This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.

Modularity in Cognitive Science

Related categories
Siblings:See also:
101 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 100 / 101
  1. Marcus P. Adams (forthcoming). Explaining the Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophical Studies:-.
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM deficit have failed to notice that autism's status as a spectrum disorder has implications about which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the explanation of the (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org philsci-archive.pitt.edu springerlink.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  2. Marcus P. Adams (2011). Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):763-773.
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism (Gerrans 2002; Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; Gerrans & Stone 2008). In this paper, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone’s (2008) account. Second, I discuss various studies of individuals (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  3. Sean Allen-Hermanson & Jennifer Matey, Synesthesia. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This encyclopedia entry provides an extended review of scientific work on synesthesia and reviews the philosophical literature that has drawn on synesthesia in order to arbitrate various disputes pertaining to topics such as the nature of consciousness, color, mental architecture, and perceptual representation, as well as several other topics.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  4. Michael Anderson, Circuit Sharing and the Implementation of Intelligent Systems.
    One of the most foundational and continually contested questions in the cognitive sciences is the degree to which the functional organization of the brain can be understood as modular. In its classic formulation, a module was defined as a cognitive sub-system with (all or most of) nine specific properties; the classic module is, among other things, domain specific, encapsulated (i.e. maintains proprietary representations to which other modules have no access), and implemented in dedicated neural substrates. Most of the examinations—and especially (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More options ...
  5. Irene Appelbaum (1998). Fodor, Modularity, and Speech Perception. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):317-330.
    Fodor argues that speech perception is accomplished by a module. Typically, modular processing is taken to be bottom-up processing. Yet there is ubiquitous empirical evidence that speech perception is influenced by top-down processing. Fodor attempts to resolve this conflict by denying that modular processing must be exclusively bottom-up. It is argued, however, that Fodor's attempt to reconcile top-down and modular processing fails, because: (i) it undermines Fodor's own conception of modular processing; and (ii) it cannot account for the contextually varying (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  6. R. Arp (2006). The Environments of Our Hominin Ancestors, Tool-Usage, and Scenario Visualization. Biology and Philosophy 21 (1).
    In this paper, I give an account of how our hominin ancestors evolved a conscious ability I call scenario visualization that enabled them to manufacture novel tools so as to survive and flourish in the ever-changing and complex environments in which they lived. I first present the ideas and arguments put forward by evolutionary psychologists that the mind evolved certain mental capacities as adaptive responses to environmental pressures. Specifically, Steven Mithen thinks that the mind has evolved cognitive fluidity, viz., an (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  7. Theodore Bach (forthcoming). Analogical Cognition: Applications in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Philosophy Compass.
    Analogical cognition refers to the ability to detect, process, and learn from relational similarities. The study of analogical and similarity cognition is widely considered one of the ‘success stories’ of cognitive science, exhibiting convergence across many disciplines on foundational questions. Given the centrality of analogy to mind and knowledge, it would benefit philosophers investigating topics in epistemology and the philosophies of mind and language to become familiar with empirical models of analogical cognition. The goal of this essay is to describe (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  8. Axel Barceló Aspeitia, Ángeles Eraña & Robert Stainton (2010). The Contribution of Domain Specificity in the Highly Modular Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27.
    Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  9. Clark H. Barrett (2005). Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive Modularity. Mind and Language 20 (3):259-287.
    Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, however, to (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: anthro.ucla.edu sscnet.ucla.edu repositories.cdlib.org blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  10. Clark H. Barrett & R. Kurzban (2006). Modularity in Cognition: Framing the Debate. Psychological Review 113:628-647.
    Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  11. H. Clark Barrett (2005). Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive Modularity. Mind and Language 20 (3):259-87.
    Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, however, to (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: repositories.cdlib.org anthro.ucla.edu sscnet.ucla.edu blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  12. L. J. Bennett (1990). Modularity of Mind Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (September):429-36.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org bjps.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  13. Vincent Bergeron (2007). Anatomical and Functional Modularity in Cognitive Science: Shifting the Focus. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):175 – 195.
    Much of cognitive science is committed to the modular approach to the study of cognition. The core of this approach consists of a pair of assumptions - the anatomical and the functional modularity assumptions - which motivate two kinds of inference: the anatomical and the functional modularity inferences. The legitimacy of both of these inferences has been strongly challenged, a situation that has had surprisingly little impact on most theorizing in the field. Following the introduction of an important, yet rarely (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  14. Vincent Bergeron & Mohan Matthen (2008). Assembling the Emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.
