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Summary There are various important monistic views. Contemporary discussion of monism focuses in part on two theses. The first claims that the cosmos is a vast concrete object and it’s the only concrete object. The second claims that, while there are many concrete objects, the cosmos as a whole is the only fundamental or basic concrete object. A familiar pluralistic alternative is this: instead of there being only one fundamental or basic concrete object, there are many – the concrete objects that themselves lack proper parts. Of the three theses just mentioned, the second and third are theses of sparse ontology. According to sparse ontology, there are fundamental entities and derivative entities, and the world exhibits an overarching hierarchical structure in virtue of this fact.    
Key works Monism in various forms has been discussed in philosophy from the very beginning – see, for example, Plato, Parmenides, Plotinus, Spinoza, Hegel, Royce, and Bradley. Recent interest in monism is due in large part to Horgan & Potrč 2008 and Schaffer 2010.  
Introductions For an introduction to monism, see Schaffer 2008.
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  1. Scott Austin (2003). From Parmenidean to Hegelian Monism. In Andreas Bächli & Klaus Petrus (eds.), Monism. Ontos 9--57.
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  2. Andreas Bächli & Klaus Petrus (eds.) (2003). Monism. Ontos.
    This volume aims to discuss some of these aspects historically and systematically.
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  3. Andrew M. Bailey (2011). The Incompatibility of Composition as Identity, Priority Pluralism, and Irreflexive Grounding. Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):171-174.
    Some have it that wholes are, somehow, identical to their parts. This doctrine is as alluring as it is puzzling. But in this paper, I show that the doctrine is inconsistent with two widely accepted theses. Something has to go.
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  4. Sam Baron & Jonathan Tallant (2016). Monism: The Islands of Plurality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are merely derivative. Jonathan Schaffer has defended monism in its current guise, across a range of papers. Each paper looks to add something to the monistic picture of the world. In this paper we argue that monism—as Schaffer describes it—is false. To do so (...)
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  5. Pierfrancesco Basile (2012). Russell on Spinoza's Substance Monism. Metaphysica 13 (1):27-41.
    Russell’s critique of substance monism is an ideal starting point from which to understand some main concepts in Spinoza’s difficult metaphysics. This paper provides an in-depth examination of Spinoza’s proof that only one substance exists. On this basis, it rejects Russell’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of reality as founded upon the logical doctrine that all propositions consist of a predicate and a subject. An alternative interpretation is offered: Spinoza’s substance is not a bearer of properties, as Russell implied, but an (...)
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  6. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo, Priority Monism, Physical Intentionality and the Internal Relatedness of All Things.
    Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. We conclude (...)
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  7. Einar Duenger Bohn (2012). Monism, Emergence, and Plural Logic. Erkenntnis 76 (2):211-223.
    In this paper I argue that we need to take irreducibly plural logic more seriously in metaphysical debates due to the fact that the verdict of many metaphysical debates hangs on it. I give two examples. The main example I focus on is the debate recently revived by Jonathan Schaffer over the fundamental cardinality of the world. I show how the three main arguments provided by Schaffer are unsound in virtue of an employment of plural logic. The second example I (...)
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  8. Jacek Brzozowski (2010). Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):743-745.
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  9. Claudio Calosi (2013). Quantum Mechanics and Priority Monism. Synthese (5):1-14.
    The paper address the question of whether quantum mechanics (QM) favors Priority Monism, the view according to which the Universe is the only fundamental object. It develops formal frameworks to frame rigorously the question of fundamental mereology and its answers, namely (Priority) Pluralism and Monism. It then reconstructs the quantum mechanical argument in favor of the latter and provides a detailed and thorough criticism of it that sheds furthermore new light on the relation between parthood, composition and fundamentality in QM.
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  10. Ross P. Cameron (2010). From Humean Truthmaker Theory to Priority Monism. Noûs 44 (1):178 - 198.
