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  1. Marcus P. Adams (2013). Explaining the Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):233-249.
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. Most involved in the debate about the explanation of the ToM deficit have failed to notice that autism’s status as a spectrum disorder has implications about which explanation is more plausible. In this paper, I argue that the shift from viewing autism as a unified syndrome to a spectrum disorder increases the plausibility of the explanation of the (...)
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  2. Marcus P. Adams (2011). Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):763-773.
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism (Gerrans 2002; Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; Gerrans & Stone 2008). In this paper, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone’s (2008) account. Second, I discuss various studies of individuals (...)
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  3. Sean Allen-Hermanson & Jennifer Matey (2012). Synesthesia. In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  4. John R. Anderson (2007). How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe? OUP Usa.
    The human cognitive architecture consists of a set of largely independent modules associated with different brain regions. This book discusses in detail how these various modules can combine to produce behaviours as varied as driving a car and solving an algebraic equation.
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  5. Michael Anderson, Circuit Sharing and the Implementation of Intelligent Systems.
    One of the most foundational and continually contested questions in the cognitive sciences is the degree to which the functional organization of the brain can be understood as modular. In its classic formulation, a module was defined as a cognitive sub-system with (all or most of) nine specific properties; the classic module is, among other things, domain specific, encapsulated (i.e. maintains proprietary representations to which other modules have no access), and implemented in dedicated neural substrates. Most of the examinations—and especially (...)
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  6. Irene Appelbaum (1998). Fodor, Modularity, and Speech Perception. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):317-330.
    Fodor argues that speech perception is accomplished by a module. Typically, modular processing is taken to be bottom-up processing. Yet there is ubiquitous empirical evidence that speech perception is influenced by top-down processing. Fodor attempts to resolve this conflict by denying that modular processing must be exclusively bottom-up. It is argued, however, that Fodor's attempt to reconcile top-down and modular processing fails, because: (i) it undermines Fodor's own conception of modular processing; and (ii) it cannot account for the contextually varying (...)
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  7. Michael A. Arbib (1989). Modularity, Schemas and Neurons: A Critique of Fodor. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer 193--219.
  8. R. Arp (2006). The Environments of Our Hominin Ancestors, Tool-Usage, and Scenario Visualization. Biology and Philosophy 21 (1):95-117.
    In this paper, I give an account of how our hominin ancestors evolved a conscious ability I call scenario visualization that enabled them to manufacture novel tools so as to survive and flourish in the ever-changing and complex environments in which they lived. I first present the ideas and arguments put forward by evolutionary psychologists that the mind evolved certain mental capacities as adaptive responses to environmental pressures. Specifically, Steven Mithen thinks that the mind has evolved cognitive fluidity, viz., an (...)
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  9. Andrew Atherton (2003). Saying What You Mean and Meaning What You Say. Philosophy of Management 3 (3):55-66.
    This paper examines the dynamics of thought-language interactions within the organisational context of business. Based on an assessment of the cognition-voice debate within the cognitive sciences and related areas of philosophical enquiry, the paper proposes that thought and language are distinct systems. This notion of modularity is developed into a framework within which the two systems interact and, in doing so, influence and shape each other. These interactions form multiple thought and voiced drafts, reflecting the ‘multiple drafts’ model developed by (...)
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  10. Scott Atran (2002). Modular and Cultural Factors in Biological Understanding: An Experimental Approach to the Cognitive Basis of Science. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press 41--72.
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  11. Theodore Bach (2012). Analogical Cognition: Applications in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Philosophy Compass 7 (5):348-360.
    Analogical cognition refers to the ability to detect, process, and learn from relational similarities. The study of analogical and similarity cognition is widely considered one of the ‘success stories’ of cognitive science, exhibiting convergence across many disciplines on foundational questions. Given the centrality of analogy to mind and knowledge, it would benefit philosophers investigating topics in epistemology and the philosophies of mind and language to become familiar with empirical models of analogical cognition. The goal of this essay is to describe (...)