    In this article, we discuss the modularity of the emotions. In a general methodological section, we discuss the empirical basis for the postulation of modularity. Then we discuss how certain modules -- the emotions in particular -- decompose into distinct anatomical and functional parts.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: muse.jhu.edu dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  15. Mark H. Bickhard (2003). An Integration of Motivation and Cognition. In L. Smith, C. Rogers & P. Tomlinson (eds.), Development and Motivation: Joint Perspectives. Leicester: British Psychological Society.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  16. Derek Browne (1996). Cognitive Versatility. Minds and Machines 6 (4):507-23.
    Jerry Fodor divides the mind into peripheral, domain-specific modules and a domaingeneral faculty of central cognition. John Tooby and Lisa Cosmides argue instead that the mind is modular all the way through; cognition consists of a multitude of domain-specific processes. But human thought has a flexible, innovative character that contrasts with the inflexible, stereotyped performances of modular systems. My goal is to discover how minds that are constructed on modular principles might come to exhibit cognitive versatility.Cognitive versatility is exhibited in (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  17. Joanna J. Bryson (2002). Language Isn't Quite That Special. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):679-680.
    Language isn't the only way to cross modules, nor is it the only module with access to both input and output. Minds don't generally work across modules because this leads to combinatorial explosion in search and planning. Language is special in being a good vector for mimetics, so it becomes associated with useful cross-module concepts we acquire culturally. Further, language is indexical, so it facilitates computationally expensive operations.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  18. David J. Buller (2005). Get Over: Massive Modularity. Biology and Philosophy 20 (4).
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  19. S. Butterfill (2007). What Are Modules and What is Their Role in Development? Mind and Language 22 (4):450–473.
    Modules are widely held to play a central role in explaining mental development and in accounts of the mind generally. But there is much disagreement about what modules are, which shows that we do not adequately understand modularity. This paper outlines a Fodoresque approach to understanding one type of modularity. It suggests that we can distinguish modular from nonmodular cognition by reference to the kinds of process involved, and that modular cognition differs from nonmodular forms of cognition in being a (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: interscience.wiley.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  20. Philip Cam (1988). Modularity, Rationality, and Higher Cognition. Philosophical Studies 53 (March):279-94.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  21. Lelio Camilleri (1992). On Music Perception and Cognition: Modularity, Structure, and Processing. Minds and Machines 2 (4).
    The paper treats issues concerning the modular modelisation of musical mental processes. Some musical phenomena, like musical illusions, are explained in the framework of modularity and hypotheses are advanced in which the modular model seems very promising for the study of musical perception and cognition. In addition, arguments are proposed to distinguish between levels of abstraction and knowledge in musical cognitive processes.Moreover, some aspects about the theory of musical competence and the theory of musical processing are identified and the possibilities (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  22. Peter Carruthers (2008). An Architecture for Dual Reasoning. In J. Evans & K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
    In J. Evans and K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, 2008. (In draft.).
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: philosophy.umd.edu   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  23. Peter Carruthers (2006). The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell.
    My charge in this chapter is to set out the positive case supporting massively modular models of the human mind.1 Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted understanding of what a massively modular model of the mind is. So at least some of our discussion will have to be terminological. I shall begin by laying out the range of things that can be meant by ‘modularity’. I shall then adopt a pair of strategies. One will be to distinguish some things that (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  24. Peter Carruthers (2006). Simple Heuristics Meet Massive Modularity. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter investigates the extent to which claims of massive modular organization of the mind (espoused by some members of the evolutionary psychology research program) are consistent with the main elements of the simple heuristics research program. A number of potential sources of conflict between the two programs are investigated and defused. However, the simple heuristics program turns out to undermine one of the main arguments offered in support of massive modularity, at least as the latter is generally understood by (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: philosophy.dept.shef.ac.uk   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  25. Peter Carruthers (2006). Distinctively Human Thinking: Modular Precursors and Components. In Peter Carruthers (ed.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition. New York: Oxford University Press New York.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  26. Peter Carruthers (2006). The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Peter Carruthers, a leading philosopher of mind, provides a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. Written with unusual clarity and directness, and surveying an extensive range of research in cognitive science, it will be essential reading for anyone with an interest in the nature and organization of the mind.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  27. Peter Carruthers (2004). Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind. Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278.
    This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author's previous work. This is that distinctivelyhuman flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few amodular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that requires any (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: philosophy.umd.edu blackwell-synergy.com interscience.wiley.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  28. Peter Carruthers (2003). Moderately Massive Modularity. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Mind and Persons. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind’s structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the thesis of moderately massive modularity is explained and elaborated.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  29. Peter Carruthers (2003). Is the Mind a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection? In Christopher R. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell.