    I argue that the truthmaker theorist should be a priority monist if she wants to avoid commitment to mysterious necessary connections. In section 1 I briefly discuss the ontological options available to the truthmaker theorist. In section 2 I develop the argument against truthmaker theory from the Humean denial of necessary connections. In section 3 I offer an account of when necessary connections are objectionable. In section 4 I use this criterion to narrow down the options from section 1. In (...)
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  11. John Carriero (2002). Monism in Spinoza. In Olli Koistinen & J. I. Biro (eds.), Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Oxford University Press 38--59.
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  12. William Charlton (1981). Spinoza's Monism. Philosophical Review 90 (4):503-529.
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  13. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):559-578.
    Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call (...)
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  14. Ralph W. Church (1935). On Dr. Ewing's Neglect of Bradley's Theory of Internal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 32 (10):264-273.
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  15. David M. Cornell (forthcoming). Taking Monism Seriously. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Monism is the view that there is only a single material object in existence: the world. According to this view, therefore, the ordinary objects of common sense—cats and hats, cars and stars, and so on—do not actually exist; there is only the world. Because of this, monism is routinely dismissed in the contemporary literature as being absurd and obviously false. It is simply obvious that there is a plurality of material things, thus it is simply obvious that monism is false, (...)
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  16. David M. Cornell (2013). Monism and Statespace: A Reply to Sider. Analysis 73 (2):230-236.
    According to Existence Monism, there is only one concrete object in existence—the world. This view is to be contrasted with Existence Pluralism, which posits multiple concrete objects. In a recent Analysis paper, Sider (Analysis 2007; 67:1–7) presents arguments against Existence Monism claiming that there are evident features of statespace, which the monist is at a loss to explain. Given that the pluralist can give plausible and satisfying explanations of these features, we have good reason to favor pluralism over monism, or (...)
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  17. Michael Della Rocca (2002). Spinoza's Substance Monism. In Olli Koistinen & J. I. Biro (eds.), Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Oxford University Press
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  18. Louis deRosset (2010). Getting Priority Straight. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73-97.
    Consider the kinds of macroscopic concrete objects that common sense and the sciences allege to exist: tables, raindrops, tectonic plates, galaxies, and the rest. Are there any such things? Opinions differ. Ontological liberals say they do; ontological radicals say they don't. Liberalism seems favored by its plausible acquiescence to the dictates of common sense abetted by science; radicalism by its ontological parsimony. Priority theorists claim we can have the virtues of both views. They hold that tables, raindrops, etc., exist, but (...)
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  19. A. C. Ewing (1935). On Dr. Ewing's Neglect of Bradley's Theory of Internal Relations: Reply. Journal of Philosophy 32 (10):273.
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  20. A. R. J. Fisher (2015). Priority Monism, Partiality, and Minimal Truthmakers. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):477-491.
    Truthmaker monism is the view that the one and only truthmaker is the world. Despite its unpopularity, this view has recently received an admirable defence by Schaffer :307–324, 2010b). Its main defect, I argue, is that it omits partial truthmakers. If we omit partial truthmakers, we lose the intimate connection between a truth and its truthmaker. I further argue that the notion of a minimal truthmaker should be the key notion that plays the role of constraining ontology and that truthmaker (...)
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  21. Steven French (2011). Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology – Terence Horgan and Matjaž Potrč. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):201-202.
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  22. Mathias Girel (2006). Relations internes et relations spatiales : James, Bradley et Green. Archives de Philosophie 3:395-414.
    La thèse du présent article est que l’opposition factice entre James, repré- sentant supposé des « relations externes », d’une part, et Bradley, représen- tant supposé des « relations internes », d’autre part, est due à une mauvaise appréhension des thèses de ce dernier. Ce premier contresens conduit alors à manquer le propos même de James.
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  23. Anna Giustina (forthcoming). Conscious Unity From the Top Down: A Brentanian Approach. The Monist 100.