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  12. Andrew Bailey (2005). Consciousness Made Manifest? Review of Science and the Riddle of Consciousness by Jeffrey Foss. [REVIEW] Psyche 11.
    Reconstructing reason and representation is a no small ambition. Is Clarke up to it? His basic theoretical postulate is the massive modularity hypothesis, one of the Founding Articles of High Church Evolutionary Psychology . Clarke defends the massive modularity hypothesis against its critics – well, to be precise, against Jerry Fodor. Fodor’s main argument is that cognitive modules cannot do nondemonstrative reasoning in an effective and economical way. The problem is that, given a particular problem and given that we have (...)
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  13. Axel Barceló Aspeitia, Ángeles Eraña & Robert Stainton (2010). The Contribution of Domain Specificity in the Highly Modular Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (1):19-27.
    Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain (...)
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  14. Clark H. Barrett (2005). Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive Modularity. Mind and Language 20 (3):259-287.
    Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, however, to (...)
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  15. Clark H. Barrett & R. Kurzban (2006). Modularity in Cognition: Framing the Debate. Psychological Review 113:628-647.
    Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing (...)
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  16. H. Clark Barrett (2005). Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive Modularity. Mind and Language 20 (3):259-87.
    Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, however, to (...)
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  17. H. Clark Barrett (2005). Modularity And. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind. Oxford University Press 2--199.
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  18. Alexander Batthyany (2001). The Mind Doesn’T Work That Way. [REVIEW] Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):335-336.
    This excellent book presents a timely critique of present trends in cognitive science and computational psychology. What makes this critique so remarkable is, in addition to its lucidity and the depths of its arguments, the fact that it comes from someone who has actively contributed much to the field of computational psychology for the past quarter of a century. This book, then, is a remarkable work in many ways. The title refers to Steven Pinker’s How the Mind Works, a relentlessly (...)
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  19. Guillaume Beaulac (2014). Language, Mind, and Cognitive Science: Remarks on Theories of the Language-Cognition Relationships in Human Minds. Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    My dissertation establishes the basis for a systematic outlook on the role language plays in human cognition. It is an investigation based on a cognitive conception of language, as opposed to communicative conceptions, viz. those that suppose that language plays no role in cognition (its only role being to externalize thought). I focus, in Chapter 2, on three paradigmatic theories adopting this perspective, each offering different views on how language contributes to or changes cognition. -/- In Chapter 3, I criticize (...)
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  20. Guillaume Beaulac (2010). A Two Speed Mind? For a Heuristic Interpretation of Dual-Process Theories (L'esprit À Deux Vitesses ? Pour Une Interprétation Heuristique des Théories À Processus Duaux). Dissertation, Université du Québec À Montréal
    This dissertation is devoted to dual-process theories, widely discussed in the recent literature in cognitive science. The author argues for a significantly modified version of the account suggested by Samuels (2009), replacing the distinction between ‘Systems’ with a distinction between ‘Types of processes,’ which allows a critique of both the (only) modularist accounts and the accounts describing a deep difference between two systems each having their specificities (functional, phenomenological and neurological). In the account of dual-process theories developed here, the distinction (...)
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  21. Haroldo G. Benatti & Ruy Jgb de Queiroz (2005). Descriptive Complexity of Modularity Problems on Graphs. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 34 (2):61-75.
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  22. L. J. Bennett (1990). Modularity of Mind Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (September):429-36.
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  23. Vincent Bergeron (2007). Anatomical and Functional Modularity in Cognitive Science: Shifting the Focus. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):175 – 195.
    Much of cognitive science is committed to the modular approach to the study of cognition. The core of this approach consists of a pair of assumptions - the anatomical and the functional modularity assumptions - which motivate two kinds of inference: the anatomical and the functional modularity inferences. The legitimacy of both of these inferences has been strongly challenged, a situation that has had surprisingly little impact on most theorizing in the field. Following the introduction of an important, yet rarely (...)