    This chapter defends the positive thesis which constitutes its title. It argues first, that the mind has been shaped by natural selection; and second, that the result of that shaping process is a modular mental architecture. The arguments presented are all broadly empirical in character, drawing on evidence provided by biologists, neuroscientists and psychologists (evolutionary, cognitive, and developmental), as well as by researchers in artificial intelligence. Yet the conclusion is at odds with the manifest image of ourselves provided both by (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  30. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (2005). The Innate Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This is the first volume of a projected three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The extent to which the mind is innate is one of the central questions in the human sciences, with important implications for many surrounding debates. By bringing together the top nativist scholars in philosophy, psychology, and allied disciplines these volumes provide a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and a definitive reference point for future nativist inquiry. The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, concerns the fundamental architecture (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  31. A. J. Chien (1996). Why the Mind May Not Be Modular. Minds and Machines 6 (1):1-32.
    Fodor argued that in contrast to input systems which are informationally encapsulated, general intelligence is unencapsulated and hence non-modular; for this reason, he suggested, prospects for understanding it are not bright. It is argued that an additional property, primitive functionality, is required for non-modularity. A functionally primitive computational model for quantifier scoping, limited to some scoping influences, is then motivated, and an implementation described. It is argued that only such a model can be faithful to intuitive scope preferences. But it (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  32. John M. Collins (2005). On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity. Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.
    Jerry Fodor argues that the massive modularity thesis – the claim that (human) cognition is wholly served by domain specific, autonomous computational devices, i.e., modules – is a priori incoherent, self-defeating. The thesis suffers from what Fodor dubs the input problem: the function of a given module (proprietarily understood) in a wholly modular system presupposes non-modular processes. It will be argued that massive modularity suffers from no such a priori problem. Fodor, however, also offers what he describes as a really (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com kluweronline.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  33. Michael K. Cundall (2006). Rethinking the Divide: Modules and Central Systems. Philosophia 34 (4):379-393.
    In this paper I argue that the cognitive system is best viewed as a continuum of cognitive processing from modules to central systems rather than having these as discrete and wholly different modes of cognitive processing. I rely on recent evidence on the development of theory of mind (ToM) abilities and the developmental disorder of autism. I then turn to the phenomenology of modular processes. I show that modular outputs have a stronger force than non-modular or central system outputs. I (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  34. Gregory Currie & Kim Sterelny (2000). How to Think About the Modularity of Mind-Reading. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):145-160.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  35. Emmanuel Dupoux (2002). Language, Brain and Cognitive Development: Essays in Honor of Jacques Mehler. MIT Press.
    The contributions to this collection, written in honor of Jacques Mehler, a founder of the field of psycholinguistics, assess the progress of cognitive science.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  36. Angeles Eraña (forthcoming). Dual Process Theories Versus Massive Modularity Hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    Two prevailing accounts of the structure of the mind have been provided, respectively, by the Dual System Theory and by the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. It has been claimed, however, that they cannot both be true at the same time, i.e., that they are incompatible and, thus, that one of them must be abandoned. I will offer some arguments to challenge this claim. I will show that a plausible understanding of each theory makes it possible for them both to be true (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  37. M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger (2004). New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press.
  38. Jerry A. Fodor (2005). Reply to Steven Pinker So How Does the Mind Work?. Mind and Language 20 (1):25-32.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com interscience.wiley.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  39. Jerry A. Fodor (1986). The Modularity of Mind. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), Meaning and Cognitive Structure. Ablex.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: getabstract.com books.google.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  40. Jerry A. Fodor (1983). The Modularity of Mind. MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ruccs.rutgers.edu getabstract.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  41. Naama Friedmann & Aviah Gvion (2002). Modularity in Developmental Disorders: Evidence From Specific Language Impairment and Peripheral Dyslexias. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):756-757.
    Evidence from various subtypes of Specific Language Impairment and developmental peripheral dyslexias is presented to support the idea that even developmental disorders can be modular. However, in developmental letter position dyslexia and neglect dyslexia we show that additional errors can occur because of insufficient orthographic-lexical knowledge.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  42. Karl J. Friston (1999). Modularity, Segregation, and Interactions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):99-100.
    This commentary considers how far one can go in making inferences about functional modularity or segregation, based on the sorts of analyses used by Caplan & Waters in relation to the underlying neuronal infrastructure. Specifically, an attempt is made to relate the “functionalist” approach adopted in the target article to “neuroreductionist” perspectives on the same issue.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  43. Daniel Gilman (1992). What's a Theory to Do... With Seeing? Or Some Empirical Considerations for Observation and Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):287-309.
    it to be an empirical fact that even the most basic human perception is heavily theory–laden. I offer critical examination of experimental evidence cited by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Churchland on behalf of this supposition. I argue that the empirical evidence cited is inadequate support for the claims in question. I further argue that we have empirical grounds for claiming that the Kuhnian discussion of perception is developed within an inadequate conceptual framework and that a version of the observation/theory distinction (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: bjps.oxfordjournals.org jstor.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  44. Helmut Hildebrandt (1994). Organology and Modularity: One Piece of the Mind or Two? Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):21-38.