    The question of the unity of consciousness is often treated as the question of how different conscious experiences are related to each other in order to be unified. Many contemporary views on the unity of consciousness are based on this bottom-up approach. In this paper I explore an alternative, top-down approach, according to which (to a first approximation) a subject undergoes one single conscious experience at a time. From this perspective, the problem of unity of consciousness becomes rather (...)
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  24. Philip Goff (ed.) (2012). Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  25. Philip Goff (2012). There is More Than One Thing. In Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan 113-22.
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  26. Rebecca Goldstein (2012). Explanatory Completeness and Spinoza's Monism. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan
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  27. Ghislain Guigon (2011). Spinoza on Composition and Priority. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan
    This article has two goals: a historical and a speculative one. The historical goal is to offer a coherent account of Spinoza’s view on mereological composition. The speculative goal is to show that Spinoza’s substance monism is distinct from versions of monism that are currently defended in metaphysics and that it deserves the attention of contemporary metaphysicians. Regarding the second goal, two versions of monism are currently defended and discussed in contemporary metaphysics: existence monism according to which there actually exists (...)
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  28. Richard Healey (2012). The World As We Know It. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism.
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  29. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2012). Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan 51--76.
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  30. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2008). Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. The MIT Press.
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  31. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2006). Abundant Truth in an Austere World. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press 137--167.
    What is real? Less than you might think. We advocate austere metaphysical realism---a form of metaphysical realism claiming that a correct ontological theory will repudiate numerous putative entities and properties that are posited in everyday thought and discourse, and also will even repudiate numerous putative objects and properties that are posited by well confirmed scientific theories. We have lately defended a specific version of austere metaphysical realism which asserts that there is really only one concrete particular, viz., the entire cosmos (...)
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  32. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2002). Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism. Facta Philosophica 4:311-322.
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  33. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2000). Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence. Facta Philosophica 2:249-270.
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  34. C. E. M. Joad (1916). Monism in the Light of Recent Developments in Philosophy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 17:95 - 116.
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  35. Daniel Z. Korman (2008). Review of Terence E. Horgan, Matjaz Potrč, Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008.
    The main focus of the review is Horgan and Potrč’s strategy for reconciling austere ontologies -- like their own, which includes exactly one concrete particular: “the blobject” -- with ordinary discourse about tables and the like. I try to show that, once we accept their ontological conclusions, there is no reason to prefer their conciliatory ontological-cum-semantic package to a more straightforward error-theoretic package on which we simply say lots of false things in ordinary discourse about tables and the like.
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  36. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Brentano's Latter-Day Monism. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge
    According to “existence monism,” there is only one concrete particular, the cosmos as a whole (Horgan and Potrč 2000, 2008). According to “priority monism,” there are many concrete particulars, but all are ontologically dependent upon the cosmos as a whole, which accordingly is the only fundamental concrete particular (Schaffer 2010a, 2010b). In essence, the difference between them is that existence monism does not recognize any parts of the cosmos, whereas priority monism does – it just insists that the parts are (...)
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  37. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Kantian Monism. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):23-56.
    Abstract Let ?monism? be the view that there is only one basic object?the world. Monists face the question of whether there are also non-basic objects. This is in effect the question of whether the world decomposes into parts. Jonathan Schaffer maintains that it does, Terry Horgan and Matja? Potr? that it does not. In this paper, I propose a compromise view, which I call ?Kantian monism.? According to Kantian monism, the world decomposes into parts insofar as an ideal subject under (...)
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  38. Mark Kulstad (2012). Spinoza's Demonstration of Monism: A New Line of Defense. In Philip Goff (ed.), History of Philosophy Quarterly. Palgrave Macmillan 299-316.
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  39. Mark A. Kulstad (2003). What Spinoza, in Company with Leibniz and Descartes, Can Bring to Light About Important Varieties of Substance Monism. In Andreas Bächli & Klaus Petrus (eds.), Monism. Ontos 9--63.
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  40. Mark A. Kulstad (1996). Spinoza's Demonstration of Monism: A New Line of Defense. History of Philosophy Quarterly 13 (3):299 - 316.
