistic, Automatic, Mandatory: On An Ambiguity in Mandatory Perceptual Processing.
  43. Robert N. McCauley & J. Henrich (2006). Susceptibility to the Muller-Lyer Illusion, Theory-Neutral Observation, and the Diachronic Penetrability of the Visual Input System. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):79-101.
    Jerry Fodor has consistently cited the persistence of illusions--especially the M.
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  44. Matthew McGrath (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification.
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  45. Costas Pagondiotis (forthcoming). COGNITIVE (IM)PENETRABILITY OF VISION: RESTRICTING VISION Vs. RESTRICTING COGNITION. In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. OUP.
  46. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, (...)
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  47. Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) (2005). Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science.
    The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception.
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  48. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2001). Reentrant Neural Pathways and the Theory-Ladenness of Perception. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S187-S199.
    In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observation, which I will call (...)
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  49. Gillian Rhodes & Michael L. Kalish (1999). Cognitive Penetration: Would We Know It If We Saw It? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):390-391.
    How can the impenetrability hypothesis be empirically tested? We comment on the role of signal detection measures, suggesting that context effects on discriminations for which post-perceptual cues are irrelevant, or on neural activity associated with early vision, would challenge impenetrability. We also note the great computational power of the proposed pre-perceptual attention processes and consider the implications for testability of the theory.
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  50. Irvin Rock (1983). The Logic Of Perception. Cambridge: Mit Press.
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