    The conception of a modular structure of mind, which postulates that the mind is composed of more or less autonomous subsystems, is widespread in contemporary psychology. Proponents of a modular structure of the mind, such as Marshall (1980; 1984; 1985), Fodor (1983), Gardner (1983), and Shallice (1988), have linked their work to F. J. Gall's theory of organology or of the “functions of the brain”. This paper argues: (1) Gall's organology defends a view of the capacities of the mind that (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  45. Karen Jones (2006). Quick and Smart? Modularity and the Pro-Emotion Consensus. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (5S):3-27.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: muse.jhu.edu dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  46. Patrick Juola (2002). Encapsulating Architecture and Encapsulating Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):759-759.
    Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith (T&K-S) raise the excellent and, in retrospect, obvious point that in a dynamic learning environment where feedback is possible, we should expect networks to adapt to damage by altering details of their behavior. We should therefore not expect that developmental disorders should result in “normal” modules. The implications of this point go much further, since interprocess dependency in the brain does not rely only on learned neural connections. This argues strongly against behavioral and process-related definitions, as (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  47. Frank C. Keil, How to Learn Multiple Tasks.
    The article examines the question of how learning multiple tasks interacts with neural architectures and the flow of information through those architectures. It approaches the question by using the idealization of an artificial neural network where it is possible to ask more precise questions about the effects of modular versus nonmodular architectures as well as the effects of sequential versus simultaneous learning of tasks. A prior work has demonstrated a clear advantage of modular architectures when the two tasks must be (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More options ...
  48. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2001). Innateness and Domain-Specificity. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):191-210.
    There is a widespread assumption in cognitive science that there is anintrinsic link between the phenomena of innateness and domainspecificity. Many authors seem to hold that given the properties ofthese two phenomena, it follows that innate mental states aredomain-specific, or that domain-specific states are innate. My aim inthis paper is to argue that there are no convincing grounds forasserting either claim. After introducing the notions of innateness anddomain specificity, I consider some possible arguments for theconclusion that innate cognitive states are (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: kluweronline.com springerlink.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  49. Paul Kiparsky, A Modular Metrics for Folk Verse.
    Hayes & MacEachern’s (1998) study of quatrain stanzas in English folk songs was the first application of stochastic Optimality Theory to a large corpus of data.1 It remains the most extensive study of versification that OT has to offer, and the most careful and perceptive formal analysis of folk song meter in any framework. In a follow-up study, Hayes (2003) concludes that stress and meter — or more generally, the prosodic structure of language and verse — are governed by (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More options ...
  50. Yonata Levy (2002). Structural Abnormality May Not Equal Functional Oddity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):760-761.
    This commentary questions the authors’claim that cognitive neuropsychology is defined by modularity and that other theoretical frames, that is, connectionism, are a priori rejected. It also points to the fact that whereas in genetic disorders there are developmental delay and asynchrony, there are few reports of deviant developmental trajectories that are never seen in typical development. It is suggested that the possibility that structure does not equal function in the developing brain, may be a viable option.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  51. Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider (2008). Fodor's Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind. Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.
    In The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way, Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the Globality Argument. This is an in principle argument against CTM. We argue that it is self-defeating. We consider an alternative argument constructed from materials in the discussion, which avoids the pitfalls of the official argument. We argue that it is also unsound and that, while (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: web.clas.ufl.edu blackwell-synergy.com interscience.wiley.com sas.upenn.edu doi.wiley.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  52. Jack C. Lyons (2003). Lesion Studies, Spared Performance, and Cognitive Systems. Cortex 39 (1):145-7.
    The term ‘module’ has – to my ear – too many associations with Fodor’s (1983) seminal book, and I will concentrate here on the more general notion of a cognitive system. The latter, as I will understand the term, is – roughly – a computational mechanism which can operate independently of all other computational mechanisms (for a much fuller and more precise treatment, see Lyons, 2001). To say that there is a face recognition system, for example, is to say, at (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ncbi.nlm.nih.gov   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  53. Jack C. Lyons (2001). Carving the Mind at its (Not Necessarily Modular) Joints. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):277-302.
    The cognitive neuropsychological understanding of a cognitive system is roughly that of a ‘mental organ’, which is independent of other systems, specializes in some cognitive task, and exhibits a certain kind of internal cohesiveness. This is all quite vague, and I try to make it more precise. A more precise understanding of cognitive systems will make it possible to articulate in some detail an alternative to the Fodorian doctrine of modularity (since not all cognitive systems are modules), but it will (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: bjps.oupjournals.org jstor.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  54. Edouard Machery (2007). Massive Modularity and Brain Evolution. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):825-838.