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  24. Vincent Bergeron & Mohan Matthen (2008). Assembling the Emotions. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press 185-212.
    In this article, we discuss the modularity of the emotions. In a general methodological section, we discuss the empirical basis for the postulation of modularity. Then we discuss how certain modules -- the emotions in particular -- decompose into distinct anatomical and functional parts.
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  25. M. Besson & D. Schön (2011). What Remains of Modularity. In Patrick Rebuschat, Martin Rohrmeier, John A. Hawkins & Ian Cross (eds.), Language and Music as Cognitive Systems. OUP Oxford 283--291.
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  26. Mark H. Bickhard (2003). An Integration of Motivation and Cognition. In L. Smith, C. Rogers & P. Tomlinson (eds.), Development and Motivation: Joint Perspectives. Leicester: British Psychological Society 41-56.
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  27. Ned Block & Susanna Siegel (2013). Attention and Perceptual Adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):205-206.
  28. Ingo Brigandt (2008). Peter Carruthers, The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 28:246-248.
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  29. Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler (2015). Conscious Vision in Action. Cognitive Science 39 (2).
    It is natural to assume that the fine-grained and highly accurate spatial information present in visual experience is often used to guide our bodily actions. Yet this assumption has been challenged by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis , according to which visuomotor programming is the responsibility of a “zombie” processing stream whose sources of bottom-up spatial information are entirely non-conscious . In many formulations of TVSH, the role of conscious vision in action is limited to “recognizing objects, selecting (...)
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  30. Derek Browne (1996). Cognitive Versatility. Minds and Machines 6 (4):507-23.
    Jerry Fodor divides the mind into peripheral, domain-specific modules and a domaingeneral faculty of central cognition. John Tooby and Lisa Cosmides argue instead that the mind is modular all the way through; cognition consists of a multitude of domain-specific processes. But human thought has a flexible, innovative character that contrasts with the inflexible, stereotyped performances of modular systems. My goal is to discover how minds that are constructed on modular principles might come to exhibit cognitive versatility.Cognitive versatility is exhibited in (...)
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  31. Joanna J. Bryson (2002). Language Isn't Quite That Special. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):679-680.
    Language isn't the only way to cross modules, nor is it the only module with access to both input and output. Minds don't generally work across modules because this leads to combinatorial explosion in search and planning. Language is special in being a good vector for mimetics, so it becomes associated with useful cross-module concepts we acquire culturally. Further, language is indexical, so it facilitates computationally expensive operations.
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  32. David J. Buller (2005). Get Over: Massive Modularity. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):881-891.
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  33. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2007). What Are Modules and What is Their Role in Development? Mind and Language 22 (4):450–473.
    Modules are widely held to play a central role in explaining mental development and in accounts of the mind generally. But there is much disagreement about what modules are, which shows that we do not adequately understand modularity. This paper outlines a Fodoresque approach to understanding one type of modularity. It suggests that we can distinguish modular from nonmodular cognition by reference to the kinds of process involved, and that modular cognition differs from nonmodular forms of cognition in being a (...)
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  34. Rachael Cabasaan (unknown). A Critique Of Two Models Of Modularity. Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 18.
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  35. Philip Cam (1988). Modularity, Rationality, and Higher Cognition. Philosophical Studies 53 (March):279-94.
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  36. Lelio Camilleri (1992). On Music Perception and Cognition: Modularity, Structure, and Processing. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 2 (4):365-377.
    The paper treats issues concerning the modular modelisation of musical mental processes. Some musical phenomena, like musical illusions, are explained in the framework of modularity and hypotheses are advanced in which the modular model seems very promising for the study of musical perception and cognition. In addition, arguments are proposed to distinguish between levels of abstraction and knowledge in musical cognitive processes.Moreover, some aspects about the theory of musical competence and the theory of musical processing are identified and the possibilities (...)