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  41. Baptiste Le Bihan (forthcoming). Les propriétés du vide et de l'espace-temps. Philosophiques.
    Les propriétés matérielles sont généralement appréhendées comme les propriétés d'une substance matérielle : cette chemise possède la propriété d'être bleue, cette chaussure la propriété d'être en bon état. Pourtant, on peut trouver plusieurs raisons de douter que les propriétés soient nécessairement les propriétés d'une substance matérielle, à la fois en métaphysique avec la théorie du faisceau, et en physique contemporaine à travers les notions d'énergie du vide et de champ. Or, si les propriétés ne sont pas les propriétés de substances (...)
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  42. Baptiste Le Bihan (forthcoming). Super-Relationism: Combining Eliminativism About Objects and Relationism About Spacetime. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    I will introduce and motivate eliminativist super-relationism. This is the conjunction of relationism about spacetime and eliminativism about material objects. According to the view, the universe is a big collection of spatio-temporal relations and natural properties, and no substance (material or spatio-temporal) exists in it. The view is original since eliminativism about material objects, when understood as including not only ordinary objects like tables or chairs but also physical particles, is generally taken to imply substantivalism about spacetime: if properties are (...)
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  43. Martin Lin (forthcoming). The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Spinoza. In Michael Della Rocca (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Spinoza.
  44. Peter Loptson (1988). Spinozist Monism. Philosophia 18 (1):19-38.
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  45. E. J. Lowe (2013). Ontological Vagueness, Existence Monism and Metaphysical Realism. Metaphysica 14 (2):265-274.
    Recently, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč have defended the thesis of ‘existence monism’, according to which the whole cosmos is the only concrete object. Their arguments appeal largely to considerations concerning vagueness. Crucially, they claim that ontological vagueness is impossible, and one key assumption in their defence of this claim is that vagueness always involves ‘sorites-susceptibility’. I aim to challenge both the claim and this assumption. As a consequence, I seek to undermine their defence of existence monism and support a (...)
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  46. E. J. Lowe (2012). Against Monism. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan 92--112.
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  47. Kris McDaniel (2009). Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):325-331.
    The problem of qualitative heterogeneity is to explain how an extended simple can enjoy qualitative variation across its spatial or temporal axes, given that it lacks both spatial and temporal parts. I discuss how friends of extended simples should address the problem of qualitative heterogeneity. I present a series of arguments designed to show that rather than appealing to fundamental distributional properties one should appeal to tiny and short-lived tropes. Along the way, issues relevant to debates about material composition, persistence (...)
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  48. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2011). Why Spinoza is Not an Eleatic Monist (Or Why Diversity Exists). In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave
    “Why did God create the World?” is one of the traditional questions of theology. In the twentieth century this question was rephrased in a secularized manner as “Why is there something rather than nothing?” While creation - at least in its traditional, temporal, sense - has little place in Spinoza’s system, a variant of the same questions puts Spinoza’s system under significant pressure. According to Spinoza, God, or the substance, has infinitely many modes. This infinity of modes follow from the (...)
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  49. Elizabeth Miller (2014). Schaffer on the Action of the Whole. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3):365-370.
    I argue that Schaffer’s recent defence of Spinozan Monism—the thesis that the cosmos is the only substance, or the only fundamental and integrated thing— fails to establish that the universe is uniquely fundamental. In addition, Schaffer’s own defence of his thesis offers the pluralist about fundamentality a model for responding to Schaffer’s criticism of pluralism.
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  50. Kristie Miller (2009). Defending Contingentism in Metaphysics. Dialectica 63 (1):23-49.
    Metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our world: under what conditions composition occurs; how objects persist through time; whether properties are universals or tropes. It is near orthodoxy that whichever of these sorts of metaphysical claims is true is necessarily true. This paper looks at the debate between that orthodox view and a recently emerging view that claims like these are contingent, by focusing on the metaphysical debate between monists and pluralists about concrete particulars. This (...)
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