    Quartz (2002) argues that some recent findings about the evolution of the brain (Finlay & Darlington, 1995) are inconsistent with evolutionary psychologists’ massive modularity hypothesis. In substance, Quartz contends that since the volume of the neocortex evolved in a concerted manner, natural selection did not act on neocortical systems independently of each other, which is a necessary condition for the massive modularity of our cognition to be true. I argue however that Quartz’s argument fails to undermine the massive modularity hypothesis.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: pitt.edu philsci-archive.pitt.edu journals.uchicago.edu dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  55. Eduoard Machery (2008). Modularity and the Flexibility of Human Cognition. Mind and Language 23 (3):263–272.
    In The Architecture of the Mind, Carruthers proposes a new and detailed explanation for how human cognition could be both flexible and massively modular. The combinatorial nature of our linguistic faculty and our capacity to engage in inner speech are the cornerstones of this new explanation. Despite the ingenuity of this proposal, I argue that Carruthers has failed to explain how a massively modular mind could display the flexibility that is characteristic of human thought.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com interscience.wiley.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  56. Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one’s cognitive system, for example, one’s thoughts or beliefs? Ifone thinks that this can happen [at least in certain ways that are identWed in the paper] then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitivelv impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case ofcognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: onlinelibrary.wiley.com dx.doi.org doi.wiley.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  57. Alexander Maier, Melanie Wilke, Nikos K. Logothetis & David A. Leopold (2003). Perception of Temporally Interleaved Ambiguous Patterns. Current Biology.
    Background: Continuous viewing of ambiguous patterns is characterized by wavering perception that alternates between two or more equally valid visual solutions. However, when such patterns are viewed intermittently, either by repetitive presentation or by periodic closing of the eyes, perception can become locked or "frozen" in one configuration for several minutes at a time. One aspect of this stabilization is the possible existence of a perceptual memory that persists during periods in which the ambiguous stimulus is absent. Here, we use (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: current-biology.com ncbi.nlm.nih.gov linkinghub.elsevier.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  58. Matteo Mameli (2002). Modules and Mindreaders. Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):377-93.
    There are many interesting empirical and theoretical issues concerning the evolution of cognition. Despite this, recent books on the topic concentrate on two problems. One is mental modularity. The other is what distinguishes human from non-human minds. While it is easy to understand why people are interested in human uniqueness, it is not clear why modularity is the centre of attention. Fodor (2000) has a nice argument for why people _should_ be interested in modularity.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: kluweronline.com springerlink.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  59. Gary F. Marcus (2002). What Can Developmental Disorders Tell Us About Modularity? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):762-763.
    This commentary discusses the logic of inferring modularity or the lack of modularity from observed patterns of developmental disorders.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  60. Rainer Mausfeld (2011). Intrinsic Multiperspectivity: Conceptual Forms and the Functional Architecture of the Perceptual System. In Welsch Wolfgang, Singer Wolf & Wunder Andre (eds.), Interdisciplinary Anthropology. Springer.
    It is a characteristic feature of our mental make-up that the same perceptual input situation can simultaneously elicit conflicting mental perspectives. This ability pervades our perceptual and cognitive domains. Striking examples are the dual character of pictures in picture perception, pretend play, or the ability to employ metaphors and allegories. I argue that traditional approaches, beyond being inadequate on principle grounds, are theoretically ill equipped to deal with these achievements. I then outline a theoretical perspective that has emerged from a (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  61. Rainer Mausfeld (2010). The Perception of Material Qualities and the Internal Semantics of the Perceptual System. In Albertazzi Liliana, Tonder Gert & Vishwanath Dhanraj (eds.), Perception beyond Inference. The Information Content of Visual Processes. MIT Press.
  62. Ron McClamrock (2003). Modularity. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    Marr (for whom the boundary of the visual module the cognitive impenetrability of the systems of.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  63. Theo C. Meyering (1994). Fodor's Modularity: A New Name for an Old Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):39-62.
    This paper critically examines the argument structure of Fodor's theory of modularity. Fodor claims computational autonomy as the essential properly of modular processing. This property has profound consequences, burdening modularity theory with corollaries of rigidity, non-plasticity, nativism, and the old Cartesian dualism of sensing and thinking. However, it is argued that Fodor's argument for computational autonomy is crucially dependent on yet another postulate of Fodor's theory, viz. his thesis of strong modularity, ie. the view that functionally distinct modules must also (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  64. Marcin Miłkowski (2008). When Weak Modularity is Robust Enough? Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):77-89.