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  37. Alessandro Capone (2011). Default Semantics and the Architecture of the Mind. Journal of Pragmatics 43:1741–1754..
    Relationship between default semantics and modularity of mind (in particular mind reading through the principle of Relevance).
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  38. Donal E. Carlston (1992). Impression Formation and the Modular Mind: The Associated Systems Theory. In L. Martin & A. Tesser (eds.), The Construction of Social Judgments. Lawrence Erlbaum 301--341.
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  39. Peter Carruthers, Précis of the Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and The.
    This article outlines the main themes and motivations of Carruthers (2006). Its purpose is to provide some background for the critical commentaries of Cowie, Machery, and Wilson (this volume).
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  40. Peter Carruthers (2008). Las Heurísticas Simples Se Encuentran Con la Modularidad Masiva. Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):113-138.
    Este artículo investiga la coherencia entre la propuesta de una organización modular masiva de la mente y el enfoque de las heurísticas simples. Se discute una serie de potenciales conflictos entre los dos programas, pero finalmente son desestimados. De todos modos, el programa de las heurísticas simples sí termina socavando uno de los muchos argumentos propuestos para apoyar la modularidad masiva, al menos en el modo en que esta última es comprendida por los filósofos. Así que un resultado de la (...)
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  41. Peter Carruthers (2008). On Fodor-Fixation, Flexibility, and Human Uniqueness: A Reply to Cowie, Machery, and Wilson. Mind and Language 23 (3):293–303.
    This paper argues that two of my critics (Cowie and Wilson) have become fixated on Fodor’s notion of modularity, both to their own detriment and to the detriment of their understanding of Carruthers, 2006. The paper then focuses on the supposed inadequacies of the latter’s explanations of both content flexibility and human uniqueness, alleged by Machery and Cowie respectively.
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  42. Peter Carruthers (2008). An Architecture for Dual Reasoning. In J. Evans & K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press
    In J. Evans and K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, 2008. (In draft.).
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  43. Peter Carruthers (2008). Précis of the Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. Mind and Language 23 (3):257–262.
    This article outlines the main themes and motivations of Carruthers, 2006. Its purpose is to provide some background for the critical commentaries of Cowie, Machery, and Wilson (this volume).
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  44. Peter Carruthers (2006). Simple Heuristics Meet Massive Modularity. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition. Oxford University Press
    This chapter investigates the extent to which claims of massive modular organization of the mind (espoused by some members of the evolutionary psychology research program) are consistent with the main elements of the simple heuristics research program. A number of potential sources of conflict between the two programs are investigated and defused. However, the simple heuristics program turns out to undermine one of the main arguments offered in support of massive modularity, at least as the latter is generally understood by (...)
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  45. Peter Carruthers (2006). The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Peter Carruthers, a leading philosopher of mind, provides a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. Written with unusual clarity and directness, and surveying an extensive range of research in cognitive science, it will be essential reading for anyone with an interest in the nature and organization of the mind.
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  46. Peter Carruthers (2006). The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell
    My charge in this chapter is to set out the positive case supporting massively modular models of the human mind.1 Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted understanding of what a massively modular model of the mind is. So at least some of our discussion will have to be terminological. I shall begin by laying out the range of things that can be meant by ‘modularity’. I shall then adopt a pair of strategies. One will be to distinguish some things that (...)
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  47. Peter Carruthers (2006). Distinctively Human Thinking: Modular Precursors and Components. In The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition. New York: Oxford University Press New York 69--88.
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  48. Peter Carruthers (2004). The Mind is a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection. In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell Pub. 293--311.
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  49. Peter Carruthers (2004). Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind. Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278.
    This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author's previous work. This is that distinctivelyhuman flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few amodular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that requires any (...)
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  50. Peter Carruthers (2003). Moderately Massive Modularity. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 67-89.
    This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind’s structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the thesis of moderately massive modularity is explained and elaborated.
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