    In this paper, I suggest that the notion of module explicitly defined by Peter Carruthers in The Architecture of The Mind (Carruthers 2006) is not really In use in the book. Instead, a more robust notion seems to be actually in play. The more robust notion, albeit implicitly assumed, seems to be far more useful for making claims about the modularity of mind. Otherwise, the claims would become trivial. This robust notion will be reconstructed and improved upon by putting it (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  65. K. Moutoussis, G. A. Keliris, Z. Kourtzi & N. K. Logothetis (2005). A Binocular Rivalry Study of Motion Perception in the Human Brain. Vision Research 45 (17):2231-43.
    The relationship between brain activity and conscious visual experience is central to our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying perception. Binocular rivalry, where monocular stimuli compete for perceptual dominance, has been previously used to dissociate the constant stimulus from the varying percept. We report here fMRI results from humans experiencing binocular rivalry under a dichoptic stimulation paradigm that consisted of two drifting random dot patterns with different motion coherence. Each pattern had also a different color, which both enhanced rivalry and (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: sciencedirect.com ncbi.nlm.nih.gov linkinghub.elsevier.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  66. Javier R. Movellan & Jonathan D. Nelson (2001). Probabilistic Functionalism: A Unifying Paradigm for the Cognitive Sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):690-692.
    The probabilistic analysis of functional questions is maturing into a rigorous and coherent research paradigm that may unify the cognitive sciences, from the study of single neurons in the brain to the study of high level cognitive processes and distributed cognition. Endless debates about undecidable structural issues (modularity vs. interactivity, serial vs. parallel processing, iconic vs. propositional representations, symbolic vs. connectionist models) may be put aside in favor of a rigorous understanding of the problems solved by organisms in their natural (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  67. Ralph-Axel Müller (2002). Weak Evidence for a Strong Case Against Modularity in Developmental Disorders. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):764-765.
    Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith (T&K-S) provide evidence from computational modeling against modular assumptions of “Residual Normality” (RN) in developmental disorders. Even though I agree with their criticism, I find their choice of empirical evidence disappointing. Cognitive neuroscience cannot as yet provide a complete understanding of most developmental disorders, but what is known is more than enough to debunk the idea of RN.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  68. Dominic Murphy (2006). On Fodor's Analogy: Why Psychology is Like Philosophy of Science After All. Mind and Language 21 (5):553-564.
    Jerry Fodor has argued that a modular mind must include central systems responsible for updating beliefs, and has defended this position by appealing to shared properties of belief fixation and scientific confirmation. Peter Carruthers and Stephen Pinker have attacked this analogy between science and ordinary inference. I examine their arguments and show that they fail. This does not show that Fodor's more general position is correct.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: interscience.wiley.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  69. Erik J. Olsson (1997). Coherence and the Modularity of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):404-11.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: taylorandfrancis.metapress.com informaworld.com ingentaconnect.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  70. Mitch Parsell (2005). Context-Sensitive Inference, Modularity, and the Assumption of Formal Processing. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):45-58.
    Performance on the Wason selection task varies with content. This has been taken to demonstrate that there are different cognitive modules for dealing with different conceptual domains. This implication is only legitimate if our underlying cognitive architecture is formal. A non-formal system can explain content-sensitive inference without appeal to independent inferential modules.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com ingentaconnect.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  71. Steven Pinker (2005). A Reply to Jerry Fodor on How the Mind Works. Mind and Language 20 (1):33-38.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com interscience.wiley.com ingentaconnect.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  72. Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (2007). Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.
    "This book represents a continuation of the research project in philosophy of language and semantics represented in the journal "Protosociology" at the J. W. ...
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  73. Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Is the Mind Really Modular? In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell.
    When Fodor titled his (1983) book the _Modularity of Mind_, he overstated his position. His actual view is that the mind divides into systems some of which are modular and others of which are not. The book would have been more aptly, if less provocatively, called _The Modularity of Low-Level Peripheral Systems_. High-level perception and cognitive systems are non-modular on Fodor’s theory. In recent years, modularity has found more zealous defenders, who claim that the entire mind divides into highly specialized (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: books.google.com subcortex.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  74. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1986). Meaning And Cognitive Structure: Issues In The Computational Theory Of Mind. Norwood: Ablex.
  75. Steven Quartz & Terrence Sejnowski (2000). Constraining Constructivism: Cortical and Sub-Cortical Constraints on Learning in Development. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):785-791.
    It is becoming increasingly clear that acquiring cognitive skills is feasible only with significant developmental constraints. However, recent research provides the strongest evidence to date for constructivist development. Here, we examine how these two apparently conflicting perspectives may be reconciled. Specifically, we suggest that subcortical and cortical structures possess divergent developmental strategies, with many subcortical structures satisfying Fodor's criteria for modularity. These structures constitute an early behavioral system that guides the construction of later emerging cortical structures, for which there is (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  76. Verónica C. Ramenzoni & Michael A. Riley (2004). Strong Modularity and Circular Reasoning Pervade the Planning–Control Model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):48-49.
    We believe the dichotomy of processes introduced in the target article is highly speculative, because the dichotomy is shaped by the questionable assumption of modularity and the complementary assumption of locality. As a result, the author falls into a line of circular reasoning that biases his analysis of the experimental and neuropsychological data, and weakens the proposed model.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  77. Philip Robbins, Modularity of Mind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  78. Jacob J. Ross (1990). Against Postulating Central Systems in the Mind. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):297-312.
    This paper is concerned with a recent argument of Jerry Fodor's to the effect that the frame problem in artificial intelligence is in principle insoluble. Fodor's argument is based on his contention that the mind is divided between encapsulated modular systems for information processing and 'central systems' for non-demonstrative inference. I argue that positing central systems is methodologically unsound, and in fact involves a muddle that bears a strong family resemblance to the basic error in dualism. I therefore conclude that (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  79. Richard Samuels (2006). Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? In Rod Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell.
    Among the most pervasive and fundamental assumptions in cognitive science is that the human mind (or mind-brain) is a mechanism of some sort: a physical device com- posed of functionally specifiable subsystems. On this view, functional decomposition – the analysis of the overall system into functionally specifiable parts – becomes a central project for a science of the mind, and the resulting theories of cognitive archi- tecture essential to our understanding of human psychology.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  80. Richard Samuels (2005). The Complexity of Cognition: Tractability Arguments for Massive Modularity. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: sas-space.sas.ac.uk ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  81. John Sarnecki & Matthew Sponheimer (2002). Why Neanderthals Hate Poetry: A Critical Notice of Steven Mithen's the Prehistory of Mind. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):173 – 184.
    The significance of historical advances in human development has been widely debated within cognitive science. Steven Mithen's recent book, The prehistory of mind (London: Thames & Hudson, 1996), presents an archeologist's attempt to explain the details of cognitive development within the framework of modern anthropology and cognitive psychology. We argue that Mithen's attempt fails for a number of different reasons. The relationship between the archeological evidence he considers and his conclusions is problematic. We maintain that it is difficult to draw (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  82. Susan Schneider (2007). Yes, It Does: A Diatribe on Jerry Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Psyche.
    The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way is an expose of certain theoretical problems in cognitive science, and in particular, problems that concern the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). The problems that Fodor worries plague CTM divide into two kinds, and both purport to show that the success of cognitive science will likely be limited to the modules. The first sort of problem concerns what Fodor has called “global properties”; features that a mental sentence has which depend on how the (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  83. Brian J. Scholl (1997). Neural Constraints on Cognitive Modularity? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):575-576.
    Is (some) innate cognitive modularity consistent with a lack of innate neural modularity? Quartz & Sejnowski's (Q&S's) implicit negative answer to his question fuels their antinativist and antimodular cognitive conclusions. I attempt here to suggest a positive answer and to solicit discussion of this crucial issue.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  84. Benny Shanon (1988). Remarks on the Modularity of Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (September):331-52.
    the concept of modularity of cognitive processes is introduced and a picture of mind is proposed according to which the peripheral input systems are modular whereas the central processes are not. The present paper examines this view from both a methodological and a substaintive perspective. Methodologically, a contrast between considerations of principle and of fact is made and implications for the nature of cognitive theory are discussed. Substantively, constraints on information flow are examined as they appear in various aspects of (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org bjps.oxfordjournals.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  85. Lee Spector (2002). Hierarchy Helps It Work That Way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):109-117.
    Jerry Fodor argues, in The mind doesn't work that way (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, that the computational theory of mind is undermined by the pervasive context sensitivity of human cognition. His objections can be easily met, however, by noting the properties of appropriately structured representation hierarchies.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: helios.hampshire.edu informaworld.com taylorandfrancis.metapress.com ingentaconnect.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  86. Dan Sperber (2005). Modularity and Relevance: How Can a Massively Modular Mind Be Flexible and Context-Sensitive. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Content. Oup.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: perso.club-internet.fr   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  87. Dan Sperber & Lawrence Hirschfeld (2006). Culture and Modularity. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition.
    Members of a human group are bound with one another by multiple flows of information. (Here we use “information” in a broad sense that includes not only the content of people’s knowledge, but also that of their beliefs, assumptions, fictions, rules, norms, skills, maps, images, and so on.) This information is materially realized in the mental representations of the people, and in their public productions, that is, their cognitively guided behaviors and the enduring material traces of these behaviors. Mentally represented (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  88. Olaf Sporns (1997). Deconstructing Neural Constructivism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):576-577.
    Activity-dependent processes play an active role in shaping the structure of neuronal circuitry and therefore contribute to neural and cognitive development. Neural constructivism claims to be able to account for increases in the complexity of cognitive representations in terms of directed growth of neurons. This claim is overstated, rests on biased nterpretations of the evidence, and is based on serious misapprehensions of the nature of somatic variation and selection.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  89. Robert J. Stainton (2006). Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
  90. Kim Sterelny (2004). Language, Modularity, and Evolution. In David Papineau & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oup.
    Language is at the core of the cognitive revolution that has transformed that discipline over the last forty years or so, and it is also the central paradigm for the most prominent attempt to synthesise psychology and evolutionary theory. A single and distinctively modular view of language has emerged out of both these perspectives, one that encourages a certain idealisation. Linguistic competence is uniform, independent of other cognitive capacities, and with a developmental trajectory that is largely independent of environmental input (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: vuw.ac.nz victoria.ac.nz   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  91. Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron, Modular Architectures and Informational Encapsulation: A Dilemma.
    Modular architectures of the mind can vary both with respect to the strength of the notion of modularity and the scope of the modularity of mind. We propose a dilemma for modular architectures, no matter how they vary along these two dimensions. First, if a modular theory commits to the informational encapsulation of modules, then modules are on this account impenetrable. However, there are plausible cases of the cognitive penetrability of perception. And so any strongly modular theory of perception is (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: stokes.mentalpaint.net   | Scholar | More options ...
  92. Ron Sun & Isaac Naveh (2007). Social Institution, Cognition, and Survival: A Cognitive–Social Simulation. Mind and Society 6 (2):115-142.
    Although computational models of cognitive agents that incorporate a wide range of cognitive functionalities have been developed in cognitive science, most of the work in social simulation still assumes rudimentary cognition on the part of the agents. In contrast, in this work, the interaction of cognition and social structures/processes is explored, through simulating survival strategies of tribal societies. The results of the simulation demonstrate interactions between cognitive and social factors. For example, we show that cognitive capabilities and tendencies may be (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  93. John Sutton, Review of Jerry Fodor, the Mind Doesn’T Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.
    This review sketches Fodor's critique of evolutionary psychology and the 'massive modularity' thesis; queries his views on abduction in central processes; and suggests that his pessimism about the scope of computational psychology undermines his realism about folk psychology.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: cogprints.org   | Scholar | More options ...
  94. Alexandra D. Twyman & Nora S. Newcombe (2010). Five Reasons to Doubt the Existence of a Geometric Module. Cognitive Science 34 (7):1315-1356.
    It is frequently claimed that the human mind is organized in a modular fashion, a hypothesis linked historically, though not inevitably, to the claim that many aspects of the human mind are innately specified. A specific instance of this line of thought is the proposal of an innately specified geometric module for human reorientation. From a massive modularity position, the reorientation module would be one of a large number that organized the mind. From the core knowledge position, the reorientation module (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  95. Neil Van Leeuwen (2007). The Spandrels of Self-Deception: Prospects for a Biological Theory of a Mental Phenomenon. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329 – 348.
    Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers' attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  96. Daniel Weiskopf (2002). A Critical Review of Jerry A. Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551 – 562.
    The "New Synthesis" in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn't work that way , Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is an open question. Massive (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: informaworld.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  97. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2010). Concepts and the Modularity of Thought. Dialectica 64 (1):107-130.
    Having concepts is a distinctive sort of cognitive capacity. One thing that conceptual thought requires is obeying the Generality Constraint: concepts ought to be freely recombinable with other concepts to form novel thoughts, independent of what they are concepts of. Having concepts, then, constrains cognitive architecture in interesting ways. In recent years, spurred on by the rise of evolutionary psychology, massively modular models of the mind have gained prominence. I argue that these architectures are incapable of satisfying the Generality Constraint, (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: interscience.wiley.com   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  98. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2002). On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
    The "New Synthesis" in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn't work that way , Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is an open question. Massive (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  99. Robert A. Wilson (2008). What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind.
    Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Fodor has developed the dark message of The Modularity of Mind regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent (...)
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
  100. Robert A. Wilson (2008). The Drink You Have When You're Not Having a Drink. Mind and Language 23 (3):273–283.
    The Architecture of the Mind is itself built on foundations that deserve probing. In this brief commentary I focus on these foundations—Carruthers’ conception of modularity, his arguments for thinking that the mind is massively modular in structure, and his view of human cognitive architecture.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com interscience.wiley.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
1 — 100 / 101